Commoners versus knights. Bruges Matins and the Battle of Courtrai. Commoners vs. Knights "Good Day" vs. Knights
Background of the battle
The French king Philip IV the Fair at the beginning of the 14th century managed to capture the County of Flanders. From now on, Flanders constituted only one of the royal provinces; it was included in the lands of the French crown. However, Philip, having occupied Flanders, was unable to retain it. His policies encountered serious opposition - primarily the resistance of cities.
The inevitable course of events that led to general discontent and rebellion was accelerated by the inept policy of the governor whom Philip placed at the head of Flanders, Jacques de Chatillon. According to A. Pirenne, “in Flanders, where the burghers were everything, he wanted to rule with the help of feudal lords.” As a result, “the embitterment of the people’s party reached its final limits. It saw that the result of the French conquest was only the strengthening of the dominance of the patricians in the cities, and the dominance of the knights in rural areas.” The attempts of the king, always in need of money, to collect additional taxes from urban communities only exacerbated the conflict, because... the patriciate transferred the full burden of the exactions to the artisans. An uprising was inevitable.
In the spring of 1302, a rebellion broke out in Bruges, led by Pieter de Koninck. However, on May 17, Chatillon and the royal adviser Pierre Flot, accompanied by a large detachment (about 800), approached the city. The frightened townspeople surrendered and the French entered Bruges. However, at night the leaders of the rebellion who had fled returned to the city, the dissatisfied happily joined them, and at dawn on May 18, Chatillon’s detachment was slaughtered by the rebels, more than 300 French died. This event was nicknamed “Bruges Friday” (or “Good Friday”) by contemporaries, and went down in history as “Bruges Matins”. Contrary to the evidence of the Annals of Ghent (written in this part by an author sympathetic to the rebellion), it is obvious that the massacre was prepared in advance and that Chatillon fell into a trap. However, he, like the Fleet, managed to escape, the first to the castle of Courtrai, the second to Lille. This event marked the beginning of a protracted and costly war against French rule in Flanders.
From now on there was no turning back for the residents of Bruges. So they raised a militia and turned to other Flemish cities asking for help. Everyone answered them except Ghent, who remained loyal to the king. The assembled army was led by Guillaume de Julier (William of Julich; c. 1277-1304) and his uncle Guy of Namur, grandson and youngest son of Guy de Dampierre (d. 1305), Count of Flanders, who was imprisoned in France. Audenard was captured by them, and on June 26 the rebels approached the castle of Courtray, which was still held by the French garrison.
Philip the Fair, intending to take revenge for the “Matins of Bruges,” sent a large army to Flanders, consisting mainly of mounted feudal militia. It was headed by Robert II the Good (1250-1302), Count d'Artois, grandson of Louis VIII, relative of the kings of England and France.
On July 8, the French army approached Courtray. For three days she stood there, planning her attack. The Flemings were waiting for them at their position. There were skirmishes between the troops, however, they never developed into a full-scale battle. These battles could have taken place in the area of the destroyed bridge over the “river” that flowed in front of the castle. French sources, the first continuation of Guillaume de Nangy's Chronicle and the Great French Chronicle, state that the French tried to restore this bridge, which had previously been destroyed by the Flemings. However, they did not succeed, because... The Flemings "always attacked the French and in every possible way interfered with the work." Flemish sources do not report this event. But if this was indeed the case, and if the Lys is considered the “river”, perhaps this indicates that the French army was trying to encircle the Flemings and attack from the rear.
According to the Annals of Ghent, Artois allowed his troops to plunder the area around Courtray, while the French ( How could we do without it!), of course, they did not spare women, children, or the sick, they beheaded and mutilated statues of saints in churches in order to “show their cruelty and frighten the Flemings.” But, naturally, the valiant Flemings were not frightened by such acts, which only “aroused them and aroused in them even greater indignation, anger and military courage.”
What Artois was really busy with was scouting out Flemish preparations for the upcoming battle. In particular, as his accounts show, he bought from a certain Pierre l’Orrible (probably a pseudonym - literally, “Pierre the Terrible”) for 13 livres 10 sous 10 deniers (in Parisian coins) a plan of the Flemish ditches. This in itself is an extremely curious detail, proving that the people of the Middle Ages took war extremely seriously and carefully.
Everyone expected a battle that was inevitable. And the battle took place under the walls of Courtray on July 11, 1302.
Strengths of the parties
The Flemish army was quite large, many towns and villages sent contingents to it. Lodewijk (Louis) van Veltem (The Historical Mirror, circa 1316) believes that there were 13,000 people there, and the Annals of Ghent even suggest a figure of 60,000! According to J.F. Verbruggen ("Battle of the Golden Spurs", 1952), there were from 7378 to 11,000 Flemings. In his other work, published two years later (it was his famous monograph The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages), he gives more rounded calculation results - 8000-10500 infantry.
It is believed that Bruges sent 3,000 militia, the Free District of Bruges and coastal Flanders - 2,500, East Flanders - 2,500 (including 700 Ghentians of Jean Borlut, who, despite the prohibition of the elders, joined the rebel army), Ypres - about 500. In total, with the nobles and a reserve (if we estimate it at 500), up to 9,000 soldiers.
Several sources confirm that the Flemish army consisted largely (if not entirely) of commoner infantry, since the nobles and patricians who fielded the cavalry remained loyal to France.
The infantry stood in a phalanx in tight formation. The first rank consisted of warriors with pikes (who stuck the blunt ends of their weapons into the ground and pointed the tips towards the enemy), the second was armed with godendags (a club with a point mounted at the top), the third was again made up of pikemen, etc. On the “chest from Courtrai” (dedicated to the events of 1302) there are chain mail hoods with crests, buckler shields with umbons, crossbows, pikes, swords, falchions, godendags, quilted gambesons, sometimes chain mail on top of them, and armored gloves.
Lodewijk van Veltem and the Annals of Ghent also mention crossbowmen (and, apparently, archers) at Courtrai - according to Verbruggen's calculations, there were less than 500 of them. Verbruggen's English translation speaks of about 500 servants with the army - perhaps these are crossbowmen.
The number of knights and squires among the Flemings is unknown. According to Verbruggen there were several hundred (up to 500), but Pirenne writes about 30 (including the Dutchman Jean de Renesse and several nobles from Brabant, Limburg and Rhineland Holland). T. Sevan counts 56 knights in the Flemish army, of which only 28 probably participated in the battle. They all dismounted and fought in the ranks of the infantry.
Among the Flemish commanders, fortunately for them, there were only nobles (Guy of Namur, Guillaume de Julier, Jean de Renesse, Henri de Loncin/Lontzen, Gossin de Godenshoven/Goswin de Goswenhoven, Dietrich de Hondeshot/Thierry de Hondshote, Robert de Levergem and Baldwin de Popperorde/Popperode), although few had military experience. Among the commanders was Pieter de Koninck. General management may have been carried out by Jean de Renesse.
Number French army unknown, except that it was large - “many famous French knights and a great multitude of infantry” (Great French Chronicles). The Chronicle of the Counts of Flanders compares the Flemings with "a few people" and "many" (20,000) French. Van Veltem, on the contrary, gives the figure 7024. According to Verbruggen's calculations, Artois had about 2500-3000 knights and squires, 4000-5000 infantry (say 1000 crossbowmen, 1000-2000 spearmen and 2000 bidots). Those. The forces were approximately equal, and, perhaps, the Flemings even outnumbered them.
