June 22, 1941 November 1942 Great Patriotic War. The ideology of German Nazism and the Nazi occupation regime on the territory of the USSR

There are usually three periods of the Patriotic War:

1. June 1941 - November 1942 - initial period,
2. November 1942-1943 - radical fracture;
3. 1944-1945 - completion.

Defeats of the Red Army at the beginning of the war and their causes

In the early morning of June 22, 1941, the invasion of Nazi Germany and its allies - Romania, Hungary and Finland - began. It was carried out by three army groups: “North”, “Center” and “South”, which corresponded to three main directions of attacks - towards Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv.

In the very first weeks of fighting, Soviet troops were cut into pieces by German tank wedges, deprived of supply bases and lost contact with each other. Aviation was destroyed at the airfields. The attackers secured absolute air superiority.

Already in the first days, Soviet soldiers offered heroic resistance, the most striking example of which was the Brest Fortress. The exploits of Nikolai Gastello and Viktor Talalikhin are well known.

However, the Wehrmacht continued to rapidly advance to the East. Already on the second day of the war, the Germans captured Kaunas and Vilnius. At the beginning of July, Riga fell - the path to Leningrad was cleared. At the end of July, Minsk was captured. Many units were surrounded, and in the first months of the war, about 4 million Soviet troops were captured.

It was only near Smolensk that the Germans first encountered organized resistance. Here, in July 1941, a battle unfolded in which the Red Army was defeated, but which demonstrated that the seemingly indestructible Wehrmacht machine could slip. Near Smolensk, for the first time in World War II, the Wehrmacht received an order to go on the defensive.

Historians are still arguing about the reasons for these defeats, which were especially terrible given the fact that the entire interwar twenty years were subordinated to the strengthening of defense, in the name of which industrialization was carried out with enormous sacrifices. A number of points of view are expressed:

1. Stalin: "Surprise attack"
2. Under Brezhnev: they did everything they could, but they didn’t have time
3. Under Khrushchev and now: Stalin is to blame - his mistakes and crimes. The main ones:

• repression
• slow deployment of mass production of the latest technology
• destruction of the "Stalin line".
• manic trust in Hitler, ignoring information about the date of the attack, only at the last moment decisive measures

1. Now. V. Suvorov claims: they were well prepared, but for an offensive war - Hitler was ahead of Stalin.

Defense organization

July 3, 1941, when the situation at the front was not just a crisis, but catastrophic. Stalin finally spoke on the radio with an appeal to the people. Calling the Soviet people “brothers and sisters,” he declared the Patriotic War and outlined a program for mobilizing the forces of the people to fight the aggressor.

To manage the defense, the State Defense Committee (GKO) was created, in which all the completeness was concentrated state power. Soon the State Defense Committee was headed by Stalin himself. He also became Supreme Commander-in-Chief and People's Commissar for Defense.

An important operation was the evacuation of the population and industrial enterprises. 2.6 thousand industrial enterprises and several million workers and employees were relocated to the rear of the country in difficult conditions. In a short time they managed to put the evacuated enterprises into operation.

Meanwhile, throughout July-August the situation at the front worsened every day. In the north, parts of the Wehrmacht approached Leningrad (Zhukov was sent to save it), in the south the Germans captured the entire left bank of Ukraine with Kiev, besieged Odessa, occupied Crimea, besieged Sevastopol, and advanced to Rostov-on-Don. From here the road to the Caucasus opened for them.

The exception was the battles near Yelnya at the end of July - beginning of August: here under the command of G.K. Zhukov launched the first successful counteroffensive during the war, in which Katyusha rockets were used for the first time. At the same time, guard units were established. However, this success could not yet change the general situation.

Moscow battle

On September 30, the first German attack on Moscow began. The Red Army suffered a number of defeats, in particular its large forces fell into the “cauldrons” near Vyazma and Bryansk. Facing the danger of losing the capital, Stalin called Zhukov from Leningrad to organize the defense. A decision was made to evacuate Moscow, which got out of control and turned into a stampede. On October 19, a state of siege was introduced in the capital.

At the end of October 1941, the German offensive began to run out of steam. The Wehrmacht was exhausted by continuous bloody battles on the outskirts of Moscow. The Nazis had to take a break from offensive operations. Stalin took advantage of this to organize propaganda events, the most famous of which was the parade of Soviet troops on November 7, 1941.

In mid-November, the Germans resumed their offensive, trying to take Moscow in a pincer movement from the north and south. IN critical days the beginning of the offensive, on November 17, an unforgettable feat was accomplished by 28 soldiers of General Panfilov’s division, who stood to the death at the Dubosekovo crossing. The words of their political instructor Vasily Klochkov spread throughout the country: “Russia is great, but there is nowhere to retreat - Moscow is behind us.” At the end of November, the young partisan Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya accomplished her feat.

Stalin, based on information from R. Sorge that Japan would not stab in the back, decided to send troops located in the Far East into battle. The appearance of fresh Siberian divisions near Moscow, by all accounts, greatly strengthened the defense. At the end of November 1941, the German offensive finally ran out of steam. On December 5, the Soviet counteroffensive began, during which fascist German troops were thrown back 100-300 km to the west. In January 1942, the Moscow battle ended. Its significance is that the blitzkrieg strategy was finally overturned. Now some historians even express the opinion that the Battle of Moscow was the main battle of the Second World War, the beginning of a radical change (usually associated with the Battle of Stalingrad).

Failures of 1942

After the Battle of Moscow, German forces were very large. But the General Staff of the Red Army, planning military operations, proceeded from Stalin’s erroneous instructions: “the best divisions of the enemy have already been defeated.” According to Stalin, 1942 was supposed to be the year final defeat fascist Germany.

Attempts by Soviet troops to go on the offensive failed. Units of the Red Army suffered huge losses. Attempts to release Leningrad were unsuccessful, during which the 2nd Shock Army was killed, and its commander, General Vlasov, surrendered. The situation of the Leningraders, who found themselves surrounded by Nazi troops due to the mistakes of the Soviet command, was catastrophic; about a million people in besieged Leningrad died from hunger and cold. An attempt by Soviet troops to liberate Crimea in May 1942 led to the death of 176 thousand soldiers and officers in the Kerch region, and as a result of an unsuccessful attack on Kharkov (June-July 1942), 240 thousand military personnel were captured.

Stalin's second mistake was in incorrectly determining the main direction of the German attack in 1942: they thought that the Germans would try to attack Moscow again. Our main forces were concentrated in this direction. The Germans launched an offensive on July 28 in the direction of the Volga and the Caucasus. Our front was broken through, and a new difficult retreat of the Red Army began.

a) Battle of Smolensk (July 10 - September 10, 1941)

After the capture of Minsk, the enemy rushed to the Dnieper, where he intended to cut through the Western Front with powerful tank wedges, encircle the main group of Soviet troops in the Smolensk region and open the way to Moscow. At the beginning of July 1941, the 2nd Panzer Group of G. Guderian crossed the Dnieper and, breaking through the defenses of the 13th Army of General F.N. Remezov, rushed to Smolensk. The 3rd Panzer Group of G. Hoth captured Vitebsk and surrounded the troops of the 16th (M. Lukin), 19th (I. Konev) and 20th (P. Kurochkin) combined arms armies. And on July 16, the enemy entered Smolensk. The fall of this ancient Russian city, which was traditionally considered the key to Moscow, was taken very hard by I.V. Stalin, who demanded the removal of S.K. Timoshenko from the post of front commander and put him on trial by a military tribunal, but under the influence of the weighty arguments of G.K. Zhukov changed his anger to mercy and left S.K. Tymoshenko in his post.

July 20, 1941, on the personal instructions of I.V. Stalin from the reserve Headquarters were transferred to the Western Front 20 rifle divisions, which became part of five army groups under the command of Generals K.K. Rokossovsky, V.A. Khomenko, S.A. Kalinina, V.Ya. Kachalov and I.I. Maslennikova. According to the plan of the Headquarters, these army groups were supposed to defeat the advanced units of the Wehrmacht and liberate Smolensk with a series of powerful counterattacks from the Yartsevo-Roslavl area. However, it was not possible to solve the task, since within a few days the enemy surrounded the army group of Lieutenant General V.Ya. Kachalov and captured Roslavl and Yelnya. But further advance of the enemy towards Dorogobuzh was stopped by the troops of the 24th Army, Major General K.I. Rakutin, who created a reliable line of defense on his sector of the front.

As a result of fierce fighting, units of the 16th and 20th armies were able to escape from the encirclement, which south of Yartsevo reached the right bank of the Dnieper and, joining with the main forces of the Western Front, went over to the defense along the line Velikie Luki - Yartsevo - Krichev - Zhlobin. Thus, the first stage of the Smolensk battle was completed, during which the enemy did not achieve its goals and was forced to switch to strategic defense.

The persistent resistance of the Red Army units in the Smolensk-Moscow direction and the discussion of the plan for further actions on the Eastern Front became the cause of severe disagreements in the top military leadership of the Wehrmacht. A. Hitler himself, who held the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Wehrmacht, Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht High Command (OKW) Field Marshal W. Keitel and Head of the OKW Operations Directorate, Colonel General A. Jodl, believed that in the current situation it was necessary to temporarily suspend the offensive of Army Group Center "and concentrate the main efforts on defeating the troops of the Southwestern Front defending Kyiv. The commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht ground forces, Field Marshal V. Brauchitsch, and the chief of the General Staff of the ground forces (OKH), Colonel General F. Halder, on the contrary, believed that the offensive should be continued on the central sector of the front, and not disperse the Wehrmacht strike forces to solve less important local tasks. This “discussion” ended with the victory of A. Hitler, who, with his directives No. 33 and No. 34, suspended the offensive of Army Group Center and set the task of defeating Soviet troops in the southern strategic direction and capturing Kiev as soon as possible.

b) Defense of Kyiv (July 10 - September 19, 1941)

At the end of July 1941, the situation on the southern sector of the front became sharply more complicated. During fierce battles, the enemy significantly pushed back the troops of the 5th (M. Potapov), 6th (I. Muzychenko), 9th (Ya. Cherevichenko), 12th (P. Ponedelin) and 26th (F. Kostenko) armies of the Southern and Southwestern fronts and reached Odessa, Zaporozhye, Dnepropetrovsk and Kremenchug. Especially dangerous situation took shape in the lower reaches of the Dnieper, where the enemy created large bridgeheads and began concentrating his troops for a further attack on Kyiv.

In this dangerous situation, which threatened to turn into a disaster for the Soviet troops, Army General G.K. Zhukov suggested I.V. Stalin: 1) immediately leave Kyiv, withdraw the troops of the Southwestern Front to the left bank of the Dnieper and create a new line of defense on the Psel River; 2) conduct a major offensive operation in the Yelnya area to eliminate the resulting bulge, which created a real threat of an attack on the capital from the southwestern direction. The proposal to surrender Kyiv caused a sharply negative reaction from the Supreme Commander, who understood perfectly well that the fall of the capital of Soviet Ukraine would have a huge political resonance throughout the world. As a result, between G.K. Zhukov and I.V. Stalin had a rough altercation, which ended with the removal of G.K. Zhukov from the post of Chief of the General Staff and the appointment of Marshal B.M. to this post. Shaposhnikova. However, on the evening of July 29, I.V. Stalin changed his anger to mercy and offered G.K. Zhukov was to lead the troops of the new Reserve Front, which was to prepare and conduct an offensive operation near Yelnya.

The enemy, continuing his offensive in the southern direction, captured Krivoy Rog, Kirovograd, Nikolaev, completely blocked Odessa, surrounded the troops of the 6th Combined Arms Army and captured its army commander, General I.N. Muzychenko. This circumstance forced the Supreme Command Headquarters on August 16, 1941 to adopt the famous order No. 270, according to which all soldiers and commanders who were captured or surrendered to the enemy were declared enemies of the people, and members of their families were subject to deportation and deprivation of all social payments and benefits ( certificates) for the entire period of the war. The same order ordered that all deserters and cowards be shot on the spot, regardless of their previous merits, positions and ranks. During the period of “Gorbachev’s perestroika,” the blame for the adoption of this order was placed entirely on I.V. Stalin, because, according to a number of authors (A. Mertsalov, M. Semiryaga), such pathological cruelty was inherent in Stalinism. However, if you look at the original of this order, you can easily see the signatures of all the then members of the Supreme Command Headquarters - I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotova, K.E. Voroshilova, S.M. Budyonny, B.M. Shaposhnikova, S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukova.

On August 19, by decision of the Headquarters, the Bryansk Front was formed, led by Colonel General A.I. Eremenko, whose main tasks were to be:

1) covering the right flank of the troops of the Southwestern Front from a possible flank attack by the enemy from the Priluki-Konotop area;

2) the defeat of the 2nd Panzer Group of G. Guderian;

3) creation of reliable cover on the distant approaches to Moscow from the Oryol-Tula direction.

On August 30, the troops of the 24th (K. Rakutin) and 43rd (D. Seleznev) armies of the Reserve Front began the Elninsky offensive operation, which ended on September 8 with the complete defeat of five divisions of the 4th Army of Field Marshal G. Kluge and the liquidation of an extremely dangerous for Moscow the Yelninsky bridgehead. In Russian historical science, the operation near Yelnya has always been assessed as the first major offensive operation of the first period of the war, which had not only great military-tactical, but also enormous moral and psychological significance. However, in Western historiography (D. Boffa, N. Werth) the opinion still prevails that the battles near Yelnya had little tactical success, which was deliberately advertised by Soviet propaganda.

At the beginning of September 1941, the situation sharply worsened on the southern sector of the front, where the military-political leadership of the Southwestern direction was Marshal S.M. Budyonny and N.S. Khrushchev almost completely lost control over the operational situation:

a) The troops of the Bryansk Front (A.I. Eremenko) were never able to complete the assigned task. Units of the 2nd Tank Group (G. Guderian) and the 2nd Field Army (G. Schobert) of the Wehrmacht, having made a roundabout maneuver, penetrated deeply into the location of the Southwestern Front in the Chernigov-Konotop region.

b) The troops of the Southern Front (I.V. Tyulenev), under pressure from the superior forces of the 17th Field Army (R. Ruoff) and the 1st Tank Group (E. Kleist), were forced to leave Zaporozhye, Dnepropetrovsk and Kremenchug and retreat to the left bank Dnieper.

c) The troops of the Southwestern Front (M.P. Kirponos), suffering huge losses, continued with great difficulty to hold back the onslaught of the 6th Field Army (W. Reichenau), which was advancing in the Kiev direction.

