War between the USSR and Finland. Soviet-Finnish war. Combat tactics on both sides

75 years ago, on November 30, 1939, the Winter War (Soviet-Finnish War) began. The Winter War was almost unknown to the people of Russia for quite a long time. In the 1980-1990s, when it was possible to blaspheme with impunity history of Russia-USSR, the dominant point of view was that “bloody Stalin” wanted to seize “innocent” Finland, but the small but proud northern people fought back against the northern “evil empire.” Thus, Stalin was blamed not only for the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940, but also for the fact that Finland was “forced” to enter into an alliance with Hitler’s Germany in order to resist the “aggression” of the Soviet Union.

Many books and articles denounced Soviet Mordor, which attacked little Finland. They cited absolutely fantastic figures for Soviet losses, reported on heroic Finnish machine gunners and snipers, the stupidity of Soviet generals, and much more. Any reasonable reasons for the Kremlin's actions were completely denied. They say that the irrational anger of the “bloody dictator” is to blame for everything.

In order to understand why Moscow went to this war, it is necessary to remember the history of Finland. Finnish tribes have long been on the periphery of the Russian state and the Swedish kingdom. Some of them became part of Rus' and became “Russians”. The fragmentation and weakening of Rus' led to the fact that the Finnish tribes were conquered and subjugated by Sweden. The Swedes pursued a colonization policy in the traditions of the West. Finland did not have administrative or even cultural autonomy. The official language was Swedish, spoken by the nobles and the entire educated segment of the population.

Russia , having taken Finland from Sweden in 1809, essentially gave the Finns statehood, allowed them to create basic state institutions and form a national economy. Finland received its own authorities, currency and even an army as part of Russia. At the same time, the Finns did not pay general taxes and did not fight for Russia. The Finnish language, while maintaining the status of the Swedish language, received the status of the state language. The authorities of the Russian Empire practically did not interfere in the affairs of the Grand Duchy of Finland. The policy of Russification was not carried out in Finland for a long time (some elements appeared only in a later period, but it was already too late). The resettlement of Russians to Finland was actually prohibited. Moreover, the Russians living in the Grand Duchy were in an unequal position in relation to the local residents. In addition, in 1811, the Vyborg province was transferred to the Grand Duchy, which included lands that Russia had captured from Sweden in the 18th century. Moreover, Vyborg had great military-strategic importance in relation to the capital of the Russian Empire - St. Petersburg. Thus, the Finns in the Russian “prison of nations” lived better than the Russians themselves, who bore all the hardships of building an empire and its defense from numerous enemies.

The collapse of the Russian Empire gave Finland independence. Finland thanked Russia by first entering into an alliance with the Kaiser’s Germany, and then with the Entente powers ( more details in a series of articles - How Russia created Finnish statehood; Part 2; Finland allied with the Kaiser's Germany against Russia; Part 2; Finland is in alliance with the Entente against Russia. First Soviet-Finnish War; Part 2 ). On the eve of World War II, Finland occupied a hostile position towards Russia, leaning toward an alliance with the Third Reich.

Most Russian citizens associate Finland with a “small, cozy European country”, with peaceful and cultural inhabitants. This was facilitated by a kind of “political correctness” towards Finland, which reigned in late Soviet propaganda. Finland, after defeat in the war of 1941-1944, learned a good lesson and extracted maximum benefits from its proximity to the huge Soviet Union. Therefore, the USSR did not remember that the Finns attacked the USSR three times in 1918, 1921 and 1941. They preferred to forget about this for the sake of good relations.

Finland was not a peaceful neighbor of Soviet Russia.Finland's separation from Russia was not peaceful. The Civil War began between the White and Red Finns. The Whites were supported by Germany. The Soviet government refrained from large-scale support for the Reds. Therefore, with the help of the Germans, the White Finns gained the upper hand. The winners created a network of concentration camps and unleashed the White Terror, during which tens of thousands of people died (during the fighting itself, only a few thousand people died on both sides).In addition to the Reds and their supporters, the Finns “purged” the Russian community of Finland.Moreover, the majority of Russians in Finland, including refugees from Russia who fled from the Bolsheviks, did not support the Reds and Soviet power. Former officers of the tsarist army, their families, representatives of the bourgeoisie, intelligentsia, numerous students, the entire Russian population indiscriminately, women, old people and children . Significant material assets belonging to the Russians were confiscated.

The Finns were going to place a German king on the throne of Finland. However, Germany's defeat in the war led to Finland becoming a republic. After this, Finland began to focus on the Entente powers. Finland was not satisfied with independence, the Finnish elite wanted more, laying claim to Russian Karelia, the Kola Peninsula, and the most radical figures made plans to build a “Greater Finland” with the inclusion of Arkhangelsk, and Russian lands up to the Northern Urals, Ob and Yenisei (the Urals and Western Siberia are considered ancestral home of the Finno-Ugric language family).

The leadership of Finland, like Poland, was not satisfied with the existing borders and was preparing for war. Poland had territorial claims to almost all its neighbors - Lithuania, the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Germany, the Polish lords dreamed of restoring a great power “from sea to sea.” People in Russia more or less know about this. But few people know that the Finnish elite was delirious with a similar idea, the creation of a “Greater Finland.” The ruling elite also set the goal of creating a Greater Finland. The Finns did not want to get involved with the Swedes, but they laid claim to Soviet lands, which were larger than Finland itself. The radicals had unlimited appetites, stretching all the way to the Urals and further to the Ob and Yenisei.

And first they wanted to capture Karelia. Soviet Russia was torn apart by the Civil War, and the Finns wanted to take advantage of this. Thus, in February 1918, General K. Mannerheim stated that “he will not sheathe his sword until Eastern Karelia is liberated from the Bolsheviks.” Mannerheim planned to seize Russian lands along the White Sea line - Lake Onega- Svir River - Lake Ladoga, which was supposed to facilitate the defense of new lands. It was also planned to include the Pechenga region (Petsamo) and the Kola Peninsula into Greater Finland. They wanted to separate Petrograd from Soviet Russia and make it a “free city”, like Danzig. On May 15, 1918, Finland declared war on Russia. Even before the official declaration of war, Finnish volunteer detachments began to conquer Eastern Karelia.

Soviet Russia was busy fighting on other fronts, so it did not have the strength to defeat its insolent neighbor. However, the Finnish offensive on Petrozavodsk and Olonets and the campaign against Petrograd across the Karelian Isthmus failed. And after the defeat of Yudenich’s white army, the Finns had to make peace. From July 10 to July 14, 1920, peace negotiations took place in Tartu. The Finns demanded that Karelia be transferred to them, but the Soviet side refused. In the summer, the Red Army drove the last Finnish troops out of Karelian territory. The Finns held only two volosts - Rebola and Porosozero. This made them more accommodating. There was no hope for help from the West; the Entente powers had already realized that the intervention in Soviet Russia had failed. On October 14, 1920, the Tartu Peace Treaty was signed between the RSFSR and Finland. The Finns were able to obtain the Pechenga volost, the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula, and most of the Sredny Peninsula and the islands, west of the limit line in the Barents Sea. Rebola and Porosozero were returned to Russia.

This did not satisfy Helsinki. Plans for the construction of “Greater Finland” were not abandoned, they were only postponed. In 1921, Finland again tried to resolve the Karelian issue by force. Finnish volunteer detachments, without declaring war, invaded Soviet territory, and the Second Soviet-Finnish War began. Soviet forces in February 1922 fully liberated the territory of Karelia from invaders. In March, an agreement was signed to take measures to ensure the inviolability of the Soviet-Finnish border.

But even after this failure the Finns did not cool down. The situation on the Finnish border was constantly tense. Many, remembering the USSR, imagine a huge powerful power that defeated the Third Reich, took Berlin, sent the first man into space and made the entire Western world tremble. Like, how could little Finland threaten the huge northern “evil empire”. However, the USSR 1920-1930s. was a great power only in terms of territory and potential. Moscow's real policy at that time was extremely cautious. In fact, for quite a long time, Moscow, until it became stronger, pursued an extremely flexible policy, most often giving in and not getting into trouble.

For example, the Japanese plundered our waters off the Kamchatka Peninsula for quite a long time. Under the protection of their warships, Japanese fishermen not only completely caught all the living creatures from our waters worth millions of gold rubles, but also freely landed on our shores for repairs, fish processing, obtaining fresh water, etc. Before Khasan and Khalkin Gol, when The USSR grew stronger thanks to successful industrialization, received a powerful military-industrial complex and strong armed forces, the Red commanders had strict orders to restrain Japanese troops only on their territory, without crossing the border. A similar situation occurred in the Russian North, where Norwegian fishermen fished in the internal waters of the USSR. And when the Soviet border guards tried to protest, Norway took warships into the White Sea.