But the main strength of the French lay in their cavalry, “the flower of French chivalry” (and a certain number of Flemings and Dutch loyal to the king, Leliaarts, supporters of the lily) set out on this campaign, and sources emphasize a significant percentage of knights in this army. For the most part, horsemen at arms were in the royal pay. The infantry was served mainly by “Genoese” crossbowmen (in chainmail hoods, bascinets, quilted jackets, with a sword and quiver on a sling), although they were recruited throughout Italy, and lightly armed ones from Spain (Navarre, etc.), “ bido", armed with a pair of darts, a spear and a knife at the belt (Guillard noted that "they have no other weapons").
Battle formations. Flemings
To block the path to the castle, the Flemings stood directly in front of it, occupying the corner between the city of Courtrai and the Lys River. The leaders lined up their phalanx. In the rear they had the Lis, in front of the left flank was the Groeninge stream, in front of the right was the Grote (Big) stream. The infantrymen stood at a sufficient distance from the stream to minimize losses from the bolts of the Genoese crossbows. But this space, as events showed, turned out to be sufficient for the French knights to launch an attack by crossing the stream.
On the right flank stood the Bruges with Guillaume de Julier. The center, covered partly behind Grote Beek, partly for Groeninge Beek, consisted of contingents from the Free District of Bruges and East Flanders. Left flank (Guy of Namur) - contingents of Alost, Odenard and Courtray, as well as the Ghentians. Renesse was waiting with a reserve (500 or 1200 people, according to various estimates) behind the center. The Ypresians watched over the garrison of the castle and guarded the rear of the Flemish formation. In front of the phalanx front, the Flemish skirmishers were scattered.
In addition, during the siege of the castle, the Flemings dug ditches in the neighboring fields, preparing to repel the attack of the enemy cavalry (for some reason Verbruggen says nothing about them). They combined many of them with the Fox, thereby filling them with water. Others they camouflaged with dirt and vegetation. A later source (Chronicle of Flanders, circa 1477) states that the fog on the battlefield (in this part of what is now Belgium, thick fog often occurs in the summer) further obscured the ditches.
So, their position was protected from the rear by the Lys River, and from the front by ditches and streams. Additional defense was provided by the Lower Ditch (Lage Vijver) on the right wing, and the Groeninge Monastery on the left.
With the exception of Gilles le Muisy (Abbot of St. Martin in Tournai), who writes that the Flemings did not initially show much fighting spirit, almost every account of the battle emphasizes their high morale. True, it seems that this attitude stemmed from the simple fact that escape was impossible, defeat meant the complete destruction of the army. All that remained was to win or die.
Descriptions of the Battle of Courtrai allow us to illustrate a rare case - the psychology of a medieval battle. It is incredibly difficult to resist cavalry rushing towards you in an open field if you are an infantryman, this is inherent in human psychology. This is how he describes it in the middle of the 19th century. Colonel V. Zigman the effect produced by a cavalry attack: “The moral influence inherent in cavalry, with which it often does more than with its pikes and sabers... if a united cavalry mass... bravely... flies towards the infantry, then... unpleasant the feeling embraces this latter, since each individual person remains a mere mortal; this feeling can turn into panic fear, especially if the cavalry appears unexpectedly..." According to the military of that time, “it is physically impossible for an infantryman to resist a horse rushing at him at full speed.” Even good infantry will withstand the onslaught of cavalry only if it is “poorly controlled,” has exhausted horses, or operates on sticky or slippery terrain.
In fact, it is believed that the effect of the knight's charge was primarily psychological, for one cannot force a horse to attack another animal, a person, or a fortification. But, flying at full speed towards the enemy, they always hoped that he would not withstand the formidable spectacle and would run away before the collision.
According to van Veltem, the Flemings were nervous, anxious, “terribly afraid of the terrible battle ahead. There was no possibility of retreat, and the enemies were approaching. Everyone took communion on the spot, and then they huddled closer to each other. In this way they were lined up as if there was a stone wall to withstand the terrible test."
But they believed that their cause was just, that the Lord was on their side and that He would lead them to victory. According to a later tradition (the chronicle of Jean de Brustem), they "rejoiced and worried, roaring like lions" ( It must be a funny sight!).
The rise in morale was also helped by the fact that the knights dismounted - in order to make escape impossible and to support or encourage the courage of ordinary warriors. The Chronicle of the Counts of Flanders writes that only the leaders kept the soldiers from fleeing the battlefield at the sight of the French.
Guy of Namur knighted Pieter de Koninck and his two sons, along with about 30 other wealthy citizens from Bruges. Then he and Guillaume also sent off their horses and took a place in the front row, wearing ordinary helmets without visors, holding a pike or godendag in their hands. Before the battle, the Franciscans who were with the army celebrated masses and delivered sermons, the soldiers took communion and prayed.
According to sources, Jean de Renesse (or someone else) made a speech to the army. The fact itself is certainly fictitious, not to mention the fact that it is physically impossible. It is only clear that immediately before the battle, the order was passed down the ranks to kill both people and horses in battle, not to take any spoils, and anyone who does this, either surrenders to the enemy or runs, will be killed on the spot. It was ordered not to take prisoners - the battle was destined to become one of the most merciless and bloody battles of the Middle Ages. The battle cry was “Lion of Flanders!”
Battle formations. French people.
At approximately 6:00 a call was made in the French camp to arm themselves and saddle their horses. The cavalry lined up in 10 battles (each with perhaps 6-21 "banners", a total of about 2500-3000 men-at-arms).
In the morning, after reconnaissance, for which two marshals were sent, a military council was held, where many spoke out against the attack. Constable Raoul de Clermont, Sire de Nelles, pointed out the danger for the knights if they fought on the other side of the stream. In case of retreat, the streams will become a trap for the cavalry. He advised luring the Flemings into the field. Jean de Burla, Grand Maître of Crossbowmen (i.e., chief of infantry), proposed using his light infantry to inflict such serious damage on the Flemings that they would have to retreat. Then the knights will be able to deliver the decisive blow. Godefroy of Brabant (brother of the Duke of Brabant, Jean I) thought that it would be better not to attack, but to use the usual French technique - to exhaust the Flemings, forcing them to stand in formation all day, without food or drink, in the heat, and the next day they would no longer be able to fight.
However, the prevailing opinion was that of those who wanted to immediately begin a battle with these “poor and unarmed peasants.” Robert de Artois, ignoring all warning advice, lined up the troops in three lines with trumpet signals (infantry, 8 cavalry battles and a reserve of 2 battles) and shortly before noon entered the battle.
Progress of the battle.
First stage. Shootout
The battle began with a skirmish between crossbowmen and bidots on the French side (followed at some distance by detachments of cavalry) and crossbowmen and archers on the Flemish side. It seems that there were few of both, but gradually the Flemings retreated. The French infantry moved forward, their arrows began to reach the ranks of the Flemish phalanx, they themselves easily passed the ditches and seemed to be engaged in close combat. According to Gilles le Muisy, they acted so successfully that “they were almost on the verge of victory.”
But the infantry was stopped by the order of Robert de Artois (Verbruggen for some reason thinks that the infantry had only just reached the streams). As the Old Chronicle of Flanders reports, the French knights, seeing that the infantry was about to defeat the Flemings, approached Artois and asked him: “Sire, what are you still waiting for? Our infantrymen ... are advancing so that they will win and we We won’t gain any honor here.” But, according to the Chronicle of Flanders, the knights attacked only because they decided that the Flemings were fleeing the battlefield.
