Alexander Zhuchkovsky about the current moment. Alexander Zhuchkovsky. Notes of a Russian volunteer from Novorossiya

Alexander Zhuchkovsky today at 16:23 About the arrest of Alexey Smirnov, the situation in the LPR, the military situation, etc. I apologize for not getting in touch for a long time - I was on vacation until the 20th (I just needed a rest, including from information matters) , and upon returning to Donetsk I had to resolve the problems that arose in my absence. The problems have been resolved, I continue to serve for the benefit of the DPR and Novorossiya. Since I received many questions about a number of events in the LDPR, I will try to answer them briefly. I won’t report anything fundamentally new, but I will express my opinion on some topical issues. 1. Regarding assistance to the militia. Due to vacation, I postponed the delivery of equipment and uniforms to October. Since the last report, we have collected 320 thousand rubles. Now I’m working with applications and communicating with commanders about current problems and departmental needs. At the beginning of October we will place orders and make purchases as usual. Since military operations in this moment are practically non-existent, and without any progress in the liberation of Donbass, some believe that the work to help the militia has lost its meaning. Indeed, the future of Donbass remains unclear, and the reluctance of many to continue providing assistance is understandable. But I will repeat what I have said many times: as long as there are people who are ready to provide assistance to Donbass, we are not going to curtail the work that we have been doing for 2.5 years. The militias who fought for the liberation of Donbass became hostages of the treacherous “Minsk process”, which left many of them without a home, family, health and life prospects. These are the people that Russian society supports, regardless of the political situation. 2. Regarding the arrest of Alexey Smirnov in Donetsk. Smirnov’s activities throughout the war in Donbass are certainly worthy of respect. Smirnov’s great merit, first of all, is that he and his team, during the hottest periods of the war, evacuated civilians from the most dangerous areas exposed to shelling by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This is a lot of lives saved, primarily of the elderly and children who could not leave their places of residence on their own. Smirnov’s arrest has nothing to do with his humanitarian activities and especially with politics - he was not associated with opponents of the DPR authorities and never even criticized the leadership of the republic. The reason for the arrest was stated by Smirnov himself in yesterday’s video message, and what he said corresponds to reality, this is not self-incrimination. He is charged with illegal possession of weapons and use of false official documents. Sale of weapons (sale means not only sale, but also simply transfer to third parties) and illegal financial activities, as initially planned, he is no longer charged with. When Smirnov was detained, he was going to be released in a couple of days on his own recognizance in exchange for admitting guilt. Smirnov was confident that he would be protected, so he behaved quite independently, not intending to cooperate with the investigation. The MGB officers did not like this and decided to keep him in custody until his trial. As far as I know, there was no physical pressure on him. Smirnov did not wait for defense, and the MGB convinced him that he must admit guilt and take personal responsibility for everything, then his people would be released, and no additional charges would be brought against him. Since formally Smirnov actually violated the law, he agreed to these conditions and recorded an appeal to his supporters. His people are being released, and Smirnov himself will be in custody until the trial, but how long this will last is unknown, maybe a month, or maybe six months. I assess the situation with Smirnov as follows. From the point of view of the laws of the DPR, his arrest was justified, no weapons or explosives were planted on him, the actions of the MGB officers can be called lawlessness in in this case it is forbidden. But judging by my conscience, I consider Smirnov’s arrest unfair. He did not participate in any anti-state affairs, did not threaten the safety of citizens, all his activities were related exclusively to providing assistance to the needy residents of the DPR. It was enough to limit ourselves to the seizure of weapons, and if they were tried for violations of the law, then without detention. The situation in which Smirnov found himself is not uncommon for the DPR (it just became widely known due to Smirnov’s great popularity); people with unregistered weapons are constantly detained in large numbers. Many people keep weapons and transfer them to third parties - not necessarily for commercial purposes, but for self-defense, to strengthen friendly units, for exchange for other valuable things (equipment, optics, fuels and lubricants) necessary in combat conditions. The leadership of the DPR and the MGB, of course, does not take into account the private problems of military personnel, taking an equally strict approach to all formal violations of the law. In 2014, we ourselves regularly purchased weapons to supply our fighters or barter. But times have changed, today is far from 2014; since the beginning of 2015, the DPR authorities began strict control over the circulation of weapons among the civilian population and military personnel. In principle, any citizen of the DPR can register a firearm, this is what all my comrades who are not members of the military service. Citizens of the Russian Federation cannot register weapons, having the right to carry them only as