Tightening of the regime of Stalin's personal power in the post-war period. Tightening of the political regime after the war

The defeat of fascism became a triumph not only of the Soviet people, but also of its leader, Stalin. Stalin's personality cult last years his reign permeated all spheres of society. The victorious outcome of the war long overshadowed for the majority of the population all the mistakes and miscalculations made on the eve of and during the war.

In the economic sphere, strict centralization and an administrative-command leadership style have been preserved. Increased responsibility of the directors for results production activities, and accordingly the powers of superiors of all ranks in relation to subordinates have expanded.

The collective farm system was restored to its previous form and implemented in the Baltic states, in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. The transfer of funds from Agriculture to other sectors of the economy. Personal farms of collective farmers were subject to excessive taxes. In 1946 ᴦ. drought struck Ukraine, Moldova, the Right Bank of the Lower and Middle Volga, the Rostov region, and the Central Black Earth zone.

IN political sphere there have also been changes. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR resumed its work. Congresses of trade unions, the Komsomol, and a number of public organizations were held. At the end 1952 ᴦ. The XIX Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was held, at which it was renamed CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union). People's Commissariats in 1946. were renamed to ministries. Decision-making still remained the prerogative of Stalin, who suspected even his closest associates of seeking to remove him from power and was preparing a “second personnel revolution.”

In 1949 ᴦ. was fabricated" Leningrad affair". A large group of party, Soviet and economic workers were accused of treason against the Motherland, with the intention of turning the Leningrad party organization into a support for the fight against the Central Committee, etc. The death penalty, abolished after the end of the war, was restored. In the “Leningrad Case”, 214 people were convicted at various trials, 23 of them were shot, the rest were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment and exile. Over 2 thousand people were expelled from the CPSU(b) or transferred from Leningrad to other regions of the country.

The “Mingrelian case” was fabricated in Georgia. A number of leading officials were accused of nationalism, collaboration with foreign intelligence services, etc. Authoritative military leaders whom Stalin feared were subjected to prosecution and disgrace: Marshal G.K. Zhukov, Air Marshal A.A. Novikov, Admiral fleet N.G. Kuznetsov and many others. In 1949 ᴦ. almost the entire leadership of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was repressed and accused of having connections with British and Israeli intelligence. An anti-Semitic campaign was launched, which reached its climax at the end of 1952 - beginning of 1953. in connection with "The Doctors' Case" The Stalinist regime needed to create an enduring “image of the enemy.” The machinations of “enemies” explained the problems within the country and the extreme importance of isolation from the outside world. The Stalinist system of power was restored in full. The apogee of Stalinism was the celebration of Stalin's 70th birthday in 1949. (In recent years, it has been documented that Joseph Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili was actually born on December 6 (18), 1878, and not on December 9 (21), 1879, as was believed for a long time.) In spiritual life after 1945. Another “taming of the intelligentsia” began, the revival of a strict ideological dictate was called “Zhdanovshchina” after the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) A. A. Zhdanov. In 1946-1952. A number of party directive decisions gave devastating assessments of the work of the poet A. A. Akhmatova, satirist M. M. Zoshchenko, film director S. M. Eisenstein, composer D. D. Shostakovich and other recognized masters of Russian artistic culture. Among the accusations were admiration of the West (“adulation”, “cosmopolitanism”), “denigration” of the historical past and incorrect presentation of the present, deviation from “socialist realism” towards “formalism”, etc. Disgraced creators were persecuted.

During the “discussions” on issues of philosophy, natural science, and linguistics, promising scientific directions died out, many scientists were subjected to repression, and false scientists came to the fore (T. D. Lysenko). Genetics and cybernetics were officially considered “the corrupt girls of American imperialism.” The political regime sought to prevent any “revolution in the minds,” which was fraught with dangerous consequences. In social, material and everyday terms, the life of the majority of Soviet people, especially peasants, remained difficult. Vacations and regular days off were restored, but the labor regime remained strict. The abolition of the card system had its source in increasing tax pressure on the village. The decline in prices brought the situation to pre-war levels. With the help of monetary reform, significant cash. Housing was built slowly. The privileged position of the nomenklatura was maintained. Death of Stalin on March 5, 1953. a significant part of the population greeted it with fear: “as if it would get worse.”

The end of the war brought certain changes to the mentality of the Soviet people, which, on the one hand, idealized the pre-war period and painted it in the rosy tones of memorable holidays and general enthusiasm. At the same time, already from 1947 there was a “psychological breakdown” of people, the solution of whose social problems was postponed until later times. On the other hand, soldiers returning from the front who had visited European countries brought a critical spirit to Soviet society.

Millions of people, having been abroad as part of the active army, were able to evaluate for themselves the achievements of Western civilization and compare them with the situation in their own country, shook established stereotypes and aroused interest and sympathy for the West among Soviet people. By January 1953 5.46 million Soviet citizens who found themselves abroad during the war were repatriated to the USSR. Over 500 thousand remained abroad for various reasons.

However, public expectations were not destined to come true. Moreover, the authorities' reaction to the emerging sentiments turned out to be inappropriately harsh. Already in 1946, trials took place against youth groups classified as “anti-Soviet” and “terrorist”. In 1947, the so-called “courts of honor” were created to “combat actions that undermine the honor and dignity of Soviet workers.”

The leader and his entourage sought to erase sympathy for the West from the people's consciousness, strengthen the country's ideological isolation, inflame chauvinistic and anti-Semitic feelings, and recreate the image of an internal enemy. A course was set to restore the pre-war repressive order in the country. For these purposes, the majority of repatriated prisoners of war, instead of returning home, were sent either to camps or sentenced to exile and forced labor to restore war-ravaged areas.

In Western Ukraine and the Baltic states, resistance to the establishment of Soviet power and collectivization was suppressed. By 1950, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (led by R. Shukhevych) ceased to exist. Of the 250 thousand active members of the combat units of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), 55 thousand were killed, and 50-60 thousand went to the West through Slovakia and Poland. Fighting for the national independence of Ukraine, OUN fighters were particularly cruel to the enemy. According to academician M. Semiryagi, 60 thousand Soviet citizens died at their hands, including 50 Orthodox priests, about 70 secretaries of party and Komsomol organizations, 25 thousand military personnel and law enforcement officers, more than 30 thousand activists of the Soviet government (including including teachers, specialists in various fields).