Therefore, Robert gave the order “Infantrymen, retreat back!”, and the standard bearers rode ahead of the knights. Then came the order “Move!” ( Mouvez), and 7 battles, unfurling their banners, rushed across the field.
It is possible, however, that Robert took into account not only the honor of the nobility, but also the consideration that without the support of the cavalry, the infantry would have been defeated by the Flemish phalanx. But I think the battle was quite successful before Artois's order.
Progress of the battle.
Second phase. Cavalry Charge
The infantrymen gave way to their cavalry, but some did not hear the order or were late and were trampled. The overwhelming majority, however, retreated safely between battles or were distributed along the flanks.
The knights crossed the water as quickly as possible (so as not to be caught by a counterattack). Some horses stumbled, others had to be urged, several riders fell out of the saddle, but on the whole the obstacle was successfully crossed.
The left wing (4 battles of de Nel, Jean de Burle, Godefroy of Brabant and two marshals) crossed the Grote, quickly changed formation, switched to a fast trot and attacked the right flank and part of the center of the Flemings, simultaneously dispersing their riflemen who had taken refuge in the rear of the phalanx. Some of the horsemen held their horses, but most of the knights collided with the infantry (believed to be lined up 8 rows deep) with a terrible roar, but the Bruges survived. Godefroy of Brabant threw Guillaume de Juliet to the ground, cut down his banner, even fought his way through the ranks of the Flemings, but was ultimately pulled off his horse and killed. Pal and Raoul de Nel. Fierce hand-to-hand fighting ensued, and the Flemings, with their longer weapons, pikes and godendags, gained considerable advantage over the French, who did not have much room to maneuver.
In the center, the French were initially successful; some of the soldiers of the Free District of Bruges wavered and ran. It seemed that the ranks of the Flemings were about to be broken.
At this moment, the right wing (3 battles) crossed Groeninge, but in greater order than on the French left flank, and fell on the East Flemings. However, here too the first onslaught was repulsed, after which hand-to-hand fighting flared up along the entire front.
Hoping to help his own, Jean de Lan made a desperate foray from the castle, and his men set fire to a house in the market square, intending to distract the Ypres. But they remained at the castle gates and successfully repelled the attack of the garrison.
Meanwhile the fight continued. At one time the situation seemed threatening for the Flemings, especially in the center. But Renesse hastened with a reserve to help, and the French knights were driven back. This success inspired the Flemish center to counterattack, followed by the flanks - 3000-4000 Flemings (according to Verbruggen's estimates, in reality - one and a half times more) pushed the French horsemen to the water. There was general confusion among the French. According to the author of one English poem, the French knights were like a “hare” that fell into a “trap.” Jean de Hoekzem used a different metaphor for knights falling into ditches: like "bulls sacrificed, without protection."
Progress of the battle.
Third stage. Retreat and flight of the French army
Robert de Artois realized that his army would be defeated, and he himself rushed into the attack with his men (probably the 8th Battle), while simultaneously ordering the rearguard (reserve) to join the battle. To the sound of trumpets, the knights of Artois clashed with the troops of Guy of Namur. The ranks of the eastern Flemings were partly upset during the offensive, so Artois initially managed to achieve success, go deeper into the Flemish system and reach the banner (Robert even managed to tear off part of the banner). His attack and the sight of the approaching rearguard caused panic in the ranks of Guy's detachment, some of the soldiers even fled. But reinforcements arrived to help the Flemings, brother Willem van Saftinghe/Seftinghe from Ter Dest Abbey killed the count's horse (according to other sources, the count himself, but there are indications of what, the horse fell into the ditch) and Robert was killed, allegedly praying before his death for mercy.
The remnants of his battles were driven to the water and, despite desperate resistance, were almost completely killed, including the horses. Many drowned while trying to be rescued by swimming. No prisoners were taken.
Having completed the defeat of the cavalry, the Flemings crossed the streams and moved to the rearguard. The latter, consisting of 2 battles, did not move during all this time. But as soon as the Flemings were on the other side, the French cavalry fled to Lille and Tournai, dragging the infantry with them (at about 15:00). The Flemish pursued them for 10-11 kilometers.
Consequences
By evening the fugitives reached Tournai, where they exchanged their weapons for bread, although some of them were too shocked to eat. Gilles le Muisy: “From the towers of the Church of Our Lady of Tournai, the Abbey of St. Martin and the city, they could see running along the roads, through hedges and fields, in such numbers that no one who did not see it would believe... in the vicinity of the city and in the villages there were so many knights and foot soldiers dying of hunger that it was a terrible sight. Those who tried to find food near the city exchanged their equipment for it. All that night and the next day those who arrived in the city were so afraid that many of them did not They could even eat."
The losses were stunning - only one of the commanders of the battles participating in the battle was captured (Mathieu de Tri, Sir de Fontenoy), the rest were killed. Killed were 63 nobles (including Marshal Raoul de Nesle and the commander, Robert de Artois), Chancellor Pierre Flot, and at least 700 knights (possibly as many as 1,000). The lists of those killed in the chronicles take up several pages (!). Among them are Marshal Guy de Clermont, Sire de Breteuil, brother of the constable; Marshal Simon de Melun, Seneschal of Limousin; Godefroy of Brabant, sire de Archot; Arnaud de Wezemel, Marshal of Brabant; Grand Maître of Crossbowmen Jean de Bürla, Seneschal Gieni. In addition, Jacques de Chatillon fell (but his brother Guy, Comte de Saint-Paul, escaped); Renaud de Tree, sire de Vaumin; Jean de Ponthieu, Comte de Haumale; Jean de Brienne, Comte d'Eux; Jean de Tri, Count of Dammartin; Robert de Tancarville, chamberlain of Normandy; Thomas de Coucy; Godefroy, sire de Aspremont; Raoul de Flamand, sire de Cany and Verpilliers; Jean de Hainault, Count of Ostrevant, son of the Count de Hainault. Robert, Count of Auvergne and Boulogne, survived, but his son Godefroy died, as did the son of the Count de Soissons, Raoul.
F. Contamine believes that up to 40% of the number of French knights remained on the field, although Verbruggen and G. Funk-Brentano suggest a figure of 50%. Even Jean Froissart, decades later, recalled how “the Comte d’Artois and the whole flower of France” fell.
The losses of the Flemings are unknown, they think that no more than “several hundred.” However, given the intensity of the battle, it is doubtful that almost 1000 knights allowed themselves to be killed so easily. One might think that the number of killed Flemings was not inferior to the number of fallen French horsemen.
The Flemings plundered the bodies of the fallen French, removing several hundred golden spurs from the knights (which they hung in the churches of Courtrai), and left, leaving the bodies unburied. What is curious is that the sources seem to say that the victors did not bury their dead either; why is not clear (were they so intoxicated by victory?). The body of Robert de Artois, however, was taken to a nearby monastery by angels (French version) or loyal Flemings (prose version) and buried there.
In France, the victory of the rebels and the death of many noble warriors was perceived as a tragedy. Flanders, on the contrary, honored its heroes. Giovanni Villani wrote about those days: “The Flemings became so proud and undaunted after their victory at Courtrai that one Flemish with a godendag was not afraid to kill two mounted French knights.”
True, their ardor was quickly cooled by the Battle of Arc (1303), and then the defeat at Mont-en-Pevele (1304). As a result, in June 1305, in Athy-sur-Orge, the Flemings had to sign a peace treaty with the French king on very strict terms.