military personnel of the DPR army (with the weapon registered in their military ID). Alexey Smirnov “psychologically” remained in 2014 and did not bother to “legalize” himself in any way. I repeat, Smirnov is a very honored person, but he did not understand that the “rights and freedoms of 2014” were curtailed long ago, and that “in conscience and justice” nothing has been working here for a long time, and in general, if you have formally broken the law (even guided by good intentions ), then no services to the DPR will be taken into account by anyone. Unfortunately, this is evidenced by the sad fate of many heroes of the war in Donbass. Smirnov’s problem was also that, in my opinion, he somewhat overplayed his self-presentation on social networks, constantly posing with weapons and describing in detail his movements around the territory of the republic. It is for this reason that the MGB began to develop it as an armed group of people who are not military personnel and work in a combat zone, using fake documents (Smirnov needed them to freely pass checkpoints when traveling to “hot spots” to help local residents ). So, unfortunately, in the current situation it is Smirnov himself who is largely to blame - he did not take precautions, did not “legalize”, believing that no one would touch him for his great services. This is an example to many other people who continue to live and work in the DPR. We must not forget where and what time we live. 3. Regarding the situation in the LPR. For many reasons (which do not need to be explained), I have had virtually no connection with the LPR for more than a year now. Last year I tried to transfer most of our volunteers to DPR army units. Almost everyone I know moved to Donetsk to work civilians from Russia. For this reason, I try not to interfere with the processes taking place there and rarely comment on them. I have a general vision of the situation in the LPR, and I have expressed it several times. As for the preparation of a coup d'etat, I have good reason to doubt this version. As far as I know, the repressions and murders currently taking place in the LPR are related to the ongoing personal and commercial disputes between the former and current leaders of the republic (military and political) there since 2014. In other words, the reasons for the current events are connected with the fears and suspicions of the current Luhansk managers, as well as with the desire to build a “vertical of power” in the LPR at the political and economic level. In reality to commit coup d'etat no one was going to the LPR, for a very simple reason - the people who are accused of this could not help but understand the complete senselessness of such a coup, since power in the LPR can only be obtained in Moscow offices, and not with the help of weapons. Even if someone managed to eliminate Moscow’s current proteges in Lugansk and take their positions, these people would be instantly cleared out and new ones would be installed, strictly controlled by the Russian Federation. Despite the very tough methods of “restoring order” in the LPR (if in Donetsk sometimes an “interview” is enough to solve a problem, in Lugansk it is usually murders), over these two years a “vertical of power” has not been formed there, and There is total suspicion and distrust of each other in ruling circles. It got to the point that in order to “resolve the conflict,” Plotnitsky even requested the support of the DPR (Zakharchenko sent “Sparta”), since he was not sure that the interests of the ruling group were capable of protecting their own security forces. 4. Regarding the military situation. Fighting and shelling are currently reduced to a minimum (they exist, but compared to August-September there is a relative lull). This is due to Russia's actions in mid-September. The unilateral truce from September 15 in the LDPR was made at the initiative of the Russian Federation in order to put pressure on the Kiev junta, which was told that if the Ukrainian Armed Forces continue high-intensity actions on the front line, then the militia will “have a free hand” as in the winter of 2015. At the same time, Zakharchenko threatened that if the situation escalates, “an order to begin hostilities will follow immediately.” This is not complete, but it worked, shelling and provocations decreased significantly. Although there is not a single person in the DPR who is sure that this calm will last long. Tensions between Russia and Ukraine will decrease again (however, they have already decreased), everyone will forget about the “order to start hostilities,” and the Ukrainians will continue to increase the rate of shooting and provoke - until the next threatening statements and meetings in Minsk. Judging by the mood of the population and the army, the DPR is now in the most depressive period since the beginning of this year. Expectations and hopes for change this fall were very high even among the biggest skeptics (I wrote about this at the beginning of the month). But expectations were again not met, and this caused many to give up. We all understand that this can continue for a long time, but it cannot continue indefinitely. The denouement will come sooner or later. Someone (Russia/LPR or the West/Ukraine) will have to go on the offensive or make concessions. Then the fate of Ukraine, the LDPR and all of us who connected last years of his life with Novorossiya. All that is required of us is under no circumstances to put up with the seeming defeat of our ideas and goals, to be able to survive, to wait out this difficult stagnation. It is not the strongest who win, but the most resilient. We must endure this difficult time, no matter how long and endless it may seem. Everything has a beginning and everything has an end. And this time will also end someday.