Of course, Finland no longer wanted to fight the USSR alone. Finland has become a friend of any power hostile to Russia. As the first Finnish Prime Minister Per Evind Svinhuvud noted: “Any enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland.” Against this background, Finland even became friends with Japan. Japanese officers began to come to Finland for internships. In Finland, as in Poland, they were afraid of any strengthening of the USSR, since their leadership based their calculations on the fact that a war between some great Western power and Russia was inevitable (or a war between Japan and the USSR), and they would be able to profit from Russian lands . Inside Finland, the press was constantly hostile to the USSR, conducting almost open propaganda for an attack on Russia and the seizure of its territories. All kinds of provocations constantly took place on the Soviet-Finnish border on land, at sea and in the air.

After hopes for an imminent conflict between Japan and the USSR did not materialize, the Finnish leadership headed for a close alliance with Germany. The two countries are linked by close military-technical cooperation. With the consent of Finland, a German intelligence and counterintelligence center (“Bureau Cellarius”) was created in the country. His main task was to conduct intelligence work against the USSR. First of all, the Germans were interested in data about the Baltic Fleet, formations of the Leningrad Military District and industry in the northwestern part of the USSR. By the beginning of 1939, Finland, with the help of German specialists, had built a network of military airfields that was capable of receiving 10 times more aircraft than the Finnish Air Force. It is also very significant that even before the start of the war of 1939-1940. The Finnish swastika was the identifying mark of the Finnish Air Force and armored forces.

Thus, by the beginning of the great war in Europe, we had on the north-western borders a clearly hostile, aggressive state, whose elite dreamed of building a “Greater Finland at the expense of Russian (Soviet) lands and was ready to be friends with any potential enemy of the USSR. Helsinki was ready to fight the USSR both in alliance with Germany and Japan, and with the help of England and France.

The Soviet leadership understood everything perfectly and, seeing the approach of a new world war, sought to secure the northwestern borders. Leningrad was of particular importance - the second capital of the USSR, a powerful industrial, scientific and cultural center, as well as the main base of the Baltic Fleet. Finnish long-range artillery could fire at the city from its border, and ground forces could reach Leningrad in one burst. The fleet of a potential enemy (Germany or England and France) could easily break through to Kronstadt, and then Leningrad. To protect the city, it was necessary to push back the land border on land, as well as restore the distant line of defense at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, gaining space for fortifications in the northern and southern shores. The largest fleet of the Soviet Union, the Baltic, was actually blocked in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland. The Baltic Fleet had a single base - Kronstadt. Kronstadt and Soviet ships could be hit by long-range guns of the Finnish coastal defense. This situation could not satisfy the Soviet leadership.

The issue with Estonia was resolved peacefully. In September 1939, a mutual assistance agreement was concluded between the USSR and Estonia. A Soviet military contingent was introduced into Estonia. The USSR received the rights to create military bases on the islands of Ezel and Dago, Paldiski and Haapsalu.

It was not possible to come to an amicable agreement with Finland. Although negotiations began back in 1938. Moscow has tried literally everything. She proposed concluding a mutual assistance agreement and jointly defending the Gulf of Finland zone, giving the USSR the opportunity to create a base on the coast of Finland (Hanko Peninsula), sell or lease several islands in the Gulf of Finland. It was also proposed to move the border near Leningrad. As a compensation Soviet Union offered much larger territories of Eastern Karelia, preferential loans, economic benefits, etc. However, all proposals were met with a categorical refusal from the Finnish side. It is impossible not to note the inciting role of London. The British told the Finns that it was necessary to take a firm position and not give in to pressure from Moscow. This gave Helsinki hope.

In Finland, general mobilization and evacuation of the civilian population from border areas began. At the same time, arrests of left-wing figures were carried out. Incidents at the border have become more frequent. So, on November 26, 1939, a border incident occurred near the village of Maynila. According to Soviet data, Finnish artillery shelled Soviet territory. The Finnish side declared the USSR to be the culprit of the provocation. On November 28, the Soviet government announced the denunciation of the Non-Aggression Treaty with Finland. On November 30, the war began. Its results are known. Moscow solved the problem of ensuring the security of Leningrad and the Baltic Fleet. It can be said that it was only thanks to the Winter War that the enemy was unable to Patriotic War capture the second capital of the Soviet Union.

Currently, Finland is again drifting towards the West, NATO, so it is worth keeping a close eye on it. The “cozy and cultural” country can again recall the plans for “Great Finland” right up to the Northern Urals. Finland and Sweden are thinking about joining NATO, and the Baltic states and Poland are literally turning into NATO’s advanced springboards for aggression against Russia before our very eyes. And Ukraine becomes an instrument for war with Russia in the southwestern direction.

After the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, Germany went to war with Poland, and relations between the USSR and Finland began to strain. One of the reasons is a secret document between the USSR and Germany on delimiting spheres of influence. According to it, the influence of the USSR extended to Finland, the Baltic states, western Ukraine and Belarus, and Bessarabia.

Realizing that a major war was inevitable, Stalin sought to protect Leningrad, which could be shelled by artillery from Finnish territory. Therefore, the task was to move the border further north. To resolve the issue peacefully, the Soviet side offered Finland the lands of Karelia in exchange for moving the border on the Karelian Isthmus, but any attempts at dialogue were suppressed by the Finns. They didn't want to come to an agreement.

Reason for war

The reason for the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 was an incident near the village of Mainila on November 25, 1939 at 15:45. This village is located on the Karelian Isthmus, 800 meters from the Finnish border. Mainila was subjected to artillery shelling, as a result of which 4 representatives of the Red Army were killed and 8 were wounded.

On November 26, Molotov summoned the Finnish ambassador in Moscow (Irie Koskinen) and presented a note of protest, stating that the shelling was carried out from the territory of Finland, and that the only thing that saved him from starting a war was that the Soviet army had an order not to succumb to provocations.

On November 27, the Finnish government responded to the Soviet note of protest. Briefly, the main provisions of the answer were as follows:

• The shelling actually took place and lasted approximately 20 minutes.
• The shelling came from the Soviet side, approximately 1.5-2 km southeast of the village of Maynila.
• It was proposed to create a commission that would jointly study this episode and give it an adequate assessment.

What really happened near the village of Maynila? This is an important question, since it was as a result of these events that the Winter (Soviet-Finnish) War was unleashed. The only thing that can be stated unequivocally is that there really was shelling of the village of Maynila, but who carried it out is impossible to establish through documentation. Ultimately, there are 2 versions (Soviet and Finnish), and each needs to be evaluated. The first version is that Finland shelled the territory of the USSR. The second version is that it was a provocation prepared by the NKVD.

Why did Finland need this provocation? Historians talk about two reasons:

1. The Finns were a political tool in the hands of the British, who needed war. This assumption would be reasonable if we consider the winter war in isolation. But if we remember the realities of those times, then at the time of the incident a world war was already underway, and England had already declared war on Germany. England's attack on the USSR automatically created an alliance between Stalin and Hitler, and this alliance would sooner or later hit England itself with all its might. Therefore, to assume this is tantamount to assuming that England decided to commit suicide, which, of course, was not the case.
2. They wanted to expand their territories and influence. This is an absolutely stupid hypothesis. This is from the category - Liechtenstein wants to attack Germany. It's nonsense. Finland had neither the strength nor the means for war, and everyone in the Finnish command understood that their only chance of success in the war with the USSR was a long defense that would exhaust the enemy. With such situations, no one will disturb the den with the bear.

The most adequate answer to the question posed is that the shelling of the village of Mainila is a provocation of the Soviet government itself, which was looking for any excuse to justify the war with Finland. And it was this incident that was subsequently presented to Soviet society as an example of the treachery of the Finnish people, who needed help to carry out the socialist revolution.

Balance of forces and means

It is indicative how the forces were correlated during the Soviet-Finnish war. Below is summary table, which describes how the opposing countries approached the Winter War.

In all aspects except infantry, the USSR had a clear advantage. But conducting an offensive, superior to the enemy by only 1.3 times, is an extremely risky undertaking. In this case, discipline, training and organization come to the fore. The Soviet army had problems with all three aspects. These figures once again emphasize that the Soviet leadership did not perceive Finland as an enemy, expecting to destroy it in the shortest possible time.

Progress of the war

The Soviet-Finnish or Winter War can be divided into 2 stages: the first (December 39th - January 7th 40th) and the second (January 7th 40th - March 12th 40th). What happened on January 7, 1940? Timoshenko was appointed commander of the army, who immediately set about reorganizing the army and establishing order in it.

First stage

The Soviet-Finnish war began on November 30, 1939, and the Soviet army failed to carry it out briefly. The USSR army actually crossed the state border of Finland without declaring war. For its citizens, the justification was the following - to help the people of Finland in overthrowing the bourgeois government of the warmonger.

The Soviet leadership did not take Finland seriously, believing that the war would be over in a few weeks. They even mentioned a figure of 3 weeks as a deadline. More specifically, there should be no war. The Soviet command's plan was approximately as follows:

• Send in troops. We did this on November 30th.
• Creation of a working government controlled by the USSR. On December 1, the Kuusinen government was created (more on this later).
• Lightning-fast attack on all fronts. It was planned to reach Helsinki in 1.5-2 weeks.
• Declining the real government of Finland towards peace and complete surrender in favor of the Kuusinen government.