Battle Analysis
Actually, the question of why the French lost the Battle of Courtrai has been troubling scientific minds for more than a century. They blamed either ditches and swamps, or Robert de Artois, or infantry tactics (and managed to find here almost the world’s first victory of infantry over cavalry), Funk-Brentano generally invented a whole theory of the “old, obsolete world of chivalry” of France and the stronger "new, modern world"Flanders. Then, of course, the French were doomed from the beginning. However, it is not clear why they even entered the field in this case?
For those who like to remember the “Battle of the Spurs” and the notorious (and fantastic) “Infantry Revolution” Western Europe(with the exception, perhaps, of England in the 2nd half of the 1310s-1320s), I would like to ask one simple question - what happened to these golden spurs, these glorious symbols of the victory of the “modern” Flemish infantry over the “obsolete” "knightly cavalry (which was already completely hired)? The answer is very simple - they were taken home by the French, exactly 80 years later. And they took Courtray from the burnt to the ground, having first destroyed at Roosebeck the same infantry phalanx that stood at Courtray in 1302. And even earlier - inflicting crushing defeats on the same phalanx at Mont-en-Pevel and Cassel, and then at Autey, Rupelmonde , Gavere, Brusteme. Against the backdrop of all these victories, Courtray and Ark (in the latter case, a useless and expensive victory) look a little different. But everyone knows Courtray, which cannot be said about the Flemish defeats, which by no means proved the invincibility of Flemish tactics.
K. DeVries devoted a lot of space to trying to prove that ditches and streams did not help the Flemings in victory. Admitting that ditches are mentioned by almost all chroniclers, who awarded them the epithets “treasonous”, “malicious” or, at worst, simply “harmful”, and the French allegedly “trembled” when they came across them, he notes that “there are many reasons why they cannot be recognized as the only reason for the defeat of the French cavalry." Firstly, Flemish sources devote very little space to them in their descriptions of the battle and do not attach any special significance to this defensive measure.
Item, those sources that were written on the Flemish side and mention ditches, see in them only a secondary reason for their victory. The Chronicle of the Counts of Flanders says that the Flemings, it turns out, did not even suspect what would happen, and the effect the ditches had on the French attack struck them first of all. The Old Chronicle of Flanders and the third continuation of the Acts of the Abbots of St. Trudonius insist that the French knights began to fall into the ditches only when they were defeated and retreating - i.e. during the cavalry attack they were not even noticed.
Item, the cause of the death of many heavily armed horsemen was not the ditches themselves, but the water and mud that filled them (Geoffroy of Paris).
Item, despite the assurances of Villani and other authors that the French were blissfully unaware of such an obstacle in their path, a number of sources (and the most reliable of them - the accounts of Robert de Artois himself!) prove otherwise. Moreover, the French infantry walked ahead of the cavalry and, if they did not force the ditches, they saw them perfectly!
But compared to other battles, his arguments seem somewhat unconvincing. All Flemish tactics were defensive, waiting for the enemy in a favorable position - as soon as they went on the offensive, opening the flanks and rear of the phalanx to the enemy cavalry, they immediately suffered crushing defeats. Moreover, the flanks of the formation, and often the front and rear, always tried to rely on natural obstacles. Another thing is how useful these obstacles turned out to be for the attacking side. But in the case of Courtray, their benefit is obvious, albeit for the defenders - having surrounded themselves on all sides with water, the Flemings simply had nowhere to run, even if they really wanted to. They had no choice but to wait and pray.
Be that as it may, whether the ditches are the reason, or ( more likely) features of horse psychology (as already said, you cannot force a horse to attack a person), or simply the peaks of the Flemings (and the knights, despite all their bravery, of course, did not want to die at all), but the French cavalry failed to break through the ranks. She had to fight while standing still. And the lack of opportunity for maneuver and attack, in conditions of numerical superiority of the enemy, meant death for her. Soon they were driven to the ditches, and then into them.
The Battle of Courtrai only once again throughout the Middle Ages demonstrated the simple fact that persistent infantry, be it Italians, Scots, Swiss, Flemings, Dithmarsh, English, can defeat heavily armed cavalry, especially if they select and prepare the terrain (here: ditches) in advance. for the future battlefield and if it is limited to dense defense in tight formation. And if the cavalry fails to break through their formation and scatter the infantry, it, as at Courtrai, will face defeat and huge losses. According to one anonymous chronicler, “the whole flower of French chivalry seemed to have disappeared there.” However, the French turned out to be capable students - in the history of the Franco-Flemish wars we will not find any mention of attacks on horseback. And, as Mont-en-Pevel showed, the Flemish pikemen were helpless against an enemy who had a large number of riflemen.
Against cavalry, which did not have infantry support and yet decided to attack the phalanx, its pikes were, of course, a very effective weapon - however, the example of Courtray remains the only one.
Sources and literature
The main source of facts for this article was the book “Infantry Techniques of Warfare in the Early 14th Century” by Kelly DeVries ( K.R. DeVries, "Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century", Woodbridge, 1996, pp.9-22). There is also a complete bibliography, including indications of publications of sources, none of which, unfortunately, have been translated into Russian to this day (although, fortunately, there are French and English translations). The description of the battle was also used in the work of J. Verbruggen ( J.F. Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages, Amsterdam-N.Y.-Oxford, 1979, pp.166-173). The only Russian-language description of Delbrück has long been outdated and is of no interest (except for his fantastic theory that the Flemings, it turns out, attacked the French cavalry when they crossed the ditches).
French and Flemish tactics and military organization were studied based on the works of F. Contamine ( Contamine Ph. La guerre au Moyen Age. Paris,1999), D. Nicolas ( Nicolle D. French Medieval Armies 1000-1300. Osprey,1991), J. Verbruggen ( Decree. op.) and J. Heath ( Heath I. Armies of the Middle Ages. Vol.I. Worthing,1982).
"Medieval Cities of Belgium" by A. Pirenne (republished in 2001), part of his "History of Belgium", although written with pronounced Flemish patriotism (which is also the case with Verbruggen's monograph), is still useful for understanding the events before and after the Battle of Courtray. Interesting considerations about the policies of Philip the Fair can be found in the first chapter (“Participants”) of “The Templar Trial” by M. Barber (M., 1998).
Publication:
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Illani tells how incredibly proud the Flemings were of their victory at Courtrai, and they say that after it one Fleming with a godendag in his hands would have decided to confront two mounted knights. He gives detailed description battles.
The Flemings were still besieging the castles of Cassel and Courtray, occupied by the French, when a large French army came to the aid of the besieged under the command of Captain-General Comte d'Artois, son-in-law of King Philip. In view of this, the Flemings lifted the siege of Cassel and concentrated all their forces near Courtray, the inhabitants of which also joined to the movement. Artois approached the city, no doubt believing that his very appearance would force the Flemish citizen militia to retreat and lift the siege of the castle. But it was clear to the Flemings that if they wanted to save their country they would have to fight, and they decided to take the battle precisely here, before Courtray. If they had retreated and disbanded their army, the French would not only have liberated the castle and ravaged the plain, but perhaps would have captured the cities, even Bruges, since it was weakly fortified. They could, to an even greater extent, than the Persians once did in Attica, count on supporters among the population itself.The strong castle (or citadel) of Courtray, which the French wanted to free from siege, was located in the northern corner of the city on the Lys River, as well as the city itself, on the right south coast her. In order to block access to the citadel, the Flemings lined up directly in front of it, occupying the corner between the city and the river. To the right of them was a long and narrow city, stretching along the river to the south, to the left was a monastery lying by the river, in front was a rather deep stream of Groeningen, the banks of which were partly marshy. The position did not allow retreat: in case of defeat, the townspeople would be thrown into the river, which was located directly in their rear; the people who fought here decided to win or die.