The Black Hundred publishing house is preparing to publish a book by Russian volunteer Alexander Zhuchkovsky, “85 Days of Slavyansk.” You can pre-order the book now on the publisher's website. In anticipation of the book's release, its author kindly agreed to answer questions from "Russian Strategy". RS editor Elena Semyonova talks with Alexander Zhuchkovsky about the book “85 Days of Slavyansk” and the spiritual essence of “Russian Spring”.

Your book is dedicated to the defense of Slavyansk. Why did you focus your attention specifically and only on this episode of the war?

For several reasons. Firstly, I had the opportunity to take a direct part in the defense of Slavyansk, and I know this initial period of the war in Donbass better than others.

Secondly, the “Slavic period” was the most important, key, decisive episode of the Russian-Ukrainian war, and therefore deserves detailed description first of all. This period determined both the fate of the Donbass uprising and the liberation of part of Donbass, which could have remained under Ukrainian occupation, like the rest of the regions of Novorossiya. Knowing the essence and mechanics of the process that took place in the spring of 2014 in the Donbass, I can say that without the defense of Slavyansk, the uprising would most likely have been brutally suppressed, and Lugansk and Donetsk would have faced the same fate as Odessa and Kharkov.

Thirdly, the decision to write a book specifically about the defense of Slavyansk was dictated by the desire to make a detailed and specific description of the initial period of the Donbass War. Describing the entire period of the war, which included many episodes, circumstances, and battles, would take a lot of time, which I do not yet have at my disposal. Of course, initially I wanted to write “about everything,” but over time I realized that the book was about all the events of 2014-17. in Donbass will be too superficial, so I decided to focus on the “Slavic period”, which I know better and which seems to me the most important.

What will the book be by genre? Are these memoirs, essays about heroes and events, conversations with participants and eyewitnesses, a chronicle of the war?

This is more of a "journalism" than a literary work. Unlike some war participants who wrote their memoirs (for example, “Memoirs of a Terrorist” and “The Visitor”), I cannot boast of a great literary gift or ability for artistic reproduction. And with the exception of a few episodes, I do not narrate in the first person. First of all, this is, of course, a chronicle of military operations, an analysis of key clashes, a description of the situation in and around Slavyansk, including based on the stories of many participants in the defense of Slavyansk with whom I met and talked.

What was the main task you set for yourself when taking on this book?

First, to reflect in the narrative what we call the “spirit of the fourteenth year.” This atmosphere of general national uplift, inspiration and unity, in which the Russian Spring and the heroic defense of Slavyansk took place. We want to remember ourselves and remind people where and why it all began.

Secondly, this is the task of reconstructing the events in and around Slavyansk as truthfully and accurately as possible, as well as showing the political context of these events.

In 2014, it was obvious to all normal people that the Russian Spring was precisely Russian, not Soviet, not something else. Over the past years, through propaganda efforts, the emphasis on Russianness has been carefully shifted. In essence, they tried to erase the word “Russian” altogether. This was very clearly demonstrated, for example, in the strange propaganda film “Crimea”. Why, in your opinion, are they so afraid of Russianness, why are they so diligently trying to replace the essence of the Russian Spring and generally consign it to oblivion?

The Russian Spring was such precisely because it began independently, as a broad popular movement - independently and without patronage Russian Federation, which over the previous decades demonstrated non-recognition of Russian subjectivity both within the country and abroad, including on the territory of Ukraine. The movement, called the "Russian Spring", was Russian precisely because it had national character, - the nature of the confrontation with someone else’s artificial identity imposed on Russians in Ukraine.

For the Russian Federation, all Russians who found themselves in Ukraine after 1991 became “Ukrainians.” For the Russian Federation, the residents of Donbass are still “Ukrainians”. The exception in 2014 was Crimea. The potential of the Russian Spring was so great that at first the Kremlin succumbed to its “national charm”, and, apparently, there were real plans to annex other regions of Novorossiya to Russia. This moment - March-April 2014 - was so bright and unexpected that it gave rise to serious illusions about the Kremlin’s national turn, even among skeptics like me. I remember Vladimir Putin’s “Crimean Speech,” in which he spoke twenty times about the divided Russian people and our national interests. Unfortunately, this rhetoric was quickly curtailed, and the “Novorossiya project” was quickly abandoned under pressure from Western and Ukrainian “partners.” Just as the Russian Federation suddenly switched to “Russian rails,” it just as quickly left them and returned to its previous state. Hence the “information de-Russification” in the interpretation of events in Crimea and Donbass of that period.

You were one of the first volunteers to go to Donbass in 2014. What was your motivation?

For many years before the Russian-Ukrainian war, I was part of a large community of people who lived with the expectation of serious changes in Russia, during which we could have a significant impact on Russian politics and the nature of Russian statehood. Of course, we expected social upheavals within the country. But active events began not in the Russian Federation, but beyond its borders. At that moment, many, including me, really regarded this as the beginning of a national turn in the Russian Federation. And I wanted to take part in this, to contribute with all my might to ensure that this process develops further. Although there was a very personal emotional perception of what was happening after the tragedy in Odessa on May 2, which forced me, like hundreds of other volunteers, to leave for Donbass.

Then, in 2014, a number of people who had hitherto been with us as if on the same side of the barricades (ideologically “white”, nationalists), suddenly found themselves on the other side of the front, taking the side of Ukraine and enrolling us in the “scoops,” supporters of the regime," etc. What explains such a dislocation of consciousness and do these people still have the right to be called Russian nationalists and whites?