In the current situation, the Headquarters appointed Marshal S.K. as the new commander of the South-Western direction. Tymoshenko ordered the withdrawal of troops from the Southwestern Front to a new line of defense to the Psel River. However, on September 12, the enemy with the forces of the 1st Tank Group E. Kleist, going on the offensive from the Kremenchug bridgehead, broke through the defenses of the 38th Army of Major General N.V. Feklenko and began to rapidly advance towards Kyiv. In the same direction, the advanced units of the 2nd Panzer Group of G. Guderian rushed from the Konotop bridgehead, which on September 15, in the area of ​​​​the village of Lokhvitsa, closed the encirclement of Soviet troops. As a result of these tragic events, units and formations of the 5th (M. Potapov), 21st (V. Kuznetsov), 26th (F. Kostenko), 37th (A. Vlasov) and 38th were surrounded (N. Feklenko) armies with a total number of 450 thousand soldiers and.

Very few managed to break out of the bag of fire: more than 100 thousand soldiers, including the front commander, Colonel General M.P. Kirponos and the chief of staff of the front, Major General V.I. Dead ends, suffered a heroic death, and more than 300 thousand soldiers were taken prisoner. On September 19, 1941, the advanced units of the 6th Field Army of Field Marshal W. Reichenau occupied Kyiv, the fall of which was a heavy blow for the entire country.

c) Defense of Leningrad (August 30 - September 20, 1941).

In July - the first half of August 1941, during fierce battles, the enemy, having occupied the territory of Latvia, Lithuania and a significant part of Estonia, fighting to the territory of the Leningrad region of the RSFSR. In such a critical situation, a commission of the State Defense Committee and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, consisting of V.M., was urgently sent to Leningrad. Molotova, G.M. Malenkova, A.N. Kosygina and N.G. Kuznetsova, who was ordered to urgently take all necessary measures to defend the city.

The situation at the front continued to rapidly deteriorate: neither the authoritative commission nor the leadership of the Leningrad Front (M.M. Popov) were able to organize a worthy rebuff to the enemy, and already on August 30 the enemy troops reached the Neva. At the beginning of September 1941, by order of Headquarters, the troops of the Leningrad Front were led by Marshal K.E. Voroshilov, however, this decision could not change the situation for the better. Moreover, on September 8, the enemy, having broken through to Lake Ladoga, captured Shlisselburg and closed the land blockade ring around the city. In this situation, on September 10, on the personal instructions of I.V. Stalin, the new commander of the Leningrad Front, Army General G.K., flew to Leningrad. Zhukov, to whom the Supreme Commander gave extremely strict instructions not to surrender the city to the enemy.

In mid-September, the advanced units of the 18th Field Army of Field Marshal E. Manstein went on the offensive on the Pulkovo Heights and reached the Uritsk area. In the current situation, G.K. Zhukov urgently transferred Major General I.I. to the location of the 42nd Army. Fedyuninsky necessary reserves and gave the order to the commander of the 54th Army, Marshal G.I. Kulika to immediately launch an attack on Mga. However, during the Sinyavinsk offensive operation, Soviet troops were unable to complete the assigned task and release the city from the south-eastern direction.

The enemy, with the help of six infantry and tank divisions, tried to break through the defenses of our troops at the junction of the 42nd and 55th armies. In such a critical situation, G.K. Zhukov gave the order to the commander of the 8th Army, General V.I. Shcherbakov launched a powerful flank attack on the enemy’s Kolpino grouping, which forced the Germans to urgently transfer part of their forces and resources to the Peterhof direction. For a whole week, the enemy tried to break the resistance of Soviet troops near Pulkovo, Kolpino and Peterhof, but all his attempts were in vain, and on September 26 he went on the defensive in all sectors of the Leningrad Front.

Leningrad itself and its immediate suburbs fell into a severe land blockade (867 days), which became not only the most tragic, but also the most heroic page in the history of the entire Great Patriotic War. The failure of the operation to capture Leningrad was taken extremely hard by A. Hitler, who soon removed Field Marshal W. Leeb from his post and in January 1942 appointed Field Marshal G. Küchler as the new commander of Army Group North.

2. Battle of Moscow (September 30, 1941 - April 20, 1942)

a) Defense of Moscow (September 30 - December 5-6, 1941)

On September 6, 1941, A. Hitler signed Directive No. 35 on the transition of Army Group Center to a general offensive against Moscow. In accordance with the plan of Operation Typhoon, the main elements of which were developed in the spring of 1941, the Wehrmacht strike force, which was to take the Soviet capital, consisted of the 2nd (M. Weichs), 4th (G. Kluge) and 9th (A. Strauss) field armies, 2nd (G. Guderian), 3rd (G. Hoth) and 4th (E. Hoepner) tank groups and 2nd Air Fleet of Field Marshal A. Kesselring. The total number of German troops aimed at Moscow was 76 infantry, motorized and tank divisions, more than 1,200 tanks and 1,100 aircraft. Such a powerful enemy group was created quite deliberately, since A. Hitler and his generals associated the end of the entire Eastern campaign with the capture of Moscow. On September 24, a final meeting was held in Smolensk at the headquarters of Army Group Center, at which the final plan and timing of the operation were fully agreed upon.

The troops of Army Group Center on the distant approaches to the capital were opposed by troops of three Soviet fronts:

Western Front (Colonel General I.S. Konev) consisting of the 16th (K. Rokossovsky), 19th (M. Lukin), 20th (F. Ershakov), 21st (V. Kuznetsov), The 22nd (V. Yushkevich) and 30th (V. Khomenko) combined arms armies defended the 350-kilometer Ostashkov-Yelnya line.

Reserve Front (Marshal S.M. Budyonny) consisting of the 24th (K. Rakutin), 29th (I. Maslennikov), 31st (V. Dolmatov), ​​32nd (S. Vishnevsky), 43rd The th (P. Sovetnikov) and 49th (I. Zakharkin) combined arms armies were partly located in the rear of the Western Front, and partly held a 120-kilometer defense in the first echelon of Yelnya - Frolovka.

Bryansk Front (Colonel General A.I. Eremenko) consisting of the 3rd (Ya. Kreizer), 13th (A. Gorodnyansky) and 50th (M. Petrov) combined arms armies and the operational group of General A.N. Ermakov held the defense on the left bank of the Desna in the Frolovka-Putivl area.

The total strength of the three Soviet fronts defending Moscow was 83 rifle and 9 cavalry divisions, 10 tank brigades, about 1,000 tanks and 670 aircraft.

On September 30, 1941, the enemy, with the forces of the 2nd Tank Group (G. Guderian) and the 2nd Field Army (M. Weichs), went on the offensive against the troops of the Bryansk Front and, breaking through the defenses of the 13th and 50th armies, occupied Orel , Bryansk, Kromy and, having cut the main communications of the front, placed its troops in conditions of operational encirclement. The Oryol-Bryansk defensive operation of the Soviet troops began, which lasted until the end of October 1941.

On October 2, the 4th Panzer Group of General E. Hoepner and the 4th Field Army of Field Marshal G. Kluge went on the offensive, breaking through the defenses of the troops of the 19th, 24th, 32nd and 43rd armies of the Western and Reserve Fronts , captured Kholm-Zhirkovsky, Spas-Demensk and Yukhnov. As a result of this breakthrough, the troops of five Soviet armies were under threat of encirclement. In this situation, the Supreme Command Headquarters ordered the urgent withdrawal of the troops of these armies to the Rzhev-Vyazma defensive line. However, on October 6, the enemy west of Vyazma surrounded units and formations of the 16th, 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd armies with a total number of 660 thousand soldiers and.

According to a number of historians (A. Isaev, L. Lopukhovsky), the reasons for such a deplorable development of events were not only the enemy’s significant superiority in manpower and military equipment, but also major miscalculations in the leadership of the Soviet troops on the part of the front, army and divisional command levels.

In these troubled days, according to a number of historians (N. Pavlenko, A. Samsonov), I.V. Stalin gave instructions to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria “to probe through our channels the possibility of concluding a new Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty with the Germans.” The Bulgarian ambassador P. Stamenov acted as a mediator in these negotiations, but his mission was unsuccessful, since the highest imperial leadership refused to conduct any negotiations, believing that Soviet Union already lost the war. However, it seems that this version, born during the years of “Gorbachev’s perestroika” in the wake of extremely aggressive anti-Stalin propaganda, is based on not very reliable sources, in particular, the memoirs of the former head of the 4th Directorate of the USSR Ministry of State Security, Lieutenant General P.A. Sudoplatova.

Meanwhile, the enemy continued to implement the Typhoon plan: the 2nd Tank Group of the Wehrmacht went on the offensive in the Tula direction, the 2nd Field Army began to defeat the Soviet troops in the Vyazma cauldron, the 4th Tank Group and the 4th Field Army of the Wehrmacht began rapidly advance in the Mozhaisk and Volokolamsk directions, and the 3rd Tank Group and the 9th Field Army went on the offensive in the Kalinin direction.

On October 9, on the instructions of I.V. Stalin, a commission from the Headquarters and the State Defense Committee, consisting of V.M., arrived at the headquarters of the Western Front. Molotova, K.E. Voroshilov and A.M. Vasilevsky, who was tasked with understanding the reasons for such a deplorable development of the situation at the front and taking urgent and tough measures to correct it. Based on the results of its work, the commission proposed:

1) unite the troops of the Western and Reserve Fronts into a single Western Front and appoint Army General G.K. as commander of the new front. Zhukova;

2) former commander of the Western Front, Colonel General I.S. Konev to be tried by a military tribunal. However, at the personal request of G.K. Zhukov, the last decision of the commission was canceled by I.V. Stalin.

On October 10, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief signed an order from Headquarters on the appointment of G.K. Zhukov as commander of the united Western Front. On his recommendation, Colonel General I.S. was appointed his first deputy. Konev, Lieutenant General V.D. remained chief of staff. Sokolovsky, and N.A. was approved as a member of the Military Council of the front. Bulganin.

The situation at the front developed as follows: a) the troops of the 3rd, 13th and 50th armies of the Bryansk Front, after heavy and bloody battles, only at the end of October were able to break out of encirclement and retreat in an organized manner to the Tula defense line; b) the troops of the 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd armies of the Western Front, having pinned down significant enemy forces, desperately tried to break out of the encirclement. Having suffered huge losses, very few units and formations were able to escape from the Vyazemsky cauldron. The bulk of the troops either died in unequal battles with the enemy, or, as the commander of the encircled group, Lieutenant General M.F. Lukin, was captured.

According to the admission of the military themselves (G.K. Zhukov, B.M. Shaposhnikov, A.M. Vasilevsky) and the testimony of historians (A.M. Samsonov, V. Anfilov), the bloody battle of Vyazma became an extremely important factor in the victorious completion of the entire Moscow battles. During this most tragic period of the Battle of Moscow (October 6-15, 1941), the encircled troops of four Soviet armies, pinning down twenty-eight enemy divisions, made it possible to create a new line of defense around the capital.

On October 12, the Military Council of the Western Front, realizing that it would not be able to create a continuous line of defense around Moscow, decided to close the five main directions to the capital. The 5th Army of Major General D.D. was concentrated in the Mozhaisk direction. Lelyushenko, in Volokolamsk - the 16th Army of Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky, in Naro-Fominsk - the 33rd Army of Lieutenant General M.G. Efremov, in Maloyaroslavl - the 43rd Army of Lieutenant General S.D. Akimov and in Kaluga - the 49th Army of Lieutenant General I.G. Zakharkina.

The enemy, despite the huge losses, continued to stubbornly move forward: on October 12, the advanced units of the Wehrmacht captured Kaluga and Rzhev, and on October 14, the enemy captured Kalinin. In this situation, the Headquarters decided to create a new Kalinin Front on the northwestern approaches to the capital, consisting of the 22nd (V. Vostroukhov), 29th (I. Maslennikov), 30th (V. Khomenko) and 31st ( V. Yushkevich) combined arms armies. Colonel General I.S. was appointed commander of the front. Konev, and Major General I.I. became the chief of staff of the front. Ivanov.

On October 15-16, the enemy, with the forces of the 3rd Panzer Group of Colonel General G. Hoth and the 9th Field Army of Colonel General A. Strauss, launched an attack on Torzhok, but was stopped on the approaches to the city and forced to go on the defensive on this section of the front . A more difficult situation developed in the southwestern and western directions, where on October 16-20 the enemy, having broken through the defenses of our troops, captured Borovsk, Maloyaroslavets, Mozhaisk, Volokolamsk and Naro-Fominsk.

In these alarming days, on October 15, 1941, the State Defense Committee decided to evacuate from the capital almost all government institutions, including most of the people's commissariats, the apparatus of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff of the Red Army, as well as a number members and candidate members of the Politburo of the Central Committee - V.M. Molotova, K.E. Voroshilova, L.M. Kaganovich, M.I. Kalinina, A.A. Andreeva and N.A. Voznesensky, who were tasked with creating parallel bodies of party-state power and government in Arzamas and Kuibyshev in the event of the fall of Moscow. On October 19, 1941, by decision of the State Defense Committee, a state of siege was introduced in the capital and a curfew was established.

IN Lately In the historical literature, the question of whether I.V. was going to be actively discussed. Stalin surrenders Moscow. Most historians (A. Samsonov) believe that such plans were allowed, but were hardly seriously discussed by the country's top leadership. Their opponents (A. Mertsalov, M. Semeryaga) are confident that I.V. Stalin not only allowed the surrender of Moscow, but also made a specific decision about it. However, at the same time, our home-grown anti-Stalinists did not present any concrete facts or compelling evidence of their “scientific discovery”. These same historians are also confident that the acute situation at the front in October 1941 created favorable conditions and made it necessary to remove I.V. Stalin from all his posts, which would undoubtedly have a beneficial effect on the further course and outcome of the entire war, but there were no principled and competent people either in the leader’s circle or in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Let’s leave this latest passage of corrupt party historians without comment and ask just one rhetorical question: if surrounded by I.V. Stalin and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) did not find principled and competent people, then who could really lead the country during the hard times of war...

At the end of October 1941, the enemy, having achieved small tactical successes in the Tula, Volokolamsk and Naro-Fominsk directions, suddenly stopped offensive operations and switched to strategic defense along the entire front line, which stabilized along the Ostashkov - Kalinin - Dmitrov - Naro-Fominsk - line Mtsensk - Aleksin.

