Lithuanian services. Special forces of the Lithuanian army. Prerequisites for the emergence of special forces World prerequisites

Lithuania: Baltic “virtual” spies

The country's intelligence system consists of:

Department of State Security Lithuania;

Second Department of Operational Services(former intelligence and counterintelligence) under the Ministry of Regional Defense (IOC) - “Antrasis operativiniu tarnybu departamenatas prie KAM” (AOTD prie KAM - (Krasto apsaugos ministerija);

Special Investigation Service(Specialiuju tyrimu tarnyba - in Lithuanian STT);

Intelligence services at the General Staff and KASP (Krasto apsaugos savanoriskosios pajegos - Volunteer Regional Security Forces);

Management Security Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs(“Vadovybes apsaugos departamentas prie Vidaus reikalu ministerijos”).

Remembering past “battles”

When the intelligence services of this country celebrated their fifteenth anniversary, the “young” veterans of the “secret war” had something to remember in a narrow circle of work colleagues.

It all started in 1991, when three intelligence services were established: the Department of State Security (DSS) - responsible for intelligence and counterintelligence (in Lithuania it is often called simply GB); Department of Regional Protection (DOC) - secret police, state security and border protection and DRC (Department of Intelligence and Counterintelligence) under the General Staff - military intelligence and counterintelligence service.

The harsh actions of the DGB and the MLC in the early nineties of the last century against leftist forces, the Russian-speaking and Polish minorities, members of the communist party banned in the country, as well as relatives of communists who emigrated to Russia caused protest in the West and among the local intelligentsia. It seemed to many that the country was sliding into a police state. This scenario for the development of the situation was real.

One of the steps towards this goal is the creation of a special department of secret operations, which specialized in the search for Lithuanian functionaries of the CPSU. It was headed by an American citizen of Lithuanian origin, who was trained in the ranks of the American Green Berets, Euwe Andrius. Among the successful actions was the seizure of the territory of independent Belarus in early January 1994 former first Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania Mykolas Burokevičius and Head of the Organizational Department of the Central Committee Jozas Jermalavičius.

Three years later, they, as well as four other communists, were sentenced to various terms (from one and a half to twelve years) in prison for participating in the events of January 13, 1991. Let us recall that on that day the Vilnius TV tower and the Lithuanian Radio and Television building were stormed, as a result of which 11 people were killed and 300 were injured. Mykolas Burokevičius was found guilty of incitement to premeditated murder with aggravating circumstances, the creation of anti-state organizations, open calls for a violent violation of the sovereignty of Lithuania and other crimes. He was sentenced to 12 years in prison in a maximum security colony. The former head of the ideological department of this party, Jozas Ermalavičius, was found guilty of creating anti-state organizations and open calls for a violent violation of the sovereignty of the Republic of Lithuania. The court sentenced him to 8 years in prison in a maximum security colony.

Another little-known episode is the active participation in organizing the transfer to the West of a former employee of the archive department of the PGU KGB (foreign intelligence), ex-major Vasily Mitrokhin. He held this post until 1984, until he retired. He secretly copied many top-secret documents and then sent his archive to the UK. Mitrokhin lived on the shores of foggy Albion for twelve years - from November 1992 until his death in January 2004.

From Russia to Great Britain he came in a roundabout way - through Lithuania and Sweden. So says ex-Minister of Regional Protection of Lithuania Audrius Butkevicius. And his colleague, the former head of the immunity service of the Ministry of Regional Defense of Lithuania, Colonel Virginijus Chesnulevichius, said: “Lithuanian special services participated in the operation of removing Mitrokhin and his archive to the UK, which became one of the most significant blows to the KGB in the entire history of this organization.” According to him, Lithuanian intelligence services became involved in the operation on the initiative of British intelligence agents MI5 in early 1992.

Cesnulevichius said that Mitrokhin and his family arrived in Lithuania under the pretext of vacationing at the Lithuanian resort of Druskininkai, popular in the former USSR. They were met in Vilnius by members of the Lithuanian special services and taken to Klaipeda, where a ship flying the Swedish flag was already waiting for him. It brought the former KGB archivist and his archive to Sweden, and a few days later to the UK.

In 1994, employees of the Children's Security Service and the Children's Police Department were found to have contacts with Dzhokhar Dudayev's militants in Chechnya. From that moment on, a series of scandals began. For example, Russian counterintelligence officers captured the Lithuanian instructor Sosnovkis, who trained Chechen militants and at the same time served in the MLC. Vilnius quickly abandoned its employee and called him a voluntary mercenary. This is what almost all intelligence agencies in the world do in similar situations. Then numerous contacts between Chechen militants and Lithuanian intelligence officers were identified. Cover was provided by Officer Waitenkus. At the same time, other officers of the State Security Service (Arbachauskas, Petronis, etc.) were accused of recruiting Russian citizens of Lithuania, who were then sent to Russia.

The lack of agents, foreign personnel and simply qualified employees in local intelligence services led to the fact that in the ranks of these structures there were many untested national personnel. In the early nineties of the last century, ardent nationalists, scammers and simply amateurs worked there. A typical scandal of that era: in 1994, the internal security service arrested officer Vitkūnas at the DSS, who used secret documents and operational information to blackmail Lithuanian politicians for his own personal purposes.

Nationalists and radicals from the “organs”

In the mid-nineties of the last century, a “purge” began in the special services. First of all, ardent nationalists were fired. Sometimes entire units had to be disbanded. This fate befell, for example, the Kaunas branch of the Children's City Hospital. Some employees were deprived not only of their jobs, but also of their freedom. In 1997, the founder of the MLC, Butkevicius, was put on trial for corruption in his department and illegal arms trade. At the trial, he referred to his heroic past as a fighter against the totalitarian regime, and threatened to reveal details of the collaboration of many leading politicians of the country with the KGB of the USSR, but such statements did not help, and he was convicted.

Personnel changes did not affect individual intelligence officers. They continued their secret activities. Many of them not only covered and provided the necessary information to terrorists from the groups “Thunder”, “Black Crows”, “Voluntary Regional Protection Service”, but were also the direct developers and perpetrators of terrorist attacks. Many of them were exposed as members of these groups in 1995–1999.

In early September 1997, the Vilnius department of the VSD arrested a group of seven former and current MLC employees who were preparing an assassination attempt on Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko during his visit to Lithuania. He intended to take part in an international conference on European security issues.

One of the group members is Vytautas Drasutis, an employee of the Siauliai regional voluntary security unit, who once graduated from the Leningrad Higher Military Command School of the Ministry of Defense former USSR. This thirty-two-year-old officer was supposed to guard some objects in Vilnius during the conference.

According to local journalists, the organizers of the assassination attempt were detained on the basis of a recording of their meeting made by the Lithuanian secret services. Also, according to reporters, explosives were supposed to be used as a murder weapon - one of the detainees was a professional bomb disposal expert.

The Black Crows group was liquidated only in 2000. MLC employee Abromavicius voluntarily confessed and testified against his colleagues who decided to create a “death squad.” His former comrades did not forgive him for his betrayal: he was soon blown up. A bomb was placed under the bottom of his car.

In 1999, the new President of Lithuania, Valdas Adamkus, discovered MLC surveillance. As the presidential guard found out, the external surveillance was organized by a secret group of right-wingers from the MLC and the DGB. It turned out that they acted at the request of the Speaker of the Seimas, Vytautas Landsbergis, and the Minister of the Interior, Vidmantas Ziemelis, who shared right-wing views. The official was immediately fired. Following him, hundreds of employees were expelled from the authorities. In addition to nationalists, those who served in the KGB or GRU lost their jobs. This is how another correction of the image of local special services began.

In secret “service” in Moscow

In 2001, employees of the Children's State Security Department decided to congratulate their boss on his fiftieth birthday by presenting him with a “royal” gift. The night before, May 21, under a bridge, near the Vilnius Vingis Park, counterintelligence officers detained a former employee of the Special Investigation Service under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Lithuania, Eugenijus Jonik. From the cache, this person was supposed to remove a “diplomat” containing one thousand dollars, which was allegedly placed there by a Russian intelligence resident in Lithuania. They never detained the foreign spy, and the photo reporter from the largest Lithuanian newspaper was unable to take the necessary photographs - it was pouring rain, but this did not darken the joy of the hero of the day.

The problems started later. At first, the prosecutor's office dropped the charges of treason against the detainee. And then other piquant aspects of this operation became clear.

It all started with the fact that, while working in the Special Investigation Service, he dealt with the problem of corruption among law enforcement officers. Some of the Lithuanian “werewolves in uniform” did not like his activity. They began to follow him and ordered him to stop the investigation. He refused to do this and after some time resigned of his own free will. Then he worked for some time kindergarten, the head of which was his mother. And then he decided to move to Russia, where his father, a retired officer of the Soviet army, lived. To do this, he contacted the Russian Embassy, but never met with the diplomat. But a certain courier began to regularly call him, who brought a package from “Yuri Ivanovich” from Riga.

Eugenijus Jonik took the envelope from the “postman”. It contained: a ticket from Siauliai to Riga, a map of the Old Town and a booklet from the Victoria Hotel, where the meeting was scheduled. “Yuri Ivanovich” spoke Russian with a clear Baltic accent and constantly confused the middle name of his interlocutor. The “diplomat” also introduced himself as an employee of the “Russian Intelligence Service” and asked to sign an agreement on cooperation with... the FSB. He chose the word “Snowball” as the agent’s nickname. The first task for the newly minted spy looked like this: to obtain the texts of laws regulating the activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and also to collect information about the cadets of the Vilnius Police Academy (since, according to him, personnel for the VSD are recruited from them).