This is explained, firstly, by ignorance and misunderstanding of Russian history, and secondly, by simple human stupidity. There are not many such people. But their hatred of the political regime outweighs their love for their people. Although it is impossible to talk about love for one’s people in relation to people who took the side of the enemy, obsessed with the idea of ​​destroying everything Russian. This dislocation of consciousness was characteristic of many people in other periods of history, starting from the time of Andrei Kurbsky and ending with the support of Chechen militants against the “federals” in the 90s. People with a healthy national feeling always support their people in military confrontation, regardless of the existing political regime. Even the most consistent anti-communists and haters of the Soviet system (like Ilyin, Denikin and others) could not support the Germans against the Russians during the Second World War.

As for the ostentatious anti-Sovietism of people who sided with Ukraine and the inclusion of us in the “Soviet” group, this is another manifestation of the deformation of the national consciousness of these people. Independent Ukraine and the total Ukrainization of the southern Russian lands of Russia is precisely the generation and continuation of the national policy of the USSR, the consequences of which we are trying to fight. No one in Donbass is fighting for the restoration of the USSR and the revival of Soviet social and national practices. Novorossiya is a historical phenomenon of pre-Soviet, imperial Russia. Novorossiya strives for the preservation of Russian identity and reunification with Russia, and not for the Gulag and the continuation of Bolshevik Ukrainization.

How would you formulate the ideological, spiritual essence of the Russian Spring of 2014?

The spiritual essence of the Russian Spring is the awakening of the Russian national spirit and its desire to break the orders that were implanted and imposed on Russians for many decades - first the Soviet and then the post-Soviet period. The Russian volunteer movement, revived in 2014, was driven not only by the idea of ​​de-Ukrainization of the southern Russian lands of Russia, but also by the “Russification” of the entire country. We saw Donbass as a springboard for this process, a powerful push with the help of which the national turn in the Russian Federation would finally begin. “Let's make Russia Russian again” was the narrative of the Russian Spring.

The Russian Spring, unfortunately, has long been replaced by autumn or even winter... Or, rather, some kind of protracted off-season. In your opinion, are we destined to get out of it, and will the good crops of the 14th year sprout? What is your forecast?

We should hope for the revival of the Russian Spring while we are alive, while the Russian people are alive. Which showed well what it is capable of even after decades of degradation and national decline. After all, before 2014, we ourselves, and the whole world, buried ourselves and almost agreed that Russians were no longer capable of national feats and active self-defense. It turned out that this was not the case.

I don’t like to give specific forecasts: experience shows that Russian reality is too unpredictable to model anything based on constantly changing data. But there is a feeling that despite the efforts of the Russian authorities, the country will not return to its former life (which everyone lived until the age of 14), and severe trials await us ahead. The final solution to the “Ukrainian issue” is still ahead. The situation in Novorossiya is in a strategic impasse, a way out for millions of people, incl. in big Russia, it will be very painful. You need to be prepared for this.

The history of war, as we know, is written by the victors. The current war is still going on, and its end is not in sight, but its history is already being falsified before our eyes. Incl. because many heroes of the 1st period of the war are no longer alive, and they are trying hard to replace them with fake “heroes”. I really hope and wish that your book will become a serious counterbalance to various falsifications, a barrier on their path and one of the starting points for future researchers.

Russian Strategy

After yesterday’s report about the situation in the GRU DPR and the violent reaction to this message, I will try to explain a few fundamental points about why I periodically (albeit rarely) write about such things and how these things relate to the general situation in the militia.

I ask you to distribute this text so that society does not have the wrong opinion about what is happening in Novorossiya.

1. As I noted in yesterday’s message, such things need to be discussed publicly if such a situation cannot be resolved for a long time by internal administrative measures.

And the situation in the GRU developed over a long period of time and was not resolved, despite many “signals” to the leadership of the DPR and the intention of the MGB to “pack” Stary and his people suspected of various crimes.

I knew about all this for a long time, some GRU fighters asked me earlier to inform me about what was happening, but the security forces (who developed Stary) assured me that they would sort everything out and the culprits would receive their well-deserved punishment.

But after
1) proper measures were not taken,
2) my comrades in the GRU were repressed and
3) the well-known message on the war-and-world blog has already appeared, I considered it necessary to also write about what is happening.

That’s why the Donbass militia is called people’s militia - because they are not professional military men, but people from the people.
And just like in the people, in the militia there are people both good and bad, things both positive and negative appear.

Our society helps the militia in its war of liberation and is proud of its victories. But at the same time, it should not idealize the militia, or, on the contrary, immediately “bury” it for its troubles and mistakes.
Of course, I would very much like the militia to return to its previous path - to the original principles of the uprising, which were voiced by Strelkov and Mozgovoy.

But for now, “we have what we have” and we will continue to fight for our truth as long as we have strength and hope. As I say in such cases, we don’t have another militia and another Donbass now.

On May 8, approaching Novorossiya and about to cross the state border and the line separating me from peaceful life, I wrote that my most relevant reading was the Prayer Book and “Sputnik and Pogrom.”