By 1950, the forced formation of collective farms in western regions. Thus, if in 1948 the share of collective farms in Latvia did not exceed 2.4 percent, then in 1950, 90.8 percent were socialized here. farms according to the same model as throughout the country in 1929-1933. The activities carried out by the Soviet and party authorities in Western Ukraine and the Baltic states contributed to the preservation of tension in national relations there in subsequent decades.

At the same time, a campaign was launched to restore control over the country's intellectual life, which had been somewhat weakened during the war. The totalitarian dictatorship in the sphere of culture and art has intensified. In the works of artists, publicists, etc. The authorities discovered the so-called “foreign influence”, “Western decadence”, “petty-bourgeois individualism”. The ideological leadership of this campaign was carried out personally by the Secretary of the Central Committee A. A. Zhdanov. On August 14, 1946, the Central Committee of the Party attacked the magazines “Zvezda” and “Leningrad” (the first was reprimanded, and the second was closed) for the fact that they had become conductors of “ideologies alien to the spirit of the party,” especially for publishing the works of the poetess A. Akhmatova and satirist M. Zoshchenko. Already on September 4 of the same year, a new resolution of the Central Committee criticized “unprincipled” films (“Big Life”, “Admiral Nakhimov” and the second series of the film “Ivan the Terrible”).

Science was persecuted by ideological authorities. In the field of natural science, the “school” of Academician T. Lysenko dominated, which declared war on genetics as a “bourgeois pseudoscience.” The same fate befell cybernetics, which in the near future was destined to change the face of the entire human civilization. In the late 40s - early 50s. Huge “discussions” took place on philosophy, biology, linguistics, and political economy. During them, a number of scientists declared the need to use the experience of Western civilizations in various spheres of life of Soviet society.

Such manifestations among the Soviet intelligentsia caused a very definite reaction from the totalitarian state. In 1948, mass repressions, political trials and purges resumed. State security agencies fabricated new cases: “Leningrad”, “Mingrelian”, “case of cosmopolitans”. In 1949, a campaign was launched to combat “rootless cosmopolitans” who allegedly opposed Soviet patriotism, bowing to the West. Shortly before the death of I. Stalin in January 1953, the case of the “killer doctors” arose, which was used to whip up anti-Semitism. In 1949, Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee N.A. Voznesensky, Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks A.A. Kuznetsov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR M.I. Rodionov and many other prominent Soviet and party functionaries were repressed. The entire composition of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, which gained authority throughout the world during the war years, was destroyed. The initiative for the persecution, according to K. Simonov, came personally from the decrepit generalissimo, who dreamed of an American-Zionist conspiracy everywhere.

By the beginning of the 1950s, the “population of the Gulag” amounted to 2.5 million prisoners (excluding special settlers). In 1948, “special regime” camps were created, in which persons convicted of “anti-Soviet” or “counter-revolutionary acts” were kept in very difficult conditions. The forced labor of Gulag prisoners was used not only in industry or construction. The names of such prisoners as Tupolev, Korolev, Glushko, Myasishchev, Mints and many other scientists were associated with the activities of the Special Design Bureaus (OKB), the so-called “sharashkas”. In 1948-1953 There were several prisoner uprisings. The most famous of them were in Pechora (1948), Salekhard (1950), Ekibastuz (1952), Vorkuta and Norilsk

Composition of the Gulag by March 1953: in camps - 1,727,970 people, in colonies - 740,554 people, total - 2,468,524 people, incl. political - 465,000 people.

The apogee of Stalin's personality cult. Objectively, this was accompanied by Stalin’s role in organizing victory in the war: organizational talent, ability to find the required people in the current situation. For ordinary Soviet citizens, Stalin became a symbol of the USSR, socialism, state independence and victory. The celebration of the leader's seventieth birthday in December 1949 turned into a national celebration. For weeks, newspapers listed thousands of gifts sent to Stalin as a token of gratitude from all over the world. By this time, the leader had actually completely abandoned most of Lenin’s testaments and became a marshal, generalissimo and Chairman of the Council of Ministers. The principles of party life were consistently ignored: for thirteen and a half years, from March 1939 to October 1952, no congresses were convened, and for five and a half years, from February 1947 to October 1952, no plenums of the Central Committee were convened. Even the Politburo almost never met in full due to the practice of “small commissions” introduced by Stalin (completely illegal from the point of view of the Party Charter) with vague powers. Stalin's suspicion and distrust of those around him and those previously close to him grew (surveillance was installed, telephone conversations were tapped, etc.). The role of his personal secretariat constantly increased. By the end of 1945, the most prominent military leaders received assignments to remote areas and were almost completely removed from political life. The most popular of them, G.K. Zhukov, was sent to command first the Odessa Military District, then the Ural Military District, and since 1946 almost nothing has been written about him. Constant personnel changes culminated in the election on October 16, 1952 at the plenum of the Central Committee instead of the “narrow” Politburo, an expanded presidium of the Central Committee, which included 25 members and 11 candidates. New reshuffles and repressions were being prepared.

Death of the leader. On the night of March 3, 1953, I. Stalin died. Reaction to his death was mixed. Gulag prisoners and those who suffered significantly from the arbitrariness of the authorities were glad that they managed to survive the leader. However, the vast majority of the people felt deep and genuine grief. Wide sections of the population simply did not imagine the possibility of other orders. The stability of Soviet power had long been personified in their minds with the image of Stalin. Therefore, all of them - mourners and haters, sincere and gloating, shocked and indifferent - asked, in essence, one question: “who?”

The absence of legitimate mechanisms for the transfer of power, which had been in the hands of one person for decades, caused a protracted crisis at the top. In fact, the fate of the country was decided by a narrow circle of people who made up the inner circle of the “father of nations” and fought with each other for his inheritance. No one has yet dared to claim sole leadership of the country, so the so-called “triumvirate” was at the helm of the state, consisting of: G. Malenkov - pre-council; L. Beria - head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (the combined Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security); N. Khrushchev - Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, who oversaw personnel. In addition, the country's top leadership included V. Molotov - Minister of Foreign Affairs, N. Bulganin - Minister of Defense, K. Voroshilov - Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The idea of collective leadership of the country was proclaimed. But each of the “chicks of Stalin’s nest” was eager for individual power - before his eyes was the example of the “master”.

3. XX Congress of the CPSU and its consequences USSR and the world community. The change of power led to the emergence at different levels of society of a tendency towards liberation from the dogmas that prevailed during the reign of Stalin, to a more realistic and objective analysis of the situation within the country, as well as the role and place of the USSR in the world community. All issues of any significance - from economic priorities to relations with the Western world - turned out to be the subject of discussion.