The unexpected stop of the German offensive made it possible to hold celebrations in Moscow dedicated to the anniversary of the Great October Revolution, which were of extremely important moral and psychological significance. On November 6, a ceremonial meeting dedicated to this date was held at the Mayakovskaya metro station, and on November 7, a parade of troops of the Moscow garrison and the active army took place on Red Square, which was hosted by Marshal S.M. Budyonny. At this parade, I.V. made a keynote speech. Stalin, who for the first time, disdaining class and ideological prejudices, turned to the image of “our great ancestors”, defenders of the Fatherland, who were supposed to inspire the soldiers of the Red Army to defeat the enemy - Alexander Nevsky, Dmitry Donskoy, Kuzma Minin, Dmitry Pozharsky, Alexander Suvorov and Mikhail Kutuzova.

Army Group Center completed the development of a new plan for the attack on Moscow, codenamed “Moscow Cannes”. According to the new plan developed by the OKB headquarters (W. Keitel), Wehrmacht troops were supposed to create a double encirclement ring around the Soviet capital:

1) the inner ring, the borders of which closely approached the borders of the city, was supposed to be closed by the forces of the 4th Panzer Group of Colonel General E. Hoepner and the 4th Field Army of Field Marshal G. Kluge;

2) the outer ring, the boundaries of which ran along the line Klin - Noginsk - Kolomna, was to be closed by the troops of the 2nd and 3rd tank groups of Colonel General G. Guderian and General of the Tank Forces G. Reinhardt.

On November 13, 1941, a meeting of the senior command staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces was held in Orsha, in which the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Field Marshal V. Brauchitsch, the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel General F. Halder, and the Commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal F. Bock, took part. and the chiefs of staff of Army Groups “Center”, “North” and “South”, Colonel Generals A. Greifenberg, G. Brenneke and E. Sodenstern. The majority of the participants in this meeting spoke out against the plan for a general offensive proposed by the OKW headquarters. But at the same time, almost all the generals agreed that before the onset of winter it was necessary to capture the Soviet capital at any cost.

On the northern approaches to the capital, where the defense was held by the troops of the 16th (K. Rokossovsky) and 30th (D. Lelyushenko) armies, the 9th field army of General A. Strauss and the 3rd and 4th tanks went on the offensive groups of generals G. Reinhardt and E. Hoepner;

From the southwestern (Tula) direction, which was defended by the troops of the 49th (I. Zakharkin) and 50th (I. Boldin) armies, the offensive was launched by the troops of the 2nd Panzer Group of Colonel General G. Guderian and the 2nd Field army of Colonel General M. Weichs.

In the central sector of the front, where the troops of the 5th (L. Govorov), 33rd (M. Efremov) and 43rd (K. Golubev) armies defended, the main blow to the capital was delivered by the 4th field army of Field Marshal G. Kluge .

Within two weeks, the enemy, suffering huge losses in manpower and equipment, managed to capture Klin, Solnechnogorsk, Yakhroma, Krasnaya Polyana, Kryukovo and a number of other settlements on the northwestern approaches to Moscow, where he achieved the greatest successes. In other sectors of the front, his achievements turned out to be much more modest: the enemy failed to capture Zvenigorod, Tula, Kashira, Serpukhov, Naro-Fominsk, Yelets and other settlements in the western and southwestern directions of Moscow. In this situation, on December 3, 1941, Field Marshal F. Bock was forced to give the order for his troops to move to defense along the entire front line, which stabilized at the line Kalinin - Dmitrov - Yakhroma - Kryukovo - Zvenigorod - Naro-Fominsk - Tula - Epifan - Yelets .

b) Counter-offensive near Moscow (December 5-6, 1941 - April 20, 1942)

On December 5-6, 1941, by order of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, troops of the Kalinin (I.S. Konev), Western (G.K. Zhukov) and Southwestern (S.K. Timoshenko) fronts launched a counteroffensive along the entire front line from Kalinin to Yelets. In this first, largest offensive operation of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, troops of 13 combined arms armies took part, which successfully carried out six local offensive operations, which ended victoriously in the complete defeat of the advanced units and formations of Army Group Center near Moscow:

On the Kalinin Front, troops of the 22nd, 29th and 31st armies carried out the Kalinin offensive operation (December 1941 - January 1942);

On the Western Front, troops of the 1st Shock, 5th, 16th and 20th Armies conducted the Klin-Solnechnogorsk offensive operation (December 1941); troops of the 33rd and 43rd armies - Naro-Fominsk offensive operation (December 1941), and troops of the 10th, 49th and 50th armies - Tula (December 1941) and Kaluga (December 1941 - January 1942) offensive operations;

On the Southwestern Front, troops of the 3rd and 13th armies carried out the Yeletsk offensive operation.

The first ten days of continuous counterattacks by the Red Army were so unexpected for the enemy that he was forced to constantly retreat to new defensive lines, leaving one settlement after another. A. Hitler, enraged by the deplorable development of events near Moscow, already in mid-December 1941 dismissed several dozen Wehrmacht field marshals and generals, including V. Brauchitsch, F. Bock and G. Guderian.

By the beginning of January 1942, Soviet troops, having defeated the shock formations of Army Group Center, pushed the enemy back 100–250 kilometers from the capital and liberated hundreds of settlements in the Moscow, Kalinin, Tula and Kaluga regions, including Kalinin, Klin, Solnechnogorsk , Volokolamsk, Kaluga, Tarusa, Maloyaroslavets, Belev, Mosalsk, Sukhinichi and other cities. By January 7, 1942, by the end of the first stage of the offensive operation near Moscow, the front line had stabilized at the line Rzhev - Volokolamsk - Ruza - Mosalsk - Belev - Mtsensk - Novosil.

In Soviet historiography (A. Samsonov, V. Anfimov), the end of the Moscow Battle was traditionally attributed to April 20, 1942, when active offensive operations by Soviet troops against Army Group Center along the entire front line from Demyansk to Lyudinovo were stopped. During the years of perestroika and in the post-Soviet period, a number of authors (V. Karpov) questioned the legitimacy of this date, stating that the end of the Battle of Moscow should be dated to the beginning of January 1942, since further offensive operations on the central sector of the front developed in line with the famous Stalinist plan about a general offensive along the entire Soviet-German front. In our opinion, regardless of the development of the situation on other fronts of the Great Patriotic War, it should still be recognized that the second stage of the offensive operation near Moscow, which began on January 8-10, actually ended on April 20, 1942.

In foreign and national historiography(A. Hillgruber, A. Samsonov, V. Anfimov) The Battle of Moscow is traditionally given special significance because:

The victory near Moscow finally buried the “blitzkrieg” strategy that A. Hitler and his generals were counting on in their global plans for conquest of world domination;

In the fields near Moscow, the myth of the invincibility of the German army, which suffered the first major defeat during the entire war since September 1939, was completely debunked;

The Battle of Moscow marked the beginning of a radical change in the course of the Second World War and created favorable conditions for the beginning of a radical change in the Great Patriotic War.

The huge losses of Army Group Center in human resources, military equipment and weapons should not be discounted. Various sources, historical studies and journalistic articles provide conflicting information on this matter, including absolutely fantastic figures (D. Volkogonov, B. Sokolov, L. Lopukhovsky, Yu. Kavalerchik), which have nothing to do with the real state of affairs. At the moment, the most plausible information seems to be those of those authors (A. Samsonov, G. Krivosheev) who evaluate total Wehrmacht losses of 450–460 thousand people, 2340 tanks and 1390 aircraft.

a) Stalin's military campaign plan for 1942

On January 5, 1942, a joint meeting of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the State Defense Committee was held, at which the plan for further actions on the Soviet-German front in the winter and spring of 1942 was discussed. Stalin, who highly appreciated the successful progress of the offensive operation near Moscow, said that the main goal of the new military campaign should be a general offensive of Soviet troops along the entire front line from the Barents to the Black Seas.

The troops of the Leningrad (M.S. Khozin) and Volkhov (K.A. Meretskov) fronts, in cooperation with the Baltic Fleet (V.F. Tributs), were tasked with defeating the main forces of Army Group North and completely releasing Leningrad.

The troops of the Northwestern Front (P.A. Kurochkin) were supposed to deliver a powerful blow from the Ostashkov-Demyansk area to enemy units and formations at the junction of Army Groups “Center” and “North”.

The troops of the Kalinin (I.S. Konev) and Western (G.K. Zhukov) fronts were tasked with continuing the offensive operation in the central sector of the front and defeating the main forces of Army Group Center in the Rzhev-Vyazma-Smolensk region.

The troops of the Southwestern (F.Ya. Kostenko) and Southern (R.Ya. Malinovsky) fronts were supposed to defeat the main forces of Army Group South, liberate the left bank of Ukraine and gain a foothold on the right bank of the Dnieper.

The troops of the Caucasian Front (D.T. Kozlov), in cooperation with units and formations of the Black Sea Fleet (F.S. Oktyabrsky), were supposed to completely liberate the Crimean Peninsula and lift the siege of Sevastopol.

Proposal by I.V. Stalin's idea of ​​a general offensive at the front was fully supported by Marshals K.E. Voroshilov and S.K. Tymoshenko. More-less against Stalin's plan Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR N.A. spoke Voznesensky, Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov and the commander of the Western Front, Army General G.K. Zhukov. Their arguments were as follows:

1) The offensive can be continued only on the central sector of the Soviet-German front, where, as a result of successful counterattacks near Moscow, the enemy is completely demoralized and is unable to provide worthy resistance to Soviet troops in the near future.

2) In the remaining sectors of the Soviet-German front, one should switch to strategic defense, because:

a) there are no objective operational-tactical prerequisites for the successful conduct of offensive operations;

b) the country's military-industrial complex is not yet able to produce the required amount of weapons and ammunition for the simultaneous conduct of several large offensive operations on the entire Soviet-German front.

These arguments were not taken into account by the majority of members of the State Defense Committee and Headquarters, and I.V. Stalin categorically insisted on the approval of his proposed plan for the military campaign for 1942, which ultimately practically failed and ended in a major defeat for the Soviet troops, especially in the southwestern strategic direction. Another serious miscalculation of the leader was that he completely trusted the leadership of military intelligence, headed at that time by Major General A.P. Panfilov, gave the order to transfer significant military reserves and military equipment from other strategic directions and fronts to the Western Front. IN in this case A fatal role was played by the fact that Soviet intelligence officers fell for the bait of German military intelligence - the Abwehr, headed by Admiral F. Canaris, whose agents were able to convince them that in the spring of 1942 a new general offensive against Moscow would begin, codenamed "Kremlin" "

b) Military operations at the front in winter - summer 1942.

At the end of December 1941, in pursuance of the order of the Supreme Command Headquarters, a number of local offensive operations began, which at the first stage were tactically successful.

During the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation (December 1941 - January 1942), the troops of the Transcaucasian Front (D.T. Kozlov), having liberated the eastern part of the Kerch Peninsula, not only prevented the real threat of invasion of German troops in the North Caucasus, but also created a convenient springboard for the complete liberation of the Crimean Peninsula from the enemy.

During the Toropetsk-Kholmsky (January - February 1942) and Demyansk (January - May 1942) offensive operations, troops of the Kalinin (I.S. Konev) and Northwestern (P.A. Kurochkin) fronts, defeating the forward units The 9th (V. Model) and 16th (E. Busch) field armies of the Wehrmacht advanced 200-300 kilometers and reached the line Staraya Russa - Kholm - Velikiye Luki.

During these operations, the plans of the Supreme Command Headquarters were realized to the maximum extent, but the remaining offensive operations either completely failed or had little tactical success.

During the Lyuban offensive operation (January - April 1942), the troops of the Volkhov (K.A. Meretskov) and Leningrad (M.S. Khozin) fronts were unable to implement the assigned tasks, and the 2nd strike (A. Vlasov) and the 59th (I. Galanin) combined arms army of the Volkhov Front went over to forced defense.

During the Rzhev-Vyazemsk and Sychev-Vyazemsk offensive operations, which were carried out in January - April 1942 by the forces of thirteen combined arms armies of the Main Command of the Western Direction (G.K. Zhukov), the main operational and tactical goals, in particular, the liberation of Rzhev and Vyazma was never reached. At the same time, during heavy bloody battles, Soviet troops managed to significantly advance 100-200 kilometers and, having successfully completed the Moscow offensive operation, gain a foothold on the line Velizh - Demidovo - Bely - Sychevka - Nelidovo - Gzhatsk - Yukhnov - Lyudinovo. It should also be noted that during these operations, troops of the 29th Army (V. Shvetsov) of the Kalinin Front and the 33rd Army (M. Efremov) of the Western Front were encircled near Rzhev and Vyazma.

Recently, as part of a large-scale information war against our country, a number of engaged authors (V. Melnikov, V. Safir, F. Sverdlov, S. Mikheenkov) began to very actively discuss the issue of the so-called “Vyazma disaster” of April 1942, in in which the commander of the 33rd Army, Lieutenant General M.G., tragically died. Efremov, who, having been wounded while trying to escape the encirclement, shot himself because of the threat of being captured. Naturally, our “patriots” placed all the blame for the encirclement of Soviet troops near Vyazma and the death of the 33rd Army commander on the commander of the Western Front, Army General G.K. Zhukov, who allegedly always disliked the obstinate commander and deliberately doomed his army to death. However, an analysis of real documents suggests that the blame for the “Vyazma disaster” lies equally with everyone, including the Supreme Command Headquarters, which, in fact, authorized the Rzhev-Vyazma operation itself.

During the Barvenkovo-Lozovsky offensive operation, which was carried out in January 1942, the troops of the Southern (R.Ya. Malinovsky) and Southwestern (F.Ya. Kostenko) fronts, having moved forward 90-100 kilometers, were unable to carry out set tasks for the liberation of Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov and Poltava.

In May - June 1942, in various sectors of the Soviet-German front, the enemy managed to achieve significant operational and tactical successes, which significantly complicated the position of the Soviet troops, especially in the southwestern strategic direction.