“There comes a moment when each of us, at the last line, remembers God,” from Igor Talkov’s famous song “Former Podesaul.” This trait, I hope, is not the last for me. But in moments of danger you always remember God, and then the Prayer Book becomes a “handbook.” “Sputnik and Pogrom” is a real source of inspiration, which you draw from fiery texts and bright illustrations. Two months ago, posters by S&P were hung in Sevastopol, when its fate was being decided, and today the billboard “300 Strelkovtsy” adorns the long-suffering but heroic Kramatorsk.

“There will be pogroms,” I thought then, crossed myself and stepped into the unknown. I have been on the other side with my comrades for two weeks now.

Alexander Zhuchkovsky

Since the period of our relatively peaceful existence is coming to an end and today a new unknown will come for us, I will try to describe our Luhansk two weeks in fragments. Unfortunately, I cannot give a full picture: firstly, due to the impossibility of describing things of interest to the enemy, and secondly, due to the impossibility of describing things of interest to some official people from the Russian Federation (where, as they say, I still live), and thirdly, I am not on a journalistic trip or on a political mission, so I was not involved in special collection of information and negotiations.

Now, when I begin to write, or rather, type this text on my smartphone, we are moving along the Luhansk roads in the direction of the military camp of Alexei Mozgovoy. Typing is complicated by the need to look around (times are turbulent these days) and the constant bouncing of the car on uneven ground, because almost all Ukrainian roads consist of uneven places. I have never seen uglier roads in the world, so I hated Ukraine even more, finally becoming convinced that it was public education must be destroyed.

On the border

I’ll tell you about Mozgovoy’s camp below, but for now I’ll start with how we crossed the state border of the Russian Federation two weeks ago. In the Tarasovsky district of the Rostov region, we agreed on the transition with local border guards and Lugansk militias. However, that night there was some kind of failure, the border guards transferred us, or rather transported us by car, but instead of handing us over to the militias, we were handed over to the security officers (to one of the outposts in the border zone). There were four of us: three citizens of the Russian Federation and one of Ukraine, so the interrogations lasted all night. They were started by a local boorish security officer who addressed himself first-hand, backed up some questions with obscenities, openly enjoyed power and clearly asserted himself at our expense. Later, a larger comrade arrived - from the regional FSB department. This one was intelligent: in a suit with a thin tie, combed, with a neat parting, emphatically polite, addressed as “you” (however, in the morning the hairstyle and tie moved out, and their wearer had already switched to “you”). In general, they staged a classic play with evil and good investigators, which in this wilderness looked strange and funny. The men were clearly playing a role in an imaginary movie about the exposure of a sabotage group abandoned behind enemy lines. Therefore, the most ridiculous thing in this story was that the special services in front of us were Russian, and not Ukrainian (in the case of the latter, all these interrogations would have been logical). The “sabotage” nature of our group was indicated by the fact that one of us is a combat veteran with the appropriate document, I am a recent months I’m a frequent visitor to Ukraine, and my last visit at the end of April ended with the SBU deporting me with a ban on visiting “Nezalezhnaya” for three years. “What are you itching for?” - the “evil investigator” asked me with irritation. “Your purpose of coming to Ukraine,” the “kind investigator” asked for the tenth time (although we haven’t entered any “Ukraine” yet).

In the morning they filled out some paperwork and took us back. That night there was gunfire near the outpost: Luhansk militias were trying to persuade the Ukrainian border guards to go home. In the end, they persuaded us, and the passage was opened (we later found out). Therefore, it was doubly offensive not to get to the other side where the militia was waiting for us. At the end of the night, it became clear that the security officers were either cheering for the Ukrainian national team, or had received instructions not to allow volunteers.

Another interesting detail. A few days before (as the border guards said and later confirmed by the militia), not far from this checkpoint a car with weapons (Kalash and pistols) approached the border, which they began to transfer to the other side. Russian border guards, in cooperation with Ukrainian (!), tried to stop this event, but almost all of the cargo managed to escape. The weapon, apparently, went to Mozgovoy. According to unverified information, Zhirinovsky provided assistance. This is partly confirmed by the large presence of LDPR symbols in Mozgovoy’s camp (flags, T-shirts) and the fact that on the same days Zhirinovsky’s “Tiger” (which is now used by the Luhansk militias) broke through the border.

As for the obstacles in crossing the Russian border not only for volunteers, but also for humanitarian cargo (for example, shortly before my passage at the checkpoint in the village of Uspenskoye, a car with medicines was not allowed through because there were no documents for them), I have already heard about this repeatedly and was convinced of this personally. This situation, especially after a night of interrogation by the “native” FSB, plunged us into despondency. What was described happened on May 8, and we naively expected that the Russian Federation would decide to invade exactly by Victory Day. But two weeks before, on April 24, I was approaching the border with the then Donetsk region and a column of tanks and combat vehicles was walking in its direction, and helicopters were circling in the sky. At that moment, I was filled with very patriotic feelings, seriously deciding that I would now witness the entry of troops into Ukraine. As we know, this armada never reached the border, Shoigu assured the public that these were just exercises, and later the troops withdrew, which, in turn, Putin reported to the OSCE (this was his speech, by the way, we watched that night at border outpost, and even the border guards of the commander-in-chief swear with all their might).