No less surprising were the actions of “Snowball” himself. He not only agreed to carry out the task of the strange “Yuri Ivanovich” (Lithuanian security officers claim that it was Yuri Kondratiev, the third secretary of the Russian Embassy in Latvia), but also took concrete steps. He was going to put in the hiding place: his own thesis“Possibilities of operational work in the fight against organized crime” along with a list of local Siauliai authorities (genuine) and a list of corrupt Siauliai police officers (fictitious); secret order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Lithuania No. 004, based on the USSR Internal Affairs Law No. 0015 (published in the Lithuanian open press back in 1997), etc.

The operational game scheme implemented by Lithuanian counterintelligence officers is not new. For example, the FBI exposed retired FBI sergeant Robert Lipke (“Dan,” “Rook”) in the same way. This man actively collaborated with Soviet foreign intelligence from 1965 to 1967 and provided more than two hundred important documents to the NSA, CIA, State Department, etc. He then ended his cooperation with the KGB and resigned from the NSA. Contact with him was lost. In 1996, an FBI agent came to him and introduced himself as Captain Nikitin from the GRU. The retired agent believed and met with the “envoy” of Moscow four times. And then Robert Lipke was arrested.

New scandals

Scandals continue to rock the Children's Hospital in subsequent years. For example, when the changeover procedure took place in April 2004 general director DGB, the local media actively discussed the information that the new chief of the special service, Arvydas Pocius, was in the “KGB reserve.” According to one of the local newspapers, while working in the prosecutor's office of the city of Marijampole, he agreed to be included in the KGB reserve “for a special period.” According to sources available to the newspaper, Arvydas Pocius was not a full-time KGB employee, but in the Prosecutor General’s Office he went by the nickname “Major.” According to unconfirmed reports, he could have been awarded the rank of KGB reserve major. The newspaper draws attention to the strange fact that when this information was announced three years ago, Arvydas Pocius did not refute it. However, today he denies any connections with Soviet state security. Despite this “dark place” in his biography, Arvydas Pocius served as deputy head of the State Security Service.

Another piquant detail of his appointment. The previous head of the State Security Service, Mechis Laurinkus (allegedly a career diplomat, has been in the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry since the creation of this department in 1991; there is another version of his work activity in the nineties of the last century) planned to leave his post and go as ambassador to Spain at the beginning of 2004. He considered Arvydas Pocius as his successor. And here ex-president of the Republic, Rolandas Paksas wanted to see another person working in the Ministry of Defense as head of the intelligence service. This cost the head of state his post. The State Security Service prepared and submitted a certificate to parliament, which cited facts of violation by the leader of the country of the Constitution and the presidential oath. The Seimas removed the president from office during impeachment proceedings on April 6, 2004.

After this, a serious conflict between the former head of state and the State Security Service began. At the end of April 2004, the prosecutor's office formally charged Rolandas Paksas with disclosing state secrets.

Prosecutor of the General Prosecutor's Office Mindaugas Duda said that the ex-president was charged under Article 125 of the Criminal Code, which provides punishment for disclosing state secrets, including if this happened through negligence. According to the Code, a person who discloses information that is a state secret of the Republic of Lithuania, but his espionage activities have not been proven, is punishable by a ban on holding certain positions and types of activities, or a fine, or imprisonment for up to three years.

Let us explain that one of the charges was that Rolandas Paksas deliberately made it clear to the main sponsor of his election campaign, Russian businessman Yuri Borisov, that his telephone conversations were being monitored by law enforcement agencies.

The ex-president had to talk in detail about this conversation not only to the prosecutor’s office, but also to the State Security Service during the pre-trial investigation into his disclosure of state secrets. Although Department employees were interested not only in this, but also in how, at the end of October 2003, funds mass media received a secret information about the threat national security and how secret information about the privatization of some enterprises, submitted by the State Security Service to the presidential residence, ended up at the disposal of unauthorized persons. The fact is that the Lithuanian parliamentary commission, which investigated the accusation of the presidential administration of leaking classified information back in December 2003, admitted that Rolandas Paksas was directly responsible for this. And the head of the commission said that “we identified several incidents when information was leaked from the presidential administration, and one time when information was leaked personally from the president.”

Let's tell you more about what the ex-head of the State Security Service Mechis Laurinkus did in last decade last century. In 1994, he worked as a “tourism consultant” at JSC Gausa. At first, the company actively collected money from the population, promising 7-14% profit per month, and then mysteriously went bankrupt. “Classic” financial pyramid. Then he headed the security service commercial bank, whose president died under mysterious circumstances. Moreover, Mechis Laurinkus was the last person to see the banker alive. Although these episodes in the biography of the ex-head of the State Security Service have not been officially confirmed.

Official chronicle

The leaders of the Lithuanian special services try not to remember everything mentioned above. For journalists, they have their own version of what happened in the last decade of the last century. In 1999, it was told to Igor Korotchenko, a journalist of the Russian newspaper “Nezavisimoe Voennoye Obozreniye”, by the General Director of the Children’s State Hospital, Mechis Laurinkus. In particular, he said that in the process of creating a new agency in 1990, “when choosing a special service model, we understood that there were classic functions that had not changed for centuries: intelligence, counterintelligence, protection of state secrets. At the same time, security was introduced economic security Lithuania, you can also call it economic counterintelligence, which also exists in Western countries. In terms of its content, this is a very capacious function; our tasks in this area of activity to a certain extent overlap with the tasks of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Lithuania.

In 1994, a law was adopted that regulates in detail the activities of the VSD. In particular, it says that it is within our competence to conduct intelligence, analyze political and economic trends in foreign countries, including by studying open sources of information. It’s like an attempt, based on our own capabilities, to see what is happening in neighboring countries.”

Another important function is to ensure the security of government communications.

According to Mecis Laurinkus, the priority areas of the VSD's activities were the fight against organized crime. “During its existence, the Children’s City Hospital mainly solved precisely these problems. In Lithuania, part of the financial flows passes through criminal structures organized criminal groups show interest in the privatization process. We strive to neutralize the activities of criminals as much as possible. Our checks on those wishing to participate in privatization made it possible to prevent a number of influential criminal structures and their representatives, against whom criminal cases were brought, from entering this area. So all the work was aimed at combating economic crime.

Along with this, counterintelligence operations occupy an important place in the activities of the DSS in order to ensure the internal security of the state, as well as fend off possible threats, no matter where they come from.”

Unlike, for example, Estonia, Lithuanian counterintelligence officers do not single out the “main adversary” country against which they are working. For example, Russia. Moreover, the head of the DSS diplomatically stated in 1999 that “we proceed from the fact that, according to statements by official representatives of the SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service), this special service does not carry out intelligence activities against Lithuania.” It is possible that this is so. At least until 1999, “not a single employee of the Russian embassy in Vilnius was declared persona non grata.”

The State Security Service cooperates with the FSB on certain issues. “Good contacts, for example, have been established with the FSB Directorate for the Kaliningrad Region. We maintain these ties to coordinate efforts to combat drug and weapons trafficking. Recently, a joint operation was carried out with the participation of law enforcement agencies from Holland, Lithuania, Belarus and Russia. We detained two tons of hashish” - this is a quote from an interview with Mechis Laurinkus.

Almost nothing is known about the successes and failures of the local “knights of the cloak and dagger”. The exception is victories in the fight against smuggling and organized crime.

The problem with personnel for the new special service was solved in the same way as in its neighbors - Estonia and Latvia. The general director of the Lithuanian State Security Service said: “The new Lithuanian intelligence service was located three hundred meters from the building of the republican KGB. The government and the Seimas, of course, did not recognize its legality, and the KGB of the Lithuanian SSR, in turn, did not recognize its legality state institutions Republic of Lithuania. This dual situation continued until the August events of 1991, after which the activities of Soviet state security structures on our territory were stopped.

Some employees of the KGB of the Lithuanian SSR decided on their sympathies immediately after the declaration of independence of Lithuania. There were 36 of them. I then took some of them into my household. These were young officers, graduates educational institutions KGB of the USSR in Moscow and Minsk. However, now in the DGB there is not a single person from among the former KGB officers, since Lithuania has adopted a law restricting the work of former employees of the USSR intelligence services at strategic facilities, and this category of persons does not have the right to work with state secrets. True, there are those who help us on a non-staff basis.”

What to do with your exes

At the beginning of 2000, the Law “On the registration, recognition, accounting and protection of confessed persons who secretly collaborated with the former USSR intelligence services that occupied Lithuania in 1940–1990” was adopted. According to Rimantas Martinkenas, an employee of the Lithuanian Department of State Security, “persons who collaborated with the KGB or other intelligence services of the former USSR were obliged to do so within six months (from February 5 to August 5, 2000. - Note auto.) call the Department of State Security and agree on a time when they can arrive and tell the commission members about their activities.” Those who cannot come on their own will be sent to their home...

According to the law, a special commission, which included employees of Lithuanian “authorities”, the Center for Genocide and Resistance and the Prosecutor General’s Office, must evaluate the activities of persons who collaborated with the KGB and make decisions on registering them. These individuals are asked to “confess in writing to secret cooperation, disclose information about the activities of the intelligence services and hand over existing documents and items related to the intelligence services of the USSR.” At the same time, of course, the Lithuanian authorities promise to keep everything transferred to them secret. But if the “stained” try to hide or give distorted information, the Lithuanian authorities reserve the right to publish data on their cooperation with the KGB. In addition, those who do not want to speak out are prohibited from entering the civil service for 10 years. It only remains to add that about 30 thousand people are suspected of collaborating with the “authorities”. However, taking into account the conditions of that time, this figure can be considered an underestimate: in those years, almost every third, or even second, “wrote opera.”

During the first month of the law, more than 100 informants registered with the State Security Service. The head of the State Security Department, Mechis Laurinkus, said on March 7, 2000, that the process “is proceeding consistently, normally, and there are no problems.”

The main enemy is Moscow

The “peace-loving” image of the Lithuanian special services, which the ex-head of the State Security Service so diligently demonstrated in a conversation with a journalist from Nezavisimoe Voennoye Obozreniye, is spoiled by numerous spy scandals related to Russia.