In the first half of May 1942, the troops of the 11th Field Army of Field Marshal E. Manstein, having broken through the defenses of the 44th (S. Chernyak), 47th (K. Kolganov) and 51st (V. Lvov) armies of the Crimean Front, captured Kerch and forced the remnants of the Soviet troops to hastily retreat to the Taman Peninsula. The results of this military catastrophe, the blame for which lies entirely with the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Colonel General L.Z. Mekhlis and the commander of the Crimean Front, Lieutenant General D.V. Kozlov, turned out to be huge:

a) German troops on the shoulders of retreating Soviet units burst into the Caucasus;

b) Soviet troops were forced to leave the symbol of Russian military glory - Sevastopol, the heroic defense of which lasted almost a whole year.

On May 12, 1942, on the initiative of the Main Command of the South-Western Direction (S.K. Timoshenko, N.S. Khrushchev, I.Kh. Bagramyan), the Kharkov offensive operation began. And although the leadership of the General Staff of the Red Army, in particular, Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov and Colonel General A.M. Vasilevsky, cautiously spoke out against carrying out a large-scale offensive operation in this strategic direction, I.V. Stalin, K.E. Voroshilov and other members of the State Defense Committee and Headquarters initially supported this outright adventure, the authors of which were S.K. Timoshenko and N.S. Khrushchev.

In accordance with the operation plan, troops of the 6th (A. Gorodnyansky), 21st (V. Gordov), 28th (D. Ryabyshev) and 38th (K .Moskalenko) armies of the Southwestern Front. Initially, their offensive developed relatively successfully, and by the end of the fifth day of fighting, having broken through the defenses of the 6th Field Army of Colonel General F. Paulus, they advanced 25-50 kilometers. But already on May 17, completely unexpectedly, from the area of ​​Kramatorsk and Slavyansk, the troops of the 9th (P. Kozlov) and 57th (K. Podlas) armies of the Southern Front, Lieutenant General R.Ya. Malinovsky suffered a powerful tank attack from Army Group Kleist.

In this situation, the new Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Colonel General A.M. Vasilevsky suggested to I.V. Stalin immediately stop the offensive of the troops of the Southwestern Front and turn the troops of the 6th Army of Lieutenant General A.M. Gorodnyansky and the front-line operational group of Lieutenant General L.V. Bobkin to eliminate an extremely dangerous enemy breakthrough in the Southern Front. However, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief only gave permission on May 19 to go on the defensive along the entire front line, but it was already too late. On May 23, the advanced units of the 6th Field Army and Army Group Kleist united south of Balakleya and surrounded the troops of the 6th and 57th armies. During the fierce battles that lasted May 24-29, 1942, most of the Soviet troops were unable to break out of the encirclement and many soldiers and commanders died a heroic death on the battlefield, including the deputy commander of the Southwestern Front, Lieutenant General F. .I. Kostenko and army commanders L.V. Bobkin, A.M. Gorodnyansky and K.P. Podlas.

In the second half of June 1942, the troops of the 59th (I. Korovnikov) and 2nd shock (A. Vlasov) armies of the Volkhov Front (K.A. Meretskov), heroically fighting the enemy in the Lyuban area, were surrounded and almost completely defeated by superior forces of the 18th Field Army of Colonel General G. Lindemann. Commander of the 2nd Shock Army, Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov voluntarily surrendered and, having gone into service with the enemy, led the so-called Russian Liberation Army (ROA), which forever stained itself with indelible shame in front of the memory of the living and fallen heroes of the Great Patriotic War.

At the end of June - beginning of July 1942, during the Voronezh-Donbass defensive operation, troops of the Bryansk (F.I. Golikov), Southwestern (S.K. Timoshenko) and Southern (R.Ya. Malinovsky) fronts, suffering huge losses , retreated 150-400 kilometers inland and left the entire territory of Donbass and the Rostov region of the RSFSR to the enemy.

4. The first stage of the Battle of Stalingrad: defense of Stalingrad (July 17 - November 18, 1942)

In April 1942, A. Hitler signed Directive No. 41, which defined the main strategic task of the German armed forces for the summer campaign of 1942 - the destruction of Soviet troops in the southern strategic direction and the capture of the Caucasus, which was the most important oil region in the world.

For this purpose, at the beginning of July 1942, Army Group South was divided into two parts. Army Group A, consisting of the 11th and 17th field armies of the Wehrmacht, the 8th Italian Army and the 1st Tank Army under the overall command of Field Marshal W. List, was supposed to deliver the main blow in the Caucasian strategic direction. Army Group B, consisting of the 2nd and 4th field armies of the Wehrmacht, the 2nd Hungarian Army and the 4th Tank Army, under the overall command of Field Marshal F. Bock, launched an auxiliary attack in the Stalingrad direction. In total, the enemy concentrated on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front enormous forces and means: more than 900 thousand soldiers and 1,200 tanks, 1,650 aircraft and more than 17,000 guns.

In the southern strategic direction, the defense was held by troops of two Soviet fronts.

The Caucasian direction was defended by troops of the North Caucasus Front under the command of Marshal S.M. Budyonny. This front included units and formations of five combined arms armies: the 12th (A. Grechko) and 37th (P. Kozlov) armies defended the Stavropol direction, and the 18th (F. Kamkov), 47th (G. Kotov) and the 56th (A. Ryazhov) army - Krasnodar direction.

The Stalingrad direction was defended by troops of the Stalingrad Front under the command of Lieutenant General V.N. Gordov, which included the 21st (A. Danilov), 62nd (V. Kolpakchi), 63rd (V. Kuznetsov) and 64th (V. Chuikov) combined arms armies.

On July 17, 1942, the enemy went on the offensive along the entire front line and already on July 26, having broken through the defenses of the 62nd Army, he reached the bend of the Don and created a real threat of encirclement of the troops of the Stalingrad Front. In this critical situation, on July 28, 1942, signed by I.V. Stalin came out famous order No. 227 “Not a step back!”, according to which:

1) the death penalty was introduced for cowardice, desertion and unauthorized abandonment of combat positions at the front;

2) in units and formations of front-line subordination, penal companies and penal battalions were created for the rank and file and officers of the Red Army, who were constantly located in the most dangerous sectors of the front line;

3) in the rear of all unstable units and formations of the active army, special barrage detachments were created, which, in the event of a panicked flight from forward positions, had the legal right to open fire to kill the retreating soldiers and commanders of the Red Army.

It is necessary to emphasize the fact that, as all serious military historians have established (Yu. Rubtsov), the barrier detachments consisted of fighters from the same military units and formations, and not from the NKVD troops, which our noted liberals and anti-Stalinists especially like to gossip about (A. Mertsalov , M. Solonin, G. Popov).

In modern liberal journalism and literature, the publication of this order is presented as the most compelling evidence of the criminality of the Stalinist regime during the war. If we evaluate historically this order, then it should be recognized that he played an extremely important role in the further development of events at the front and put an end to the panicky flight of a number of our military units from forward positions.

By the beginning of August 1942, there was a temporary lull in the southern sector of the Soviet-German front, which allowed the Supreme Command Headquarters to carry out the necessary organizational measures. In particular, on August 5, two new groupings of troops were created on the basis of the Stalingrad Front: the Stalingrad Front consisting of the 21st (A. Danilov), 62nd (V. Kolpakchi) and 63rd (V. Kuznetsov) combined arms, 4th 1st tank (V. Kryuchenkin) and 1st air (S. Khudyakov) armies, and the South-Eastern Front consisting of the 51st (T. Kolomiets), 57th (F. Tolbukhin) and 64th (M. Shumilov) combined arms and 8th air (T. Khryukin) armies. Lieutenant General V.N. was appointed commander of the Stalingrad Front. Gordov, and the South-Eastern Front was headed by Colonel General A.I. Eremenko. However, already on August 9, the Supreme Command Headquarters reassigned the Stalingrad Front to Colonel General A.I. Eremenko and sent GKO member, Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) G.M. to the combat area. Malenkova.

Despite the heroic resistance of the troops of the North Caucasus Front (S.M. Budyonny), the enemy captured Maykop, Krasnodar, Armavir, Stavropol and began to rapidly advance to the foothills of the Greater Caucasus Range.

On August 19, the troops of the 6th Field Army of F. Paulus and the 4th Tank Army of G. Hoth began a new offensive in the Stalingrad direction, and by the end of August 23, having crushed the defenses of the 62nd Army, they reached north of Stalingrad to the Volga, forming an operational corridor between troops of two Soviet fronts. In the current situation, the Supreme High Command Headquarters ordered the liquidation of this corridor, but the repeated efforts of the troops of the 1st Guards (K. Moskalenko), 24th (D. Kozlov) and 66th (R. Malinovsky) armies were unsuccessful. On September 12, 1942, the enemy entered Stalingrad, where fierce street fighting began.

In the Caucasian theater of operations, thanks to the heroic fortitude of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front (Ya.T. Cherevichenko), the enemy was never able to capture the Greater Caucasus Range. Angered by this circumstance, A. Hitler, who perfectly understood the importance of Grozny and Baku oil for the further course of the entire war, dismissed Field Marshal W. List and assumed command of Army Group A. At the same time, the Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces, Colonel General F. Halder, was also dismissed and Colonel General K. Zeitzler was appointed in his place.

From mid-September to mid-November 1942, troops of the 62nd and 64th armies of the Stalingrad Front under the command of Lieutenant General V.I. Chuikov and Major General M.S. Shumilov heroically defended every inch of Volga land. Street fighting in Stalingrad was extremely brutal and bloody, especially at the strategically important heights - Mamayev Kurgan, which repeatedly changed hands. The heroic defense of the Volga stronghold, which pinned down the main enemy forces, allowed the Supreme Command Headquarters to develop and carry out the Stalingrad offensive operation, which marked the beginning of a radical change in the course of the entire Great Patriotic War.

5. Creation of the anti-Hitler coalition (July 1941 - July 1942)

In Western (G. Barnes, Ch. Tansill, R. Parkinson) and Russian liberal historiography (M. Semiryaga) there is a false idea that the process of creating an anti-Hitler coalition of the allied powers began in September 1939, that is, from the moment Second World War. At the same time, the Soviet Union, which in August 1939 was forced to sign a “Non-Aggression Pact” with Germany, according to these authors, was initially not Germany’s enemy, but its military ally, and only in June 1941, after the start of the Great Patriotic War , he was forced to move to the camp of civilized nations, who alone fought the brown plague of Nazism.

Statements of this kind, especially characteristic of modern liberals, who have always served the political interests of home-grown Westerners and Russophobes, are completely inconsistent with real historical facts.

1) Firstly, There was no talk of any serious anti-Hitler coalition before the entry of the Soviet Union into World War II, and there could not have been talk. This coalition simply did not exist because:

a) The former Munich appeasers not only waged a very strange war with the German aggressor, but also, according to authoritative authors (V. Falin), did not even develop serious military operations against Nazi Germany in the first six months of the war.

b) Almost all potential members of the anti-fascist bloc - France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Denmark and Norway, with the exception of Greece, Yugoslavia and Great Britain, were occupied by German armed forces by July 1940. Many British politicians had close working contacts with many influential Nazis, in particular, the head of the Abwehr, W. Canaris, and the Minister of Industry and Trade, J. Schacht.

c) The United States of America was not at all fully aware of the scale of Hitler’s aggression in Europe, and for the time being, without attaching serious importance to it, declared its “neutrality.” Moreover, as established by Professor V.M. Falin, in May 1940, US President F. Roosevelt conducted secret negotiations with Canadian Prime Minister M. King regarding the hasty relocation of the British fleet to the states of the British Commonwealth, until England capitulated to the Third Reich.

d) A more eloquent fact of the absence of a real anti-Hitler coalition is the mission of the personal representative of US President S. Welles to London, Paris, Rome and Berlin, which took place in February - March 1940. During his mission, the presidential envoy seriously discussed with N. Chamberlain, P Reino, B. Mussolini and with the Nazi leaders - A. Hitler, R. Hess, G. Goering, I. Ribbentrop and A. Weizsäcker, the question of concluding a peace treaty and recognizing most of Germany’s territorial acquisitions over the past two years. Only after the failure of the “S. Welles mission” did US President F.D. Roosevelt abandoned the policy of appeasing Germany and proclaimed new course in the foreign policy of their country. However, even after the announcement of this course, only a year later, in March 1941, the US Congress, having broken the powerful resistance of the “isolationists”, whose unofficial leaders were Secretary of State C. Hull, head of the CIA J. Duless and ex-President H. Hoover, adopted the famous Lend-Lease law.

e) The remaining powers of the European continent either declared their neutrality (Switzerland and Sweden) or became military satellites of Germany - Italy, Spain, Portugal, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Finland.

2) Secondly, only after the start of the Great Patriotic War, when the Soviet Union became a victim of fascist aggression, did real conditions and the prerequisites for the creation of a real anti-Hitler coalition of the united nations of America, Australia, Asia and Europe.

In Russian historiography, the process of creating an anti-Hitler coalition is traditionally divided into two main stages:

On June 22-24, 1941, i.e., virtually immediately after the attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt made official statements of support for the Soviet Union in its fight against fascist Germany and its military allies. The legal formalization of the anti-Hitler coalition began only on July 12, 1941, when, following the results of negotiations between the USSR People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov and the British Ambassador to the USSR S. Cripps signed the first Anglo-Soviet agreement “On joint actions of the governments of the USSR and Great Britain in the war against Germany,” which dealt with the provision of mutual assistance in the fight against the aggressor and the refusal to conclude any separate agreements with him. A little later, similar agreements were signed by the USSR Ambassador to Great Britain I.M. Maisky with the leaders of the emigrant governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia in London V. Sikorsky and E. Benes.

In the second half of July 1941, I.V. Stalin sent a personal message to the head of the British government, W. Churchill, with a proposal to create a Second Front in Europe in northern France or Norway, but it was immediately rejected. Then important negotiations took place in Moscow. I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov with the personal representative of the US President G. Hopkins, at which the principles of interaction between the two countries were discussed and a decision was made to convene a meeting to study the strategic interests of the three world powers in war.

In August 1941, the leaders of Great Britain and the United States on board the English battleship Prince of Wales near Newfoundland signed the famous Atlantic Charter, which proclaimed the basic principles of waging war against the aggressor and the post-war structure of the world, to which the Soviet Union joined in September 1941 Union.

At the beginning of September 1941, I.V. Stalin again turned to W. Churchill with a request to open a Second Front in Europe in northern France or the Balkans, which could pull several dozen enemy divisions from the Eastern Front. However, this time too an incomprehensible refusal was received in Moscow.