The first two points were implemented in the first days of the war, but then problems began. The blitzkrieg did not work out, and the army was stuck in the Finnish defense. Although in initial days war, until about December 4, it seemed that everything was going according to plan - Soviet troops were moving forward. However, very soon they stumbled upon the Mannerheim line. On December 4, armies entered it eastern front(near Lake Suvantojärvi), December 6 - the central front (Summa direction), December 10 - the western front (Gulf of Finland). And it was a shock. A huge number of documents indicate that the troops did not expect to encounter a well-fortified defense line. And this is a huge question for the Red Army intelligence.

In any case, December was a disastrous month that thwarted almost all the plans of the Soviet Headquarters. The troops advanced inland slowly. Every day the pace of movement only decreased. Reasons for the slow advance of Soviet troops:

1. Terrain. Almost the entire territory of Finland is forests and swamps. It is difficult to use equipment in such conditions.
2. Application of aviation. Aviation was practically not used in terms of bombing. There was no point in bombing villages adjacent to the front line, since the Finns were retreating, leaving behind scorched earth. It was difficult to bomb the retreating troops, since they were retreating with civilians.
3. Roads. While retreating, the Finns destroyed roads, caused landslides, and mined everything they could.

Formation of the Kuusinen government

On December 1, 1939, the People's Government of Finland was formed in the city of Terijoki. It was formed on territory already captured by the USSR, and with the direct participation of the Soviet leadership. The Finnish people's government included:

• Chairman and Minister of Foreign Affairs – Otto Kuusinen
• Minister of Finance – Mauri Rosenberg
• Minister of Defense - Axel Antila
• Minister of the Interior – Tuure Lehen
• Minister of Agriculture – Armas Eikia
• Minister of Education – Inkeri Lehtinen
• Minister for Karelia Affairs – Paavo Prokkonen

Outwardly it looks like a full-fledged government. The only problem is that the Finnish population did not recognize him. But already on December 1 (that is, on the day of its formation), this government concluded an agreement with the USSR on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the FDR (Finnish Democratic Republic). On December 2, a new agreement is signed - on mutual assistance. From this moment on, Molotov says that the war continues because a revolution took place in Finland, and now it is necessary to support it and help the workers. In fact, it was a clever trick to justify the war in the eyes of the Soviet population.

Mannerheim Line

The Mannerheim Line is one of the few things that almost everyone knows about the Soviet-Finnish war. Soviet propaganda said about this fortification system that all the world generals recognized its impregnability. This was an exaggeration. The line of defense was, of course, strong, but not impregnable.

The Mannerheim Line (as it received this name already during the war) consisted of 101 concrete fortifications. For comparison, the Maginot Line, which Germany crossed in France, was approximately the same length. The Maginot Line consisted of 5,800 concrete structures. In fairness, it should be noted the difficult terrain conditions of the Mannerheim Line. There were swamps and numerous lakes, which made movement extremely difficult and therefore the defense line did not require a large number of fortifications.

The largest attempt to break through the Mannerheim Line at the first stage was made on December 17-21 in the central section. It was here that it was possible to occupy the roads leading to Vyborg, gaining a significant advantage. But the offensive, in which 3 divisions took part, failed. This was the first major success in the Soviet-Finnish war for the Finnish army. This success came to be called the “Miracle of Summa.” Subsequently, the line was broken on February 11, which actually predetermined the outcome of the war.

Expulsion of the USSR from the League of Nations

On December 14, 1939, the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations. This decision was promoted by England and France, who spoke of Soviet aggression against Finland. Representatives of the League of Nations condemned the actions of the USSR in terms of aggressive actions and the outbreak of war.

Today, the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations is cited as an example of the limitation of Soviet power and as a loss in image. In fact, everything is a little different. In 1939, the League of Nations no longer played the role it had been assigned following the First World War. The fact is that back in 1933, Germany left it, refusing to comply with the demands of the League of Nations for disarmament and simply left the organization. It turns out that at the time of December 14, the League of Nations de facto ceased to exist. After all, what kind of European security system can we talk about when Germany and the USSR left the organization?

Second stage of the war

On January 7, 1940, the Headquarters of the Northwestern Front was headed by Marshal Timoshenko. He had to solve all the problems and organize a successful offensive of the Red Army. At this point, the Soviet-Finnish war took a break, and no active operations were carried out until February. From February 1 to 9, powerful attacks began on the Mannerheim line. It was assumed that the 7th and 13th armies were to break through the defense line with decisive flank attacks and occupy the Vuoksy-Karkhul sector. After this, it was planned to move to Vyborg, occupy the city and block the railways and highways leading to the West.

On February 11, 1940, a general offensive of Soviet troops began on the Karelian Isthmus. This was a turning point in the Winter War, as units of the Red Army managed to break through the Mannerheim Line and begin advancing deeper into the country. We advanced slowly due to the specifics of the terrain, the resistance of the Finnish army and severe frosts, but the main thing was that we advanced. At the beginning of March, the Soviet army was already on the western coast of the Vyborg Bay.

This effectively ended the war, since it was obvious that Finland did not have much strength and means to contain the Red Army. From that time on, peace negotiations began, in which the USSR dictated its terms, and Molotov constantly emphasized that the conditions would be harsh, because the Finns forced the war to start, during which the blood of Soviet soldiers was shed.

Why did the war last so long

According to the Bolsheviks, the Soviet-Finnish war was supposed to end in 2-3 weeks, and the decisive advantage was to be given by the troops of the Leningrad district alone. In practice, the war dragged on for almost 4 months, and divisions were assembled throughout the country to suppress the Finns. There are several reasons for this:

• Poor organization of troops. This concerns bad work command staff, but the big problem is coherence between the branches of the military. She was practically absent. If you study archival documents, there are a lot of reports according to which some troops fired at others.
• Poor security. The army was in need of almost everything. The war was fought in winter and in the north, where the air temperature dropped below -30 by the end of December. And at the same time, the army was not provided with winter clothing.
• Underestimating the enemy. The USSR did not prepare for war. The plan was to quickly suppress the Finns and solve the problem without war, attributing everything to the border incident of November 24, 1939.
• Support for Finland by other countries. England, Italy, Hungary, Sweden (primarily) - provided assistance to Finland in everything: weapons, supplies, food, airplanes, and so on. The greatest efforts were made by Sweden, which itself actively helped and facilitated the transfer of assistance from other countries. In general, during the Winter War of 1939-1940, only Germany supported the Soviet side.

Stalin was very nervous because the war was dragging on. He repeated - The whole world is watching us. And he was right. Therefore, Stalin demanded a solution to all problems, restoration of order in the army and a speedy resolution of the conflict. To some extent this was achieved. And quite quickly. The Soviet offensive in February-March 1940 forced Finland to peace.

The Red Army fought extremely undisciplinedly, and its management does not stand up to criticism. Almost all reports and memos about the situation at the front were accompanied by a postscript - “an explanation of the reasons for the failures.” I will give some quotes from Beria’s memo to Stalin No. 5518/B dated December 14, 1939:

• During the landing on the island of Sayskari, a Soviet plane dropped 5 bombs, which landed on the destroyer "Lenin".
• On December 1, the Ladoga flotilla was fired upon twice by its own aircraft.
• When occupying the island of Gogland, during the advance of the landing forces, 6 Soviet aircraft appeared, one of which fired several shots in bursts. As a result, 10 people were injured.

And there are hundreds of such examples. But if the situations above are examples of the exposure of soldiers and troops, then next I want to give examples of how the equipment of the Soviet army took place. To do this, let us turn to Beria’s memo to Stalin No. 5516/B dated December 14, 1939:

• In the Tulivara area, the 529th Rifle Corps needed 200 pairs of skis to bypass enemy fortifications. This could not be done, since the Headquarters received 3,000 pairs of skis with broken points.
• The new arrivals from the 363rd Signal Battalion include 30 vehicles in need of repair, and 500 people are wearing summer uniforms.
• The 51st Corps Artillery Regiment arrived to replenish the 9th Army. Missing: 72 tractors, 65 trailers. Of the 37 tractors that arrived, only 9 were in good condition, out of 150 machines - 90. 80% of the personnel were not provided with winter uniforms.

It is not surprising that against the backdrop of such events there was desertion in the Red Army. For example, December 14 from the 64th rifle division 430 people deserted.

Help for Finland from other countries

In the Soviet-Finnish war, many countries provided assistance to Finland. To demonstrate, I will cite Beria’s report to Stalin and Molotov No. 5455/B.

Finland is helped by:

• Sweden – 8 thousand people. Mainly reserve personnel. They are commanded by career officers who are on “vacation.”
• Italy - number unknown.
• Hungary – 150 people. Italy demands an increase in numbers.
• England - 20 fighter aircraft are known, although the actual number is higher.