The first of them entered modern history secret war called “virtual” espionage. When studying the materials of this case, one gets the feeling that this is the plot of a poorly written spy novel. After all, all the employees of the Lithuanian special services surprise with their amateurism.

Thanks to the efforts of journalists, student Pavel Ilyin (operational pseudonym “Student”) was turned into a super hacker who, fulfilling the task of the CIA and the State Security Service, was supposed to penetrate the computer network of the central office of the FSB. After failure and deportation from the territory of the Kaliningrad region, the cyber spy filed a lawsuit against one of his employers - the Lithuanian Department of State Security. This department, according to the plaintiff, did not fulfill its obligations in the event of failure (refused to do so). The mere fact of filing such a claim is of little interest. Several traitors from the KGB tried to sue British intelligence, but to no avail. Something else that is interesting and unusual about the Student’s case is everything that happened during the investigation. It is not every day that the FSB announces the arrest of foreign agents who are trying to penetrate the departmental computer network, although there are plenty of people who want to “hack” the official website of the Lubyanka.

First, the version of the FSB press service, voiced by domestic journalists: “This ridiculous-looking, thin, bespectacled twenty-five-year-old boy under the pseudonym “Student” has already gone down in the history of Russian counterintelligence. Because the operation to decipher and neutralize it took place in a “virtual” space, in which, it would seem, there are no traces, no appearances, no addresses, and no real danger of being exposed. When the operatives were playing a game with the spy, at some point they felt that “they had caught a huge monster in the virtual world.”

In fact, everything was simpler. Here are the personal details of the virtual “James Bond”, published in one of the Russian newspapers.

Last name First name Patronymic: Ilyin Pavel Sergeevich.

Education: 5th year student at Vilnius Technical University.

Places of work: 1998 JSC “Alternative Security Technologies”; 1999 - JSC "Baltic Computer Center"; from June 15, 1999 to May 2, 2000 - senior tax inspector of the Trakai branch of the State Tax Inspectorate (resigned of his own free will).

Date and reason for cooperation with the Lithuanian special services: in 1995, he was recruited by DRB employees using compromising evidence. The operational name is “Student”. He is in touch with State Security Service employees Linas Petronis and Captain Rytis Arbachauskas (born 1975).

Let's tell you more about Linas Petronis. His biography partially explains many professional mistakes made by Lithuanian counterintelligence officers when organizing an operational game with the participation of the Student. In 1990, this man graduated from the Military-Political Academy. Lenin. Before leaving the United Armed Forces of the CIS in 1992, he served as deputy head of the political department of the 466th anti-aircraft missile brigade of the 27th air defense corps. The reference (prepared upon dismissal) stated that during his work in the party organization from December 1990 to May 1992 (i.e., after Lithuania declared independence and was recognized as such by the world community), Major Linas Petronis “proven himself dedicated Communist Party and the socialist Motherland. Showed a deep knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory, which he skillfully applied in everyday life. educational work. A principled, honest communist, he has well-deserved authority among his comrades. He is very active in the international education of military personnel...” Having successfully retired from the “occupation” army, he entered the Counterintelligence Department of the Lithuanian Ministry of Regional Defense - and from there he went to serve in the Children's State Security Service, where he began to oversee finance, border guards and railway transportation.

Since February 1999, Pavel Ilyin has been involved as the main executor of a special operation to penetrate computer and information security FSB, which was carried out under the leadership of the CIA.

For this purpose, the Student tried several times to make virtual contact with the FSB, using the Internet. Let us clarify that we are talking about correspondence by email. In the letters, the initiative reported that he works as a senior tax inspector and performs the duties of an agent of the State Security Service, but loves the homeland of his ancestors and wants to become an FSB agent. He offered the addresses of the “mailboxes” to Moscow himself. It was they who alerted Russian counterintelligence officers. First, because they did not receive any mail from other recipients. In other words, these “boxes” were created specifically for correspondence with Moscow. It is possible that security officers secretly regularly checked the contents of the box. Technically, this procedure is simple to implement. Later it turned out that their mail was taken from one computer, which was installed in the operational apartment of the Children's State Security Service. For this or another reason, the FSB ignored his proposal.

In fact, the fact that the Student himself chose a “mailbox” and nothing came to him is not surprising. Usual precaution. But the fact that the “seizure” of mail took place from the same computer is really a “failure” of the Lithuanian special services. In theory, the Student was supposed to use Internet cafes and other places to access the World Wide Web. Each time leaving a new place. In this case, it would be extremely difficult to “find direction”. And so he quickly fell under the “cap” of Russian counterintelligence. This is provided that Lubyanka really established the place from where he checked his mailbox.

The student was controlled not only by the FSB, but also by the CIA. Moreover, the latter did it so unprofessionally that the agent discovered the “surveillance”, although he did not understand who exactly put him under the “cap.” The security officers also recorded the mistake of their colleagues and drew the appropriate conclusions.

Without waiting for an answer, in the spring of 1999 the Student came to Kaliningrad and offered his services to the regional FSB administration as an initiative agent. At the second meeting in Kaliningrad, in order to stir up interest in himself, the Student informs Russian counterintelligence officers that he is in contact with the State Security Service and has at his disposal a large volume of documentary materials. Then, citing the impossibility of further trips to the Russian Federation, he proposes to hold a rendezvous on the territory of third countries under the pretext of transferring to the FSB secret data allegedly recorded on the computer’s hard drive, as well as photographic materials. Among the possible meeting places, Poland is especially strongly suggested to them, then Sweden, Finland and France. I wonder how he could justify his trips to Western countries to the Lithuanian law enforcement agencies? After all, his official income was small.

Let us turn again to the “official” version of Lubyanka. The operational combination of the CIA and the DSS had several goals. The main thing is the withdrawal of the Student’s curator from the Kaliningrad FSB Directorate abroad with his further capture by local security services and a subsequent attempt at recruitment. For this purpose, Pavel Ilyin was supposed to hand over a package of classified materials to his FSB contact abroad. Next, the Russian counterintelligence officer would be faced with a choice: either a multi-year prison sentence for espionage, or work as a CIA agent. In case of refusal, an active operation was envisaged with the involvement of leading Western media in order to create an unfavorable background for Russia on the eve of the Moscow summit between Vladimir Putin and Bill Clinton.

Another task of Pavel Ilyin, as an agent of the State Security Service (he was not a full-time employee), was to actually find out what the technical equipment and practical training of FSB computer specialists were. The student regularly contacted representatives of Lubyanka by e-mail (by the way, the correspondence was camouflaged as communication between two “gays” - this does not raise suspicion on the Internet), offering to provide Russian counterintelligence with a huge amount of information from the computer database of the State Security Service. For example, a complete archive of agents. After this, in the words of a high-ranking Russian counterintelligence officer responsible for computer security, “you can disband the FSB, leaving three “eggheads” and even border guards with Dzhulbars, and just wait.”

This also alerted domestic counterintelligence officers. As an agent (not an employee) of the VSD and a hacker (with a below-average level of training), he could not access the contents of the top-secret database. After all, to do this he needs to overcome multi-level protection.

Pavel Ilyin's emails always contained some kind of proposal. For example, a letter dated April 19: “Briefly about the materials: these will be documents obtained by agents, compromising the Russian government, it doesn’t seem like nonsense, but then I don’t understand why the West hasn’t used them yet, because let this go to the wind a piece of paper - and the end of loans.”

A computer method of obtaining it was proposed: the FSB was supposed to create an electronic mailbox somewhere in Brazil, where Pavel Ilyin would send the information he obtained. It is clear that a minute after the Student became aware of the address of this mailbox, all virtual inputs and outputs from it would be put under control and the CIA would, as a result, receive real FSB computer addresses. The security officers did just that when they needed to put Pavel Ilyin’s own “mailboxes” under control.

Another example. The agent offered to download information directly from the VSD computer. “Work quickly, don’t run any other programs except FAR and choose your most powerful computer, if it doesn’t connect, then I’m sorry, it didn’t work out. Then on April 8, 2000 I will be in Mikolajki on the territory of Poland and will be able to convey everything to you.” In this case, the CIA would have an idea of the power of the computers used in the FSB and the real address from which the connection would take place. Maybe that's true. Although in this case the procedure for accessing the Children's Hospital computer is surprising. It feels like he is the only one in the entire organization.

There was also the following message: “...I collected almost all the materials by 70-75 percent and grabbed a small, because it was a very fatty piece in the owners’ office... but with the preparation of the remaining 30 percent I will need your help, namely the help of an ORACLE consultant, because that I don’t know ORACLE and I have neither the time, nor the desire, nor the opportunity to learn...” Thus, according to " official version", established the capabilities of the FSB in modern software and the level of training of specialists.

There is also a third version of the Student use plans. As he would later tell FSB operatives, his handlers from the State Security Service oriented him toward the prospect of “playing” with Lubyanka for a period of six to seven years. An “advanced” guy, a former hacker, was supposed to infiltrate the computer information security division of the FSB to obtain information about the organization of its work, personnel, and level of professionalism. For Americans, such information is a real treasure. It sounds nice, but its implementation is hampered by two important factors.

Firstly, another operation has already been described above. Its goal is to recruit or arrest an FSB operative who will meet with the agent. In any outcome, when the security officer agrees or refuses the Americans’ offer, the Student is “exposed.” It is clear that if the security officer is arrested, the main suspicion will fall on Pavel Ilyin, and this will be the end of his career as a Lubyanka informant. Plus, increased attention from journalists. And they will do everything to find out the details of the spy meeting. And if the security officer gives his consent to cooperate, then where is the guarantee that, upon returning to Russia, he will not report what happened to his leadership. And in this case the Student fails. Even if the security officer becomes a traitor, they will try to “demobilize” Pavel Ilyin from the front of the “secret war.” What if he “fails” and at the very first interrogation he will tell everything he knows. Actually, that's exactly what happened.