Russian spring in Lugansk

Having made sure that we couldn’t pass through the checkpoint even by agreement, we decided to go ahead. At the same time we took a swim. On the other side, militiamen were picked up and taken to Lugansk. I breathed the air of the Russian spring, in the literal sense of the word. These were some of the most wonderful hours of my life. Here I saw something that I didn’t see in Crimea (I was there at the end of February - beginning of March). In Crimea, we worked with people’s self-defense, planned to take some actions, the people were about to take the situation into their own hands. If Russia had not intervened, the same thing would have happened there as today in the Southeast (but it’s good that it intervened: dozens, if not hundreds of Russian lives were saved).

In Lugansk, I saw the revolted Russian people - the people that I had dreamed of all my adult life, that I wanted to see in our cities. I had seen him before, but only from a distance, through a computer monitor. I looked at these historical videos from the SBU building, where the militia said goodbye to all of us in anticipation of the assaults and invited the enemy to fight with the words “Welcome to hell!” And later, for some time, this building became home for me, and I felt everything that the people were talking about in the video (a constant feeling of danger and anticipation of an attack).

I return to the wonderful feelings I experienced upon arrival in Lugansk. For comparison, in which, as we know, everything is known, I will “rewind” once again. At the end of December I was at the Kiev Euromaidan. There I observed everything that I would later see in the Southeast. This picture captivated me: the buildings captured by the rebels, the smell of burning bonfires in the square, all these people, inspired by the idea of ​​freedom, “chained by one goal.” At that time, such people were still there, and Euromaidan was not repelled by Russophobia. I envied these Ukrainians, thinking, sinfully, that they were qualitatively better than the Russians of Ukraine (who seemed amorphous and incapable of rebellion). Yes, all this captivated, enchanted, made us envy, but it was alien, although the majority there spoke Russian. In Lugansk, I saw not amorphous “Soviet” people, but rebel Russians, and I joined them because I was my own family.

The city lived and still lives its own life. At first glance, it seems that everything that is happening is on the periphery of the consciousness of the townspeople. Only later, having become accustomed to this strange atmosphere, do you see how completely politicized people are, how tense the situation is, how deceptive the calm is, and how illusory the safety on the streets is. The “internal enemy” in the form of “pravosek” and other criminals sits in apartments and suburban houses, waiting for a command. Military formations with equipment are either brought to the city or withdrawn. All this has kept us in great suspense for the last two weeks. Apparently, this is what the calculation is being made for. Frequent provocations, occasional shooting, information leaks and rumors are aimed at psychologically exhausting the militias. Alas, this is an inevitable component of defensive tactics. Another thing is that the plans of the militia do not end there, and we will still see new impulses of offensive in the Lugansk region.

During the first 24 hours we talked with people from the circle of People’s Governor Valery Bolotov (now the head of Lugansk people's republic), got acquainted with the situation and began to act in the main planned direction: coordination of volunteers wishing to get to the South-East from the Russian Federation, and supplies of humanitarian aid. Our safe arrival here became clear evidence that crossing the border is very possible. After that, we received many requests from those who wanted to join us. Many have already joined, some have headed to Donetsk Republic, the rest are scheduled to arrive in the coming weeks. Based on the results of the negotiations, I know about at least three dozen volunteers, but since I, thank God, am not the only coordinator and source of information, we should assume that the number is in the hundreds.

Later we moved to the “hut” - the SBU building occupied by the rebels, an outpost of the Lugansk militia. There is a strict access control here, the building is surrounded on all sides by barricades, inside of which there is a tent camp with armed militias. We stayed in the “box” (another nickname for this building), on mattresses placed on the tiled floor, with the windows filled with boxes (so that snipers wouldn’t aim), eating at the Separatistochki restaurant, periodically being blown up by the “Alarm” command and leaving the area as necessary.

Once I saw Oleg Melnikov leaving Bolotov’s office with papers. Many of you have heard about him. Melnikov is the leader of the organization “Alternative” (which saves people from slavery, including from the notorious Dagestan brick factories), worked in several hot spots: South Ossetia, Syria, Dagestan. A man with a reputation as a liberal, but in his views he is a civic nationalist. However, Melnikov came here not to free the slaves and not as a salary consultant, but out of good will - to help the young democracy as much as possible. On that day, for example, he handed over to Bolotov a recommended list of priority measures to stabilize the socio-economic situation in the republic (as a journalist, I wrote there a point about the need for competent information support for these measures. This, however, was where my “political” role began and ended , since I came here for other purposes.)