Their formation is described as "a battle line, very long and dense"; “built in one straight line and closely spaced, with closed rows”; “the townspeople formed one single battle line, sending forward archers, then men with spears and iron clubs alternately, then the rest” (Genealogia Sot. Flandrensium), “serrement et espessement ordonnes” (chronicle of Saint-Denis). Thus, the formation was flank-shaped and obviously had a length of at least 600 m, and maybe even more; not particularly numerous riflemen scattered in front of the front; the main mass was armed with pikes and godendags (a type of halberd) and only partly with defensive weapons. Both earl commanders and their retinue - about 10 mounted knights - dismounted and joined the phalanx, so that not a single warrior was on horseback. The obstacle in front of the front - Groningen, which, according to the Villani chronicle, is 5 cubits wide and 3 cubits deep, was also artificially strengthened by wolf pits and, probably, by deepening small places. One detachment, under the command of a particularly experienced knight in military affairs, Johann von Renesse, stood in reserve behind the phalanx. Another detachment, consisting of the townspeople of Ypres, was turned against the citadel, so that its garrison could not attack the phalanx in the rear during the battle.
Count d'Artois, who is described as a courageous fighter, proven in five or six battles, realized that the enemy's position was very strong and that it could neither be attacked from the front nor outflanked. He waited for several days, camping a quarter of a mile south cities: will the townspeople really dare to fight in a position that does not allow retreat? True, the French commander could force them to retreat, operating against Ypres or directly against Bruges, and in the process ruin the country. However, the garrison of the citadel of Courtrai, obviously, should would in the meantime surrender, and while the success of other maneuvers would be doubtful, victory in this sector at one blow would decide the outcome of the war and destroy the enemy.Therefore, Artois decided to attack.
Genoese crossbowmen and Spanish javelin throwers walked ahead, followed by detachments of knights; a small detachment remained in reserve. Crossbowmen and dart throwers chased the enemy archers and fired at the phalanx, which apparently stood directly behind Groningen. Their fire was so effective that the phalanx could not withstand it, but the counts managed to withdraw it in order a little back. The French riflemen could not cross Groningen to pursue the Flemings on the other side, as they would be in danger of a counterattack. Therefore, Count d'Artois signaled the crossbowmen to retreat and the knights to attack; due to the fact that the enemy infantry had retreated far enough from the obstacle in front of the front, he could hope that the cavalry would cross the stream and there would be room for a run on the other bank. Although the retreat of the riflemen through the ranks of the attacking knights caused some confusion and some of the Genoese were trampled, however, with the joint actions of these types of troops, such a phenomenon, perhaps, almost always took place and could not at all affect the development and outcome of the battle.
But then something new and completely unheard of happened: at that moment, when the knights were preparing to make a difficult crossing over the stream, and this was hampered by the flow of water, the marshy banks and artificial obstacles built by the Flemings, the enemy phalanx suddenly stirred, rushed forward and, hacking and stabbing, rushed on the knights. The latter were hardly able to use their weapons and, in any case, could not use their real strength - the onslaught of their heavy war horses, thanks to which they usually scattered and shot down enemy infantry. Undoubtedly, both Flemish counts had previously instructed their citizens regarding this tactic and now gave a timely signal. After the performance of the archers, who certainly outnumbered the knights, so that each knight was attacked simultaneously by many archers, the latter immediately became masters of the situation and killed the knights en masse. Before the battle, the Flemings issued an order: whoever spares the enemy or takes possession of the spoils before the end of the battle must be immediately stabbed to death by the soldiers standing nearby. Only in the center did the knights manage to quickly cross Groningen and attack and push back the enemy phalanx in the usual way. But at this time, the Flemish reserve, left just in case, entered the battle under the command of Johann von Renesse, who restored the situation. This battle also ended in the complete defeat of the initially victorious knights, since they again had to cross to the opposite bank of Groningen, where the Flemings easily overtook and defeated them.
Count d'Artois himself allegedly wanted to surrender to one warlike monk, Wilhelm from Suftingen, but since he spoke French, the Flemings shouted: “We don’t understand you!” and killed him. The foray undertaken by the garrison of the citadel was easily repelled by a barrier formed specifically for this purpose by citizens of the city of Ypres. The reserve under the command of Saint-Paul, left by the Count d'Artois, was unable to save or help. In this battle, the new, well-organized infantry of townspeople and peasants defeated the knightly cavalry. It became clear that the united masses of infantry could successfully resist the knightly cavalry and even counterattack it. The Flemish battle formation turned out to be capable of maneuver on the battlefield. The phalanx managed to retreat in order to get out of the affected area, and then quickly counterattack the advancing cavalry. Having allocated reserves and timely introduced them into battle, the Flemings were able to eliminate the breakthrough of the center of the phalanx and repel the attack of the castle garrison. Tactical depth ensured the stability of the Flemish battle formation. The Battle of Courtrai is one of the rather rare historical examples of a defensive battle in which complete victory was achieved.
Battle of Courtrai or Battle of the Spurs(Dutch. De Guldensporenslag, French bataille des éperons d'or) - the battle of the Flemings with the French army on July 11, 1302 near the city of Courtray during the Flemish Uprising of 1302.
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Background
In June 1297, the French invaded Flanders and were able to achieve some success. England, busy at war with Scotland, was unable to help, and the Flemings signed a truce in 1297 with the French. In January 1300 (after the end of the treaty) the French re-entered the county, and by May they were in complete control. Dampierre was arrested and taken to Paris, and Philip personally visited Flanders to carry out administrative changes.
After the king's departure on May 18, 1302, the townspeople of Bruges launched a revolt against the French governor of Flanders, Jacques de Chatillon, known as the Bruges Matins. Jean I and Guy de Namur took command of the rebels, since Guy de Dampierre remained in prison. The rebels controlled the county with the exception of Ghent, Courtray and Cassel (which supported the king). Most of the nobility took the side of the French king, fearing the rise of the common people to power.
Strengths of the parties
The French army, commanded by Count Robert of Artois, consisted of: 1,000 crossbowmen (the majority were natives of Lombardy), 2,000 spearmen and 3,000 infantry (both French and mercenary from Lombardy, Navarre and Spain) and 2,700 noble cavalry, divided into three parts .
The Flemish Army had contingents from:
- Bruges (2600 - 3700 people, including 320 crossbowmen).
- Chatels Brugse Vrije east of Bruges (2500 people led by the son of Guy de Dampierre).
- Ypres (1000 people, half were in reserve with John III Van Renesse).
- East Flanders (2,500 men)
This army mainly consisted of well-trained and equipped city militia, organized in guilds. The weapons consisted of steel helmets, chain mail, spears, bows, crossbows and godendags. The latter was a 1.5 meter long shaft with a steel spike. As mentioned above, the bulk of the nobility took the side of France; the chronicle of Ghent mentioned ten knights on the side of the rebels.
Battle
Flemish forces united at Courtray on June 26, after which they besieged the castle with a French garrison, and prepared for the upcoming battle. The castle could not be taken before the main enemy army arrived, and the two forces clashed on 11 July in an open field near the town, next to the Groninge stream.