Secondly, the very idea of hiring (full-time or part-time) a citizen of a foreign country, and an intelligence agent at that, sounds extremely ridiculous. There are many arguments that prove this thesis. For example, his level of professional training as a hacker is not very high. Many students at Russian technical universities have the same or higher level of training in the field of information technology. Moreover, they all have Russian citizenship and did not cooperate with foreign intelligence services.

Most likely, the story of a multi-year operation should have stimulated the agent’s activity, as well as a salary of $150 a month. A DGB officer (excluding various allowances) received monthly (in 1999) $200.

Contacts between Pavel Ilyin and the employees of the State Security Department of Lithuania who looked after him took place in one of the departments of the State Security Service in Vilnius (by the way, the British Embassy is located nearby) on Antkalno Street, building 4a. Several officers from the Vilnius SIS station were repeatedly noted to appear at the same address. In this regard, it is possible that the British intelligence service MI6 was also aware of the CIA operation.

Regardless of further plans for use, the Student came to a meeting with representatives of the FSB in Kaliningrad. There he was expected to have a “warm” meeting and a nine-hour conversation with the security officers. After her, Pavel Ilyin was deported to Lithuania without the right to enter Russian territory. The details of the operation carried out by the FSB were reported to Russian President Vladimir Putin, who gave it high praise.

The spy scandal did not end there, but intensified even more. It is possible that the meeting in Kaliningrad was not the final chord of the operation of domestic security officers, but one of the stages. This explains the nine-hour conversation with FSB officers (filmed on videotape - fragments of this recording will be shown on Russian television) and the Student’s quiet (without scandal) return home.

He came to Vilnius inspired by success; from the point of view of the State Security Service and the CIA, the implementation of the FSB computer system was successful. It is known that at the time of Pavel Ilyin’s return to Lithuania, both of his curators from the Children’s State Hospital were awarded regular military ranks. And the agent himself received a 5 thousand dollar bonus.

Although the agent may have sensed the completion of the operation. From Pavel Ilyin’s last virtual message: “I write letters like God knows where, I ask one question - I don’t get an answer, I ask another question - I get God knows what instead of an answer. If you don’t need these games, we quietly say goodbye, sum up the financial results and don’t spoil each other’s nerves...”

The official message from the Public Relations Center (PRC) of the FSB of the Russian Federation sounded on the evening of June 25, 2000, like “a bolt from the blue.” “As a result of a set of operational measures Federal service security, an agent of the American (CIA) and Lithuanian (DGB) intelligence services was identified and exposed.”

The FSB DSP message itself is more reminiscent of Cold War memorandums in form. It declared in detail the goals and objectives that the Americans set for the “paid agent of the State Security Service,” as well as all the crimes committed and planned. As follows from the text of the statement, the agent “has been involved since the beginning of 1999 in a special operation developed by the CIA to penetrate the computer and information security units of the Russian FSB in order to collect information about the organization of the work of these units, personnel, level of professionalism of employees, as well as the possibility of counteraction these units carry out operations of Western intelligence services against Russia.”

On the eve of the US President's visit to Russia, the agent had the task of “bringing an FSB officer to Polish territory, where he could be recruited or captured red-handed.” These actions were prevented, and, as the statement says, “thus, the CIA’s plans aimed at organizing a political provocation against Russia were thwarted.”

A few days later, the Lithuanian authorities made response statements.

On the morning of June 28, 2000, the Chairman of the Seimas, Vytautas Landsbergis, speaking on the radio, said that the information about the exposure of the Lithuanian citizen was a lie. According to the speaker, at first the FSB officers portrayed Pavel Ilyin as a “terrible bandit” who was “breaking into some centers and computers,” and then “they reported that he had been released.” Summing up, the politician said: “This is a balloon that burst as soon as it was launched.”

Soon followed by a speech by Arvydas Pocius, Deputy Director General of the State Security Department of Lithuania. He told reporters that the Lithuanian citizen detained in Moscow is known to the State Security Service, as he advised individual department employees on computer issues. According to a message from the deputy chief of Lithuanian intelligence, it was in connection with this that the Russian FSB tried to recruit him, although citizen Pavel Ilyin “was not and is not a full-time or part-time employee of the State Security Service.” In addition, Lithuanian intelligence officers deny the very fact of Pavel Ilyin’s detention in Moscow. According to them, he “had contact with FSB officers in Kaliningrad while drinking alcoholic drinks, where the recruitment attempt was made."

According to Russian counterintelligence officers, they were forced to stop playing with Pavel Ilyin due to further futility. Most likely, the CIA, which actually managed the operation from the Lithuanian side, realized that the FSB was playing and decided to take tough measures. They were talking about a possible provocation against an FSB officer in a third country, where Pavel Ilyin had summoned him for further meetings. The conversation was categorically only about Poland, and the Student demanded a meeting with a young Russian hacker working for the FSB - as if his mirror analogue. Representatives of the FSB claim that it was this danger that served as the main reason for curtailing the operation - experts already had questions about why the FSB did not continue the game with Ilyin, using him as a channel of disinformation. On the other hand, Pavel Ilyin was mentally prepared for the fact that his career as an operative would be destroyed after the capture of a Russian citizen in Poland.

From the transcript of a conversation with Pavel Ilyin in Kaliningrad: “...the capture of the employee was planned in Poland. I didn’t want detention... It would have to be carried out by a third country. And I had to deny everything, then repent, so tearfully...” CIA representatives in Lithuania practically did not hide the fact that they were the ones who were really in charge of the operation with Ilyin, which was expected to last 6-8 years. During the same conversation in Kaliningrad, Pavel Ilyin said: “No one has ever explicitly said the word “Americans,” there is an independent republic, tra-la-la and so on; when drunk, they can say “the owners”, no more... And the owners are very happy that everything is going smoothly.”

It is characteristic that CIA representatives demonstrated complete indifference to Ilyin’s failure, practically leaving Lithuanian intelligence alone with its failure. However, the FSB very confidently asserted that American intelligence officers were directly involved in the operation, without naming names. It is possible that it is the presence of a “reserve” in the form of specific names of American citizens that keeps Langley from the usual violent reaction in such cases. The British SIS finds itself in a similar position, which the FSB does not directly accuse. But Pavel Ilyin confirmed that the counterintelligence department of the DGB recently moved to the building at Antakalne Street, building 4-a - across the wall from the British embassy. “They go to visit all the time. The British come to these, these come to the British... Something like a tip.”

Why was all the attention focused on the CIA, and not MI6 or the VSD? It is possible that one of the reasons is the meeting between the leaders of the Russian Federation and the United States. Let us remember that the Americans were preparing a provocation in Poland. What prevented domestic security officers from carrying out a similar operation?

Another reason should be sought in the sphere of politics. This step by the FSB is a kind of reciprocal gesture of gratitude to the President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus, who refused to sign the bill proposed by the Lithuanian Seimas demanding compensation from Russia for the Soviet occupation of Lithuania.

The agent himself had to justify himself and prove that the insidious security officers were to blame for everything. He appeared on Lithuanian national television on the evening of June 30, 2000, where he presented his version of what happened. Two of the largest and most influential Lithuanian newspapers published comments with links to the journalists' sources in the State Security Service. On the fifth day after the FSB announced the results of the operation in Kaliningrad, the State Security Service presented its relatively complete picture of what was happening.

However, as it turned out upon closer examination, haste and, apparently, confusion failed the State Security Service. Pavel Ilyin claims that he came to Kaliningrad to buy real estate (with what money could a student working part-time in a tiny position in the provinces buy real estate in Russia?). At his birthday celebration, FSB officers allegedly gave him cognac and tried to recruit him. But Ilyin’s birthday is May 2, and the “conversation” in Kaliningrad took place on May 30. And what kind of idea is this anyway - to go to Kaliningrad in order to celebrate a birthday almost a month late in the company of counterintelligence officers of a neighboring state? An information error also caused confusion - by technical accident, the announcer of one of the Russian TV channels, which was the first to publish FSB information, “expanded and supplemented” the text of the press release. As a result of this, the Student was “detained in Moscow.”

The story of Pavel Ilyin did not end there. Late in the evening of June 25, 2000, the Student decided to urgently leave for Poland. When crossing the border, Lithuanian customs officers seized his computer disks on which secret documents were recorded. According to the Student, quoted by the local newspaper Respublika, the discs contain evidence that Lithuania is conducting reconnaissance against Russia. And a few days before that, he made a statement that, at the request of the State Security Service, he hacked the FSB computer databases.

This text is an introductory fragment. From the book 100 Great Mysteries of Nature author Nepomnyashchiy Nikolai Nikolaevich

BALTIC “GEYSERS” An unusual phenomenon has been observed by several recent years geographers of Kaliningrad State University. In one or another area of the region they record an anomalous increase in groundwater temperature. They learn about this mainly from

From the book All Countries of the World author Varlamova Tatyana Konstantinovna

Lithuania Republic of Lithuania Date of creation of an independent state: March 11, 1990 Area: 65.2 thousand square meters. kmAdministrative division: 10 counties, 44 districtsCapital: VilniusOfficial language: LithuanianCurrency: litasPopulation: 3.4 million (2003)Population density

From the book Philatelic Geography. Soviet Union. author From the book Big Soviet Encyclopedia(CO) by the author TSB

From the book Abroad author Chuprinin Sergey Ivanovich

LITHUANIA According to the latest population census, about 3.5 million people live in Lithuania, one of the most mononational states in Europe, among whom Russians make up only (according to various sources) from 6 to 8%. And almost all of them are full citizens of Lithuania, since, in

From the book Europe at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries: Economic problems author Chernikov Gennady Petrovich

From the book Cheat Sheet on Organization Theory author Efimova Svetlana Alexandrovna

From the book Naval Armaments of the Baltic Countries author Panteleev Yu.