IN international relations- the strategy of V.M. Molotov, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, based on the idea of a continuous and inevitable struggle between blocs and coming from Stalin’s times, was opposed to the strategy supported by N.S. Khrushchev, A. Mikoyan, G. Malenkov. The latter proceeded from more optimistic assessments, recognized the possibility of peaceful coexistence of the two blocs, and promised greater independence for the countries of the socialist camp.

In 1953-1956. Soviet foreign policy was marked by the gradual establishment of new relations with two socialist countries - China and Yugoslavia, the experience of searching for compromises in relations with the West and a reassessment of ideas about the neutrality of the Third World. In August 1953 G.M. Malenkov uttered the word that then spread throughout the world - “détente,” and in March 1954 he spoke even more clearly: “The Soviet government stands for the further weakening of international tension, for a lasting and lasting peace, and resolutely opposes the policy of the Cold War, because this policy is the policy of preparing a new world massacre, which, with modern means of war, means the death of world civilization.”

Khrushchev's ascent to the Olympus of power. In a non-democratic system in which power groups played a decisive role, the outcome of the discussion that arose depended on the development and outcome of the struggle for power. Beria, who concentrated power over all punitive bodies in his hands, was feared by everyone. G. Malenkov and N. Khrushchev joined forces. In June 1953, L. Beria was arrested by a group of officers led by Marshal G. Zhukov right at a meeting of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers in the Kremlin. The trial of L. Beria was closed; in the spirit of that time, he was accused of treason against the cause of socialism, connections with foreign intelligence services, and was shot in December. At the same time, many other state security leaders were executed: V. Dekanozov, V. Merkulov, B. Kobulov, S. Goglidze. State security organs were taken under the control of the party apparatus.

In September 1953, Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev became the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, further strengthening his position. In January 1955, N. Khrushchev, relying on his nominees in the party apparatus, accused G. Malenkov of organizing the “Leningrad Affair”, and V. Molotov of a pro-Stalinist position in relations with Yugoslavia and removed them from their posts, respectively, the chairman of the Council of Ministers and the Minister of Foreign Affairs business

Steps have been taken to address the abuses of past years. Stalin's personal secretariat was dissolved. Rehabilitation in the “Doctors’ Case” took place, and the “Leningrad Case” was reviewed. Already on March 27, 1953, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR declared an amnesty for all prisoners whose sentence did not exceed 5 years. Political prisoners were not subject to it. People began to return from prisons and exile. Their entry into normal life was very difficult: the stigma of being an “enemy of the people” - even a former one - gave rise to a feeling of inferiority in some, mistrust in others. Thousands of people found themselves in the position of internal “outcasts,” and the amnesty itself often looked not like the restoration of justice, but like a gift of fate. And yet, the very fact of the return of the living, the restoration of the honorable name of the dead, had a special public resonance. The country has set a course for a social reorientation of the economy.

The plans of the leaders were quickly translated into concrete decisions. The resolutions of the August (1953) session of the Supreme Council, concretized by the September (1953) plenum of the Central Committee, provided for a reduction in agricultural tax (2.5 times in 1954), the write-off of arrears on agricultural tax for previous years, and an increase in the size of collective farms. , increasing procurement prices for agricultural products, expanding opportunities for the development of the collective farm market.

But these decisions on agriculture also had a serious omission: they bypassed the grain problem. In this matter, N.S. Khrushchev took the initiative. The expansion of sown areas and the development of virgin lands in Northern Kazakhstan, Siberia, Altai and the Southern Urals constituted a significant part of his program, the adoption of which Khrushchev achieved at the February (1954) plenum of the Central Committee. Over the next three years, hundreds of thousands of mobilized people, primarily Komsomol members, developed 37 million hectares, which amounted to 30 percent of all cultivated lands of the USSR at that time. In the record grain harvest of 1956 (125 million tons), the share of virgin bread was 50 percent. This was an outstanding feat of the Soviet people.

XX Congress of the CPSU and its consequences. The decisions of the 20th Party Congress, which raised the question of Stalin and his time, gave a powerful impetus and new quality to processes of a political, spiritual and moral order. In N. S. Khrushchev’s report “On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences,” read out on February 25, 1956 at a closed meeting of the congress, Stalin’s retreat from the principles of internal party democracy, violations of the rule of law, and vicious methods of party and state leadership were spoken for the first time. The negative phenomena of the past were linked to the determining influence of Stalin’s character flaws (“evil will”), which did not allow us to delve into the depths of the phenomenon - the cult of personality.

Of course, N. Khrushchev himself had a direct connection to the mass repressions in Ukraine and Moscow. But who could openly blame him for them? Only colleagues in the party leadership: V. Molotov, K. Voroshilov, L. Kaganovich, N. Bulganin, G. Malenkov and others - who themselves were the initiators of repression. But they sat on the presidium of the congress and were silent, because N. Khrushchev did not mention their names in his report.

The assessments of the past voiced at the congress came as a shock to contemporaries. I was especially stunned by the facts, figures, and names of those illegally repressed, slandered, and consigned to oblivion. IN public consciousness the fracture was ripe. It is no coincidence that 1956 was recorded as a milestone. The system of fear was destroyed, the seemingly unshakable belief that everything was clearer from above was greatly shaken. As a result of “confusion of minds,” some gained incentive to develop thoughts, while others “lost their foothold.” The rehabilitation of victims of Stalin's repressions has begun. From 1954 to 1981, more than 737 thousand people were rehabilitated. The body of I. Stalin was taken out of the Mausoleum.

The actual process of rehabilitation began immediately after Stalin's death. In 1953-1955. The main political affairs of the post-war period were revised. “Special meetings” and other extrajudicial punitive bodies created in the 1930s were eliminated, and prosecutorial supervision was restored. The personnel composition of the state security agencies, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the court and the prosecutor's office was significantly updated: a large group of nomenklatura workers from the party and Komsomol apparatus came to work there. The concept of “enemy of the people” was abolished in criminal legislation. Special commissions were sent to the camps, where hundreds of thousands of people were hastily rehabilitated and released. The rehabilitation and return to the places of permanent residence of the illegally deported peoples of the North Caucasus and other regions has begun.

The 20th Congress gave a promising impetus to the activation of the social base of “civilization” in Soviet post-war conditions. It was possible only on the basis of adjusting the value orientations of society in the post-Stalin period, certain changes in the mentality of the Soviet people. Moreover, the social civilizational base of the 50s - early 60s. was aggravated by diversity, small numbers, and the predominance of romantic views among its adherents, in contrast to representatives of the traditional “soil” Soviet way of life. In this period, informal organizations of the intelligentsia can be classified as “civilization,” the critical position of some of whose representatives served as the basis for the dissident and national movement in the outskirts in the 1960s. The liberal reforms of N.S. Khrushchev also contributed to the activation of “civilization.”