September 29 - October 1, 1941, the Moscow Conference of representatives of the USSR (V.M. Molotov), ​​USA (A. Harriman) and Great Britain (W. Beaverbrook) was held, in which the head of the Soviet government I.V. Stalin. At this conference, making sure that the Soviet Union was able to provide real opposition to the German military machine, all issues regarding mutual supplies and use of material resources of the three countries in the war against Germany were positively resolved. In particular, Great Britain and the United States committed themselves to supplying the Soviet Union with 500 tanks, 400 aircraft and other equipment every month. military equipment and weapons, and the USSR expressed its readiness to provide the coalition allies with the raw materials and materials they needed.

At the end of October 1941, F.D. Roosevelt told I.V. Stalin about the decision of the American government to provide the USSR with an interest-free loan in the amount of one billion dollars, and already in early November, by his decree, he extended the Lend-Lease law to the Soviet Union. In early December 1941, after the official entry of the United States into World War II, the government of F.D. Roosevelt moved to more decisive and active actions. On January 1, 1942, at an international conference in Washington, twenty-six countries of the world, including the USSR, USA, Great Britain, Canada, India, China, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia, signed the “Declaration of the United Nations”, which included the most important obligations of the countries participating in the anti-Hitler coalition were enshrined among themselves:

1) use all your resources until the complete defeat of the members of the Tripartite Pact - Germany, Italy, Japan and their military allies - Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Finland;

2) actively cooperate on all issues and not enter into separate agreements or peace treaties with these countries.

In April 1942 I.V. Stalin and F.D. Roosevelt exchanged messages discussing the need to convene a new conference of the three great powers on the opening of a Second Front in Europe. On May 26, 1942, the heads of the foreign policy departments of the USSR and Great Britain V.M. Molotov and A. Eden signed an agreement in London on an alliance in the war against Nazi Germany and its military allies, as well as on cooperation and interaction between the two countries after the end of the war. And on June 11, 1942 in Washington, USSR Ambassador M.M. Litvinov and US Secretary of State K. Hull signed an agreement between the two countries, which enshrined the basic principles of mutual assistance in the fight against the aggressor and formalized the US obligations for military supplies to the USSR carried out under the Lend-Lease program. The signing of these agreements was of great importance for the further course of the entire war, since they legally formalized the military-political alliance of the three great powers in the fight against Nazism and militarism.

At the same time, the leaders of Great Britain and the USA continued to play a double game. At the end of July 1942, at the London negotiations, they signed an agreement that completely contradicted the interests of the majority of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition: the creation of the Second Front in Europe was again postponed indefinitely, but a decision was made to begin active military operations of Anglo-American troops in North Africa . Although back in May 1942, during the visit of V.M. Molotov in the USA, President F.D. Roosevelt, the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General J. Marshall, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral E. King, assured the Soviet People's Commissar that they "very much wish to open a Second Front in Europe in 1942."

On August 12-15, 1942, the Moscow meeting of the heads of government of the USSR (I.V. Stalin), Great Britain (W. Churchill) and the representative of the US President (A. Harriman) took place, at which the British prime minister again stated that the allies would not be able to objectively reasons to open a Second Front in Europe in 1942

6. The ideology of German Nazism and the Nazi occupation regime on the territory of the USSR

The policy of the Nazi leaders towards the USSR was determined by their fanatical desire to first liquidate the Soviet Union as the first socialist state, then dismember it, and then engage in the physical destruction of millions of Russians, Little Russians, Belarusians and other peoples of our country. The lands cleared in this way up to the Urals were planned to be immediately populated by German colonists. Although at first the main goal of the Nazis was not the implementation of the delusional idea of ​​the racial “cleansing” of humanity, developed by the ideologists of European racism and eugenics F. Galton, J. Gobineau and H.S. Chamberlain, and the seizure at any cost, using the most inhumane methods, of “living space for the Aryan race” in the east and the conquest of world domination. Therefore, this war was initially presented as a “struggle for living space for the German nation” and was justified by the false thesis that the Germans were the only people on Earth deprived of the living space they needed.

This policy fully met the interests of all German elites, who had long been nurturing aggressive imperial plans for Europe, which included, among other things, the conquest and colonization of all of Eastern Europe up to the Urals and the Caucasus. The Nazi version of racial theory (A. Rosenberg, K. Meyer-Hetling) also had a significant influence on the goals of German aggression and occupation, which in practice turned out to be massacres and the extermination of entire nations. The racist assessment of “Lenin-Stalin communism” and the Soviet state as “worldwide Jewish Bolshevism,” as well as the combination of anti-Semitism with anti-communism, were not only a tool of Nazi propaganda, but also integral part programs of German National Socialism. The combination of these components determined the nature of Hitler’s Germany’s war against the USSR as a war of extermination, leading to genocide against European Jews and the extermination of millions of Slavs, primarily the Russian people.

German General G. Thomas, former head of the Department of Military Economy and Armaments of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW), said during interrogation in Nuremberg that one of the leaders of the German Reich, Reichsmarshal G. Goering in November 1940 told him the following reasons prompted A. Hitler to attack the Soviet Union:

1) the Bolsheviks will attack us sooner or later anyway, so their industry must be destroyed before they are ready for war;

2) the war against England will last longer than we expected, therefore, in order to provide food for the population of Central Europe, we need rich Ukrainian harvests;

3) we need to break through to the Caucasus in order to take possession of the Caucasian oil regions, since without them it is impossible to wage a large-scale air war against England and America.

Therefore, at the beginning of June 1941, at a meeting of the Oldenburg economic headquarters, General G. Thomas, justifying his main task to ensure “the fastest use of Russia’s economic potential, in particular in the food and fuel sector,” relied on the arguments given to him by G. Goering.

From the very beginning, the German campaign against the USSR was fundamentally different from the war that the Germans waged against other European countries, both in its goals and in the methods of warfare and occupation policy. These methods and goals were inhumane and contrary to all norms of international law and rules of war. Many archival documents indicate that already at the preparatory stage for the war against the USSR, Hitler’s Germany, along with its intentions to conquer “living space” in the East of Europe, that is, to acquire sources of industrial and agricultural raw materials, areas for selling goods and vast spaces for the settlement of Germans, also pursued other far-reaching goals. Over thirty years, that is, within the life of one generation, it was planned to destroy all Jews, communists and intellectuals, and significantly reduce the size of the local, mainly Slavic, population through deliberately organized famine, mass deportations, forced labor, etc. Those who remained in the living were to become helots, that is, slaves of the German colonialists. The Barbarossa plan envisaged military occupation of Soviet territory along the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line until the winter of 1941, then temporarily pursuing a distracting policy of “pacification” of this gigantic space, and only then beginning its methodical colonization and extermination of the majority of the local population.

Since the Nuremberg trials of the main German war criminals, debates have continued in historiography about who is personally responsible for setting criminal political goals in the war against the USSR, for the mass crimes committed by the Wehrmacht during military operations, and for the crimes of the German occupation authorities. They are trying to present the German political leadership as the main, if not the only culprit of these crimes, i.e. A. Hitler, G. Himmler, J. Goebbels, G. Goering, R. Heydrich and others. At the same time, the responsibility of all command and staff levels of the Wehrmacht - from the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW), the Supreme High Command of the Land Forces (OKH) and the command of army groups to the command of individual armies and divisions, to district, city and rural commandants - is often either rejected or deliberately downplayed. At the same time, they refer to the subordinate position of the military and the limitations of their competencies. There are also statements that the actions of the Wehrmacht were dictated by “military necessity”, since they were determined, on the one hand, by directives, the responsibility for the publication of which rests solely with A. Hitler, and on the other hand, they were only a response to the actions of the Red Army and Soviet partisans. They try to justify the countless crimes against prisoners of war, the civilian population and people holding high positions in the Soviet party, state and military leadership that were committed by the Wehrmacht on the occupied territory of the USSR by citing the fact that there was supposedly no alternative to “military utilitarianism”.

Moreover, modern historiography increasingly suggests that the German military did not view this war of annihilation as a means of achieving German world domination, and that their views and actions were not inherently racist. But after 1945, a huge number of archival documents were published concerning both the preparation and conduct of the war by Germany against the USSR, which convincingly prove the inconsistency of attempts to absolve the Wehrmacht of blame for the crimes it committed. All these documents eloquently indicate that it was the military authorities who formulated the main goals of the blockade of Leningrad and determined the nature of the German occupation policy in the Leningrad region. Therefore, huge casualties among the civilian population in the occupied territories, among the Red Army soldiers captured by the Germans, and Soviet partisans were a direct consequence of the Wehrmacht’s conscious refusal to comply with the established rules of war and international law.

Fundamental documents characterizing Germany's goals in the war against the USSR and the methods it used to achieve these goals were published in numerous documentary publications and in serious scientific works. It follows from them that already when preparing the first operational developments of the Barbarossa plan, in particular, the projects of generals G. Greifenberg, E. Marx, B. Lossberg and F. Paulus, created in July - November 1940, the German General Staff were guided by the fact , What The main goal of the war against the USSR is to establish “German living space.” Moreover, the chief of staff of the OKH operational leadership, Colonel General A. Jodl, directly wrote that after the liquidation of the Jewish-Bolshevik regime, it was necessary to resolutely prevent the emergence of a national Russia in the place of Bolshevik Russia. Let us note that all these ideas were formulated by the Wehrmacht generals long before, in March 1941, A. Hitler invited the entire top general to the Imperial Chancellery and directly told him that “The war against Soviet Russia should be waged to the point of complete destruction.”

The overwhelming majority of the highest ranks of the Wehrmacht accepted this instruction from the Fuhrer without objection and, with the outbreak of hostilities, were consistently guided by it. As part of this instruction from A. Hitler, already in April - May 1941, the OKH General Staff under the leadership of Colonel General V. Halder developed orders “On the establishment of a military occupation regime”, “On the activities of special Sonder commands and special groups of security police and SD", "On military jurisdiction" and others. The last order allowed mass executions of civilians on the territory of the USSR and freed representatives of the Wehrmacht from any responsibility for their crimes committed against the local civilian population in the occupied territory. As part of this instruction, the highest command authorities of the Wehrmacht in June 1941 issued the notorious “Order on Commissars,” according to which all political commissars and political workers of the Red Army should “in principle, destroy on the spot using weapons.” In parallel with the orders to wage a war of extermination issued by military authorities on the eve of the attack on the USSR, various civilian and paramilitary departments and institutions subordinate to G. Himmler and G. Goering developed policy documents on the economic exploitation and total plunder of the entire territory of the USSR. In addition, the immediate and subsequent goals of the occupation policy of the German authorities on the territory of the USSR were formulated in a number of fundamental documents of the Nazi leaders, for example, in the notorious “Green Folder” and the Ost General Plan, which contained the main goals of German Nazism: the colonization of the territories of Eastern Europe , extermination, Germanization and transformation of the peoples of Eastern European countries into slaves of the Third Reich. The well-known savage plan “Ost” was developed mainly by the Main Directorate of Imperial Security (RSHA) under the personal leadership of its “leaders” R. Heydrich (1939-1942), and then G. Himmler (1942-1945) and was approved by A. Hitler at the end of May 1940. The full text of this plan has never been found, but documents associated with it make it possible to restore its main provisions. In particular, it provided for the physical extermination of 30 million and the eviction from their places of traditional residence of over 50 million Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Poles, Czechs and other Slavic peoples in Western Siberia, to the North Caucasus, South America and even Africa. The liberated territories were planned to be populated by 10 million ethnic Germans, and the remaining population was to be forcibly Germanized and turned into slaves. At the same time, it was planned to create specially protected military settlements for the indigenous population, forcibly limit the birth rate of “subhumans,” and replace the national language German language and eliminate the entire system of middle and higher education in the national language.

In most of the territories subject to occupation, the invaders introduced strict labor conscription for all Soviet citizens aged 18 to 45 years (for Jews - from 18 to 60 years), for refusal and evasion of which, failure to comply with any orders of civil and military authorities, the slightest disobedience to them, resistance to robbery and violence, assistance to partisans, membership in communist party and the Komsomol, belonging to the Jewish nationality and simply without reason followed mass executions, hangings, beatings and lethal torture, imprisonment in concentration camps, etc.

First of all, Slavs, Jews and Gypsies, as well as all other “inferior peoples,” were subjected to repression by the fascist invaders. In Belarus, every fourth resident was killed, and in Ukraine, every sixth person died. In the occupied territories, death camps were created similar to the notorious Kurtenhof concentration camp. (Salaspils), where, according to general estimates, about 5 million Soviet citizens died. In total, in the occupied territory there were At least 7.5 million Soviet civilians were deliberately exterminated. A huge loss of human resources also occurred as a result of the forcible deportation of the most able-bodied part of the population of the occupied territories for forced labor in Germany and other European countries included in the Third Reich. Of the total number of Soviet citizens forcibly taken to work in Germany - almost 5.3 million people, after the end of the war about 2.6 million people were repatriated to their homeland, a little more than 450 thousand people did not return to their homeland and became emigrants. and the remaining 2 million 170 thousand people either died or died in captivity.

Fearing that the three Slavic Soviet republics would be a constant source of threat to Germany itself, Hitler's leadership considered it extremely dangerous to grant these territories any form of national statehood. It was planned that the territories closest to the Third Reich would be included in its composition, in particular, Western Belarus would become an integral part of East Prussia, and Western Ukraine would become part of a special Polish General Government, and special Reichskommissariates would be created in the remaining regions of the European part of the USSR.

Already at the end of July 1941, on the instructions of the Fuhrer, the Reichskommissariat Ostland was created, which included Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Northern Belarus and part of the Leningrad and Pskov regions of the RSFSR. Gauleiter G. Lohse was appointed head of this Reichskommissariat, whose residence was Riga. At the beginning of September 1941, by a new order of the German Fuhrer, the Reichskommissariat “Ukraine” was created, which included Volyn, Galicia, Podolia, Polesie and Crimea. Gauleiter E. Koch was appointed head of this Reichskommissariat, whose residence became Rivne. As we moved forward, it was also planned to create the Reichskommissariats "Caucasus" and "Muscovy", but, as we know, these extravagant plans of the Nazi invaders suffered a complete collapse.

All Reichskommissariats were divided into general commissariats, which, in turn, were divided into regional commissariats. The region consisted of several districts headed by chief burgomasters, and districts - of districts headed by the council. Each district included seven or eight volosts, which were led by volost elders - burgomasters, and in all villages and hamlets the German authorities appointed elders from among local residents. Control over the work of civil authorities in the territory of all Reichskommissariats was assigned to the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Regions, which was led by one of the main ideologists of German Nazism, A. Rosenberg.