The best proof that the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 took place with the support of the Western countries of Finland was the speech of Finnish Minister Greensberg on December 27, 1939 at 07:15 to the English agency Havas. Below I quote the literal translation from English.

The Finnish people thank the English, French and other nations for the assistance they provide.

Greensberg, Minister of Finland

It is obvious that Western countries opposed the USSR aggression against Finland. This was expressed, among other things, by the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations.

I would also like to show a photo of Beria’s report on the intervention of France and England in the Soviet-Finnish war.

Conclusion of peace

On February 28, the USSR handed over to Finland its terms for concluding peace. The negotiations themselves took place in Moscow on March 8-12. After these negotiations, the Soviet-Finnish war ended on March 12, 1940. The peace terms were as follows:

1. The USSR received the Karelian Isthmus along with Vyborg (Viipuri), the bay and islands.
2. The western and northern coasts of Lake Ladoga, together with the cities of Kexgolm, Suoyarvi and Sortavala.
3. Islands in the Gulf of Finland.
4. Hanko Island with its maritime territory and base was leased to the USSR for 50 years. The USSR paid 8 million German marks for rent annually.
5. The agreement between Finland and the USSR of 1920 has lost its force.
6. On March 13, 1940, they ceased fighting.

Below is a map showing the territories ceded to the USSR as a result of the signing of the peace treaty.

USSR losses

The question of the number of USSR soldiers killed during the Soviet-Finnish War is still open. The official history does not answer the question, speaking in veiled terms about “minimal” losses and focusing on the fact that the objectives were achieved. There was no talk about the scale of the Red Army's losses in those days. The figure was deliberately underestimated, demonstrating the success of the army. In fact, the losses were huge. To do this, just look at report No. 174 of December 21, which provides figures on the losses of the 139th Infantry Division over 2 weeks of fighting (November 30 - December 13). The losses are as follows:

• Commanders – 240.
• Privates - 3536.
• Rifles - 3575.
• Light machine guns – 160.
• Heavy machine guns – 150.
• Tanks – 5.
• Armored vehicles – 2.
• Tractors – 10.
• Trucks – 14.
• Horse composition - 357.

Belyanov's memo No. 2170 dated December 27 talks about the losses of the 75th Infantry Division. Total losses: senior commanders - 141, junior commanders - 293, rank and file - 3668, tanks - 20, machine guns - 150, rifles - 1326, armored vehicles - 3.

This is data for 2 divisions (much more fought) for 2 weeks of fighting, when the first week was a “warm-up” - the Soviet army advanced relatively without losses until it reached the Mannerheim Line. And during these 2 weeks, of which only the last was actually combative, the OFFICIAL figures are losses of more than 8 thousand people! A huge number of people suffered frostbite.

On March 26, 1940, at the 6th session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, data on USSR losses in the war with Finland were announced - 48,745 people killed and 158,863 people wounded and frostbitten. These are official figures and therefore greatly underestimated. Today, historians give different figures for the losses of the Soviet army. It is said that between 150 and 500 thousand people died. For example, the Book of Combat Losses of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army states that in the war with the White Finns, 131,476 people died, went missing, or died from wounds. At the same time, the data of that time did not take into account the losses of the Navy, and for a long time people who died in hospitals after wounds and frostbite were not taken into account as losses. Today, most historians agree that about 150 thousand Red Army soldiers died during the war, excluding the losses of the Navy and border troops.

Finnish losses are listed as follows: 23 thousand dead and missing, 45 thousand wounded, 62 aircraft, 50 tanks, 500 guns.

Results and consequences of the war

The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, even with a brief study, points to both absolutely negative and absolutely positive aspects. The negative is the nightmare of the first months of the war and the huge number of victims. By and large, it was December 1939 and early January 1940 that demonstrated to the whole world that the Soviet army was weak. That's how it really was. But there was also a positive aspect: the Soviet leadership saw the real strength of its army. We have been told since childhood that the Red Army has been the strongest in the world almost since 1917, but this is extremely far from reality. The only major test of this army was the Civil War. We will not analyze the reasons for the victory of the Reds over the Whites now (after all, we are now talking about the Winter War), but the reasons for the victory of the Bolsheviks do not lie in the army. To demonstrate this, it is enough to just quote one quote from Frunze, which he voiced at the end of the Civil War.

All this army rabble needs to be disbanded as soon as possible.

Frunze

Before the war with Finland, the leadership of the USSR had its head in the clouds, believing that it had a strong army. But December 1939 showed that this was not the case. The army was extremely weak. But starting in January 1940, changes were made (personnel and organizational) that changed the course of the war, and which largely prepared a combat-ready army for the Patriotic War. This is very easy to prove. Almost the entire December of the 39th Red Army stormed the Mannerheim line - there was no result. On February 11, 1940, the Mannerheim line was broken through in 1 day. This breakthrough was possible because it was carried out by another army, more disciplined, organized, and trained. And the Finns did not have a single chance against such an army, so Mannerheim, who served as Minister of Defense, even then began to talk about the need for peace.

Prisoners of war and their fate

The number of prisoners of war during the Soviet-Finnish war was impressive. At the time of the war, there were 5,393 captured Red Army soldiers and 806 captured White Finns. Captured Red Army soldiers were divided into the following groups:

• Political leadership. It was political affiliation that was important, without singling out rank.
• Officers. This group included persons equated to officers.
• Junior officers.
• Privates.
• National minorities
• Defectors.

Particular attention was paid to national minorities. The attitude towards them in Finnish captivity was more loyal than towards representatives of the Russian people. The privileges were minor, but they were there. At the end of the war, a mutual exchange of all prisoners was carried out, regardless of their belonging to one group or another.

On April 19, 1940, Stalin orders everyone who was in Finnish captivity to be sent to the Southern Camp of the NKVD. Below is a quote from the Politburo resolution.

All those returned by the Finnish authorities should be sent to the Southern camp. Within three months, ensure all necessary measures are taken to identify persons processed by foreign intelligence services. Pay attention to dubious and alien elements, as well as those who voluntarily surrendered. In all cases, refer cases to court.

Stalin

The southern camp, located in the Ivanovo region, began work on April 25. Already on May 3, Beria sent a letter to Stalin, Molotov and Timoschenko, informing that 5277 people had arrived at the Camp. On June 28, Beria sends a new report. According to it, the Southern camp “receives” 5,157 Red Army soldiers and 293 officers. Of these, 414 people were convicted of treason and treason.

The myth of war - Finnish “cuckoos”

“Cuckoos” is what Soviet soldiers called snipers who continuously fired at the Red Army. It was said that these are professional Finnish snipers who sit in trees and shoot almost without missing. The reason for such attention to snipers is their high efficiency and the inability to determine the point of the shot. But the problem in determining the point of the shot was not that the shooter was in a tree, but that the terrain created an echo. It disoriented the soldiers.

Stories about “cuckoos” are one of the myths that the Soviet-Finnish war gave rise to in large numbers. It’s hard to imagine in 1939 a sniper who, at air temperatures below -30 degrees, was able to sit on a tree for days, while firing accurate shots.

Of all the wars that Russia has waged throughout history, the Karelian-Finnish war of 1939-1940. remained the least advertised for a long time. This is due both to the unsatisfactory outcome of the war and to significant losses.

It is still not known for certain how many combatants on both sides died in the Finnish war.

Soviet-Finnish war, soldiers' march to the front

When the Soviet-Finnish war, started by the country's leadership, took place, the whole world took up arms against the USSR, which in fact turned into colossal foreign policy problems for the country. Next, we will try to explain why the war could not end quickly and turned out to be a failure overall.

Finland has almost never been an independent state. In the period from the 12th to the 19th centuries it was under Swedish rule, and in 1809 it became part of the Russian Empire.

However, after the February Revolution, unrest began in Finland; the population first demanded broad autonomy, and then completely came to the idea of ​​independence. After October revolution The Bolsheviks confirmed Finland's right to independence.

The Bolsheviks confirmed Finland's right to independence.

However, the further path of development of the country was not clear-cut; a civil war broke out in the country between whites and reds. Even after the victory of the White Finns, there were still many communists and social democrats in the country's parliament, half of whom were eventually arrested, and half were forced to hide in Soviet Russia.

Finland supported a number of White Guard forces during the Russian Civil War. Between 1918 and 1921, several military conflicts occurred between the countries - two Soviet-Finnish wars, after which the final border between the states was formed.

Political map of Europe during the interwar period and the border of Finland before 1939

In general, the conflict with Soviet Russia was resolved and until 1939 the countries lived in peace. However, on the detailed map, the territory that belonged to Finland after the Second Soviet-Finnish War is highlighted in yellow. The USSR claimed this territory.

Finnish border before 1939 on the map

The main causes of the Finnish War of 1939:

• Until 1939, the USSR border with Finland was located only 30 km away. from Leningrad. In case of war, the city could be located under shelling from the territory of another state;
• Historically, the lands in question were not always part of Finland. These territories were part of the Principality of Novgorod, then were captured by Sweden, and recaptured by Russia during the Northern War. Only in the 19th century, when Finland was part of the Russian Empire, were these territories transferred to them for management. Which, in principle, was not of fundamental importance within the framework of a single state;
• The USSR needed to strengthen its position in the Baltic Sea.