However, as the shock of the 20th Congress passed and the desire to entrust answers to numerous questions grew in society, resistance to de-Stalinization intensified in the party. Most party workers who made their careers under Stalin understood that the process of de-Stalinization would be difficult to contain within the framework of the revelations made at the congress. Each of them was afraid that one day he would be asked what role, active or passive, he played in the purges and the “cult.”

But the offensive of the conservative forces, which occurred after the severe crisis that shook Poland and Hungary in October-November 1956 and threatened the unity of the “socialist camp,” was not crowned with success. The end of 1956 was spent in heated discussions, and in May 1957, Khrushchev achieved a major victory: at his proposal, the Supreme Council voted for the creation of economic councils and the liquidation of ten industrial ministries.

The actions of N. Khrushchev and the concentration of enormous power in his hands frightened the “Stalinist guard.” His calls for further decentralization led to the convening of the Presidium of the Party Central Committee on June 18, 1957, at which seven of its eleven members demanded Khrushchev's resignation. Left in the minority, the latter referred to Lenin's principles of democratic centralism and demanded that the conflict in the Presidium be referred to the Central Committee. Thanks to the decisive support of the Minister of Defense G.K. Zhukov, who organized the delivery of Central Committee members scattered throughout the country by military aircraft, the Central Committee was able to meet on June 22 and support Khrushchev. After several days of debate, the Central Committee canceled the vote of the Presidium and condemned the “factional activities of the anti-party group” led by V. M. Molotov, L. M. Kaganovich, G. M. Malenkov.

The June crisis of 1957, which ended with an important success on the path of de-Stalinization, legitimized the break with previous political practice. Despite the gravity of the charges, the vanquished were not deprived of either life or freedom (G. M. Malenkov became the director of a power plant in Siberia, V. M. Molotov was sent as ambassador to Mongolia, and L. M. Kaganovich was appointed manager of the Soyuzasbest trust in the Sverdlovsk region ).

Tightening of the political regime after the war

1. Social and political life of the country

The end of the Great Patriotic War had a significant impact on the socio-political development of society. Over the course of three and a half years, about 8.5 million former soldiers were demobilized from the army and returned to civilian life. Over 4 million repatriates returned to their homeland - prisoners of war, residents of occupied areas driven into captivity. Having endured the incredible hardships of wartime, the population expected improved working and living conditions and positive changes in society. As in previous years, for the majority these hopes were associated with the name of I.V. Stalin. In 1946-1947 On behalf of Stalin, drafts of a new Constitution of the USSR and the Program of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) were developed.

The constitutional project provided for some development of democratic principles in the life of society. Thus, simultaneously with the recognition of the state form of ownership as the dominant one, the existence of small peasant farming based on personal labor was allowed. During the discussion of the draft Constitution in the republican party and economic structures, wishes were expressed for the decentralization of economic life. Proposals were made to expand the economic independence of local management organizations.

It was proposed to supplement the draft Program of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks with a provision on limiting the terms of elective party work, etc. However, all proposals were rejected, and subsequently work on the draft documents ceased. The tasks of the recovery period were solved under the conditions of the command-bureaucratic system that had developed in previous years. The development of all legislative acts and resolutions, then formally approved by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, was carried out in the highest party authorities. Management of all spheres of social life was concentrated in the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee. Here the plans for the activities of the Supreme Council were determined, candidates for the positions of ministers and their deputies were considered, and the senior command staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR was approved.

Post-war difficulties economic development, manifested in the difficult state of agriculture and the everyday deprivations of the population, required the development of ways out of this situation. However, the attention of state leaders was directed not so much to the development of effective measures to boost the economy, but to the search for specific “culprits” for its unsatisfactory development. Thus, disruptions in the production of aviation equipment were explained by “sabotage” on the part of the industry management. In 1946, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the case of these “saboteurs” was specifically considered (“the case of Shakhurin, Novikov, etc.”). At the turn of the 40s and 50s, the leaders of the Politburo discussed the “cases” of persons allegedly involved in sabotage in the automobile industry in the Moscow healthcare system. The fabrication of cases of “enemies of the people” continued.

In 1949, the leaders of the Leningrad party organization were accused of creating an anti-party group and carrying out sabotage work (the “Leningrad affair”). The accused were party leaders, Soviet and government workers. The organizers of the non-existent anti-party group were sentenced to death, and several people were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. A lawsuit was initiated about a Mingrelian nationalist organization allegedly operating in Georgia, which aimed to eliminate Soviet power in the republic. Based on falsified materials, a number of party workers and thousands of citizens were repressed. All participants in these processes were subsequently rehabilitated.

In 1952, the so-called “doctors’ case” was fabricated. A group of prominent medical specialists who treated prominent government officials was accused of involvement in an espionage organization and the intention to commit terrorist acts against the country's leaders. The hopes of the intelligentsia for the development and strengthening of contacts with other countries did not materialize, although the Yalta and Potsdam conferences discussed comprehensive post-war cooperation. The country's leadership has taken a course towards "tightening the screws" in relation to the intelligentsia. In 1946-1948. Several resolutions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks were adopted on cultural issues.

In March 1946, a decree was issued “On the magazines “Zvezda” and “Leningrad”; the work of M. Zoshchenko and A. Akhmatova was subjected to merciless criticism. At the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee, where this issue was discussed, Stalin stated that the magazine in the USSR “is not a private enterprise”; it does not have the right to adapt to the tastes of people “who do not want to recognize our system.” “Whoever doesn’t want to rebuild, for example Zoshchenko,” Stalin specified, “let him get the hell out.” The country's main ideologist at that time, Zhdanov, speaking in Leningrad to explain the resolution, called Zoshchenko a “non-Soviet writer.” As for A. Akhmatova, according to Zhdanov, she could give nothing “except harm” to Soviet youth. After the defeat of the Leningrad writers, they took up theater, cinema, and music. Resolutions of the Central Committee of the Party were adopted accordingly “On the repertoire of drama theaters and measures to improve it”, “On the film “Big Life”, “On Muradeli’s opera “The Great Friendship”, etc.