LITHUANIA ARMED FORCES of Lithuania consists of ground forces of all branches of the armed forces with a total number of up to 13,000 people. In wartime, the army can be increased to 300,000 people. The country does not have a fleet, except for one patrol ship of 500 tons. The actual service life in the army is 12

From the very beginning of its independence, since 1991, Lithuania set a course for Western structures, both economic and defense, and overcame the path to them quite quickly. There are several reasons for this, including a relatively small population, a convenient strategic location, and certain traditions. Now the technology of European integration of this country to some extent serves as a model for the current leadership of Ukraine, which has set the task of transferring its armed forces to NATO standards. Lithuanian experience in this matter is invaluable, although it is unlikely that Kyiv will be able to copy it directly. First, you need to develop a military doctrine and compare it with the goals of the army of this Baltic country. This process will be of interest not only to Ukrainians.

Objectives of the Lithuanian Armed Forces

The task of the Lithuanian Army in the event of an attack by the enemy (meaning Russia, who else?) was formulated by the representative of the Department of Strategic Communication, Lieutenant Colonel Arturas Jasinskasov in the fall of 2013. It is quite simple - if a war starts, then you need to somehow hold out for a month, conducting “asymmetrical” actions, and then the NATO bloc will step in and help, and most likely, free you. It is difficult to say how realistic it is to achieve such a result in the hypothetical situation described by a high-ranking officer. North Atlantic analysts suggest that the Russian Armed Forces would need only three days to completely occupy not only Latvia, but also Lithuania and Estonia at the same time. It is possible that “asymmetry” refers to partisan and sabotage operations, which, as is known, cause damage to very strong armies, but nothing is said about this in the program statement. Instead, the emphasis is on the classic military organizational structure, with ground units, artillery, air force and navy.

Ground troops

In 2011, Lithuania's defense budget was allocated $360 million, that is, approximately a million dollars a day. There are approximately 10,640 career military personnel in the country; there are another 6,700 trained specialists in the reserve who have experience in army service, including that gained in the Soviet Army, which is 14,600 soldiers and officers. Of the total number of peacetime personnel, ground units number 8,200 military personnel, organizationally divided into two motorized, two mechanized and one engineer battalions. The equipment is mixed, partly old Soviet (BRDM-2), but mostly American (M113A1), with a total of 187 light armored vehicles. The Lithuanian army also has artillery, these are 120-mm mortars (61 pieces), German Carl Gustaf guns (100 pieces), 18 anti-aircraft guns, as well as man-portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft systems.

Air Force

980 soldiers and officers serving at three air force bases in five squadrons are considered aviators in Lithuania. At the same time, there are only sixteen units of flying equipment. This is not much, but the Ukrainian troops, for example, should not worry too much, since after the failures over the Donbass, Kiev has little more left, if not much. There are practically no fighters, attack aircraft and bombers in the Lithuanian Air Force, unless you count the combat training Czech L-39ZA, capable of delivering strikes in the event of absolute air supremacy. There are also L-410 transport aircraft (small, 2 pcs.) and C-27J (3 pcs.), as well as Mi-8 helicopters (9 pcs.). That's all Lithuania's air power.

Fleet

There are 530 sailors serving in the Lithuanian Navy. They make up the coastal personnel, the crews of one small Soviet-built Project 1124M anti-submarine ship, three Fluvefisken class patrol boats (Aukshaitis, Dzukas and Žemaitis), three Storm-class patrol boats (Skalvis, M-53 and M -54), as well as the headquarters ship, also called “Skalvis”. There is also a tugboat, a hydrographic ship and three more small border patrol boats (N-21-N23). The composition of the Lithuanian fleet is currently comparable to the Ukrainian one. There are 540 sailors serving in the Coast Guard.

Mobilization potential and equipment in peacetime

In the event of the outbreak of war, healthy men from 16 to 49 years old are subject to mobilization; there are more than 910 thousand of them in the country (as of 2011), and approximately the same number of women of the same age. In peacetime, the armed forces are recruited according to a mixed contract-conscription principle. At the same time, the number of people willing to serve voluntarily Lately has decreased significantly, and of the 23.5 thousand people reaching military age (in the range of 19-26 years), only two-thirds remain in the country, the rest leave to work in Europe. In connection with this circumstance, Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite resumed conscription into the army, which had not previously been practiced.

Combat training

It is difficult, if not impossible, to train a highly professional military man in 9 months, but given the limited availability of equipment, it should be assumed that the bulk of conscripts enter motorized rifle units. An exercise with the loud name “Fire Salvo - 2016” is planned for this summer, in which self-propelled guns of the battalion named after. Romualdas Giedraitis under the command of Lieutenant General Ausrius Buikus. There are four such cars in Lithuania, and the Germans will bring the same number for this occasion; their arrival is expected in May. These maneuvers will be held for the first time in many years with the participation of conscripts. The shooting involves practicing suppression of mock enemy batteries at distances of up to 40 km. German equipment is being given as a test, and based on the results of the exercises, a decision will be made on the purchase of another 16 units of self-propelled artillery units that were used by the Bundeswehr. This is where a very interesting pattern begins to emerge.

How to spend Lithuania's defense budget?

Lithuania spends significantly less than the NATO two percent of its state budget on defense. She is not alone in this; many states of the Alliance ignore this requirement, which upsets the leadership of the main members, and also the sponsors of this organization. Therefore, Vilnius is constantly being encouraged to acquire at least some models, not new ones, but at least devastating in NATO style (as today’s owners of old weapons assure). In particular, out of 16 Bundeswehr installations, three will have to be immediately disassembled for spare parts in order to repair the rest, which will certainly scare away all aggressors, and primarily Russian ones. The list of enviable and extremely necessary acquisitions also includes the M577 command and staff vehicles (26 units), produced at different times (mainly in the 60s), armored repair and recovery vehicles BPz-2 (6 units) and other time-tested units. military equipment who have served their time in “first-class” armies and now have a 100% chance of serving the cause of democracy at the forefront of defense.

Not funny

The Lithuanian army could serve as a joke for its closest neighbors, but humor towards it is extremely rare. The Germans, Dutch or French keep a serious expression on their faces because they do not want to reveal their true intentions and goals. They need to sell as much obsolete equipment as possible, so they do not interfere in issues of organization, general purpose and other internal affairs of Lithuania. Is the general holding the position of battalion commander? So what, you know better. Are you calling up Salag for nine months? Your case is probably better this way. The Russian military also has no reason to laugh at the Lithuanians. The more junk they buy, the calmer it will be on the western border. The Ukrainians also purchased Saxon armored vehicles in Britain...

The mission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania is to provide diplomatic means to protect state sovereignty and security, sustainable development of the state in the long term and the well-being of citizens, protect the legitimate interests of Lithuanian citizens abroad, promote exports and attract investments to the country.

Tasks

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania implements the state's foreign policy. The Ministry promotes and protects the interests of the state and its citizens and is an integral part of the international geopolitical situation, Lithuania's international obligations.

The President of the Republic of Lithuania makes decisions on key issues foreign policy and jointly with the government implements foreign policy. Agreements between major political parties on strategic milestones in foreign, defense and security policy have great importance to implement strategic foreign policy goals. In implementing the strategic goals of its activities, the Ministry is guided by the program of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the strategic plan of the Ministry.

Strategic Goals

Priority areas of activity of the Ministry for 2014-2016:

increasing the competitiveness of the Lithuanian economy through economic diplomacy;
making your contribution to the implementation of strategic energy projects;
being active in the European Union, strengthening cooperation with neighboring countries, expanding ties with the Eastern Partnership countries;
ensuring the availability and quality of consular services, strengthening ties between compatriots abroad and their homeland;
contributing to strengthening regional and international security, participating in the formation of NATO policy and strengthening transatlantic ties.

Structural units of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania

Administrative department,
Department of Finance,
Department of Economic Security Policy,
Department of European Union Countries,
Department European countries,
Department of Information and Public Relations,
Department of Information Technologies,
Department of Foreign Economic Relations,
Department of the United Nations, International Organizations and human rights,
Consular Department,
Department Latin America, Africa, Asia and Oceania,
HR Department,
Department of Foreign Policy Planning,
Eastern Neighborhood Policy Department,
Department of Law and International Treaties,
Department of Transatlantic Cooperation and Security Policy,
Department for work with compatriots abroad,
Development Cooperation Department,
Department of State and Diplomatic Protocol.

Network of diplomatic missions

Over the 25 years of independence, Lithuania has established diplomatic relations with 181 states, of which 179 are members of the United Nations.

There are 58 Lithuanian diplomatic missions around the world: 39 embassies, 8 consulates general, 3 consulates, an office of the Lithuanian Embassy, a special mission and 7 representative offices at national organizations.

There are diplomatic missions of 33 states in Lithuania: an office of embassies of 2 states and 11 representative offices of international organizations.

There are representative offices of these international organizations in our country: the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank, the Nordic Investment Bank, the office of the International Finance Corporation in Vilnius, the country office of the World Health Organization in Lithuania, the office of the Nordic Council of Ministers in Lithuania ; NATO Center of Excellence for Energy Security; office of the International Organization for Migration in Vilnius. There is an agency of the European Union in Vilnius - the European Institute for Gender Equality.

Awards of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

In 2003, the medal “For Merit in the Diplomatic Service of the Republic of Lithuania” was established.
From 2007 to 2009, the honorary badge “Lithuanian Millennium Star” was awarded.
In 2010, gold, silver and bronze crosses were added to the medal “For Distinction in the Lithuanian Diplomatic Service”.
Since 2010, the honorary badge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs “Star of Lithuanian Diplomacy” has been awarded.