The field was crossed by numerous ditches and streams, dug by Flemish soldiers, who covered part of what had been dug with mud and branches. In such conditions, the effectiveness of the cavalry was less; the servants sent to build the crossing were destroyed ahead of time. The Flemish position was a square, covered from the rear by the Lys River, with its front part facing the French army and located behind the large rivers.
The French infantry began to advance and managed to cross the rivers and achieve some success, although they were unable to push back the Flemish front line. Robert Artois impatiently ordered the infantry to give way to the cavalry. Its advance was much more complicated by the natural landscape, against which the Flemish infantry launched an attack. Many knights were knocked out and finished off by the godendags while trying to break the chain of spearmen; the horsemen who escaped from the encirclement were subsequently destroyed on the flanks.
To turn the tide of the battle, Artois ordered the cavalry reserves to move forward, but this maneuver was not effective. With no new reinforcements, the French knights were eventually driven back to ditches and streams, where they became easy prey for the militia. The foray from the garrison was thwarted by a specially prepared detachment of Flemings. The spectacle of the defeat of the knightly army had a strong impact on the French army, the remnants of which pursued another 10 km (6 miles). The Flemings took almost no knights prisoner, and Robert de Artois was among those killed.
The Flemings emerged victorious and collected 700 pairs of golden spurs from the corpses of the knights, which were hung in one of the city churches for the edification of future generations, so the Battle of Courtrai went down in history as well as Battle of the Golden Spurs. In 1382, the spurs were taken by the soldiers of Charles VI after the Battle of Rosebeek, and Courtray was sacked.
Consequences
With their decisive victory the Flemings strengthened their control over the county. Kortrijk Castle surrendered on July 13, the next day Guy de Namur entered Ghent. Patrician rule was soon replaced in Ghent and Ypres. The guilds received official recognition.
The battle soon became known as the "Battle of Courtrai" or "Battle of the Golden Spurs", due to the 700 pairs of spurs that were captured as trophies and hung in the nearby Church of Our Lady.
The French managed to change the current situation with two victories in 1304: in the naval battle of Zerikzee and the land battle of Mons-en-Pevele. In June 1305, negotiations culminated in the Treaty of Hathis, which recognized Flanders integral part France in the form of a county, in exchange the Flemings agreed to pay 20,000 pounds and 400,000 pounds in reparations and transferred a number of cities to the king.
The defeat of the French knighthood at Courtrai made a great impression on his contemporaries. In particular, the Florentine historian Giovanni Villani reported in his “New Chronicle”:
In total, the French lost more than six thousand knights and countless infantry killed, but did not take anyone prisoner... After this defeat, the honor and glory of the ancient nobility and courage of the French was greatly diminished, for the flower of world knighthood was defeated and humiliated by its own subjects, the noblest people in the world - weavers, fullers, workers in low crafts and occupations. They were so alien to military affairs that, out of contempt for their cowardice, other peoples of the world called the Flemings “fat rabbits.” But after these victories, respect for them became so high that one Fleming on foot with a godendak in his hand was worth two French knights.
Notes
Literature
- // Military Encyclopedia: [in 18 volumes] / ed.
In the 12th and 13th centuries, Flanders quickly became one of the most economically developed regions of Europe. Bruges, Ghent, Ypres and other cities of the county became major centers of industry, trade and culture. Bourgeois order was established in the cities, which encouraged the burghers to fight for their independence. At the same time, peasant unions emerged that sought to abolish relations of feudal dependence in rural areas.
The cities of Flanders managed to defeat the lords. However, the city patriciate (city elite) took advantage of the fruits of freedom, seizing power into their own hands. A struggle between artisans, apprentices and non-guild workers began with the patriciate, whose representatives soon turned to the French king for help. Taking advantage of this, Philip IV the Fair captured all of Flanders in 1300.
The war tax introduced by the French king caused indignation among the broad masses. In 1301, the artisans of Bruges rebelled against this tax. The French suppressed the popular uprising, but they failed to defuse the situation.
In May 1302, rebel citizens destroyed the 3,000-strong French garrison in Bruges. "Matins of Bruges" served as a signal for a general uprising against French rule. The citizens of Bruges and Ghent distinguished themselves with the greatest restraint and organization. Peasants joined the townspeople. The rebels were led by the Bruges townsman Peter Koenig. Events developed so rapidly that in a very short time the French were forced to surrender all the castles except Courtray and Cassel. However, the political situation was complicated by the fact that most of the townspeople were fighting not only the French, but also their own patriciate.
Philip sent a feudal militia against the rebelling Flemings, reinforced by mercenaries - Lombard crossbowmen and Spanish dart throwers. In total, the French had 7.5 thousand horsemen and 3-5 thousand foot mercenaries, that is, 10-12 thousand people. The army was commanded by Captain General Count d'Artois. (A. Puzyrevsky and Geisman estimated the size of the French army at approximately 47 thousand people).
Having received information about the enemy's movement, the Flemings lifted the siege of the castle of Casseya and concentrated at Courtray, deciding to give battle here. Their forces were estimated at 13–20 thousand people.
The peculiarity of the rebel army was that it consisted of only about 10 knights (commanders and their retinue), the rest were foot soldiers. The infantry consisted of archers (archers and crossbowmen), pikemen, some of whom were armed with godendags, and warriors armed with clubs. According to A. Puzyrevsky, the advanced (selected) part of the Flemish army was armed with iron helmets, chain mail, armor and long pikes with a rhombic iron tip. She was “followed by people who did not have full safety weapons; they wore a light helmet, a bassinet, and a wooden shield hung around their neck. Others have gambesons, that is, leather helmets, or body covers made of a thick quilted canvas jacket. As an offensive weapon, they had thick, rough sticks, the upper iron frame of which formed a kind of apple and then ended with an iron tip in the form of a dagger, so that this weapon could be used not only as a pike, but partly as a mace - this is the famous weapon acquired soon great glory will be in their hands.” (Puzyrevsky A. History of military art in the Middle Ages. Part I. St. Petersburg, 1884. P. 19.)
The Flemish army took up a strong defensive position in the bend of the river. Fox. In front of the front flowed the Trening stream, 2.5–3 m wide and about 1.5 m deep. The swampy banks of the stream made it difficult for the knightly cavalry to act; In addition, wolf pits were dug on the right bank. The right flank of the position was covered by the bend of the river. The fox, behind which was the city; the left flank was protected by a fortified monastery; in the rear flowed an impassable river. Fox... The total length of the front was a little more than one kilometer, the greatest depth of the battle formation was 500–600 m. The position was chosen for a defensive battle, but excluded the possibility of retreat. In addition, in the rear of the right flank there was a castle occupied by a French garrison, from which enemy attacks had to be constantly expected.
The Flemish battle formation was a phalanx built along the Trening stream. The number of ranks in it is unknown. As reported in the chronicle of Saint-Denis, “the townspeople formed one single battle line, sending forward archers, then men with spears and iron clubs - alternately - then the rest.” (See: Delbrück. “History of Military Art”. Vol. III. 1938. P. 313). Archers would be sent across the stream to serve as combat guards. Koma, blowing with their knights dismounted and stood in the center of the phalanx. A detachment of Ypres townspeople lined up against the castle with the task of repelling an attack by the French garrison. A detachment under the command of an experienced knight was allocated to the reserve. Thus, the battle formation had tactical depth, and its flanks abutted natural obstacles. The warriors received orders to hit the knight's horses.