In those occupied territories that were part of the rear areas of the Wehrmacht army groups, all power was concentrated in the hands of the military command. At the head of the military administration was the Quartermaster General of the High Command of the Ground Forces (OKW), Artillery General E. Wagner, to whom the commanders of the rear areas of the army groups were directly subordinate. In the rear areas of the armies, administrative power was in the hands of the commandants of the rear areas, and the heads of the primary bodies of the military occupation administration were field commandants and garrison commanders. Order in the rear areas of the troops and the protection of facilities were ensured by special security divisions, as well as by the police and various special units. Units of the Gestapo, Orpo, SD, SS and other special services of the German Reich operated in the occupied territory, in particular, operational groups and police formations, units of the Waffen-SS and Einsatzgruppen (combat death squads), which were called upon to monitor the local population and fight resistance occupation authorities and carry out demonstrative punitive actions. In addition, in a number of areas, the occupation authorities created pro-fascist military formations, unions and organizations from Soviet prisoners of war and local residents. They, of course, did not have a serious impact on the situation at the front, but they were a significant force in the hands of the Wehrmacht and the occupation authorities in the fight against active participants in the anti-fascist resistance.

One of the main tasks of the occupation administration was personal registration of the entire population in order to combat saboteurs, partisans and organize the workforce. All movements from cities and towns were permitted only with special passes issued at local commandant's offices, and only during the daytime. At the same time, mandatory registration of local residents was introduced, who were issued identity cards for a certain period of time, where, in addition to photographs and information about the place and date of birth, the external data of its owner were indicated: height, hair and eye color, special features, etc.

In addition, to intimidate the entire population of the occupied territories, mass executions and extermination of the inhabitants of entire villages and hamlets were widely used. The symbols of the atrocities of the German occupiers became the Belarusian village of Khatyn, where in March 1943 German and Ukrainian (Bandera) punitive forces from the 201st Schutzmannstaf battalion, formed on the basis of the Nachtigal (R. Shukhevych) and Roland (E. Pobigushchiy) battalions , burned all its inhabitants alive, including infants and young children, as well as Kiev’s Babi Yar, in which over 100 thousand people were shot. Millions of civilians were hanged, shot, buried alive in the ground, thrown into mine shafts, walled up in drifts, suffocated with automobile gases, and kept in concentration camps and reservations. Many people lost their lives for simply sheltering and treating Red Army soldiers, reading and distributing Soviet leaflets, Soviet radio messages, or simply on suspicion of disloyalty to the occupation authorities. Naturally, all these Nazi atrocities soon caused a powerful popular protest, visibly manifested in a powerful partisan movement throughout the occupied territory, especially in Belarus and Ukraine.

7. Partisan movement in occupied territory

An outstanding role during the Great Patriotic War was played by the partisan movement, which covered a significant part of the occupied territory of the country, primarily Belarus, Ukraine, Bryansk, Smolensk, Pskov, Leningrad and other regions of the RSFSR. The main tasks of the partisan movement were first set out in the joint directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "To the Party and Soviet organizations of the front-line regions" and in the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On the organization of the struggle in the rear of German troops", which were adopted shortly after the start of war - June 29 and July 18, 1941. These policy documents immediately formulated the main tasks of Soviet and party bodies in the fight against the Nazi invaders in the occupied territories: “In areas occupied by the enemy, create partisan detachments and sabotage groups to fight units of the enemy army, to incite partisan warfare everywhere, to blow up bridges, roads, damage telephone and telegraph communications, set fire to warehouses, and so on. In occupied areas, create unbearable conditions for the enemy and all his accomplices, pursue and destroy them at every step, and disrupt all their activities. To manage all this activity in advance, under the responsibility of the first secretaries of regional and district committees, create from the best people reliable underground cells and safe houses in every city, regional center, workers’ village, railway station, state and collective farms.” In addition, the most important areas of the struggle behind enemy lines, including the total destruction of trains and tracks, were formulated in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I.V. Stalin "On the tasks of the partisan movement", which was signed by him on September 5, 1942.

At the initial stage of the war, a special role in the formation and deployment of the partisan movement behind enemy lines was played by the 4th Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR, which was headed by a young but very experienced security officer-saboteur, Lieutenant General P.A. Sudoplatov. This department included the Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade for Special Purposes of the NKVD of the USSR, Colonel M.F. Orlov, from which small mobile reconnaissance and sabotage detachments were formed, thrown behind enemy lines, which then, as a rule, turned into large partisan detachments, brigades and formations. Initially, the partisans were armed mainly with light firearms - machine guns, light machine guns, rifles and carbines, but then many detachments and formations acquired mortars and heavy machine guns, and a number of them even acquired field artillery. All persons who joined partisan formations took a special partisan oath, and strict military discipline was established in the detachments themselves, violation of which was punishable by wartime laws

In May 1942, under the auspices of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TSSHPD) was created, which was headed by the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus, Lieutenant General P.K. Ponomarenko. There were two departments in the structure of the TSSHPD. The reconnaissance department of the TsShPD was responsible for the work of establishing new enemy military formations arriving at the front, regroupings of troops, the state and operation of the enemy’s communications, monitoring his measures to prepare protective and defensive lines, the deployment and relocation of airfields and ammunition depots, the number and combat effectiveness of field and security forces. units, as well as the political and economic situation in the occupied territory of the USSR. The operational department of the TsShPD directed the combat activities of partisan formations both through the corresponding headquarters of the partisan movement and directly. In addition, the Operations Department was engaged in the creation of raid partisan formations and detachments, the dispatch of organizational and sabotage groups and the reorganization of partisan formations, identified new areas of activity for them and assigned them combat missions, and also monitored the implementation of orders from the head of the Central Shpd.

In operational terms, the TsShPD was subordinate to all republican and regional headquarters of the partisan movement, which were headed by secretaries or members of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the union republics, regional committees, regional committees, city committees and district party committees. In particular, the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement was headed by a career security officer, deputy. Head of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, Major General T.A. Strokach, Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement - Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus, Major General P.Z. Kalinin, and the Lithuanian headquarters of the partisan movement - the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania A.Yu. Snechkus. The creation of headquarters for the partisan movement, as well as reliable channels of communication between partisan detachments and connections with the “Mainland” gave the partisan movement a much more organized character, which made it possible to coordinate the actions of the partisans with units of the regular Red Army on a large scale.

In September 1942, the position of Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement was established, to which Marshal K.E., a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, was appointed. Voroshilov, and the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement was reassigned to him. In November 1942, the newly appointed partisan commander-in-chief submitted to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the State Defense Committee a proposal to create a regular partisan army in the rear of the German troops. However, after studying this issue, his proposal was rejected, and in May 1943, the post of commander-in-chief of the partisan movement was abolished. From now on, the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, which included Lieutenant General P.K. Ponomarenko, People's Commissar of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, Major General V.T. Sergienko and the head of the Radio Intelligence Directorate of the GRU NO USSR, Major General T.F. Korneev, was again directly subordinate to the Supreme Command Headquarters and personally to I.V. Stalin.

Initially, in 1941–1942, the main tactical unit of the Soviet partisans was the partisan detachment, which during the war became one of the main organizational structures and the most common combat unit of all partisan formations. According to their purpose, all partisan detachments were divided into ordinary (unitary), special (reconnaissance and sabotage), cavalry, artillery, marching, headquarters, reserve and local self-defense. As a rule, these detachments had 35-90 personnel and were divided into two or three combat groups. The first partisan detachments were named after the place of deployment (Putivlsky, Shepetovsky, Pinsky) or by the name and nickname of the commander (the “Batysh Minaya” detachment, the “Batki Panas” detachment), and a little later they began to be given the names of Soviet leaders, famous Soviet commanders and legendary heroes of the revolution and civil war, for example, partisan joy to them. CM. Kirov, Separate Partisan Otrad named after. ON THE. Shchorsa, 3rd Partisan Detachment named after. G.K. Zhukov, 2nd partisan detachment named after. V.P. Chkalov, etc. The largest and most effective partisan detachments, which destroyed tens of thousands of German occupiers, thousands of units of military equipment and hundreds of tons of ammunition, food and fodder, were partisan detachments and sabotage and reconnaissance groups “Winners” (D.N. Medvedev) , “For the Motherland” (I.M. Bovkun), “Patriot” (A.S. Azonchik), “Falcons” (K.P. Orlovsky), “Hunters” (NA Prokopyuk), “Second” (N.V. Zebnitsky), “Combat” (V.L. Neklyudov), “Local” (S.A. Vaupshasov), “Help” (B.L. Galushkin) and others, whose commanders were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Then many units began to unite into partisan brigades and formations numbering from several hundred to several thousand fighters. The partisan brigade became the main organizational form of partisan formations around the fall of 1942 and usually consisted of 4–8 detachments (battalions), depending on their size. Many of them included cavalry units, artillery, mortar and machine gun platoons, companies and batteries (divisions). The number of partisan brigades constantly fluctuated from several hundred to several thousand fighters. The brigade's management usually consisted of a commander, a commissar, a chief of staff, deputy commanders for reconnaissance and sabotage, an assistant commander for support, the head of medical service and a deputy commissar for Komsomol. Most brigades had headquarters companies or platoons of communications, security, a radio station, an underground printing house, many had their own hospitals, workshops for repairing weapons and property, combat support platoons, landing sites for aircraft, etc. Among the most productive brigades, whose commanders became Heroes of the Soviet Union, were the Chashniksky partisan brigade (F.F. Dubrovsky), the Minsk partisan brigade “Uncle Kolya” (P.G. Lopatin), the 3rd Latvian partisan brigade (O.P. Oshkaln), the 123rd partisan brigade (F.I. Pavlovsky), partisan brigade "People's Avengers" (G.F. Pokrovsky), partisan brigade "Elusive" (M.S. Prudnikov), partisan brigade "Zheleznyak" (I.F. Zheleznyak), partisan brigade named after D.E. Kravtsova (M.I. Duka) and many others.

During the same period, several famous partisan formations arose - the likeness of entire partisan armies, built on the principle of large military formations of the operational-tactical level, which were led by such legendary commanders awarded general ranks as twice Heroes of the Soviet Union S.A. Kovpak (Sumy partisan unit) and A.F. Fedorov (Chernigov-Volyn partisan unit), Heroes of the Soviet Union A.N. Saburov (Zhitomir partisan unit), D.V. Emlyutin (Bryansk partisan unit), P.P. Vershigora (First Ukrainian Partisan Division), M.I. Naumov (United Cavalry Unit), V.Z. Korzh (Pinsk partisan unit), R.N. Machulsky (Minsk partisan unit), I.P. Kozhar (Gomel partisan unit) and others.

In addition, tens of thousands of Soviet patriots fought against the occupiers as part of numerous underground committees and groups, the work of which was led by republican committees, regional committees, city committees and district party committees. Many of the leaders of these underground committees died a heroic death and were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, including the first secretary of the Kharkov underground regional committee of the CP(b)U I.I. Bakulin, secretaries of the Zhitomir underground regional committee of the Communist Party (b) U A.D. Boroday, I.F. Bugaichenko and G.I. Shelushkov, secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk underground regional committee of the Communist Party (b)U N.I. Stankov, Secretary of the Minsk Underground City Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Bolsheviks) I.P. Kazinets, head of the Vinnitsa city underground party organization I.V. Bevz, secretary of the Kyiv underground district committee of the Communist Party (b)U A.S. Pirogovsky, secretary of the Vilnius underground city committee of the Communist Party (b)L Yu.T. Vitas, secretary of the Nizhyn underground committee of the Komsomol Ya.P. Batyuk, Secretary of the Riga Underground Committee of the Komsomol I.Ya. Sudmalis, members of the headquarters of the legendary Krasnodon underground organization “Young Guard” O.V. Koshevoy, S.G. Tyulenin, I.A. Zemnukhov, U.M. Gromova and L.G. Shevtsova and many others.

The main elements of the partisan struggle against the fascist occupiers were:

1) sabotage activities and destruction of enemy infrastructure (rail war, destruction of communication lines, poisoning and destruction of water pipelines, etc.);

2) destruction of ammunition depots, equipment, fuel and food, attacks on headquarters and other military institutions behind enemy lines and destruction of materiel at enemy airfields;

3) intelligence and intelligence work in the rear of German military units, police and civil administration of the Reichskommissariats;

4) destruction of enemy personnel and physical liquidation of traitors (collaborators) and leaders of the occupation authorities;

5) restoration and preservation of the institutions of Soviet power, party agitation and propaganda in the occupied territory of the country;

6) accurate information to the regular military units of the Red Army and the Soviet command about the location, number and movements of enemy troops, etc.

The peak of the partisan movement occurred during the period of radical change in the course of the war, and since June 1943, the actions of many partisan detachments, brigades and formations acquired an organized character and became part of the largest combined arms operations, for example, the legendary Operation Rail War (August - September 1943 .) and “Concert” (September - October 1943) on the territory of Leningrad, Kalinin, Smolensk, Oryol, Belgorod, Kharkov, Sumy, Chernigov, Gomel, Vitebsk and other regions, the direct organization and implementation of which was led by the “grandfather of Soviet special forces” Colonel I.G. Starinov.

By the beginning of 1944, about 1,100 partisan detachments, brigades and formations with a total number of over 180 thousand people were operating in the occupied territory, which during the war years destroyed more than 600,000 soldiers and Wehrmacht, 4,000 tanks, more than 1,000 aircraft and derailed more than 20,000 echelons with enemy manpower and equipment. Soviet saboteurs and underground fighters managed to eliminate many leaders of the Third Reich. In particular, the legendary reconnaissance saboteur N.I. Kuznetsov personally destroyed the highest officials of the Reichskommissariat "Ukraine" General G. Gehl and Oberführer A. Funk, the Vice-Governor of Galicia Dr. O. Bauer and the commander of the 740th formation of the "Eastern battalions" Major General M. Ilgen, and the brave Belarusian partisan reconnaissance M.B. Osipova, E.G. Mazanik and N.V. The Trojans eliminated the Commissar General of Belarus V. Kube.

Plan "Barbarossa". Disposition and balance of forces

on the eve of the war.