The resolutions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on cultural issues were a vivid example of gross administrative interference in culture and command leadership in this area. The relationship between the state and the church remained difficult in the post-war period. On the one side, religious organizations in a fairly short period of time they significantly strengthened their influence. From 1944 to 1948, government bodies received more than 23 thousand applications from Orthodox believers to open churches and parishes. The need of people to observe religious rituals has also become more noticeable. The Russian Orthodox Church again regained its high authority in Orthodox world. In the post-war years, two contradictory policies were closely intertwined in Soviet society: towards the actual strengthening of the repressive role of the state and towards the formal democratization of the political system.

The latter manifested itself in the following forms. In the fall of 1945, immediately after the defeat of militaristic Japan in the USSR, the state of emergency was lifted and the State Defense Committee, an extra-constitutional body of power that concentrated dictatorial powers in its hands, was abolished. In 1946-1948. re-elections of councils at all levels were held and the deputy corps, formed back in 1937-1939, was renewed.

The first session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the new, second convocation took place in March 1946. It approved the 4th five-year plan and adopted a law transforming the Council of People's Commissars into the Council of Ministers of the USSR (which corresponded to the names generally accepted in world practice). Finally, in 1949-1952. Congresses of public and socio-political organizations of the USSR resumed after a long break. Thus, in 1949, the X Congress of Trade Unions and the XI Congress of the Komsomol took place (17 and 13 years after the previous ones, respectively). And in 1952, the 19th Party Congress took place, the last congress at which Stalin was present. The congress decided to rename the CPSU (b) to the CPSU.

2. Tightening of the regime of Stalin’s personal power in the post-war period

During these years, the regime of his personal power reached its apogee. “A short course in the history of the CPSU(b)” and “ short biography I.V. Stalin,” in the writing of which he himself took part, turned into a set of immutable truths that all citizens of the country had to study without questioning. Every statement of Stalin was turned into dogma, and the slightest doubt about his infallibility was severely punished. Stalin was credited with all the credit for the real and imaginary achievements of the country and the party, which set the goal of building socialism.

In 1946 - 1950 The circulation of his works was the largest. Architects, sculptors, painters, poets, and composers competed for the right to perpetuate his name. The celebration of the 70th anniversary in 1949 gave the “leader of all countries and peoples” the features of an earthly god. Songs about him were sung on the radio from morning to evening. His wisdom and greatness were praised by the hierarchs Orthodox Church, which gave the cult a divine aura. In the minds of Soviet people, Stalin also merged with the image of the winner. In June 1945, he was awarded the title of Generalissimo, which since Peter the Great's time meant the highest degree of military merit. Worshiping him is identified with patriotism. The image of Stalin “eclipses” the party, it fades into the background, and such mechanisms of its activities as holding congresses, plenums, and Politburo meetings lose their significance.

In fact, the “statutory norms of party life” were dying out. The highest body of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Congress, did not meet from March 1939 to October 1952. The Central Committee also ceased to function (from 1945 to 1952, only two of its plenums were held). Even the Politburo, in essence, also lost its importance. It turned from a permanent collegial body into a meeting of a narrow circle of the “leader’s” associates, convened from time to time at his will. Decisions of the Politburo of the Central Committee were made, as a rule, on the basis of absentee polls, and minutes of meetings were not kept at all. In the top leadership of the party during this period, the principle of election was in fact absent. The overwhelming majority of members and candidates for membership of the party's Central Committee were co-opted. The same situation developed at lower levels of the party structure.

True, the lower the level, the more democracy there was, or rather, its appearance. Meetings were regularly held in the primary party organizations, which in most cases only approved the decisions of higher party bodies. Real power in the party was exercised by liberated party workers who were members of party committees at various levels. Party committees from district committees to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks were a rigid hierarchical structure that carried out directives issued from above. Changes in the composition of party committees were agreed upon by higher authorities. A significant event in the life of the party in the post-war period was the 19th Congress of the CPSU(b). It began its work on October 5, 1952.

The size of the party by this time was about 6 million members and about 900 thousand candidates. More than half of the communists were accepted into the party during and after the end of the Great Patriotic War. The agenda of the congress included primarily economic issues: summing up the restoration of the national economy destroyed by the war and approving directives for a new five-year development plan for 1951 - 1955. The theoretical justification for the prospects for the country’s economic development was the work of I.V. Stalin's "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR", published in September 1952. The Congress amended the Party Charter and decided to rename the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). To revise the Party Program that had been in force since 1919, which, according to the congress, was basically implemented, a special commission was elected, which was supposed to draw up a new Program of the CPSU.

However, the activities of this commission were soon terminated. At the plenum of the Central Committee that took place after the 19th Congress, at the suggestion of Stalin, instead of the previous Politburo, an expanded Presidium was formed consisting of 25 members and 11 candidates, among which, along with the old comrades of the “leader of the peoples,” many new young party functionaries were introduced. The Secretariat of the Central Committee was also significantly updated and increased to 10 people. Thus, Stalin seemed to “dissolve” his associates among the new party leadership, which undoubtedly indicated his intention to remove them from power. The Bureau of the Presidium, consisting of 9 people, was also elected at the plenum. However, from the members of the Bureau, Stalin singled out the leading “five”, which, besides him, included G.M. Malenkov, L.P. Beria, N.S. Khrushchev and N.A. Bulganin. After the end of the war, constitutional bodies were restored.

According to the Constitution of 1936, as the highest all-Union body state power The Supreme Soviet of the USSR was established, the first elections to which took place in December 1937. Since the term of office of the deputies had long expired, new elections were held in March 1946. However, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was not actually the highest authority; it only formalized the decisions made by the country's party leadership in the form of decrees. At the sessions of the Supreme Council 1946-1954. The deputies mainly unanimously approved the country's budgets and reports on their execution, and also unanimously approved the decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, the powers and competence of which for 1938 -1948. significantly expanded and supplemented.

The Presidium consisted mainly of secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and members of its Politburo. In addition to interpreting laws, issuing decrees, dissolving the chambers of the Supreme Council and calling new elections, the Presidium received the right to declare martial law in the country, grant USSR citizenship and allow withdrawal from it. And since 1948, the Presidium could denounce international treaties of the USSR, establish orders and medals, establish honorary titles of the USSR and military ranks. One example of the activities of the Presidium is its adoption in 1950 and 1954. decrees on partial restoration death penalty, abolished in 1947 by decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. One of the functions of the Presidium was control over the work of the reporting bodies: the Council of Ministers, the Supreme Court, and the Prosecutor General. Not a single issue could be raised for discussion by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and its Presidium without the order of I.V. Stalin.