The most important laws establishing the legal basis for the activities of the diplomatic service and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Law “On the Diplomatic Service of the Republic of Lithuania” (Ved. 1999, No. 7-140, current version dated April 23, 2013) This Law establishes the legal basis for the formation and functioning of the diplomatic service of the Republic of Lithuania, legal status and social guarantees for diplomats and their family members.
Implementation of the Law “On the Diplomatic Service of the Republic of Lithuania” (Ved. 1999, No. 7-141. Current edition dated April 11, 2000);
Consular Statute (Ved. 1995, No. 43-1047. Current edition dated December 29, 2012).
Government Decree “On approval of the Regulations on special attaches” dated December 12, 1997, No. 1407.

"Express Week" Border is locked tight
("EN" No. 26, July 26, 2008. Author - Vladimir Zarovsky)
The length of the state border of our country is 1,762 kilometers, it is guarded by about 5,000 people. The Express Week correspondent visited one of the outposts, tried on a helicopter pilot's seat, visited a border guard school, where he met the “secret weapon” of the State Border Protection Service - beautiful cadets.

How it was and is

Remember the beginning of 90? Construction trailers on all the roads leading from Lithuania, people in camouflage uniforms checking documents - unusual, incomprehensible, frightening. Nobody could, let alone believe, imagine that a country called the USSR could disappear overnight without loudly slamming the nuclear door goodbye.
These harmless trailers caused irritation, they were burned, but they appeared again and again. On May 19, 1991, the shift manager of the Krakun border post, Gintaras Žagunis, died, and then a terrible and senseless massacre followed - on July 31, seven defenders of the Lithuanian border were shot in Medininkai. Thus, with blood and pain, the border protection service was born.
In 1992, it was renamed the State Service under the Ministry of Regional Defense, and two years later it was transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and reorganized into the Border Police Department; in 2001, the old name was returned - Civil service border protection.
After Lithuania joined the Schengen zone, document control on the border with Poland and Latvia was abolished, but with Belarus and the Kaliningrad region it was strengthened. Currently, seven detachments are guarding the border. Each detachment consists of outposts, for example, Vilnius - of eight: Vilnius and Kaunas airports, Pavoveres, Lavorishki, Kenos, Dievinishki, Gintaro Žagunė and Padvarenu. That's where we'll go.

Outpost, in the gun!

No matter how I asked, the acting Padvaren outpost Giedrius Matkevicius remembered only one recent case of “malicious” border violation, and even that was ridiculous. The granny on the other side walked back and forth across the border strip at night, the Lithuanians contacted their Belarusian colleagues, and they took the lost elderly woman. All these spies, saboteurs, putting artificial hooves on their feet or, like thieves in the night, jumping fences with poles under cover of darkness - remained in that time, and even then, perhaps, more so - in old films.
This outpost, like all the others, is unlike the ones in the movies. There are no beardless lieutenants with young playful wives, or barracks. The outpost in Padvareniai is a newly built building with two wings with an observation tower: rooms for resting shifts, a kitchen for cooking and snacks, “cool” fashionable Mitsubishi Pajero jeeps, a helipad.
Silence, only grasshoppers forge their fleeting happiness. IN staffing table- 136 people: the head of the outpost, two deputies, one senior specialist, 10 specialists, the rest are border guards and service personnel. Border security takes place around the clock, in two twelve-hour shifts: 12 during the day, 12 at night. The outpost is allocated an area of 33 kilometers and 100 meters plus the Myadininksky checkpoint; about 1,800 vehicles cross it every day. Patrolling occurs in different ways - in cars, on a four-wheeled motorcycle, on foot, sometimes they sit, hiding in a “secret”. In winter you have to go skiing. Last year, border guards drew up 320 reports of administrative violations: well, who issued visas incorrectly, who violated the border zone regime - for example, did not take a document with them or did not have permission to enter the zone. Most of those who were at fault were agricultural and seasonal workers who were hired to prepare hay or firewood, but forgot to warn about their passports.
From the observation tower, Belarus was green with forests and bushes - the foreign country was not impressive, and I asked to go on patrol. Dalius Ilgis and Malekas Ivanovskis are brave young guys; they have been “cut off” several kilometers of the state border: they walk along it, looking around. The border is a three-meter high openwork mesh fence, on top there is barbed wire, behind it there is a wide control strip, soil loosened by a harrow, a pillar with state Lithuanian symbols, a small white column - the physical demarcation border itself, and opposite them is a Belarusian pillar. He walked up to the net and looked through the hole at his homeland: the same trees and fields. And only here did I feel a nagging feeling of the irrevocability of what had happened: we are a cut off piece. It was we, Europe, who fenced ourselves off from the Slavic world with a metal fence that went right and left for tens, hundreds of kilometers. It felt awkward and empty. The pillars are firmly dug in. Experts from the EU come here often, and the US Ambassador visited. And the border guard school regularly and regularly graduates young recruits...

Studying military history and military affairs is one of the ways to get in touch with general history. History of the Lithuanian Armed Forces, as well as the world history military history, very informative. Perhaps for this, Lithuanians should be grateful to their ancestors, who from the very moment the tribes arose did not give rest to either each other or their neighbors. Robberies, battles, wars were almost their way of life. Of course, if we move forward to present times and look at the newest period, we will be convinced that in modern Lithuania military affairs and military history are at a completely different level. The Lithuanian army, having gone through a very long and difficult path of development, has become modern, equivalent to the armed forces of other countries. One of the attributes of an army that follows the requirements of modernity is the emergence of special-purpose armed forces.

What path have the Lithuanian special forces gone through to reach their current level and earn the recognition of foreign partners?

Special operations and the military units that carry them out are attracting increasing attention from both the military and the public. Since the world practice of such units is still quite new, I assume that there is no doubt that there is interest in this topic. The relevance of the topic is also quite justified. It is enough to turn to the events of 2001, when international terrorism demonstrated its strength with unprecedented clarity and cruelty. The war against this threat required special forces. On a Lithuanian scale, the changes and reorganization carried out in the special forces over the past 4 years cannot go unnoticed. It is also worth keeping in mind that even greater transformations in these troops are planned in the near future. As a result of such reforms, Lithuania can become one of the leaders in the isolation of special forces and their adaptation to the role of separate units against the background of the general armed forces.

Prerequisites for the emergence of special forces
World prerequisites

In the twentieth century, with the growing threat of terrorism in the world, the armed forces different countries began to look for ways to combat this outwardly invisible and difficult to predict enemy. For this purpose, non-conventional army units were created, recognized to carry out special operations. For effective fight with illegal terrorist groups, such units must be small and flexible, able to act especially quickly and innovatively in a changing situation. To gain time, special units must follow simpler planning and operating procedures than a conventional army.

Army units capable of performing special combat missions have performed different tasks at different times in history.

Before the First World War, such units were considered selected light cavalry units that carried out reconnaissance raids and quick attacks behind enemy lines. When the war moved to the positional stage, assault and trench combat teams, which specialized in unexpectedly occupying and suppressing the most dangerous enemy firing points, were awarded the status of special forces.

During the Second World War, reconnaissance and sabotage units for tactical and operational purposes, and mobile assault units can be considered representatives of special forces. At this time, the more widespread use of sea and airborne assault began. At that time, such units were formed on an experimental basis rather than on the model of statutory army units. The functioning of such units was largely based on adventurism. The operations performed had a particularly high degree of risk. Often the military leadership did not formally want to control the course of military operation. Responsibility for its result rested with the special forces commander himself.

Training before deployment to Afghanistan

With the development of the Cold War, many military units were created in quantity and quality. The shock units remained, but the niche of special operations began to be occupied by completely differently trained units. Their specialization was long-term autonomous activity in a low-intensity conflict zone or behind enemy lines. From the end of World War II until the 70s, this area of activity (modern special forces) gradually became the most in demand (British SAS, American Green Beret operations in Southeast Asia). Purely offensive operations by such units were relatively rare. Contact with the enemy was due only to the inevitability of the situation. A great deal of experience in small units and counter-guerrilla operations has been accumulated. In the event of a global military conflict, unconventional actions carried out by special forces had to be transferred deep behind enemy lines. Special attention in this case, attention should have been paid to the disabling of civilian and military strategic facilities.

Standard of Special Operations Forces

Since the 70s of the twentieth century, another area of activity of special forces began to emerge - short-term active and aggressive direct actions. It was no longer necessary to fight only in the jungle and in the countries of the “third world”, but also against “urban partisans”. Criminal and political terrorism came to Europe and the United States, and it was necessary to take measures against it. Increased attention has been paid to units specializing in such measures. This was caused by the first wave of terrorism from leftist radicals and small pro-Islamist groups, which caused many casualties.

Special anti-terrorist groups improved on the battlefield. By the beginning of the 90s, these units had already accumulated invaluable experience. The British are considered the most experienced in the field of special operations, namely their SAS special forces. These troops are being trained in wide range special operations.

The organizational structure of US ground units is more focused on individual specialized areas, such as the Rangers - an assault unit; The Green Berets are a special operations group designed to operate deep behind the lines; "Delta" - a special purpose anti-terrorist unit; The Navy SEALs are a unit of combat swimmers. However, in the 80s, practice showed that the activities of these troops were not properly coordinated. In 1984, the United States created the Special Forces Operational Command to coordinate special operations plans.

The emergence of special forces is associated with the desire to oppose human factor industrialization and military industry. At the new stage of warfare, it is not large weapons that pose an increasing danger, but an arsenal of small and varied weapons. Now it is not classical troops that can deliver a disproportionate blow, but structures in which political, criminal, religious and military components are intertwined. This forces modern special forces to improve at a qualitative level. At this stage, the connection of such units, that is, complex collective activity, becomes even more important at this stage. In modern operations, activities and tasks are performed simultaneously at multiple levels.

The emergence of Lithuanian special forces

The beginning of Lithuanian special forces was laid by the current Vytautas the Great Jaeger Battalion. This battalion began to form in 1991.

The history of the formation of the development and consolidation of our special forces is similar to the general evolution of troops of this kind. Having originated as assault units, they turned into professional, well-equipped units capable of performing not only highly specialized, but also complex missions.