Referendum

I cite Oleg Melnikov as an example, since the transfer of Russian specialists to the South-East is no less significant than the provision of military assistance. The Russian Federation, fearing sanctions, does not send soldiers to Novorossiya. But the provision of assistance by military advisers and political consultants, with due secrecy, does not threaten any sanctions. However, everyone I met here was, in fact, Melnikov, who came at his own expense and of his own free will, and two of Zhirinovsky’s advisers - a very young guy and a not at all young man, whose advice, it seems, concerned only LDPR T-shirts.

The lack of assistance was evident in the preparation and organization of the referendum. For comparison, in Crimea during the corresponding period everything was put on a grand scale: huge banners were displayed on every corner, and anti-fascist rhetoric that was relevant to the local population was adopted. The presence of Russian specialists there was visible to the naked eye. In the Lugansk region there are neither “polite people” nor a well-thought-out information policy. But this, so to speak, is just a sketch - in defiance of opponents who see the hand of Moscow in everything that happens here. These thoughts depressed us on the eve of the referendum - we believed that without good campaigning, many would simply not be aware, and only ideological “anti-Ukrainians” would come to vote. But reality, thank God, dispelled fears. The turnout was higher than the organizers themselves expected. The polling stations were crowded with people, people came to “determine themselves” as if for a holiday.

Victory Day

And two days before that we celebrated Victory Day. There are already many Russian nationalists, incl. on this site, it was said about the exclusivity of the celebration of May 9 this year. Here, at the “theater of military actions,” this exclusivity was felt to the fullest. On this land and for these people, the war against the Nazis literally came to life.

As elsewhere in the Southeast, provocations were expected that day. The militia dispersed throughout the city center, and children's playgrounds were also guarded. The armed men in camouflage, with children playing behind them, made a great impression. People passing by shook their hands and thanked them as “the last defenders.”

Yes, I wore the St. George ribbon here for the first time. Because it was handed to me at the Luhansk barricades by an armed man defending his land from the enemy.

Anthracite, Donetsk

These days we visited Anthracite, a border town named after coal, and Donetsk. First of all, all for the same purpose of negotiations on the transfer of goods and the passage of volunteers.

Anthracite is controlled by the Don Cossacks, who occupied the Administration building. Three weeks ago, they broke through the border on two KAMAZ trucks with weapons, the Russian border guards shot in the air for the sake of decency, and the Ukrainian ones pretended that they weren’t there at all.

In Donetsk, as in Lugansk, Big city lives “parallel” to the epochal events taking place there. The city, however, is more politicized than militarized. Significant militia forces pulled back the world-famous Slavyansk, Kramatorsk and Mariupol. Accordingly, the Ukrainian security forces, busy with the siege of these cities, are not yet disturbing the center of the DPR.

Political, administrative and propaganda work is in full swing in the building of the former Donetsk Regional State Administration. Humanitarian supplies and volunteers arriving here are distributed among the cities of the DPR depending on needs, which are constantly changing. Today, however, both material and human assistance is relevant, first of all, for Slavyansk.

At Mozgovoy's

For corresponding purposes, we also visited the camp of one of the leaders of the Lugansk militias, Alexey Mozgovoy. Several hundred people under his command live and train in the fresh air, carry out local combat missions in the Luhansk region, and are sent in separate detachments to the hottest spots.

Mozgovoy’s camp is mobile and adapted for full-fledged guerrilla warfare. For these purposes, in fact, it was created. In the event of an assault on Lugansk and other cities of the republic, Mozgovoy’s guys will spoil a lot of blood for the enemy. As befits Russians who have taken up arms, the “brainies” have far-reaching plans. “We’ll liberate Odessa, Kharkov, let’s go to Kyiv, and then we’ll see,” a good-natured Cossack casually told me, basking in the sun after lunch.

The personnel here are a “hodgepodge”: volunteers from the Russian Federation, militias from almost all regions of Ukraine and Cossacks. The latter come here more willingly than to defend city buildings. Mozgovoy's mobile camp is a real Cossack free camp, but with high discipline and unquestioning obedience to the commander.

In the period after the referendum, the situation in the LPR became tense. Provocations have become more frequent; in Lugansk and a number of populated areas of the republic, “right-wingers” have been involved in shelling and robbery. On May 13, an assassination attempt was made on Valery Bolotov while moving to the Russian Federation. But the attempt of the Kyiv junta to behead the Lugansk Republic was unsuccessful: Bolotov escaped with a slight wound to the leg. On the night of May 17, on his way back, he was detained by Ukrainian border guards. For further transportation, help was called, but they were ahead of it: early in the morning, about a hundred fighters from our “hut” hurried to the rescue of their leader and fought back.

On May 19, one of the main tasks of recent weeks was finally completed: the militia liberated the building of the regional police department. On the same day, the Constitution of the Lugansk People's Republic was adopted.

Today our stay here has come to an end. We are waiting for the arrival of a large group of volunteers (from Moscow and the Urals) and, responding to the call of Colonel Strelkov, we go to Slavyansk. There is war ahead.