For several days the French army stood indecisively one kilometer south of Courtray. D'Artois understood that the enemy occupied a strong position. However, at dawn on July 11, 1302, he moved his army east, intending to attack the Flemings and release the castle. “The tightness of the position,” A. Puzyrevsky pointed out, “did not allow all 10 battles or separate detachments into which the army was divided stretched out into one battle line, and the troops (not counting the infantry) were located in three lines. Ahead of the front there were 10 thousand Lombard crossbowmen and bidals (dart throwers. - Author), who served as scouts for the cavalry ". (Puzyrevsky A. Op. op. p. 21.)
At about 7 o'clock in the morning, crossbowmen and javelin throwers, turning against the entire front of the rebels, attacked the Flemish archers and drove them back across the stream. Following this, they began to fire at the Flemish phalanx, which retreated a little and left the firing zone. Then d'Artois ordered the advanced units to retreat back, and the knights to pass through their infantry and attack the Flemings. This maneuver brought some confusion into the ranks of the French army. Some of the Lombards were trampled by their own cavalry.
At the moment when the knights began to cross the stream, the Flemish phalanx moved forward and counterattacked the French, which turned out to be a complete surprise to them. Hand-to-hand combat ensued along the entire front.
The French knights managed to break through the center of the Flemish phalanx, but they were unable to build on their success, because they were counterattacked and driven back by the Flemish reserve. They found themselves thrown back behind the stream and the flanks of the French army.
Having repelled three attacks by the French cavalry, both flanks of the Flemings launched a decisive offensive, driving the fleeing enemy to the stream. The persecution and physical destruction of the knights began. The Flemings had orders to keep an eye on each other, putting to death anyone who dared to show nobility and be merciful to the enemy.
At the same time, a detachment of Ypres townspeople repelled an attack by the castle garrison.
The Flemings inflicted a complete defeat on the French army. The French cavalry alone killed about 4 thousand people. The winners took 700 golden spurs from the killed knights and hung them in the church in memory of this victory. Therefore, the battle of Courtrai was called the “Battle of the Golden Spurs”.
The political result of the victory at Courtray was that the well-organized infantry of the Flemish townspeople and peasants, defending their freedom and independence, completely defeated the knightly cavalry of the conquerors. The French were forced to withdraw from Flanders. Philip IV, having abandoned its conquest, was able to retain only a few southern cities.
The moral significance of the victory was so great that after it, one Fleming on foot with a godendag was ready to fight with two mounted knights.
From a military-historical point of view, the Battle of Courtrai is interesting in that it represents one of the rather rare examples of a defensive battle: for the first time in the Middle Ages, united masses of infantry successfully resisted the knightly cavalry, counterattacked it, and won a decisive victory.
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2. Military encyclopedic lexicon, published by the Society of Military and Writers. - Ed. 2nd. - In 14 volumes - St. Petersburg, 1855. - T.7. - pp. 588–591.
3. Geisman P. A. History of military art in the Middle and New Ages (VI–XVIII centuries). - Ed. 2nd. - St. Petersburg, 1907.
4. Delbrück G. History of military art within political history. - T.Z. Middle Ages. - St. Petersburg, 1996. pp. 267–331.
5. Elchaninov A. G. History of military art from ancient times to Bonaparte. - Lithogr. notes. - St. Petersburg, 1908.
6. History of France: In 3 volumes / Ch. ed. A. Z. Manfred. - M., 1972. - T.1. -WITH. 122–123.
7. Puzyrevsky A.K. History of military art in the Middle Ages (V–XVI centuries). -SPb., 1884. - Part II. - P. 18–26.
8. Razin E. A. History of military art - St. Petersburg, 1994. - T.2. From 432–436.
9. Ryustov F.V. History of the infantry. - T. 1–2 // Military Library. XXV - St. Petersburg, 1876.
10. Soviet military encyclopedia: In 8 volumes / Chief ed. commission. N.V. Ogarkov (prev) and others - M., 1977. - T.4. - From 541–542.
11. Encyclopedia of military and naval sciences. In 8 volumes / Under general. ed. G. A. Leer. - St. Petersburg, 1889 - T 4 - P. 470–471.
The famous Battle of the Golden Spurs took place on July 11, 1302 at Courtray (Flanders), but even today it still evokes a lot of emotions.
Some are trying to understand the reasons for the death of the flower of French chivalry, and they say that the card just fell that way. Others believe that it was their incomparable valor and organization that brought victory to the Flemings.
And so, without much hope of shedding light on the reasons for the death of the French army at Courtray, let's remember those glorious events and what preceded them.
So, at the beginning of the 14th century, France was ruled by Philip IV the Handsome - the same one who would later destroy the Templar Order and be cursed.
Long before these events, he captured the county of Flanders, which today is one of the three regions of Belgium. Philip made Flanders his province and appointed a governor, Jacques de Chatillon.
Naturally, it did not occur to de Chatillon to take into account the fact that the more progressive Flanders had already replaced the feudal system with the burghers. However, it should have been. Because when Philip’s governor applied old feudal methods to the burghers, they began to grumble.
However, Philip the Fair was also not interested in details. All he wanted was to receive maximum income from his new properties. Therefore, he imposed high taxes, and those, as usual, were levied on ordinary artisans and townspeople.
As a result, in the spring of 1302, a rebellion broke out in Bruges, led by local resident Peter Koninck.
A detachment of approximately 800 people, led by de Chatillon and royal adviser Pierre Flotte, arrived to suppress the rebellion on May 17.
The frightened townspeople surrendered Bruges to the French during the day. And at night they unexpectedly attacked the sleeping garrison and massacred about 300 people. The French were identified by their characteristic accent, entered into conversation with them, and then killed. This event went down in history as the “Matins of Bruges”.
Monument to Jan Breidel and Pieter de Koninck, who organized and held the Bruges Matins - in the very city where everything happened.
However, some French managed to escape. Chatillon hid in the castle of Courtray, Flotte fled to Lille.
Blood for blood
From that moment on, a protracted and bloody war began between France and Flanders, which required large financial expenditures from Philip the Fair. However, the outcome of this war was not difficult to predict.
The citizens of Bruges had nowhere to retreat, and they turned to all other cities of Flanders for help. All except Ghent supported the uprising.
Bruges armed itself, dug ditches, connected them with the Lys River in order to fill them with water...
The assembled army was led by “a very brave and courageous young man,” the cleric Guillaume de Julier (known as William of Jülich) and Guy of Namur. They captured Audenard and on June 26 besieged the castle of Courtray, which was still held by a French garrison led by the fleeing Chatillon.
Philip the Fair did not wait and sent a large army to suppress the uprising.
Its core was the heavy cavalry, and its commander was Robert II the Good (1250-1302), Count of Artois, a glorious knight of the noblest origin. On July 8, Robert, along with his army, arrived near Courtray.
The enemies met...
Thirteen pieces of silver
For three days the armies stood opposite each other, during which time skirmishes occurred, some tried to restore the bridge, others did not, while Artois allowed his knights and fighters to plunder the outskirts of Courtray. As usually happens, they not only robbed, but also killed the people they came across; they say they beheaded and desecrated the statues of saints in the church.
Meanwhile, Robert de Artois himself was engaged in reconnaissance, studied Flemish fortifications and even managed to buy a plan for fortifications from a certain Pierre l’Orrible for 13 livres 10 sous 10 deniers (in Parisian coins).