Gradually the work of the higher legislature The country lost even the appearance of observing constitutional norms; sessions were convened irregularly, from time to time. The anarchy of Soviet bodies and the decline of their role and importance were also observed at the level of local Soviets of Working People's Deputies. Party bodies replaced their activities, the timing of elections and the order of sessions, the reporting of the Soviets were violated. Critical remarks by deputies about the work of enterprises or institutions remained without consequences. Issues that required collegial consideration at sessions were resolved by executive and administrative bodies - executive committees of the Soviets, their departments and departments that managed sectors of the national economy and culture. Deputies reported to voters only during the next re-election, thus violating the main declared principle of the work of the Councils - openness and accountability.

There was no alternative in the elections; their results were always predetermined in advance and agreed upon with the party leadership at the appropriate level. In 1946-1947 On behalf of Stalin, drafts of a new Constitution of the USSR and the Program of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) were developed. They provided for some development of democratic principles along the path of building communism. However, due to political intrigues in the upper echelons of power, work on these projects was soon curtailed. During the war years, the merger of the party and state apparatus became even more pronounced, and the style of leadership changed. Party and government workers were mainly engaged in administrative and organizational work, the success of which depended on the implementation of production plans and the coherence of the work of various structures. This led to an increase in the role of the executive branch.

In accordance with the law of March 15, 1946, the highest executive and administrative body - the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the People's Commissariats were transformed into the Council of Ministers of the USSR and ministries. Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR in 1946-1953. was still I.V. Stalin. On official occasions he was called "Head of the Soviet State". Party leadership of the apparatus government controlled manifested itself in the adoption of joint resolutions by the Central Committee of the Party and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the most important issues, and since the absolute majority of ministers were members or candidate members of the Central Committee, disagreements between the government and the Central Committee of the Party did not arise. The central sectoral bodies of government were the ministries, transformed in 1946 from the people's commissariats, headed by members of the government. They carried out executive and administrative activities, led certain sectors of the national economy and culture.

The main ministries were: foreign affairs, armed forces (in 1950-1953 - military and naval), finance, internal affairs, state security, state control, heavy, transport and construction engineering, instrument making, machine tool manufacturing, ministry of fuel industry and energy, as well as medical, forestry, chemical, light, fishing, food industries, building materials, five central departments of transport and communications, domestic and foreign trade and, finally, five ministries that managed the country’s agriculture. If in 1945 there were 25 industrial people's commissariats, then already in 1947 there were 34 ministries in this area. The post-war period was characterized by repeated reorganizations, mergers, and divisions of ministries, mainly industrial ones. This was due to the specialization of industry, which led to the disaggregation of ministries and the swelling of their apparatus. In March 1953, a general reorganization of the Union ministries was carried out: instead of 24, II enlarged departments remained, their staffs were reduced.

Along with the ministries, there were planning and supply bodies: the State Planning Commission (Gosplan), the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply of the National Economy (Gossnab), the State Committee for the Introduction of Advanced Technology into the National Economy (Gostekhnika), etc. The strengthening of the command and administrative system was manifested intensifying mass repression. The authoritarian regime needed to constantly intensify and maintain a climate of mutual distrust and a search for internal enemies within the party-administrative apparatus itself. There were several reasons for this.

Firstly, the struggle for power among Stalin’s inner circle played a huge role. In this fight, any means were used, including fabrication of criminal cases. For example, the “Leningrad case” fabricated in 1949 is associated with the names of I.V.’s closest associates. Stalin - G.M. Malenkov, L.P. Beria, M.F. Shkiryatov, V.S. Abakumov and others. It contributed to the elimination of some of the young party and government workers who were promoted to leadership positions during the war and in the early post-war years. Hundreds of people became victims of the “case,” including members of the Politburo, the Organizing Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. On October 1, 1950, the military collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, with the knowledge and approval of Stalin, sentenced Academician N.A. to death. Voznesensky - member of the Politburo, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee; A.A. Kuznetsov - member of the Organizing Bureau, secretary of the Central Committee, head (together with A.A. Zhdanov) of the defense of Leningrad during the war; M.I. Rodionov - member of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR; P.S. Popkov - candidate member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, first secretary of the Leningrad regional committee and city party committee; Ya.F. Kapustin - second secretary of the Leningrad city party committee; P.G. Lazutin - Chairman of the Leningrad City Executive Committee.

All those convicted were charged with creating an anti-party group, with subversive activities aimed at turning the Leningrad party organization into a support for the fight against the party and its Central Committee. Secondly, during the war years the independence and responsibility of local leaders increased. The transition to peaceful life was accompanied by the center's desire to suppress any initiative and establish petty guardianship. For example, all the leaders of the regional and city party committees, district party organizations of Leningrad and the region, almost all Soviet and statesmen promoted after the war from Leningrad to leadership positions in the central party and Soviet apparatus, to other regional organizations of the CPSU (b). Only in Leningrad in 1949 - 1952. More than 2 thousand communists were released from work.

After the massacre of the “central group” in 1950, trials in various regions of the country. The “case” became increasingly widespread, the “Smolninsky District Case”, “Dzerzhinsky District Case”, etc. appeared. The situation was changed by the death of Stalin, and already on April 30, 1954, the Supreme Court of the USSR rehabilitated some of those convicted in the “Leningrad Case”. The “Mingrelian affair”, which dealt a blow to the Georgian party organization in 1951, developed according to the same well-established scheme. It was based on the version of the existence of a “Mingrelo-nationalist group” in Georgia, associated with the Parisian center of Georgian emigration and aiming to eliminate Soviet power in Georgia. Many leading party and Soviet workers were removed from their positions and arrested, and thousands of innocent people were subjected to repression.

Thirdly, the victory over fascism sharpened the Soviet people's sense of national and personal dignity and changed the moral and psychological atmosphere in society. People no longer wanted to be obedient “cogs” in a huge mechanism. This contradicted the essence of the functioning of a totalitarian state. Through repression it tried to regain ideological control over society. The struggle for the minds of Soviet people in the late 1940s. unfolded under the sign of the struggle against cosmopolitanism and sycophancy before the achievements of Western culture. Representatives of the intelligentsia were declared cosmopolitans, in whose activities one could notice “admiration for everything Western.” The fight against cosmopolitanism resulted in a large-scale propaganda campaign. It especially affected historical science.