On December 5, 1940, Hitler made the final decision to start a war with the USSR, confirmed on December 18 by Directive 21. By the beginning of 1941, a detailed plan of military operations, Barbarossa, was developed. It was designed for a “lightning war” and was based on the coordinated actions of four army groups:

Finnish (commanded by German General von Dietl and Finnish Field Marshal Mannerheim) - was aimed at Murmansk, White Sea Region and Ladoga;

“North” (commander - Field Marshal V. Leeb; goal - to destroy Soviet troops in the Baltic states, capture ports in the Baltic Sea and Leningrad) - to Leningrad;

“Center” (under the command of Field Marshal F. Bock; the goal is an attack on Minsk, then on Smolensk and Moscow) - on Moscow;

“South” (Commander Field Marshal G. Rundstedt; the goal is to reach the Dnieper and launch an offensive to the southeast) - to occupy Ukraine.

Germany put up to 5.5 million soldiers and officers against the USSR; the USSR could oppose it with only 2.7 million people.

Stages of the Great Patriotic War.

Historians usually divide the entire course of hostilities into three periods:

3) the period of liberation of the USSR and the defeat of Nazi Germany (1944 - May 9, 1945). The USSR's participation in World War II continued with the period of the Soviet-Japanese War (August 9 - September 2, 1945).

The beginning of the war.

The war began on the morning of June 22, 1941, with aerial bombardment and an offensive by ground forces. Already on the first day, German aircraft bombed 66 airfields and destroyed 1,200 Soviet aircraft.

On the very first day of the war, three fronts were formed on the basis of the border military districts: Northwestern (commander - General F.I. Kuznetsov), Western (under the command of General D.G. Pavlov) and Southwestern (commander - General M. P. Kirponos). On June 24, the fourth, the Northern Front, was created (under the command of General M.M. Popov).

On June 23, the Headquarters of the High Command was established, transformed in August into the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. It was headed by Stalin.

On June 29, 1941, martial law was introduced in the country. The next day, the State Defense Committee (GKO) was created, officially becoming the highest body of state and military power. I.V. was appointed Chairman of the State Defense Committee. Stalin. The State Defense Committee also included V.M. Molotov, G.M. Malenkov, L.P. Beria, and later - N.A. Voznesensky, L.M. Kaganovich, N.A. Bulganin.

Military defeats 1941 - 1942 yearsAndtheircauses.

In the first three weeks of the war, 28 Soviet divisions were completely defeated, 72 by more than half. German troops advanced 300 - 600 km deep into Soviet territory, occupying Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, right-bank Ukraine, and almost all of Moldova.

The Soviet side tried to organize counterattacks at the end of June - in the Rivne and Dubno areas. Brody, in July - in the Llepel and Bobruisk directions, in the Soltsy - Berdichev areas and south of Kiev. In the Smolensk area, Soviet troops held the line from July 16 to August 15, which created a strategic and psychological delay in the implementation of the “blitzkrieg” plan.

On August 23, Hitler demanded from his troops not only the capture of Moscow, but also the mastery of the resources of Ukraine and the Caucasus. The offensive on the flanks developed quickly. In the northwest, Tikhvin and Vyborg were taken; On September 9, Leningrad was blocked. In the southwest, on September 19, Kyiv was surrounded, where about 650 thousand people were captured. Having taken Kyiv, the Germans launched an attack on the Donbass and Crimea and on November 3 approached Sevastopol.

Despite visible successes, in the first five weeks of the war the German army lost about 200 thousand people (twice as many as in two years of war in Europe), over 1.5 thousand tanks and 1 thousand aircraft. But the Soviet side also suffered huge losses: up to 5 million people captured, killed and wounded, a significant part of military equipment.

Among the reasons for the defeat of the Red Army at the beginning of the war, the main ones were:

1) the military-economic potential of Germany, which used the resources of almost all of Western Europe, significantly exceeded the military-economic potential of the USSR;

2) Hitler’s army was mobilized and had two years of experience in modern warfare, while the professional level of the Soviet troops, especially the command staff, decreased after mass repressions in the army;

3) major miscalculations of the Soviet leadership in military technology, in particular, underestimation of the role of mechanized formations, outdated ideas about methods of waging war in the initial period;

4) miscalculations by Stalin and his entourage in analyzing the international situation, in determining the timing of the possible outbreak of war, which led to the surprise of the enemy’s attack.

Moscow battle. Spring offensive.

The central event of the first period of the war was the Battle of Moscow.

Under the general name “Battle of Moscow” they combine defensive (September 30 - December 5, 1941) and offensive (December 5, 1941 - April 20, 1942) operations carried out by Western troops (I.S. Konev, from October 10 - G. K. Zhukov), Reserve (S. M. Budyonny). Bryansk (A.I. Eremenko), Kalinin (I.S. Konev) and Southwestern (S.K. Timoshenko) fronts.

On September 24, the command of Army Group Center made the final adjustments to the plan for Operation Typhoon - an attack on Moscow. The first line of Soviet defense was broken on the line between Rzhev and Vyazma on October 5; On October 6, Bryansk fell. The German offensive was delayed for several days by the second line of defense - near Mozhaisk. On October 10, Zhukov was appointed commander of the Western Front. On October 12, the Germans occupied Kaluga, and on October 14, Kalinin.

On November 16, the Nazi offensive resumed: by the end of November - beginning of December they managed to reach the Moscow-Volga canal, cross it (Khimki was occupied on December 5), cross the Nara River north and south of Naro-Fominsk, approach Kashira, but failed to advance further. Operation Typhoon failed, the plan for a “lightning war” was thwarted; On December 6, the troops of the Kalinin, Western and right wing of the Southwestern Front launched a counteroffensive. Kaluga, Orel, Kalinin were returned, and in some sectors of the front the advance reached 120 kilometers in December alone. However, the next month the counteroffensive fizzled out, and by March 1942 the front stabilized on the line Velikie Luki - Gzhatsk - Kirov, Oka.

On April 8, the order was given to go on the offensive in the expectation that the Wehrmacht would quickly exhaust its strength. However, from April to October 1942, the Red Army suffered a number of serious defeats. Events developed especially dramatically in the South-Western direction. On June 28, having seized the strategic initiative, the Germans went on the offensive east of Kursk, trying to encircle and destroy the troops of the Bryansk and then the Southwestern and Southern fronts. On July 2, the Soviet defense line was broken through at the junction of the Bryansk and Southwestern fronts, and on July 15, between the Don and Seversky Donets, the second line of defense was broken through. On July 24, Soviet troops left Rostov and retreated beyond the Don.

In August, the Germans launched an offensive in the Caucasian direction - on August 5 they occupied Stavropol, on the 11th - Krasnodar, on the 14th - Novorossiysk. Thus, despite the failure of the “blitzkrieg” plan, the heavy German losses and the variable success of the battles, the military campaigns of 1941 and the summer of 1942, in general, developed unsuccessfully for the USSR, and a turn in the war would occur only in the summer of 1943.

The attack on the Soviet Union occurred without a declaration of war in the morning hours of June 22, 1941. Despite long preparations for the war, the attack turned out to be completely unexpected for the USSR, since the German leadership did not even have a pretext for the attack.

The military events of the first weeks inspired full hope for the success of the next “blitzkrieg”. Armored formations advanced quickly and occupied vast areas of the country. In major battles and encirclement, the Soviet Army suffered millions of losses in killed and captured. A large amount of military equipment was destroyed or captured as trophies. Once again it seemed that the doubts and feelings of fear that had spread in Germany, despite careful ideological preparation, were refuted by the successes of the Wehrmacht. The Church Board of Trustees of the German Evangelical Church expressed the sentiments of many by assuring Hitler by telegraph that “he is supported by the entire evangelical Christianity of the Reich in the decisive battles with the mortal enemy of order and Western Christian culture.”

The successes of the Wehrmacht caused various reactions from the Soviet side. There were manifestations of panic and confusion, soldiers left their military units. And even Stalin addressed the population for the first time only on July 3. In areas captured or annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939/40. part of the population welcomed the Germans as liberators. Nevertheless, from the first day of the war, Soviet troops showed unexpectedly strong resistance even in the most hopeless situations. And the civilian population actively participated in the evacuation and relocation of militarily important industrial facilities beyond the Urals.

Stubborn Soviet resistance and heavy losses of the German Wehrmacht (up to December 1, 1941, about 200,000 killed and missing, almost 500,000 wounded) soon dashed German hopes for an easy and quick victory. Autumn mud, snow and terrible cold in winter hampered the Wehrmacht's military operations. The German army was not prepared for war in winter conditions; it was believed that by this time victory would have already been achieved. The attempt to capture Moscow as the political center of the Soviet Union failed, although German troops approached the city at a distance of 30 kilometers. At the beginning of December, the Soviet Army unexpectedly launched a counteroffensive, which was successful not only near Moscow, but also on other sectors of the front. Thus, the concept of lightning war finally collapsed.

In the summer of 1942, new forces were accumulated to advance in the southern direction. Although German troops managed to capture large territories and advance as far as the Caucasus, they were unable to gain a foothold anywhere. The oil fields were in Soviet hands, and Stalingrad became a bridgehead on the western bank of the Volga. In November 1942, the German front line on the territory of the Soviet Union reached its greatest extent, but there could be no talk of decisive success.

Chronicle of the war from June 1941 to November 1942

22.6.41. The beginning of the German attack, the advance of three army groups. Romania, Italy, Slovakia, Finland and Hungary entered the war on the side of Germany.

29/30.6.41 The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks declares the war a “patriotic” war of the entire people; formation of the State Defense Committee.

July August. German offensive along the entire front, destruction of large Soviet formations in the encirclement (Bialystok and Minsk: 328,000 prisoners, Smolensk: 310,000 prisoners).

September. Leningrad is cut off from the rest of the country. East of Kyiv, over 600,000 Soviet soldiers were captured and surrounded. The general offensive of the German troops, which suffer heavy losses, is slowed down due to the constant resistance of the Soviet Army.

2.10.41. The offensive on Moscow began; some sections of the front line at the end of November were 30 km from Moscow.

5.12.41. The beginning of the Soviet counter-offensive with fresh forces near Moscow, the German retreat. After Hitler's intervention, Army Group Center's defensive positions were stabilized in January 1942 at the cost of heavy losses. Soviet success in the south.

12/11/41. Germany declares war on the USA.

In 1941, the Soviet Army lost 1.5 - 2.5 million soldiers killed and about 3 million captured. The number of civilian deaths is not precisely established, but is estimated in the millions. The losses of the German army were about 200,000 people killed and missing.

January - March 1942 Wide winter offensive of the Soviet Army, partly successful, but did not achieve its goals due to heavy losses. The losses of the German army in manpower and equipment were also so great that continuing the offensive on a broad front turned out to be difficult. this moment impossible.

May. The failure of the Soviet offensive near Kharkov; During the counter-offensive, 250,000 Soviet soldiers were surrounded and captured.

June July. Capture of the fortress of Sevastopol and thereby the entire Crimea. The beginning of the German summer offensive, with the goal of reaching the Volga and capturing oil fields in the Caucasus. The Soviet side, in view of Germany's new victories, is in a state of crisis.

August. German troops reach the Caucasus Mountains, but are unable to decisively defeat the Soviet troops.

September. The beginning of the battles for Stalingrad, which was almost entirely captured by the Germans in October. Nevertheless, the Soviet bridgehead on the western bank of the Volga under the command of General Chuikov could not be destroyed.

9.11.42. The beginning of the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad.

50 The Soviet population listens on the street to the government announcement about the beginning of the war, June 22, 1941.

Text 33
From a radio speech by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov on June 22, 1941.

Citizens and women of the Soviet Union! The Soviet government and its head, Comrade Stalin, instructed me to make the following statement:

Today, at 4 o'clock in the morning, without declaring any claims against the Soviet Union, without declaring war, German troops attacked our country, attacked our borders in many places and bombed our cities from their planes - Zhitomir, Kiev, Sevastopol, Kaunas and some others, and more than two hundred people were killed and wounded. Enemy air raids and artillery shelling were also carried out from Romanian and Finnish territories. This unheard of attack on our country is a treachery unparalleled in the history of civilized nations. The attack on our country was carried out despite the fact that a non-aggression treaty was concluded between the USSR and Germany, and the Soviet government fulfilled all the terms of this treaty in all good faith. The attack on our country was carried out despite the fact that during the entire duration of this treaty the German government could never make a single claim against the USSR regarding the implementation of the treaty. All responsibility for this predatory attack on the Soviet Union will fall entirely on the German fascist rulers. [...]

This war was imposed on us not by the German people, not by German workers, peasants and intellectuals, whose suffering we well understand, but by a clique of bloodthirsty fascist rulers of Germany who enslaved the French, Czechs, Poles, Serbs, Norway, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Greece and other peoples . [...]

This is not the first time our people have had to deal with an attacking, arrogant enemy. At one time, our people responded to Napoleon’s campaign in Russia with a Patriotic War and Napoleon was defeated and came to his collapse. The same will happen to the arrogant Hitler, who announced a new campaign against our country. The Red Army and all our people will once again wage a victorious patriotic war for the Motherland, for honor, for freedom.

Text 34
An excerpt from Elena Scriabina’s diary dated June 22, 1941 about the news of the German attack.

Molotov’s speech sounded hesitantly, hurriedly, as if he was short of breath. His encouragement sounded completely out of place. Immediately there was a feeling that a monster was slowly approaching menacingly and terrifying everyone. After the news, I ran out into the street. The city was in panic. People quickly exchanged a few words, rushed into stores and bought everything they could get their hands on. They rushed through the streets as if beside themselves; many went to savings banks to take away their savings. This wave overwhelmed me, too, and I tried to get rubles from my savings book. But I arrived too late, the cash register was empty, the payment was suspended, everyone was making noise and complaining. And the June day was blazing, the heat was unbearable, someone felt bad, someone cursed in despair. The whole day the mood was restless and tense. Only in the evening it became strangely quiet. It seemed that everyone was huddled somewhere in horror.

Text 35
Excerpts from the diary of NKVD Major Shabalin from October 6 to October 19, 1941

Major Shabalin died on October 20. when trying to get out of the environment. The diary was transferred to the German army for military analysis. Back translation from German; the original is lost.

Diary
NKVD Major Shabalin,
boss special department NKVD
at 50 army

For accuracy of transmission
Chief of Staff of the 2nd Tank Army
Subp. Frh.f. Liebenstein
[...]

The army is not what we are used to thinking and imagining at home. Huge shortage of everything. The attacks of our armies are disappointing.

We are interrogating a red-haired German prisoner, a shabby, man-haired guy, extremely stupid. [...]