Nevertheless, the official origin of Lithuanian special forces is considered to be 1995, when the decision was made to create a professional counter-terrorism unit. The Special Purpose Department of the Volunteer Regional Security Service (DSOC) was a unit created on the basis of volunteer service. Later, only the name of this department changed, which became known as the Special Purpose Service (SON).

A turning point in the development of Lithuanian special forces occurred after the terrorist attack in the United States on September 11, 2001. All special forces (commandos of the Jaeger battalion, SON soldiers, combat swimmers of the Underwater Action Team (UCT), helicopter unit of the Air Force), which until now had operated separately, were united into the Aitvaras formation. The first test of this connection was Operation Lasting Peace, which began in 2002 in Afghanistan. In the course of carrying out joint actions, the squadron coped with the assigned tasks very well and was rated excellent by the military leadership of its foreign partners. At that time, this squadron was not yet permanent; its mobilization took place only by order of the military commander. The last point in the process of unifying special forces was reached in January 2004, when the permanent special operations unit “Aitvaras” was established. It should be emphasized that this became precisely a permanent formation, for the command of which a separate staff was established.

Use of special forces

In cases where peaceful means have been exhausted, and the conflict occurs outside the country, or citizens of a foreign state are involved in it and the use of precisely targeted and unexpected armed force is necessary, the leadership of the state and army command sets the task for special forces military services. According to international standards, elite military units are designed to perform short-term, particularly complex, locally defined and specific tasks. In peacetime, this could be the release of Lithuanian citizens taken hostage in another country, the evacuation of embassy workers and citizens of our country from zones engulfed in armed conflict, the detention of war criminals as part of the implementation of international agreements or assignments, other special operations abroad, security representatives of the highest foreign officials within their country. In the event of a military conflict, the task is to destroy strategic enemy targets, organize ambushes, protect individuals, and reconnaissance and sabotage operations.

Units of the special purpose formation "Aitvaras"
Unit Headquarters

There have been military units in the Lithuanian Armed Forces for quite a long time, on the basis of which, after the terrorist attack in the United States on September 11, 2001, it was decided to form a special operations unit (hereinafter referred to as SSO) “Aitvaras”, intended to perform special tasks, including anti-terrorist ones. Beginning in 2002, the Special Forces, the Jaeger Battalion commandos, the Navy combat swimmers and the Air Force Special Operations Helicopter Unit, hitherto performing their functions separately from each other, began to organize themselves into a flexible or mobile, but not permanent unit, assembled by order of the army commander to perform special tasks of an unconventional nature.

In 2004, the Special Operations Command Headquarters was created, to which SON and the Jaeger Battalion were directly subordinate, and the Navy Underwater Action Team and the Air Force Special Operations Helicopter Unit were transferred to operational subordination. The creation of the headquarters was carried out with the aim of more effectively managing and coordinating the activities of the formation. Its structure is no different from the classic headquarters. The only difference is that here the procedures take slightly less time. Servicemen from the SON, the Jaeger Battalion served at the headquarters, and the opportunity was created for servicemen from the Navy Underwater Action Team and the Air Force Special Operations Helicopter Unit to serve. The main task of the MTR Headquarters is to ensure that the different parts of the formation function effectively and complement each other, rationally using their specialized functions.

Symbols of the MTR headquarters

Insignia and awards

It was not by chance that the special purpose unit became known as “Aitvaras”. Lithuanians often associate military affairs with a romanticized view of the times of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Lithuanian folklore (traditions, tales, legends) reflects the firmness, determination, strength of the Lithuanian warrior, justice and devotion to his country. Aitvaras is a mythological creature, a flying fiery spirit, guardian of the elements. One of the reasons for choosing this name is related to the mythological properties of Aitvaras, which are associated with his mystery and secrecy, which is closely related to the halo surrounding the special forces. Often the appearance of Aitvaras is described as a fire poker with a sparkling tail flying in the treetops, rarely and unexpectedly shown to people.

In myths Aitvaras helps good people and punishes the bad ones. Consequently, Atvaras is also seen as a symbol of justice.

Aitvaras in the form of a fiery medieval Lithuanian sword is depicted on the patch of the Special Operations Unit “Aitvaras”.

Jaeger Battalion named after. Vytautas the Great

The training unit (Kaunas Company) - a Jaeger battalion, originated in 1991, when a company of the Voluntary Regional Security Service (VLSK) was established in Kaunas. On December 3, 1991, the Kaunas Rapid Reaction Battalion was officially established, which in 1992 became the Kaunas Motorized Landing Battalion of the Geležinis Vilkas (Iron Wolf) Brigade. On October 22, 1993, the Kaunas Motorized Landing Battalion was named after the Third Infantry Regiment. Vytautas the Great and the regimental motto “To you, the Fatherland – our strength and life” was adopted.

However, the real history of the Jaegers begins in 1995, when the battalion began to report not to the brigade, but to the commander of the army, and it was given the name of the Jaeger Battalion. Vytautas the Great. The US Special Forces program began to be used to train the battalion's military personnel. The structure of the battalion began to meet these requirements. Up to that point, the battalion had been performing infantry missions, but after the battalion structure was changed, the largest operational unit became a team using small unit tactics. At the same time, preparations began for carrying out reconnaissance and sabotage missions. When recruiting Alpha Company, which consisted exclusively of professionals, there were specific requirements.

In January 2004, the Jaeger Battalion named after. Vytautas the Great became integral part Special Operations Units "Aitvaras". The training of professional military personnel under the commando program was introduced. With the battalion joining the MTR, it was assigned the following tasks: special reconnaissance and observation; analysis and assessment of the combat situation; transfer of information to other special forces units; military assistance; support for MTR units during anti-terrorist operations.

Selection. After the reorganization, new military personnel wishing to join the battalion were required to pass a general selection into the MTR. Only professional military personnel could participate. After selection, special basic reconnaissance training, specialized training (underwater diving, parachute jumping, rappelling from buildings and from a helicopter), and classes in small unit tactics began to be conducted. The battalion's personnel were divided into 4 specialized teams according to the structure of the combat squadron: free-fall paratroopers, a water operations team, heavy weapons teams and a combat operations team in winter conditions or in the mountains. Battalion fighters also began to undergo training in traditional military specialties: grenade launcher, machine gunner, signalman. Much attention began to be paid to the training of snipers. Through extreme training conditions and dedicated work, Jaegers have become elite soldiers.

Armament. The main vehicle is specially manufactured Land Rover Defender all-terrain vehicles, the weapons are reinforced (automatic grenade launchers, mortars, adapted to support the intervention). For operations on the water, commando combat boats began to be used, and for air operations and transportation, special operations helicopters and parachutes were used. The rangers were equipped with special communications equipment, surveillance equipment, satellite radio stations, computer equipment, target indication equipment, and the GPS global positioning system.

Traditions of the Jaeger Battalion named after. Vytautas the Great

The word “jaeger” translated from German means “hunter, shooter.” In the 18th-19th centuries. Chasseurs, along with line infantrymen and grenadiers, were part of infantry military units. The huntsmen were first mentioned during the 30th War (1618-1648). In the army of the Principality of Brandenburg, the best shooters of each company were called huntsmen. The huntsmen made up special teams of shooters. They were staffed by foresters and their children, as well as sharp-shooting warriors. The huntsmen were required to navigate well in the forest and shoot accurately. In 1775, after military reform in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the former banner (company) of the Janissaries was transformed into a company of rangers, subordinate to the Grand Hetman. The banner consisted of 87 warriors. The uniform is a green caftan (mundur), bright red cuffs, white vest and culottes, golden epaulettes. For the battalion, the name of the rangers is a kind of sign of historical continuity.

A special tradition of the Jaeger Battalion is the awarding of the title of Honorary Jaeger. Only the best huntsmen can earn this name. Any soldier could receive the title and the right to wear the “Honorary Huntsman” badge, regardless of assignment or transfer to the reserve. The “Jager” patch, made in yellow letters on a green background, is intended for daily uniforms, and made in silver letters on a khaki background – for field uniforms.

Another tradition of the battalion since 1997 is the presentation of the officer’s Jaeger dagger. The metal part of the handle of this dagger is made in the form of a stylized falcon's head.

Beret cockade

It depicts a falcon, a hunting horn, a dagger and lightning. The falcon and horn are metallic in color, the dagger is silver in color with a black lacquer handle, the lightning bolt is yellow lacquer, the general background of the cockade is green. The hunting horn (horn) symbolizes the subordination of fighters and units, the falcon symbolizes vigilance and speed, as well as the readiness to attack the enemy from the air. The steel dagger symbolizes the huntsman’s firmness, and the lightning symbolizes a lightning-fast reaction to the enemy’s actions.

Service emblem

The blue cape symbolizes the continuity in the battalion of traditions of the troops of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. ON THE background of the cape on the red shield are the heraldic signs of Vytautas the Great: in the upper part of the shield there is the Latin letter V, on the right there is a crossed sword and a spear tip.

Special Purpose Service (SON)

The modern SON began to take shape as part of the Volunteer Regional Protection Service (DSOC). At that time, several officers were sent to the Counter-Terrorism Unit of the French Gendarmerie (GIGN) to gain operational experience. Upon returning to Lithuania, they were tasked with maintaining confidentiality to create a counter-terrorism service within the DSOC, called the Intelligence Unit. The unofficial formation of the service began in 1995. For about two years, volunteer military personnel created a selection and training program. On April 7, 1997, the Special Purposes Division of DSOC was officially established.

Over time, the name of the service and its subordination changed, and after a few years, taking into account emerging tasks and the need for expansion, the department was renamed the Service and began to report directly to the army commander. Since the inception of the Service, SON military personnel have acted as they themselves describe: “<…>we collected and analyzed information about the special forces of different countries, their structure, use, and looked for the option most suitable for Lithuania. At the same time, personnel selection was carried out, various teachings, preparation for special missions, search for weapons and equipment most suitable for Lithuanian special forces soldiers.”