In addition, despite the absence of war, the countries had a number of claims against each other. Many communists were killed and arrested in Finland in 1918, and a number of Finnish communists found refuge in the USSR. On the other hand, many Finns suffered during the political terror in the Soviet Union.

this year a large number of communists were killed and arrested in Finland

In addition, local border conflicts between countries regularly took place. Just as the Soviet Union was not satisfied with such a border near the second largest city in the RSFSR, not all Finns were satisfied with the territory of Finland.

In some circles, the idea of ​​​​creating a “Greater Finland” that would unite the majority of Finno-Ugric peoples was considered.

Thus, there were enough reasons for the Finnish war to start, when there were a lot of territorial disputes and mutual discontent. And after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed, Finland moved into the sphere of influence of the USSR.

Therefore, in October 1939, negotiations began between the two sides - the USSR demanded to cede the territory bordering Leningrad - to move the border at least 70 km.

Negotiations between the two countries begin in October this year

In addition, we are talking about the transfer of several islands in the Gulf of Finland, the lease of the Hanko Peninsula, and the transfer of Fort Ino. In exchange, Finland is offered a territory twice as large in area in Karelia.

But despite the idea of ​​a “Greater Finland”, the deal looks extremely unfavorable for the Finnish side:

• firstly, the territories offered to the country are sparsely populated and practically devoid of infrastructure;
• secondly, the territories to be taken away are already inhabited by the Finnish population;
• finally, such concessions would both deprive the country of a line of defense on land and seriously weaken its position at sea.

Therefore, despite the length of the negotiations, the parties did not come to a mutually beneficial agreement and the USSR began preparations for an offensive operation. The Soviet-Finnish war, the start date of which was secretly discussed in the highest circles of the political leadership of the USSR, increasingly appeared in Western news headlines.

The causes of the Soviet-Finnish war are briefly outlined in archival publications of that era.

Briefly about the balance of forces and means in the winter war

As of the end of November 1939, the balance of forces on the Soviet-Finnish border is presented in the table.

As you can see, the superiority of the Soviet side was colossal: 1.4 to 1 in numbers of troops, 2 to 1 in guns, 58 to 1 in tanks, 10 to 1 in aircraft, 13 to 1 in ships. Despite careful preparation, the start of the Finnish war (the date of the invasion had already been agreed upon with the political leadership of the country) occurred spontaneously; the command did not even create a front.

They wanted to fight the war using the Leningrad Military District.

Formation of the Kuusinen government

First of all, the USSR creates a pretext for the Soviet-Finnish war - it organizes a border conflict at Mainila on November 26, 1939 (the first date of the Finnish war). There are many versions describing the reasons for the start of the Finnish War of 1939, but the official version of the Soviet side:

The Finns attacked the border outpost, 3 people were killed.

The documents disclosed in our time that describe the war between the USSR and Finland in 1939-1940 are contradictory, but do not contain clear evidence of an attack by the Finnish side.

Then the Soviet Union forms the so-called. Kuusinen's government, which heads the newly formed Finnish Democratic Republic.

It is this government that recognizes the USSR (no other country in the world has recognized it) and responds to the request to send troops into the country and support the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeois government.

From that time until the peace negotiations, the USSR did not recognize the democratic government of Finland and did not negotiate with it. War has not even been officially declared - the USSR sent troops to assist a friendly government in an internal civil war.

Otto V. Kuusinen, head of the Finnish government in 1939

Kuusinen himself was an old Bolshevik - he was one of the leaders of the Red Finns in Civil War. He fled the country in time, headed the international for some time, and even escaped repression during the Great Terror, although it primarily fell on the old guard of the Bolsheviks.

Kuusinen's coming to power in Finland would be comparable to the coming to power in the USSR in 1939 of one of the leaders of the white movement. It is doubtful that major arrests and executions could have been avoided.

However, the fighting is not going as well as planned by the Soviet side.

Hard war of 1939

The initial plan (developed by Shaposhnikov) included a kind of “blitzkrieg” - the capture of Finland was to be carried out within a short period of time. According to the plans of the General Staff:

The war in 1939 was supposed to last 3 weeks.

It was supposed to break through the defenses on the Karelian Isthmus and make a breakthrough with tank forces to Helsinki.

Despite the significant superiority of Soviet forces, this basic offensive plan failed. The most significant advantage (in tanks) was offset by natural conditions - tanks simply could not make free maneuvers in forest and swampy conditions.

In addition, the Finns quickly learned to destroy Soviet tanks that were not yet sufficiently armored (they used mainly T-28s).

It was during the Finnish war with Russia that an incendiary mixture in a bottle and a wick got its name - the Molotov cocktail. The original name was “Cocktail FOR Molotov”. Soviet tanks simply burned out upon contact with the combustible mixture.

The reason for this was not only low-level armor, but also gasoline engines. This incendiary mixture was no less terrible for ordinary soldiers.

The Soviet army also turned out, surprisingly, to be unprepared for war in winter conditions. Ordinary soldiers were equipped with ordinary Budenovkas and overcoats, which did not protect them from the cold. On the other hand, if it were necessary to fight in the summer, the Red Army would be faced with even greater problems, for example, impassable swamps.

The offensive that began on the Karelian Isthmus was not prepared for heavy fighting on the Mannerheim Line. In general, the military leadership did not have clear ideas about this line of fortifications.

Therefore, the artillery shelling at the first stage of the war was ineffective - the Finns simply waited out it in fortified bunkers. In addition, ammunition for the guns took a long time to be delivered - the weak infrastructure affected it.

Let us dwell in more detail on the Mannerheim line.

1939 - war with Finland on the Mannerheim Line

Since the 1920s, the Finns have been actively building a series of defensive fortifications, named after a prominent military leader of 1918-1921. - Carl Gustav Mannerheim. Realizing that a possible military threat to the country does not come from the north and west, it was decided to build a powerful defensive line in the southeast, i.e. on the Karelian Isthmus.

Karl Mannerheim, the military leader after whom the front line is named

We should pay tribute to the designers - the terrain of the territory made it possible to actively use natural conditions- numerous dense forests, lakes, swamps. The key structure was the Enkel bunker - a standard concrete structure armed with machine guns.

At the same time, despite the long construction time, the line was not at all as impregnable as it would later be called in numerous textbooks. Most of the pillboxes were created according to Enkel's design, i.e. early 1920s These were outdated at the time of the Second World War for several people, with 1-3 machine guns, without underground barracks.

In the early 1930s, million-dollar pillboxes were designed and began to be built in 1937. Their fortification was stronger, the number of embrasures reached six, and there were underground barracks.

However, only 7 such pillboxes were built. It was not possible to build up the entire Mannerheim line (135 km) with pillboxes, because before the war, certain sections were mined and surrounded by wire fences.

On the front, instead of pillboxes, there were simple trenches.

This line should not be neglected either; its depth ranged from 24 to 85 kilometers. It was not possible to break through it at once - for some time the line saved the country. As a result, on December 27, the Red Army stopped its offensive operations and prepared for a new assault, bringing up artillery and retraining soldiers.

The further course of the war will show that with proper preparation, the outdated line of defense could not hold out for the required time and save Finland from defeat.

Expulsion of the USSR from the League of Nations

The first stage of the war also saw the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the League of Nations (12/14/1939). Yes, at that time this organization lost its significance. The exclusion itself was more likely a consequence of increased antipathy towards the USSR throughout the world.

England and France (at that time not yet occupied by Germany) provide Finland with various assistance - they do not enter into open conflict, but northern country There are active deliveries of weapons.

England and France are developing two plans to help Finland.

The first involves the transfer of military corps to Finland, and the second involves the bombing of Soviet fields in Baku. However, the war with Germany forces us to abandon these plans.

Moreover, the expeditionary force would have to pass through Norway and Sweden, to which both countries responded with a categorical refusal, wanting to maintain their neutrality in World War II.

Second stage of the war

Since the end of December 1939, a regrouping of Soviet troops has been taking place. A separate North-Western Front is formed. Armed forces are being built up on all sectors of the front.

By the beginning of February 1940, the number of armed forces reached 1.3 million people, guns - 3.5 thousand. Airplanes - 1.5 thousand. Finland by that time was also able to strengthen the army, including through the help of other countries and foreign volunteers, but the balance of forces became even more catastrophic for the defending side.

On February 1, a massive artillery bombardment of the Mannerheim Line began. It turns out that most Finnish pillboxes cannot withstand accurate and prolonged shelling. They bomb for 10 days just in case. As a result, when the Red Army attacked on February 10, instead of bunkers, it found only many “Karelian monuments.”

In winter, on February 11, the Mannerheim Line was broken, Finnish counter-offensives lead to nothing. And on February 13, the second line of defense, hastily strengthened by the Finns, breaks through. And already on February 15, taking advantage of the weather conditions, Mannerheim gave the order for a general retreat.