P.S. B Lately We have repeatedly received messages offering assistance in one form or another. We are very grateful to everyone who provided and continues to provide it.

Now that a large group of volunteers are joining us, I would like to ask you to help them with money transfers. Money is needed, first of all, for telephone communications, travel, household supplies and, as many militia members say, to help their families.

The funds received will be equally distributed between volunteers from the Russian Federation and Lugansk militias (15-20 people) who are sent to Slavyansk.

Sberbank card: 4276 5500 3068 4065

Yandex-money: 410011976449238

P.P.S. Good Russian people who want to take part in collective excursions around Novorossiya can write to Alexander at [email protected]

While there were three days in Moscow, the situation in Novorossiya worsened even more, every day some significant events were happening, it felt like before a “big thunderstorm.” Upon my return, I learned a lot of interesting things (although I can tell you little), and priority areas of activity for the near future were outlined.

1. From March 10 to 13, Defense Minister Shoigu was in the Rostov region and held closed meetings at which, let’s say, “current threats to the security of the Russian Federation and adjacent territories” were discussed. At the same time, “preparatory work” continues at the border; it seems that even with a sharp turn in the situation, we will have everything necessary to repel any threats from the ground and air. The Center also takes control of important areas of the front, where enemy activity is observed and offensive plans are read.

2. The border operates in the same harsh regime, the security forces find and take control of the few remaining “holes”. Just upon arrival, I encountered an indicatively absurd situation. One militiaman, who had long ago come from Germany to fight in the DPR, decided to return, but he was not allowed to cross the border because his visa had expired. I had to evacuate on my own.

3. Apparently, the Center is aimed at cutting off as much as possible uncontrolled assistance to the militia - both humanitarian and “non-humanitarian”. One more example. The drones we recently delivered to one of the important sectors of the front gave excellent results - previously unknown to the headquarters, facts of a large concentration of enemy armored vehicles were discovered. The command was alarmed that such valuable information was being obtained with the help of a “third force” and even tried to “squeeze” our devices. The attempt was unsuccessful, but in the end, thank God, they wisely agreed to act together. With this example, I want to show that the “tightening of the screws” on the border and fronts is dictated not by malicious intent (the notorious “leaking”), but by the desire of the “vacationers” to control the territory as much as possible on the eve of upcoming events. Although of course I really don’t like all this. Some wrote that I approved of closing the border because it was necessary for military trade. I didn’t approve, I was misunderstood, I was just trying to logically explain the situation. But there is a humanitarian catastrophe in the Donbass, so the Center’s desire to control the situation (the fight against arms smuggling in the Russian Federation, gangs in the republics, cargo theft, trade in humanitarian aid, etc.) still does not justify the “squeeze” on the flow of non-state aid from the Russian Federation.

4. As you already know, Kononov handed over the post of Minister of Defense of the DPR to his deputy Velikorodny, known in the Donbass as “Cap”. He was our commander in Semenovka in May-July, after leaving Slavyansk we continued to work in Snezhny under his leadership. He was also given large loads for distribution in the Semenovsky battalion (which was stationed not only in Snezhnoye). Today I asked “Cap” whether it’s worth congratulating him, but he said that it’s not worth it, he’s just “executing duties” for now, and Kononov may return after resolving personal issues. Based on the experience of similar “temporary departures,” I doubt that he will return, but it is not a fact that “Cap” will be approved, especially since he is a Muscovite, and as a rule, locals are appointed to high positions.

5. As I already reported, we have resumed work with the underground in the occupied territories and have already held some preliminary “consultations”. The second priority area for the next month and a half is the collection of new drones. In view of the upcoming hostilities, we will need additional “eyes” for more effective reconnaissance and insurance in case the first devices are disabled. The third direction is the purchase of uniforms and shoes for the militia. Winter uniforms are already being worn out, but the usual ones have long since fallen into disrepair.

A certain amount of funds have already been collected during the trip to Moscow and electronic transfers, but in order to fully work in these areas, a lot more funds will be needed. You can support the militia [...]. As always, I will inform you promptly about the progress and results of the work.

Originally posted by colonelcassad at Before the "big storm"

They ask to comment on Zhuchkovsky’s latest post about the situation.
The points.

1. I can add that today or tomorrow the Air Force Commander-in-Chief is expected to visit the Rostov region.
2. Similarly, control at the border continues to tighten; only products can be smuggled through by agreement. Well, the smugglers began to be put under pressure.
3. Again, everything is like that. On the one hand, centralization is understandable, but on the other hand, bureaucratic delays also affect the delivery of purely humanitarian goods.
4. I wrote about this fact yesterday, I also doubt that Kononov will return. Plus, rumors have revived again that Bezler, who was tipped for the post of Defense Minister of the DPR last fall, will return to Novorossiya.
5. In terms of uniforms and drones, everything is also correct - this is what front-line units need in the near future. Fortunately, I could look at this using the example of a battalion commander from Shirokino, fighting in boots and a tattered uniform.