Unequal forces and morale
The exact number of those who fought is unknown. Thus, chronicler Van Veltem puts the figure at 7 thousand people, but his colleague Verbruggen disagrees with him. Robert de Artois, he believes, had about 2.5 - 3 thousand knights and squires, as well as 4.5 - 5 thousand infantry (crossbowmen, spearmen, and so on).
On the Flemish side it is thought that there were approximately the same number of fighters, but again different sources differ in the data. Numbers are quoted from 13 to 60 thousand, while the Verbruggen already familiar to us has 8 - a maximum of 10.5 thousand infantrymen.
It is important to note here that the main force of the French army is heavily armed knights, every single one of them mounted. At the same time, they were opposed by foot Flemish militia, practically inexperienced and lightly armored.
We can judge the armor they wore from the carvings on the "Courtray chest" commemorating that battle.
We see the Flemings in chain mail hoods with simple helmets, in quilted jackets - gambesons, and in combat gloves reinforced with iron. They are armed with swords, pikes, crossbows, godendags...
Let us explain what godendag is. This is such a heavy club or a short - very short spear. The godendag ended with a sharp faceted tip, which was driven into the shaft like a nail.
Here, by the way, are two such godendag tips that have survived to this day.
But what the godendag looked like when assembled can be seen in the following illustration. According to one version, the Flemings hit the knights in the neck with this faceted tip, hitting one of the most vulnerable places in their armor. The killed knight dropped his head onto his chest, as if saying to his enemies, “ Good morning", or in Dutch, "goedendag".
By the way, the militia was supported by some Flemish knights. Some chroniclers claim that there were several hundred of them, others say only three dozen.
Reading many articles on this topic, I find conflicting opinions that this is the only case when the infantry withstood the onslaught of heavy cavalry, but they also say that this is not surprising at all, and such cases have happened.
One way or another, this battle is a battle between cavalry and infantry, between knights accustomed to military affairs and rebel townspeople, between the burghers and feudalism.
Forgetting about fear
Blocking the French's path to the castle, the Flemings lined up in several rows in front of it. The first rank stood with pikes, resting their shafts on the ground, and pointing their tips at the charging cavalry. The second rank is with godendags, the third is again with pikes, and so on.
Pressing each other with their shoulders, the warriors did not give the cavalry the slightest chance to destroy their battle formation, which occupied the corner between the city of Courtray and the Lys River. On the left flank is the Groeninge stream, on the right is the Grote (Big) stream.
Ordinary townspeople were very afraid of the upcoming battle. They did not know how they, inexperienced infantrymen, could survive against professional warriors who possessed the best weapons and armor of their time.
But they had nowhere to retreat. Behind the Flemings were houses, families, children and old parents, just like the legendary Hector, who had Troy behind him.
Standing in the first row
Guy of Namur knighted Peter Koninck and his two sons, and with them several other famous townspeople.
After prayer and communion - after all, no one knew whether he would see tomorrow alive, Guy of Namur and Guillaume de Julier put on simple helmets and stood in the first row with pikes.
Before the battle, the order was read to everyone:
1. First of all, kill the horses, then finish off the fallen knights
2. Take no prisoners, anyone who shows pity will be killed.
3. Do not take booty; anyone who engages in looting during the battle will be killed.
4. Do not retreat, under pain of death.
One must think that in difficult moments, the commanders kept people from stampeding, carrying out orders... if only they had time for this...
The finest hour of the French infantry
It all started with the shelling of French crossbowmen, so the Flemings were forced to retreat. The crossbowmen covered the infantry, which was increasingly pressing the militia.
Crossbow bolt heads found at the battle site
Now the infantrymen have passed the ditches and have already entered into close combat with the Flemings.
Robert de Artois gave the order to the infantry to retreat, believing that it was time for the cavalry to advance before the crossbowmen got all the glory. And the knights rushed forward, crushing some of their own infantrymen who did not have time to retreat.
Choked attack
They say that while attacking, the horsemen did not even notice the ditches blocking their path, however, having crashed into the first ranks of the Flemings, they suddenly got stuck. The Flemings survived.
With a terrible roar, the armored cavalry of the magnificent French knighthood - the chosen ones, the best of the best - collided with the desperate Flemish militia.
The French right wing was slightly behind; in the center they managed to cut deep into the ranks of the Flemings. The knight Godefroy of Brabant threw Guillaume de Julier to the ground and cut down his banner. He made his way into the midst of the Flemings, and they swallowed him up like a whirlpool, pulled him off his horse and killed him.
The right wing from the French arrived, but their onslaught was repulsed, and a bloody massacre ensued.
The approaching reserve supported the trembling central region, and the Flemings dared to counterattack.
...And it so happened that the proud knights were forced to retreat, and while retreating, they suddenly began to fall into ditches filled with water, which recently, during the attack, they had easily jumped over or had not even noticed.
Robert de Artois, seeing the development of events, himself rushed to the attack, leading one of the detachments that had already drank French blood and a reserve.
However, the reserve became bogged down in the battle, and Artois and his men encountered the troops of Guy of Namur. At that moment, the horse on which de Artois was sitting fell into the water, and its owner was killed by the Flemings.
Death of Robert de Artois
The French fleeing the battlefield, driven into the water, drowned. According to rumors, no one swam across the Lys River, while some managed to cross the stream. The cavalry was defeated, victory remained with the Flemish infantry.
700 golden spurs
The survivors of the French war fled to Lille and Tournai, while the Flemish pursued them for several kilometers. The Flemings did not take prisoners, as they were ordered.
After the battle, several hundred golden spurs were removed from the killed French knights (reportedly 700) - and the walls of the Courtray church (several churches?) were decorated with these spurs. After this event, the battle was given the poetic name “Battle of the Golden Spurs.”
The local museum has an entire exhibition dedicated to it:
...By the evening of July 11, the fugitives reached Tournai, where they tried to exchange weapons for food, and some were powerless to do anything.
Gilles le Muisy: " From the towers of the Church of Our Lady of Tournai, the Abbey of St. Martin and the city, they could see running along the roads, through hedges and fields, in such numbers that no one who did not see it would believe it...
In the vicinity of the city and in the villages there were so many knights and foot soldiers dying of hunger that it was a terrible sight. Those who tried to find food near the city exchanged their equipment for it. All that night and the next day those who arrived in the city were so afraid that many of them could not even eat.«.
Results of the battle
The entire flower of French chivalry remained on the battlefield at Courtrai. According to chronicler historians, from 40 to 50% of the French knights died; the lists of those killed in the chronicles take up several pages.
"Since this defeat,- writes the ancient chronicle, - the honor, importance and glory of the ancient nobility and ancient French courage fell significantly, since the flower of the then knighthood was defeated and humiliated by its servants, the lowest people in the world: clothiers, fullers and other artisans who understood nothing in military affairs, and whom all nations were despised for their ignorance, called nothing more than dirty bunnies.”
The body of Robert de Artois was taken to a nearby monastery for burial, but, according to the French side, this was done by angels.
The Flemings' losses are believed to have been equal to those of the French, but Flanders celebrated their victory. A short, terrible, heroic victory.
Sword found at the battle site
The winners, for unknown reasons, decided not to bury the dead, neither strangers nor their own. How they could decide to take such a step in the summer, in the heat, is unclear, especially given that the corpses remained in the water, in water sources near the city.