The situation with personnel is very difficult; almost the entire army consists of people whose homelands were captured by the Germans. They want to go home. Inactivity at the front and sitting in the trenches demoralize the Red Army soldiers. There are cases of drunkenness among command and political personnel. People sometimes don't return from reconnaissance. [...]

The enemy has us surrounded. Continuous cannonade. Duel of artillerymen, mortarmen and machine gunners. Danger and fear almost all day long. I'm not even talking about the forest, swamp and overnight stay. Since the 12th I haven’t slept anymore, since October 8th I haven’t read a single newspaper.

Creepy! I wander around, there are corpses around, the horrors of war, continuous shelling! Hungry and sleepless again. I took a bottle of alcohol. I went into the forest to investigate. Our complete destruction is obvious. The army was defeated, the convoy was destroyed. I am writing in the forest by the fire. In the morning I lost all the security officers, I was left alone among strangers. The army fell apart.

I spent the night in the forest. I haven't eaten bread for three days. There are a lot of Red Army soldiers in the forest; there are no commanders. Throughout the night and morning, the Germans fired at the forest with weapons of all kinds. At about 7 o'clock in the morning we got up and walked north. The shooting continues. At the rest stop I washed my face. [...]

We walked all night in the rain through marshy areas. Pitchless darkness. I was soaked to the skin, my right leg was swollen; it's terribly hard to walk.

Text 36
Field mail letter from non-commissioned officer Robert Rupp to his wife dated July 1, 1941 about the attitude towards Soviet prisoners of war.

They say that the Fuhrer issued an order that prisoners and those who surrender are no longer subject to execution. It makes me happy. Finally! Many of the shot people I saw on the ground lay with their hands raised up, without weapons or even a belt. I've seen at least a hundred people like this. They say that even a parliamentarian walking with a white flag was shot dead! After lunch they said that the Russians were surrendering in whole companies. The method was bad. Even the wounded were shot.

Text 37
Diary entry of former ambassador Ulrich von Hassell dated 18.8.1941 regarding Wehrmacht war crimes.

Ulrich von Hassell took an active part in the anti-Hitler Resistance of conservative circles and was executed after the assassination attempt on Hitler on July 20, 1944.

18. 8. 41 [...]

The whole war in the east is terrible, general savagery. One young officer received an order to destroy 350 civilians, including women and children, herded into a large barn, at first he refused to do this, but he was told that this was a failure to comply with the order, after which he asked for 10 minutes to think and finally did it , together with some others, directed machine-gun bursts into the open door of the barn into a crowd of people, and then, finishing off those still alive with machine guns. He was so shocked by this that, having later received a slight wound, he firmly decided not to return to the front.

Text 38
Excerpts from the order of the commander of the 17th Army, Colonel General Khot, dated November 17, 1941, regarding the basic principles of warfare.

Command
17th Army A.Gef.St.,
1a No. 0973/41 secret. from 11/17/41
[...]

2. The campaign to the East should end differently than, for example, the war against the French. This summer it is becoming increasingly clear to us that here, in the East, two internally irresistible views are fighting against each other: the German sense of honor and race, the centuries-old German army against the Asian type of thinking and primitive instincts, fueled by a small number of mainly Jewish intellectuals: fear of whip, neglect of moral values, equalization with inferiors, neglect of one’s life of no value.

51 The launch of German Junker Ju-87 (Stukas) dive bombers from a field airfield in the Soviet Union, 1941.

52 German infantry on the march, 1941

53 Soviet prisoners dig their own grave, 1941.

54 Soviet prisoners before execution, 1941. Both photographs (53 and 54) were in the wallet of a German soldier who died near Moscow. The location and circumstances of the shooting are unknown.

More strongly than ever, we believe in the historical turn when the German people, by virtue of the superiority of their race and their successes, will take over the government of Europe. We realize more clearly our calling to save European culture from Asian barbarism. Now we know that we have to fight an embittered and stubborn enemy. This struggle can only end in the destruction of one side or the other; there can be no agreement. [...]

6. I demand that every soldier in the army be imbued with pride in our successes and a sense of unconditional superiority. We are the masters of this country which we have conquered. Our sense of dominance is expressed not in well-fed tranquility, not in disdainful behavior, and not even in the selfish abuse of power by individuals, but in conscious opposition to Bolshevism, in strict discipline, unyielding determination and tireless vigilance.

8. There should be absolutely no place for sympathy and softness towards the population. The Red soldiers brutally killed our wounded; they brutally dealt with the prisoners and killed them. We must remember this if the population that once endured the Bolshevik yoke now wants to accept us with joy and worship. One should behave towards Volksdeutsche with a sense of self-awareness and calm restraint. The fight against impending food difficulties should be left to the self-government of the enemy population. Any trace of active or passive resistance or any machinations of Bolshevik-Jewish instigators must be immediately eradicated. The need for brutal measures against elements hostile to the people and our policy must be understood by the soldiers. [...]

In everyday life, we should not lose sight of the global significance of our struggle against Soviet Russia. The Russian mass has been paralyzing Europe for two centuries. The need to take Russia into account and the fear of its possible attack constantly dominated political relations in Europe and hampered peaceful development. Russia is not a European, but an Asian state. Every step into the depths of this dull, enslaved country allows one to see this difference. Europe and especially Germany must be freed forever from this pressure and from the destructive forces of Bolshevism.

For this we fight and work.

Commander Hoth (signed)
Send to the following units: regiments and individual battalions, including construction and service units, to the patrol commander; distributor 1a; reserve = 10 copies.

Text 39
Report from the rear commander of the 2nd Panzer Army, General von Schenkendorff, dated March 24, 1942, regarding the looting.

Commander of the 2nd Tank Army 24.3.42
Rel.: unauthorized requisition;
Application

1) The rear commander of the 2nd Tank Army in a daily report dated 2/23/42: “The unauthorized requisition by German soldiers near Navleya is increasing. From Gremyachey (28 km southwest of Karachev), soldiers from the Karachevo area took 76 cows without a certificate, and from Plastovoye (32 km southwest of Karachev) - 69 cows. In both places there was not a single head of cattle left. In addition, the Russian law enforcement service in Plastov was disarmed; the next day the village was occupied by partisans. In the area of ​​Sinezerko (25 km south of Bryansk), soldiers of the platoon commander, Fel-Feb Sebastian (code 2), wildly requisitioned livestock, and in a neighboring village they shot at the village headman and his assistants. [...]

Such cases are being reported more and more frequently. In this regard, I especially point out the orders issued on the conduct of troops and their supply in the country in accordance with the order. They are once again reflected in the application.”

Sergei Varshavchik, RIA Novosti columnist.

November 1941 is the 27th month of World War II. The severe crisis in which the Red Army found itself had not yet been overcome: . However, unlike, due to increased resistance in a number of places, German troops had to pause their advance to the east, and in some places even retreat. The blitzkrieg machine began to crack.

Don't let the enemy gain a foothold

By November 1941, the German Army Group North, having abandoned the assault on Leningrad, carried out, together with Finnish troops, a systematic blockade of the northern capital of the USSR. All communications between the city on the Neva and the mainland were cut off. The defenders of the city had only a communication route along Lake Ladoga, since part of the land coast was in their hands. The Nazis decided to cut this thin “thread” too, moving the fighting to the east of the Leningrad region.

Fierce fighting broke out on the approaches to the cities of Volkhov and Tikhvin. The latter was captured on November 9 by the German 39th Panzer Corps.

On the same day, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command removed General Yakovlev from his post as commander of the 4th Army, appointing in his place the former Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General Meretskov. The next day, an order came from Moscow: “in order to prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold in Tikhvin, subject the city of Tikhvin to continuous aerial bombardment day and night, using incendiary bombs and cartridges.” On November 19, a heavy counter-battle began for the city, during which both sides repeatedly launched counterattacks for several weeks.

As for Volkhov, the German offensive in this direction was stopped only by November 25. As a result, the front line passed only 6 kilometers south of this city. Realizing that they were facing a “tough nut to crack,” the German command shifted the spearhead of the attack west of Volkhov, to the area of ​​the village of Voybokalo. But the onslaught of the Wehrmacht was repelled there too. On November 28, Soviet troops, with a powerful counterattack, pushed the enemy even further from Volkhov, partially liberating the Volkhov-Tikhvin railway line.

On the verge of major success

In the Moscow direction, after frosts hit in early November and the roads became more passable, the Germans began the second stage of Operation Typhoon. The idea was simple - to defeat the flanking units of the Soviet troops from the north and south and encircle Moscow. The main attacks on November 15-18 were delivered in the direction of Klin-Rogachevo and Tula-Kashira.

Having brought 51 divisions into battle, including 13 tank and 7 motorized, the Germans managed to achieve significant tactical successes. By the end of November, having captured Klin, Solnechnogorsk, Istra and Krasnaya Polyana, the enemy advanced from the northwest and north to the near approaches to Moscow.

A wall of water prevented further advance: the spillways of the Istrinsky, Ivankovsky reservoirs and reservoirs of the Moscow Canal were blown up. As a result, a water flow up to 2.5 meters high was formed over a distance of up to 50 kilometers. Attempts by the Germans to close the spillways were unsuccessful. Meanwhile, the Soviet 1st Shock and 20th Armies, transferred to the Western Front, covered the gap between the 30th and 16th Armies. As a result, the enemy was stopped and forced to temporarily go on the defensive.

In the Tula area, units of the 2nd and 4th German armies tried to take the city on the move, but their frontal attacks were repulsed. Then General Guderian decided to bypass the city from the southeast and east with the forces of the 2nd Panzer Group. But by November 7, in the area of ​​​​the village of Dedilovo, the German advance was stopped due to a strong counterattack by the 50th and 3rd Soviet armies on the flanks of the attackers.

Having regrouped their forces, the Germans resumed their offensive, taking Dedilovo on November 18, and Stalinogorsk (now the city of Novomoskovsk) on the 25th. By November 24, Tula found itself semi-surrounded. But the Nazis failed to destroy the Soviet units north of the city, despite a strong blow to the right flank of the Soviet 50th Army.

At the same time, east of Tula, the 2nd Tank Army at the end of November stood on the verge of a major success, which could lead to dire consequences for the defenders of Moscow. Having captured the city of Skopin on November 25, units of the 18th German Panzer Division, practically without encountering resistance, quickly moved in the direction Ryazan region. This area, located at the junction of the Western and Southwestern fronts, turned out to be bare. The threat of a deep enemy breakthrough into the Soviet rear was eliminated by the sailors from the 84th Marines who were urgently transferred here. rifle brigade. They not only stopped the attackers, but also recaptured Skopin from the Germans on November 28, holding out until units of the 10th Soviet Army arrived.

Successes on the Soviet-German front were not cheap for the Wehrmacht. On November 30, 1941, the chief of staff of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces, General Halder, wrote in his diary: “the shortage on the Eastern Front is 340,000 people, that is, half the combat strength of the infantry. Now companies have an average of 50-60 people.”

Hitler's Fury

On November 5, units of Army Group South under Field Marshal von Rundstedt began an active offensive in the direction of Rostov-on-Don. The main target of the onslaught is the Caucasus and its oil. The city itself was defended by the 56th Army of General Remezov. After a week of stubborn fighting, on November 21, the Germans managed to capture the capital of the Don, but on November 29, Soviet troops drove the invaders out of the city.

On the same day, Stalin sent a jubilant telegram to the commander of the Southern Front, General Cherevichenko, and the commander-in-chief of the South-Western direction, Marshal Timoshenko: “I congratulate you on your victory over the enemy and the liberation of Rostov from the Nazi invaders. I greet the valiant troops of the 9th and 56th armies led by Generals Kharitonov and Remezov, who hoisted our glorious Soviet banner over Rostov."

Rundstedt ordered his troops to retreat to the Mius River line. Hitler was furious and removed him from command, replacing him with Field Marshal von Reichenau. However, he, having arrived at the place, confirmed the order of his predecessor. As a result, the front line along the Mius River stabilized until the summer of 1942.

Meanwhile, in Crimea, after the evacuation of the 51st Army to Kuban, only one small “enclave” remained in the hands of the Red Army - Sevastopol. Its defense was strengthened by the Primorsky Army of General Petrov, which had experience defending Odessa.

On the approaches to Sevastopol, from the end of October, battles broke out with the advanced detachments of the 11th German Army of General von Manstein. On November 11, with the arrival of the main forces of the 11th Army, the Germans launched a large-scale attack on the city. However, over the course of 10 days they managed to only slightly penetrate certain defense lines.

In his memoirs, Manstein cited the weather as the reason for the failure. “The Russian winter prevented us... Continuous rains began in Crimea, which in the shortest possible time disabled all roads without hard surfaces... By November 17, 50% of our transport was out of order for technical reasons. On the mainland, in the north, severe frost was already raging , which disabled four of the five locomotives we then had at our disposal south of the Dnieper,” the field marshal complained.

As a result, the first attempt by the Nazis to storm the city of Russian glory failed, and a short time There was a lull in this sector of the front.

Operation Crusader

By November 1941, fighting in northern Africa intensified. British troops, having recovered from the spring-summer successes of the German General Rommel, launched an offensive in Libya against German-Italian troops as part of Operation Crusader.

On November 18, the British 8th Army under the command of General Cunningham attacked the enemy on the coastal road east of the city of Tobruk. Rommel's troops repelled the onslaught, forcing a tank battle on the British, during which both sides suffered serious losses in armored vehicles. The British retreated, and on November 26, Cunningham was relieved of his post. Instead, the 8th British Army was led by General Ritchie.

The next day, the 2nd New Zealand Division linked up with the garrison of the city of Tobruk besieged by the Germans, releasing it. On November 30, the German Afrika Korps attempted to restore the situation, but after two days of fighting it was forced to begin a retreat.

In November the British suffered a serious loss at sea. On November 13, the aircraft carrier Ark Royal was torpedoed by the German submarine U-81 in the Mediterranean Sea. The struggle for the survivability of the giant ship lasted 10 hours, but the next day the aircraft carrier sank.

British destroyers dropped 130 on the submarine depth charges, however, U-81 managed to escape pursuit. On December 10, the commander of the successful submarine, Lieutenant Commander Guggenberger, was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross for the successful attack.

In the same month, from the shores of Iceland with strategic cargo and military equipment The fourth Arctic convoy, PQ-3, was sent from the USA and Great Britain to the USSR. Having set out to sea on November 9, he safely arrived in Arkhangelsk on November 22.