Help for Finland from other countries

It should be noted that breaking through the Mannerheim Line meant the end of the war and even defeat in it. There was practically no hope for major military assistance from the West.

Yes, during the war, not only England and France provided Finland with various technical assistance. Scandinavian countries, the USA, Hungary and a number of others sent many volunteers to the country.

soldiers were sent to the front from Sweden

At the same time, it was the threat of direct war with England and France, in the event of a complete capture of Finland, that forced I. Stalin to negotiate with the current Finnish government and make peace.

The request was transmitted through the USSR Ambassador to Sweden to the Finnish Ambassador.

The myth of war - Finnish "cuckoos"

Let us dwell separately on the well-known military myth about Finnish snipers - the so-called. cuckoos During the Winter War (as it is called in Finland), many Soviet officers and soldiers fell victims to Finnish snipers. A story began to circulate among the troops that Finnish snipers were hiding in the trees and firing from there.

However, sniper fire from trees is extremely ineffective, since a sniper in a tree himself represents an excellent target and does not have a proper foothold and the ability to quickly retreat.

The answer to such accuracy of snipers is quite simple. At the beginning of the war, the officers were equipped with insulated sheepskin coats of a dark color, which were clearly visible in the snowy desert and stood out against the background of the soldiers' greatcoats.

The fire was fired from insulated and camouflaged positions on the ground. Snipers could sit in improvised shelters for hours, waiting for a suitable target.

The most famous Finnish sniper of the Winter War is Simo Häyhä, who shot about 500 Red Army officers and soldiers. At the end of the war, he received a serious injury to his jaw (it had to be inserted from the femur), but the soldier lived to be 96 years old.

The Soviet-Finnish border was moved 120 kilometers from Leningrad - Vyborg, the northwestern coast of Lake Ladoga, and a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland were annexed.

A 30-year lease for the Hanko Peninsula was agreed upon. In return, Finland received only the Petsamo region, which provided access to the Barents Sea and was rich in nickel ores.

The completion of the Soviet-Finnish war brought bonuses to the winner in the form of:

1. USSR acquisition of new territories. They managed to move the border away from Leningrad.
2. Gaining combat experience, awareness of the need to improve military equipment.
3. Colossal battle losses. Data vary, but the average death toll was over 150 thousand people (125 from the USSR and 25 thousand from Finland). Sanitary losses were even greater - 265 thousand in the USSR and over 40 thousand in Finland. These figures had a discrediting effect on the Red Army.
4. Failure of the plan for the creation of the Finnish Democratic Republic .
5. Decline in international authority. This applies to both the countries of the future allies and the Axis countries. It is believed that it was after the Winter War that A. Hitler finally became convinced that the USSR was a colossus with feet of clay.
6. Finland lost territories that are important to them. The area of ​​land given away was 10% of the entire territory of the country. The spirit of revanchism began to grow in her. From a neutral position, the country increasingly gravitates toward supporting the Axis countries and ultimately participates in the Great Patriotic War on the side of Germany (in the period 1941-1944).

Summarizing all of the above, we can conclude that the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939 was a strategic failure of the Soviet leadership.

Little-known details of the military campaign that was eclipsed by the Great Patriotic War
This year, November 30, will mark 76 years since the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939–1940, which in our country and beyond its borders is often called the Winter War. Unleashed right on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, the Winter War remained in its shadow for a very long time. And not only because memories of it were quickly eclipsed by the tragedies of the Great Patriotic War, but also because of all the wars in which the Soviet Union participated in one way or another, this was the only war started on Moscow’s initiative.

Move the border west

The Winter War became in the literal sense of the word “a continuation of politics by other means.” After all, it began immediately after several rounds of peace negotiations stalled, during which the USSR tried to move the northern border as far as possible from Leningrad and Murmansk, in return offering Finland land in Karelia. The immediate reason for the outbreak of hostilities was the Maynila Incident: an artillery shelling of Soviet troops on the border with Finland on November 26, 1939, which killed four servicemen. Moscow placed responsibility for the incident on Helsinki, although later the guilt of the Finnish side was subject to reasonable doubt.
Four days later, the Red Army crossed the border into Finland, thus beginning the Winter War. Its first stage - from November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940 - was extremely unsuccessful for the Soviet Union. Despite all efforts, Soviet troops failed to break through the Finnish defense line, which by that time was already being called the Mannerheim Line. In addition, during this period, the shortcomings of the existing system of organization of the Red Army most clearly manifested themselves: poor controllability at the level of middle and junior echelons and lack of initiative among commanders at this level, poor communication between units, types and branches of the military.

The second stage of the war, which began on February 11, 1940 after a massive ten-day preparation, ended in victory. By the end of February, the Red Army managed to reach all those lines that it had planned to reach before the new year, and push the Finns back to the second line of defense, constantly creating the threat of encirclement of their troops. On March 7, 1940, the Finnish government sent a delegation to Moscow to participate in peace negotiations, which ended with the conclusion of a peace treaty on March 12. It stipulated that all territorial claims of the USSR (the same ones that were discussed during the negotiations on the eve of the war) would be satisfied. As a result, the border on the Karelian Isthmus moved away from Leningrad by 120–130 kilometers, the Soviet Union received the entire Karelian Isthmus with Vyborg, the Vyborg Bay with islands, the western and northern coasts of Lake Ladoga, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, and the peninsula Hanko and the maritime area around it were leased to the USSR for 30 years.

For the Red Army, victory in the Winter War came at a high price: irrevocable losses, according to various sources, ranged from 95 to 167 thousand people, and another 200–300 thousand people were wounded and frostbitten. In addition, Soviet troops suffered heavy losses in equipment, primarily in tanks: of the almost 2,300 tanks that went into battle at the beginning of the war, about 650 were completely destroyed and 1,500 were knocked out. In addition, the moral losses were also heavy: both the army command and the entire country, despite massive propaganda, understood that the military power of the USSR was in urgent need of modernization. It began during the Winter War, but, alas, was never completed until June 22, 1941.

Between truth and fiction

The history and details of the Winter War, which quickly faded in the light of the events of the Great Patriotic War, have since been revised and rewritten, clarified and double-checked more than once. As happens with any large historical events, the Russian-Finnish War of 1939–1940 also became the object of political speculation both in the Soviet Union and beyond - and remains so to this day. After the collapse of the USSR, it became fashionable to review the results of all key events in the history of the Soviet Union, and the Winter War was no exception. In post-Soviet historiography, the figures for the losses of the Red Army and the number of destroyed tanks and aircraft increased significantly, while the Finnish losses, on the contrary, were significantly downplayed (contrary to even the official data of the Finnish side, which against this background remained practically unchanged).

Unfortunately, the further the Winter War moves away from us in time, the less likely it is that we will ever know the whole truth about it. The last direct participants and eyewitnesses pass away, to please the political winds, documents and material evidence are shuffled and disappeared, or even new ones, often false, appear. But some facts about the Winter War are already so firmly fixed in world history that they cannot be changed for any reason. We will discuss the ten most notable of them below.

Mannerheim Line

Under this name, a strip of fortifications erected by Finland along a 135-kilometer stretch along the border with the USSR went down in history. The flanks of this line abutted the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. At the same time, the Mannerheim line had a depth of 95 kilometers and consisted of three consecutive defense lines. Since the line, despite its name, began to be built long before Baron Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim became commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, its main components were old single-aspect long-term firing points (pillboxes), capable of conducting only frontal fire. There were about seven dozen of these in the line. Another fifty bunkers were more modern and could fire on the flanks of the attacking troops. In addition, obstacle lines and anti-tank structures were actively used. In particular, there were 220 km in the support zone barbed wire in several dozen rows, 80 km of anti-tank granite bumps, as well as anti-tank ditches, walls and minefields. Official historiography on both sides of the conflict emphasized that Mannerheim's line was practically irresistible. However, after the command system of the Red Army was rebuilt, and the tactics of storming the fortifications were revised and linked to preliminary artillery preparation and tank support, it took only three days to break through.

The day after the start of the Winter War, Moscow radio reported the creation in the city of Terijoki on the Karelian Isthmus of Finland Democratic Republic. It lasted as long as the war itself: until March 12, 1940. During this time, only three countries in the world agreed to recognize the newly formed state: Mongolia, Tuva (at that time not yet part of the Soviet Union) and the USSR itself. Actually, the government of the new state was formed from its citizens and Finnish emigrants living on Soviet territory. It was headed, becoming at the same time Minister of Foreign Affairs, one of the leaders of the Third Communist International, a member Communist Party Finland Otto Kuusinen. On the second day of its existence, the Finnish Democratic Republic concluded a treaty of mutual assistance and friendship with the USSR. Among its main points, all the territorial demands of the Soviet Union, which became the cause of the war with Finland, were taken into account.