At the same time, intensive work was carried out; servicemen provided personal protection to guests of the Ministry of Regional Protection and carried out other tasks within the country. When Lithuania joined Operation Lasting Peace in Afghanistan in 2002, SON soldiers successfully fought as part of the Aitvaras expeditionary squadron for two years. The allies praised the level of training of the military and their ability to carry out special operations. When the Special Operations Unit was formed in 2004, SON became an integral part of it.

Tasks. The Special Purpose Service is a counter-terrorist unit of the Lithuanian Army that performed special-purpose tasks and carried out special operations.

The selection could include military personnel who served one year in the Jaeger Battalion, or - in exceptional cases - who participated in international missions. Military personnel who passed the selection were sent for specialized training. Anyone wishing to become a “green” had to go through several stages of selection and basic training. The selected fighters began training in a basic training program, which took a total of about one year and included various courses, depending on their specialization. The applicant could not get into the combat team until all these stages had been completed.

Armament. In addition to standard weapons, SON fighters used weapons more adapted to conducting counter-terrorism operations. They were provided with uniforms designed for close combat, special impenetrable vests, shields, helmets with visors, and searchlights. Depending on the task, sniper weapons of different calibers could be selected - German, Finnish, etc. Among light weapons, submachine guns MP-5N (naval version), MP-5AD - with a silencer were used; gas grenades for various purposes and varying power. SON's arsenal included various grenade launchers, machine guns, automatic rifles, and day and night vision sights. Weapons and ammunition were selected to best suit the operating conditions (eg non-ricochet ammunition for indoor operations). SON fighters have proven themselves well and have accumulated considerable experience in testing the latest weapons.

Traditions of the Special Purpose Service. "Greens"

A SON service soldier is called a “green.” This name was not chosen by chance. It is connected with an appeal to the history of Lithuania and drawing parallels with the fighters of the armed resistance to Soviet power in 1944-53. The current “greens” have preserved the memory of the post-war freedom fighters not only in name. The organization, discipline, determination and self-sacrifice of the post-war resistance fighters have become excellent examples and motivation for modern “greens” seeking to continue the valiant traditions.

Military salute in memory of post-war soldiers

The name “greens” began to be used officially in 1996, as a tribute to the anti-Soviet resistance that lasted more than 10 years. This name conveys the idea of determination to find a way to act under the most unfavorable circumstances, resolutely striving towards a delineated goal.

Not all SON fighters became “green”. Only those who had a badge indicating the highest military qualifications, impeccable training, psychological stability and moral stability were named this way. Belonging to the “greens” is the highest rating for a SON fighter, awarded only after a long selection process and intensive specialized training. When presenting the badge, the commander uttered a word that had a deep meaning: “don’t let me down.” This meant that a soldier must constantly feel responsible to his land, family, comrades and justify the trust of the state and military command. SON also acquired its own emblem, which depicts arrows, meaning long-range combat (sniper operations), a grenadier symbol - a grenade, symbolizing the use of explosives during operations, and a sword - a symbol of close combat (knives, pistols).

Underwater Action Team (UDT)

The Underwater Action Team (UCT) was founded in 1990. With the arrival of professional divers in the Volunteer Regional Protection Service (VSS), through their efforts, the creation of a training program for new swimmers began, literature, diving equipment and equipment were accumulated. In 1992, these divers were transferred to the Diver Team of the Reconnaissance Detachment of the Klaipeda Battalion (modern Dragoon Battalion) of the "Geležinis Vilkas" (Iron Wolf) brigade. At this time, a training program for military divers was created, important tasks were carried out: mine clearance, search for explosives. In 1996, the Reconnaissance Detachment was renamed the Combat Swimmer Detachment. In 2001, military divers became part of the Navy and became known as the Submarine Action Team (USC).

In 1996, cooperation with the Special Purpose Service began, and the exchange of experience in performing tasks on the water began. Soon, a selection of combat swimmers was organized at the SON base. Military personnel who passed the selection were sent to serve in the KPD, where their training continued. After the events of September 11, 2001, the United States began creating a Special Operations Unit, which was to include the KPD. Thus, the KPD, together with the Aitvaras fighters, began to prepare for anti-terrorist operations. Somewhat later, at the operational level, the KPD began to report to the SOF commander.

KPD objectives: The team's fighters are trained to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage operations, protect water bodies from enemy sabotage actions, conduct land reconnaissance with landings from the water, underwater mine clearance, and inspect ships. Thus, combat divers were trained to perform special operations both in water and on land.

Selection for the combat diver unit was carried out in several stages. First of all, candidates had to pass the general selection for the MTR. After this, basic training for military divers began. Specialization awaited the fighters who completed this course: the opportunity to become a ship diver, an underwater mine clearance specialist, or a combat swimmer.

Armament. For operations on the water (related to special reconnaissance, mining and demining of dangerous objects), combat swimmers used closed and open cycle diving apparatus, wet and dry suits, fins, equipment for underwater navigation, powerful boarding boats, waterproof weapons and radio communications. The main weapons of divers, adapted for carrying underwater, are combat knives and Heckler & Koch submachine guns, model MP-5N (marine version).

Special Operations Unit (SOZ)

Military helicopter pilots began performing reconnaissance operations together with rangers in 1995. The specialization of helicopter pilots in the field of special operations began to be introduced in 1997 in collaboration with soldiers of the special purpose department of the Volunteer Regional Defense Forces (DVOC). Until 2003, the Special Operations Unit of the Helicopter Squadron was formed, to which helicopters and pilots were assigned.

The purpose of the POP is to ensure mobility, efficiency and surprise when performing tasks. The functions of the unit are air reconnaissance, transportation of SON fighters, air support.

Selection. When performing special operations, the helicopter team consisted of a commander, an on-board technician and a machine gunner (in accordance with the specifics of the mission).

Equipment and weapons. The special operations unit used Mi-8 and Mi-8 MTV helicopters operated by the Lithuanian Air Force. The helicopters used in special operations did not have night vision devices, and the communication system was imperfect. Mi-8 helicopters were armed with aircraft missiles designed to destroy ground targets. Machine guns were mounted on both sides of the helicopter, and high-velocity six-barreled machine guns could also be mounted.

Unwritten rules of special forces

Lithuanian special forces, like their colleagues in other countries, have their own code of honor. The fighters are guided by the unwritten, but important rules. The Lithuanian special forces try to combine two often contradictory principles: freedom and discipline. A fighter must be proactive, have internal freedom and independence of thought and at the same time be able to obey and respect both higher and lower ranks. In all special forces units, the tradition of “baptism”, a kind of initiation, has become widespread, which, of course, is kept secret. The principle of honor for the fighters of the Unit was the statement: “if at least one SON fighter is in the ranks, then the unit is alive and will fight to the end.”

Special forces in international missions

Since 1994, members of the Jaeger battalion have constantly taken part in peacekeeping missions in Croatia and Kosovo, and since 2002 - in Operation Lasting Peace in Afghanistan. The Kosovo mission and the Afghanistan mission differed significantly in their nature and objectives. In Kosovo, rangers did not have the opportunity to test their strength as special forces soldiers. Our commandos experienced their baptism of fire in Afghanistan, fulfilling their mission as part of the “Aitvaras” squadron together with the “greens” and combat swimmers. Such interaction between the fighters guaranteed the success and effectiveness of the Afghan mission. In this mission, particularly modern weapons and equipment were used, something that could only be dreamed of in Kosovo.

The composition of the Aitvaras squadrons heading to Afghanistan was different. The first two squadrons included “greens” from SON and huntsmen, and the third mostly consisted of “greens” and KPD combat swimmers. During the first mission, which lasted 6 months, the squadron's fighters carried out mainly combat reconnaissance, although direct action also occurred. The third squadron carried out much more intensive operations, of which only a minority was special reconnaissance, and the rest was direct action (when the specific goal and task are known; the operation is unexpected and quick, designed to detain or neutralize the intended object). The information collected by the Lithuanians during special intelligence operations mainly concerned terrorist groups and their commanders.

Armament of special operational forces

Different weapons were used for different missions. We tried to purchase what is modern and best suits the price. Compared to similar units in other countries, Lithuanian fighters used adequate weapons. They tried to abandon old weapons that the entire army used to use, for example, Soviet Kalashnikovs, use them only during exercises, and use new models adapted for special operations as the main weapon. The main thing is that the weapon is accurate and reliable.

MTR fighters began to use Glock-17 pistols, Heckler & Koch MP-5 submachine guns (with and without a silencer), Browning machine guns, Carl Gustav anti-tank grenade launchers, 60-mm mortars, disposable and under-barrel grenade launchers, modern German G-36 automatic rifles (various modifications), sniper rifles from the Sako and Gol Sniper companies, range finders, holographic sights, night vision devices from European manufacturers that meet the requirements of special operatives, radio communications (Harris radio stations), which can be used to negotiations both in the air and on the ground, over unlimited distances and in various natural conditions. The use of climbing equipment has begun to overcome obstacles.

The fighters adapted equipment and ammunition to suit themselves in a way that was convenient for them. The tactical vest could easily be reconfigured as it is more flexible and tailored to the needs of the fighter. It was possible to place grenades, shops, radio communications, first aid kits, and flasks on it in various ways. True, the MTR soldiers did not use the flasks familiar to our infantrymen, but camel backs, which were attached to the back, and water was supplied through a special tube. An integral part of the equipment of MTR fighters are bulletproof Kevlar helmets (could also be with a special wide visor to help protect against shots), as well as bulletproof vests (in exceptional cases, vests of the highest 4th degree of protection were used, corresponding to a 7.62 mm shot from an AK). The fighters could not do without such special means as grenades (sound and light), explosives (to provide passage, for example, to destroy a wall - but not to destroy the people inside), gases - intoxicating, disorienting, but not destructive impact.

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