Many famous Soviet scientists (I.I. Mints, I.M. Razgon, etc.) were accused of distorting the history of Soviet society, of belittling the role of the USSR in the world historical process. All this was accompanied by administrative measures and “workings” of famous scientists. The Party Central Committee held similar “discussions” on issues of philosophy, political economy and linguistics. A.A. Zhdanov, “the main ideologist of the party,” called on Soviet scientists to “lead the fight against the corrupt and vile bourgeois ideology.” The ideological pressure on the intelligentsia in the late 1940s was called “Zhdanovshchina” after its organizer.

In 1946-1948. A number of resolutions of the Central Committee on issues of literature and art were adopted. In August 1946, a decree “On the magazines “Zvezda” and “Leningrad” was issued. In it, the work of A.A. was subjected to offensive criticism. Akhmatova and M.M. Zoshchenko. The reason for it was the publication in the magazine “Murzilka” of a story by M.M. Zoshchenko’s “The Adventures of a Monkey”, later reprinted by the literary magazine “Zvezda”. The work of these authors was considered incompatible with the socialist worldview, and political accusations were made against them. The fate of many cultural figures was heavily affected by such resolutions of the Party Central Committee as “On the repertoire of drama theaters”, “On the film “Big Life”, “On the opera “The Great Friendship” by V. Muradeli” and others. Administrative interference in creative activity representatives of culture, political assessments of artistic creativity contributed to the strengthening of the authoritarian regime.

3. Ideological campaigns and repressions of the second half of the 40s - early 50s

Throughout the 40-80s, society's orientation towards building communism as the main goal of development was maintained. This does not mean that no changes occurred in the official ideology, but they were of a private nature and did not affect its main conclusions and provisions. At the same time, the inverse dependence of theory and practice gradually increased: if earlier social reality was constructed in accordance with ideological ideas, then in the last stages of the existence of the Soviet system, socio-economic and political realities forced the development of corresponding theoretical structures.

Thus, at the end of the 60s, when the inconsistency of the third party program, which promised to build communism in 20 years, became obvious, the concept of a “developed socialist society” was developed. It oriented society towards a much longer, gradual movement towards communism. The war with Nazi Germany required extreme mobilization, extreme effort of all forces to defend the country. Under these conditions, the government for the first time used not only its traditional class slogans, calling for the defense of the gains of socialism, but also national-patriotic ones.

The war with Germany was declared a holy war in defense of the Fatherland, for the first time the unequivocally negative assessments of the pre-revolutionary history of Russia changed, and propaganda of the traditions of Russian military art and the victories of Russian weapons began. To expand its social support, especially in the countryside, the authorities considered it necessary to rely not only on national traditions, but also on the religious feelings of people. This led to a softening public policy in relation to the church. And finally, during the war years, for the first time, universal, national-state interests were placed on an equal footing with class ones, and the possibility of successful cooperation between states with different socio-political systems was demonstrated. Assessing the effectiveness of political leadership during the war, some historians come to the conclusion that the Soviet system suffered a crushing defeat and was unable to timely find optimal solutions to the problems facing the country.

Indeed, the defeats of 1941-1942 were the result of mistakes and miscalculations of pre-war policy. However, the conclusion about the complete failure of the system is questionable. The political regime had a contradictory impact on the situation in those years. At first, society seemed to be reaping the results of the ineffectiveness of the system in a very complex pre-war situation, which required the simultaneous solution of several problems on the basis of a balanced analysis, i.e. something that was unusual for the Soviet political system. During the war years, the situation became simpler, and a single goal of society emerged - the salvation of the Fatherland.

The Soviet system, which initially developed as a system for the implementation of one or very few goals recognized as socially significant, turned out to be quite effective during the war years and made it possible to quickly concentrate society's efforts on solving military problems. For a while, the gap between the government and the people disappeared. The system's desire to protect itself coincided with the interests of the people, and the more energetically the government fought for its gains. The combination of popular impulse and the organizing power of the leadership was the main condition for victory. It seriously strengthened the authority of Stalin, the Communist Party, and the entire system as a whole, not only within the country, but also in the world.

Reflecting on this, the philosopher G. Fedotov wrote: “Our ancestors, communicating with foreigners, should have blushed for their autocracy and their serfdom. If they had met everywhere the same servile attitude towards the Russian Tsar that Europe and America show towards Stalin, it would not have occurred to them to think about the shortcomings in their home.” Front-line writer F. Abramov accurately conveyed the mood of those years: “Intoxicated by victory, arrogant, we decided that our system was ideal, and not only did not begin to improve it, but, on the contrary, began to dogmatize it even more.” The victory brought the spirit of freedom, but at the same time created psychological mechanisms that blocked its further development.

The authorities began to solve the problems of restoring the economy and establishing a normal peaceful life in conditions of a high level of trust from the people. However, the “people-power” community that had gradually emerged during the war years began to split. This happened as a complex of “deceived hopes” was formed from below and signs of a crisis in the ruling elite were indicated. The latter manifested itself in the fact that in the changed conditions the authorities tried to preserve the previous forms and methods of management, designed for extreme conditions. But since the war had already ended, the authorities were forced to artificially create an atmosphere of emergency, again playing the card of a military threat, organizing a series of propaganda campaigns that whipped up suspicion, mistrust, and forced them to look for internal enemies. The Cold War and the fight against “adulation” to the West erased the results of cooperation with the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition.

A new round of repression began, which was stopped only by the death of Stalin. The period of the 50-60s was an extremely difficult and dramatic period in the development of Soviet society. At this time, attempts were made to update various aspects public life. The need for change was obvious to the new leadership, but the ruling elite believed that only partial reforms were needed that would eliminate negative phenomena in the economy, socio-political, and cultural spheres.

The viability of the Soviet system as a whole was not questioned; the goal (building communism) remained unchanged. Hence the half-heartedness and inconsistency in carrying out reforms. Soviet leaders of the 50-60s - N. Khrushchev, G. Malenkov, V. Molotov - belonged to the generation of Soviet leaders whose worldview was formed during the years civil war, they formed the backbone of the “Stalinist guard”. In the 60-70s, the key role in the management of Soviet society, determining the nature and pace of its development, passed to the “new class” - the class of managers. After Khrushchev's removal from power, this social group was finally formed as a powerful political force.

Having great benefits and powers, the top layer of party and economic functionaries was deprived of personal security until the mid-50s, fearing for their fate and career. Stalin, through repression and handouts, kept the nomenklatura in check and blocked its desire to finally turn power into property. After his death, the ruling elite is freed from fear for their lives and gains stability. The main part of the apparatus of the 60-80s were people who began their careers after the repressions of the 30s. They were not fanatics of the socialist idea; Marxist ideology was just familiar rhetoric for them.