Sabotage war

Since the Finnish army entered the war, although mobilized, but clearly losing to the Red Army both in numbers and technical equipment, the Finns relied on defense. And its essential element was the so-called mine warfare - more precisely, the technology of continuous mining. As Soviet soldiers and officers who participated in the Winter War recalled, they could not even imagine that almost everything that the human eye could see could be mined. “Stairs and thresholds of houses, wells, forest clearings and edges, roadsides were literally strewn with mines. Here and there, abandoned as if in a hurry, bicycles, suitcases, gramophones, watches, wallets, and cigarette cases were lying around. As soon as they were moved, there was an explosion,” this is how they describe their impressions. The actions of the Finnish saboteurs were so successful and demonstrative that many of their techniques were promptly adopted by the Soviet military and intelligence services. It can be said that the partisan and sabotage war that unfolded a year and a half later in the occupied territory of the USSR was, to a large extent, conducted according to the Finnish model.

Baptism of fire for heavy KV tanks

Single-turret heavy tanks of a new generation appeared shortly before the start of the Winter War. The first copy, which was actually a smaller version of the SMK heavy tank - "Sergei Mironovich Kirov" - and differed from it by the presence of only one turret, was manufactured in August 1939. It was this tank that ended up in the Winter War in order to be tested in a real battle, which it entered on December 17 during the breakthrough of the Khottinensky fortified area of ​​the Mannerheim Line. It is noteworthy that of the six crew members of the first KV, three were testers at the Kirov Plant, which was producing new tanks. The tests were considered successful, the tank showed itself with best side, but the 76-mm cannon with which he was armed was not enough to combat the bunkers. As a result, the KV-2 tank was hastily developed, armed with a 152-mm howitzer, which no longer managed to take part in the Winter War, but forever entered the history of world tank building.

How England and France prepared to fight the USSR

London and Paris supported Helsinki from the very beginning, although they did not go beyond military-technical assistance. In total, England and France, together with other countries, transferred 350 combat aircraft, approximately 500 field guns, over 150 thousand firearms, ammunition and other ammunition to Finland. In addition, volunteers from Hungary, Italy, Norway, Poland, France and Sweden fought on the Finnish side. When, at the end of February, the Red Army finally broke the resistance of the Finnish army and began to develop an offensive deep into the country, Paris began to openly prepare for direct participation in the war. On March 2, France announced its readiness to send an expeditionary force of 50 thousand soldiers and 100 bombers to Finland. After this, Britain also announced its readiness to send its expeditionary force of 50 bombers to the Finns. A meeting on this issue was scheduled for March 12 - but did not take place, since on the same day Moscow and Helsinki signed a peace treaty.

There is no escape from the “cuckoos”?

The Winter War was the first campaign in which snipers participated en masse. Moreover, one might say, only on one side - the Finnish one. It was the Finns in the winter of 1939–1940 who demonstrated how effective snipers could be in modern warfare. The exact number of snipers remains unknown to this day: they will begin to be identified as a separate military specialty only after the start of the Great Patriotic War, and even then not in all armies. However, we can say with confidence that the number of sharp shooters on the Finnish side was in the hundreds. True, not all of them used special rifles with a sniper scope. Thus, the most successful sniper of the Finnish army, Corporal Simo Häyhä, who in just three months of hostilities brought the number of his victims to five hundred, used an ordinary rifle with open sights. As for the “cuckoos” - snipers shooting from the crowns of trees, about which there are an incredible number of myths, their existence is not confirmed by documents from either the Finnish or Soviet side. Although there were many stories in the Red Army about “cuckoos” tied or chained to trees and freezing there with rifles in their hands.

The first Soviet submachine guns of the Degtyarev system - PPD - were put into service in 1934. However, they did not have time to seriously develop their production. On the one hand, for a long time the command of the Red Army seriously considered this type of firearm to be useful only in police operations or as an auxiliary weapon, and on the other hand, the first Soviet submachine gun was distinguished by its complexity of design and difficulty in manufacturing. As a result, the plan to produce PPD for 1939 was withdrawn, and all already produced copies were transferred to warehouses. And only after, during the Winter War, the Red Army encountered Finnish Suomi submachine guns, of which there were almost three hundred in each Finnish division, did the Soviet military quickly begin to return weapons so useful in close combat.

Marshal Mannerheim: who served Russia and fought with it

The successful opposition to the Soviet Union in the Winter War in Finland was and is considered primarily the merit of the commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, Field Marshal Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim. Meanwhile, until October 1917, this outstanding military leader held the rank of lieutenant general of the Russian Imperial Army and was one of the most prominent division commanders of the Russian army during the First World War. By this time, Baron Mannerheim, a graduate of the Nikolaev Cavalry School and the Officer Cavalry School, had participated in Russo-Japanese War and the organization of a unique expedition across Asia in 1906–1908, which made him a member of the Russian Geographical Society - and one of the most prominent Russian intelligence officers of the early twentieth century. After the October Revolution, Baron Mannerheim, maintaining his oath to Emperor Nicholas II, whose portrait, by the way, hung on the wall of his office all his life, resigned and moved to Finland, in whose history he played such an outstanding role. It is noteworthy that Mannerheim retained his political influence both after the Winter War and after Finland's exit from World War II, becoming the country's first president from 1944 to 1946.

Where was the Molotov cocktail invented?

The Molotov cocktail became one of the symbols of the heroic resistance of the Soviet people to the fascist armies at the first stage of the Great Patriotic War. But we must admit that such a simple and effective anti-tank weapon was not invented in Russia. Alas, the Soviet soldiers, who so successfully used this remedy in 1941–1942, had the opportunity to first test it on themselves. The Finnish army, which did not have a sufficient supply of anti-tank grenades, when faced with tank companies and battalions of the Red Army, was simply forced to resort to Molotov cocktails. During the Winter War, the Finnish army received more than 500 thousand bottles of the mixture, which the Finns themselves called the “Molotov cocktail,” hinting that it was this dish they prepared for one of the leaders of the USSR, who, in a polemical frenzy, promised that the very next day after the start of the war he would dine in Helsinki.

Who fought against their own

During the Russian-Finnish War of 1939–1940, both sides - the Soviet Union and Finland - used units in which collaborators served as part of their troops. On the Soviet side, the Finnish People's Army took part in the battles - the armed force of the Finnish Democratic Republic, recruited from Finns and Karelians living on the territory of the USSR and serving in the troops of the Leningrad Military District. By February 1940, its number reached 25 thousand people, who, according to the plan of the USSR leadership, were supposed to replace the occupation forces on Finnish territory. And on the side of Finland, Russian volunteers fought, the selection and training of whom was carried out by the white émigré organization “Russian All-Military Union” (EMRO), created by Baron Peter Wrangel. In total, six detachments with a total number of about 200 people were formed from Russian emigrants and some of the captured Red Army soldiers who expressed a desire to fight against their former comrades, but only one of them, in which 30 people served, for several days at the very end of the Winter war participated in hostilities.

"WINTER WAR"

Having signed mutual assistance agreements with the Baltic states, the USSR turned to Finland with a proposal to conclude a similar agreement. Finland refused. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of this country, E. Erkko, stated that “Finland will never make a decision similar to those made by the Baltic states. If this happens, it will only be in the worst case scenario.” The origins of the Soviet-Finnish confrontation are largely explained by the extremely hostile, aggressive position of the ruling circles of Finland towards the USSR. Ex-president Finland P. Svinhuvud, under whom Soviet Russia voluntarily recognized the independence of its northern neighbor, said that “any enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland.” In the mid-30s. M. M. Litvinov, in a conversation with the Finnish envoy, stated that “in no neighboring country is there such open propaganda for an attack on the USSR and the seizure of its territory as in Finland.”

After the Munich Agreement of Western countries, the Soviet leadership began to show particular persistence towards Finland. During 1938-1939 Negotiations were held during which Moscow sought to ensure the security of Leningrad by moving the border on the Karelian Isthmus. In exchange, Finland was offered territories of Karelia, much larger in size than the lands that were supposed to be transferred to the USSR. In addition, the Soviet government promised to allocate a certain amount for the resettlement of residents. However, the Finnish side stated that the territory ceded to the USSR was insufficient compensation. The Karelian Isthmus had a well-developed infrastructure: a network of railways and highways, buildings, warehouses and other structures. The territory transferred by the Soviet Union to Finland was an area covered with forests and swamps. In order to transform this territory into an area suitable for living and economic needs, it was necessary to invest considerable funds.

Moscow did not give up hope for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and offered various options conclusion of the contract. At the same time, he firmly stated: “Since we cannot move Leningrad, we will move the border to secure it.” At the same time, he referred to Ribbentrop, who explained the German attack on Poland by the need to secure Berlin. Large-scale military construction began on both sides of the border. The Soviet Union was preparing for offensive operations, and Finland for defensive operations. Finnish Foreign Minister Erkko, expressing the mood of the government, confirmed: “Everything has its limits. Finland cannot agree to the proposal of the Soviet Union and will defend its territory, its inviolability and independence by any means.”