In an effort to stabilize, the Soviet leadership in the 70-80s embarked on the path of curtailing criticism of Stalinism, believing that further deepening of this topic would create difficulties in the internal political life of the country. The theoretical attitude of party ideologists to consider the Soviet political system as completely identical to the social system, and to interpret any attempts to update it as an attempt on socialism did not allow changes to be made in the political system during the years of Brezhnev's rule.

With the completion of the process of formation of the nomenklatura system, the communist party actually loses its elite status, although formally it remains the core of the political system, moreover, the conclusion is made about the “increase in the leadership role of the party.” In fact, real power was concentrated in the executive bodies of the party, in the hands of the nomenklatura. The ruling elite has become closed social group, interested in maintaining their own power, and not in solving pressing social problems. The control system became more and more cumbersome, clumsy, and ineffective. For example, during the Brezhnev twenty years, the number of all-Union and republican ministers increased from 29 to 160. The closedness of the Soviet system, undemocratic nature, and lack of feedback between the authorities and the people gave rise to its deep crisis, and then its decomposition.

Ideological repression. The intelligentsia especially caused a lot of trouble for the Soviet leadership. It was a force capable of pointing out to society the need to transform the existing system. The authorities decided to strengthen the ideological and political control over the intelligentsia, which was weakly implemented during the war years. Since the summer of 1946, a broad ideological attack launched by the Soviet leadership, allegedly against those who idealized the capitalist way of life and worshiped the West, unfolded. Any free thinking that did not fit within the framework of communist ideology was considered a hostile, bourgeois ideology, unacceptable for a Soviet citizen.

The beginning of ideological repression in fiction and art was the decision made by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1946 regarding the magazines “Zvezda” and “Leningrad”. The editors of these magazines were accused of publishing apolitical, unprincipled and ideologically harmful works. The works of the writer Mikhail Zoshchenko and the poetess Anna Akhmatova were especially attacked. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, which always obediently and diligently followed the instructions of Moscow, held a meeting in the same 1946 with the participation of the editorial board of the magazine “Mnatobi” and the leadership of the Writers' Union of Georgia.

It is clear that the meeting “revealed” in the work of the magazine “Mnatobi” the same “errors and shortcomings” that were pointed out in the magazines “Zvezda” and “Leningrad” and decided to “transform” the work of the magazine. The Georgian leadership exactly repeated the decisions adopted in Moscow and immediately began the search for “vices” in Georgian reality. Ideological repression also penetrated into science. At that time, a peculiar phenomenon dominated - creative discussions, during which the Soviet leadership imposed its, for the most part, anti-scientific views. During such discussions, Georgian researchers also suffered a heavy blow. The henchmen of communist ideology treated Georgian scientists with distrust. They accused them of trying to instill bourgeois ideology and nationalism.

Political repression. Political repressions of the 50s of the XX century were directed primarily against the intelligentsia. And this was no accident. The Georgian intelligentsia always aroused distrust among the Soviet leadership and therefore it was suspicious of it, considering it the bearer of the ideology of bourgeois “nationalism”, i.e. a force hostile to Soviet power. The Georgian intelligentsia did not escape political reprisals in the post-war years, when national-patriotic feelings raged especially strongly within them. They were arrested on the slightest charge of participation in the “nationalist” movement. The investigation was conducted behind closed doors (sometimes there was no investigation at all). Often the identity of the convicted person was not disclosed and kept secret.

In 1948, 11 Tbilisi students were arrested state university. 9 of them were convicted and sentenced to 25 years in prison. These were: Dzhijadze Shota, Meladze Aleko, Tsintsadze Zhores (George), Zaldastanishvili Tengiz, Pachkoria Otia, Magularia Givi and others. Their fault was that they fought against the Soviet occupation regime. The authorities tried in every possible way to weaken the national movement and suppressed any manifestation of anti-Sovietism on the part of the Georgian intelligentsia. The government saw a particularly dangerous force in creating an “undesirable atmosphere” in former prisoners of war who had returned from abroad and in relatives of emigrants. These people had information about life in the West and could tell others, their loved ones and acquaintances, about it.

At the end of 1951, a plan was secretly developed to evict these people from Georgia. The “undesirable elements” also included completely innocent people. The eviction operation was carried out in one night - December 25, 1951. About 20 thousand people, including women, old people and children, were herded into specially prepared railway trains stationed in Tbilisi, Kutaisi, Sukhumi and Batumi, and sent to Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Some of these people died on the way, the other part - in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, and the survivors received the right to return to their homeland only in 1954. The majority of those forcibly resettled were intellectuals and members of their families. All of them were assigned to work on collective and state farms as ordinary workers and employees. At the end of 1951, the so-called The “Mingrelian case”, which has not been fully disclosed to this day. This case was fabricated on the initiative of Joseph Stalin and with his direct participation.

In the last years of his reign, Stalin watched with suspicion Lavrenti Beria, who was uncontrollably striving for power, and decided to get him out of the way, so there is an assumption that the “Mingrelian affair” was specially prepared against Beria. Many false accusations were made against a group of senior officials of Mingrelian origin. In addition to “Mingrelian nationalism,” they were charged with attempting to secede Georgia from the Soviet Union and join Turkey, as well as in connection with foreign intelligence. The following were taken under arrest: Mikhail Baramia, Nino Zhvania, Alexander Mirtskhulava and other party workers of Megrelian origin.

The Georgian public was well aware that the so-called. The “Mingrelian affair” is a provocation, but under the conditions of a total dictatorship no one dared to express their protest out loud. The events that took place in the early 50s once again showed that the political, economic, social and cultural situation of the country requires radical changes.

political post-war Stalin repression

Bibliography

1. Volkogonov D.A. Triumph and tragedy: a political portrait of I.V. Stalin. \\ Book. 2. Part 2, M. 1989

2. Volkglnov D.A. Seven Kremlin leaders. \\ Book. 1. M. 1995

3. Zhukov Yu.N. The struggle for power in the leadership of the GCC in 1945-1952. \\ Questions of History, 1995, No. 1

4. Zubkov E.Yu. After the war: Malenkov, Khrushchev and the “thaw” \\ History of the Fatherland: people, ideas, decisions. M. 1991

5. Popov V.P. The peasantry and the state (1945-1953). Paris. 1992

6. Reiman M. Post-war rivalry in the Soviet political leadership. \\ Questions of history. 2003. No. 3. P. 24-40.

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