The Soviet Union and Finland did not follow the path of finding a compromise acceptable to them. Stalin's imperial ambitions made themselves felt this time too. In the second half of November 1939, diplomatic methods gave way to threats and saber-rattling. The Red Army hastily prepared for military operations. On November 27, 1939, V. M. Molotov issued a statement in which he said that “yesterday, November 26, the Finnish White Guards undertook a new vile provocation by firing artillery fire at a military unit of the Red Army located in the village of Mainila on the Karelian Isthmus.” Disputes are still ongoing as to from whose side these shots were fired. The Finns already in 1939 tried to prove that the shelling could not have been carried out from their territory, and the whole story with the “Maynila incident” was nothing more than a provocation by Moscow.

On November 29, taking advantage of the shelling of its border positions, the USSR terminated the non-aggression pact with Finland. On November 30, hostilities began. On December 1, on Finnish territory, in the city of Terijoki (Zelenogorsk), where Soviet troops entered, on the initiative of Moscow, a new “people's government” of Finland was formed, headed by the Finnish communist O. Kuusinen. The next day, an agreement on mutual assistance and friendship was concluded between the USSR and the Kuusinen government, called the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic.

Events, however, did not develop as well as the Kremlin had hoped. The first stage of the war (November 30, 1939 - February 10, 1940) was particularly unsuccessful for the Red Army. To a large extent, this was due to an underestimation of the combat capability of the Finnish troops. Break through the Mannerheim Line on the move - a complex of defensive fortifications built in 1927-1939. and stretching along the front for 135 km, and in depth up to 95 km, it was not possible. During the fighting, the Red Army suffered huge losses.

In December 1939, the command stopped unsuccessful attempts to advance deep into Finnish territory. Careful preparations for the breakthrough began. The North-Western Front was formed, led by S.K. Timoshenko and member of the Military Council A.A. Zhdanov. The front included two armies, led by K. A. Meretskov and V. D. Grendal (replaced in early March 1940 by F. A. Parusinov). The total number of Soviet troops was increased by 1.4 times and brought to 760 thousand people.

Finland also strengthened its army by receiving military equipment and equipment from abroad. 11.5 thousand volunteers arrived from Scandinavia, the USA and other countries to fight the Soviets. England and France developed their plans for military action, intending to enter the war on the side of Finland. In London and Paris they did not hide their hostile plans towards the USSR.

On February 11, 1940, the final stage of the war began. Soviet troops went on the offensive and broke through the Mannerheim Line. The main forces of the Karelian Army of Finland were defeated. On March 12, a peace treaty was concluded in the Kremlin after short negotiations. Military operations along the entire front ceased from 12 o'clock on March 13. In accordance with the signed agreement, the Karelian Isthmus, the western and northern coasts of Lake Ladoga, and a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland were included in the USSR. The Soviet Union received a 30-year lease on the Hanko Peninsula to create a naval base on it “capable of defending the entrance to the Gulf of Finland from aggression.”

The cost of victory in the “winter war” turned out to be extremely high. In addition to the fact that the Soviet Union as an “aggressor state” was expelled from the League of Nations, during the 105 days of the war the Red Army lost at least 127 thousand people killed, died from wounds and went missing. About 250 thousand military personnel were wounded, frostbitten, and shell-shocked.

The "Winter War" demonstrated major miscalculations in the organization and training of the Red Army troops. Hitler, who closely followed the course of events in Finland, formulated the conclusion that the Red Army was a “colossus with feet of clay” that the Wehrmacht could easily cope with. Certain conclusions from the military campaign of 1939-1940. They did it in the Kremlin too. Thus, K.E. Voroshilov was replaced as People's Commissar of Defense by S.M. Timoshenko. The implementation of a set of measures aimed at strengthening the defense capability of the USSR began.

However, during the “winter war” and after its end, no significant strengthening of security in the north-west was achieved. Although the border was moved away from Leningrad and Murmansk railway, this did not prevent the fact that during the Great Patriotic War Leningrad fell into the siege ring. In addition, Finland did not become a friendly or at least neutral country to the USSR - revanchist elements prevailed in its leadership, who relied on supporting Nazi Germany.

I.S. Ratkovsky, M.V. Khodyakov. History of Soviet Russia

POET'S VIEW

From a shabby notebook

Two lines about a boy fighter,

What happened in the forties

Killed on ice in Finland.

It lay somehow awkwardly

Childishly small body.

The frost pressed the overcoat to the ice,

The hat flew far away.

It seemed that the boy was not lying down,

And he was still running

Yes, he held the ice behind the floor...

Among the great cruel war,

I can’t imagine why,

I feel sorry for that distant fate

Like dead, alone,

It's like I'm lying there

Frozen, small, killed

In that unknown war,

Forgotten, small, lying.

A.T. Tvardovsky. Two lines.

NO, MOLOTOV!

Ivan goes to war with a cheerful song,

but, running into the Mannerheim line,

he starts singing a sad song,

as we hear it now:

Finland, Finland,

Ivan is heading there again.

Since Molotov promised that everything would be fine

and tomorrow in Helsinki they will be eating ice cream.

No, Molotov! No, Molotov!

Finland, Finland,

The Mannerheim Line is a serious obstacle,

and when terrible artillery fire began from Karelia

he silenced many Ivans.

No, Molotov! No, Molotov!

You lie even more than Bobrikov!

Finland, Finland,

The invincible Red Army is afraid.

Molotov already said to look for a dacha,

otherwise the Chukhons are threatening to capture us.

No, Molotov! No, Molotov!

You lie even more than Bobrikov!

Go beyond the Urals, go beyond the Urals,

there is a lot of space for a Molotov dacha.

We will send the Stalins and their henchmen there,

political instructors, commissars and Petrozavodsk swindlers.

No, Molotov! No, Molotov!

You lie even more than Bobrikov!

MANNERHEIM LINE: MYTH OR REALITY?

It is good form for supporters of the theory of a strong Red Army that broke through an impregnable defense line, always quoting General Badu, who built the “Mannerheim Line.” He wrote: “Nowhere in the world were natural conditions so favorable for the construction of fortified lines as in Karelia. In this narrow place between two bodies of water - Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland - there are impenetrable forests and huge rocks. The famous “Mannerheim Line” was built from wood and granite, and where necessary from concrete. The anti-tank obstacles made in granite give the Mannerheim Line its greatest strength. Even twenty-five ton tanks cannot overcome them. Using explosions, the Finns built machine-gun and artillery nests in the granite, which were resistant to the most powerful bombs. Where there was a shortage of granite, the Finns did not spare concrete.”

In general, reading these lines, a person imagining the real “Mannerheim Line” will be terribly surprised. In Badu’s description, one sees before one’s eyes some gloomy granite cliffs with firing points carved into them at a dizzying height, over which vultures circle in anticipation of mountains of corpses of the attackers. Badu's description actually fits more closely to the Czech fortifications on the border with Germany. The Karelian Isthmus is a relatively flat area, and there is no need to cut down in the rocks simply due to the absence of the rocks themselves. But one way or another, the image of an impregnable castle was created in the mass consciousness and became firmly entrenched in it.

In reality, the Mannerheim Line was far from the best examples of European fortification. The vast majority of long-term Finnish structures were one-story, partially buried reinforced concrete structures in the form of a bunker, divided into several rooms by internal partitions with armored doors. Three bunkers of the “million-dollar” type had two levels, another three bunkers had three levels. Let me emphasize, precisely the level. That is, their combat casemates and shelters were located at different levels relative to the surface, slightly buried casemates with embrasures in the ground and completely buried galleries connecting them with the barracks. There were negligibly few buildings with what could be called floors. Below each other - such placement - small casemates directly above the premises of the lower tier were only in two bunkers (Sk-10 and Sj-5) and the gun casemate in Patoniemi. This is, to put it mildly, unimpressive. Even if you do not take into account the impressive structures of the Maginot Line, you can find many examples of much more advanced bunkers...

The survivability of the gouges was designed for Renault-type tanks in service in Finland, and did not meet modern requirements. Contrary to Badu's assertions, Finnish anti-tank guns showed during the war their low resistance to attacks from T-28 medium tanks. But it wasn’t even a matter of the quality of the “Mannerheim Line” structures. Any defensive line is characterized by the number of long-term fire structures (DOS) per kilometer. In total, on the “Mannerheim Line” there were 214 permanent structures for 140 km, of which 134 were machine gun or artillery DOS. Directly on the front line in the combat contact zone in the period from mid-December 1939 to mid-February 1940 there were 55 bunkers, 14 shelters and 3 infantry positions, about half of which were obsolete structures from the first period of construction. For comparison, the Maginot Line had about 5,800 DOS in 300 defense nodes and a length of 400 km (density 14 DOS/km), the Siegfried Line had 16,000 fortifications (weaker than the French ones) on a front of 500 km (density - 32 structures per km) ... And the “Mannerheim Line” is 214 DOS (of which only 8 artillery) on a front of 140 km (average density 1.5 DOS/km, in some areas - up to 3-6 DOS/km).