The stages of the Afghan war briefly. War in Afghanistan. History of the issue. Foreign support for radicals

The decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and formalized by a secret resolution of the CPSU Central Committee.

The official purpose of the entry was to prevent the threat of foreign military intervention. The Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee used repeated requests from the Afghan leadership as a formal basis.

The limited contingent (OKSV) was directly drawn into the civil war that was flaring up in Afghanistan and became its active participant.

This conflict involved the armed forces of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) on the one hand and the armed opposition (Mujahideen, or dushmans) on the other. The struggle was for complete political control over the territory of Afghanistan. During the conflict, the dushmans were supported by military specialists from the United States, a number of European NATO member countries, as well as Pakistani intelligence services.

December 25, 1979 The entry of Soviet troops into the DRA began in three directions: Kushka Shindand Kandahar, Termez Kunduz Kabul, Khorog Faizabad. The troops landed at the airfields of Kabul, Bagram, and Kandahar.

The Soviet contingent included: the command of the 40th Army with support and service units, 4 divisions, separate brigades- 5, separate regiments - 4, combat aviation regiments - 4, helicopter regiments - 3, pipeline brigade - 1, material support brigade 1 and some other units and institutions.

The presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activities are conventionally divided into four stages.

1st stage: December 1979 - February 1980 Entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, placing them in garrisons, organizing the protection of deployment points and various objects.

2nd stage: March 1980 - April 1985 Conducting active combat operations, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work to reorganize and strengthen the armed forces of the DRA.

3rd stage: May 1985 - December 1986 The transition from active combat operations primarily to supporting the actions of Afghan troops with Soviet aviation, artillery and sapper units. Special forces units fought to suppress the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. The withdrawal of six Soviet regiments to their homeland took place.

4th stage: January 1987 - February 1989 Participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparing Soviet troops for the return to their homeland and implementing their complete withdrawal.

April 14, 1988 With the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation around the situation in the DRA. Soviet Union pledged to withdraw its contingent within 9 months, starting from May 15; The United States and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.

In accordance with the agreements, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Afghanistan began May 15, 1988.

February 15, 1989 Soviet troops were completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the limited contingent, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov.

Losses:

According to updated data, in total in the war the Soviet Army lost 14 thousand 427 people, the KGB - 576 people, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28 people dead and missing. More than 53 thousand people were wounded, shell-shocked, injured.

The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. Available estimates range from 1 to 2 million people.

And the republican system was established. This was the impetus for the start of the civil war between various socio-political and nationalist forces in the country.

In April 1978, the People's Democratic Party (PDPA) came to power in Afghanistan. The radicalism of the new Afghan leadership, the hasty destruction of the centuries-old traditions of the people and the foundations of Islam, strengthened the population's resistance to the central government. The situation was complicated by foreign interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The USSR and some other countries provided assistance to the Afghan government, and NATO countries, Muslim states and China provided assistance to the opposition forces.

By the end of 1979, the situation in the country had become sharply complicated, and the threat of overthrowing the ruling regime loomed. In this regard, the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) repeatedly appealed to the USSR with a request to send military units to the country. The Soviet side initially rejected this form of intervention, but, in the context of the worsening Afghan crisis, on December 12, 1979, the leadership of the USSR, fearing the transfer of hostilities to the territory of the Central Asian republics, decided to send troops to provide military assistance to the government of Afghanistan. The decision was made at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee in accordance with Article 4 of the Soviet-Afghan "Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborhood and Cooperation", concluded on December 5, 1978, and formalized by a secret resolution of the CPSU Central Committee.

The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was considered by the political leadership of the USSR as a short-term measure aimed at ensuring security southern borders Soviet Union.

The main task of the limited contingent of Soviet troops (OCSV) was to create a “cordon sanitaire” at the borders of the USSR in the face of the looming threat of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism on the territory of the Soviet Muslim republics.

On December 16, 1979, an order was given to separate the field administration of the 40th Army from the administration of the Turkestan Military District (TurkVO) and its complete mobilization. The first deputy commander of the TurkVO troops, Lieutenant General Yuri Tukharinov, was appointed commander of the army. Formations and units of the 40th Army were fully mobilized 10-12 days before entry.

The commissioning and deployment of OKSV in the DRA began on December 25, 1979. By mid-January 1980, the introduction of the main forces of the 40th Army was basically completed. Three divisions (two motorized rifle and one airborne), an air assault brigade, two separate regiments and other units were introduced into Afghanistan.

Subsequently, the combat strength of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan was constantly updated in order to strengthen it. The largest number of OKSV (1985) was 108.7 thousand people, including 73.6 thousand people in combat units. The composition of the OKSV mainly included: the command of the 40th Army, three motorized rifle and one airborne divisions, nine separate brigades and seven separate regiments, four front-line regiments and two army aviation regiments, as well as rear, medical, repair, construction and other units and divisions.

The general management of OKSV was carried out by the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which was headed by Marshal of the USSR Sergei Sokolov, and since 1985 - Army General Valentin Varennikov. Direct control of the combat and daily activities of the OKSV was carried out by the commander of the 40th Army, subordinate to the command of the TurkVO troops.

Soviet troops in Afghanistan guarded and defended national economic facilities, airfields, and roads vital for the country, and carried out transport convoys with cargo through the territory under the control of the armed opposition.

To reduce the military activity of the opposition, OKSV conducted active military operations of various scales using the entire arsenal of conventional weapons, and carried out air strikes on opposition bases. In accordance with the decision of the political leadership of the USSR, Soviet troops, in response to numerous attacks on their garrisons and transport convoys by opposition units, began to carry out joint attacks with Afghan units fighting to search for and eliminate the most aggressive enemy armed groups. Thus, the Soviet troops brought into Afghanistan found themselves involved in an internal military conflict on the side of the country's government against the opposition forces, to whom Pakistan provided the greatest assistance.

The presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activities are conventionally divided into four stages.

Stage 1: December 1979 - February 1980. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, their placement in garrisons, the organization of protection of deployment points and various objects.

Stage 2: March 1980 - April 1985. Conducting active combat operations, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work to reorganize and strengthen the armed forces of the DRA.

3rd stage: May 1985 - December 1986. The transition from active combat operations primarily to supporting the actions of Afghan troops with Soviet aviation, artillery and engineer units. Special forces units fought to suppress the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. The withdrawal of six Soviet regiments to their homeland took place.

Stage 4: January 1987 - February 1989. Participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparing Soviet troops for the return to their homeland and implementing their complete withdrawal.

Even after sending troops to Afghanistan, the USSR continued to look for opportunities for a political resolution of the intra-Afghan conflict. Since August 1981, he tried to ensure the negotiation process of the DRA with Pakistan and Iran, and since April 1986, to promote a systemic policy of national reconciliation.

On April 14, 1988, in Geneva (Switzerland), representatives of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the USSR and the USA signed five fundamental documents on the settlement of the political situation around Afghanistan. These agreements regulated the process of withdrawal of Soviet troops and declared international guarantees of non-interference in the internal affairs of the republic, the obligations of which were assumed by the USSR and the USA. Deadlines for the withdrawal of Soviet troops were set: half of the limited contingent was withdrawn by August 15, 1988, the remaining units - after another six months.

On May 15, 1988, the withdrawal of OKSV began, which was completed on February 15, 1989. The withdrawal of troops was led by the last commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov.

About 620 thousand military personnel completed military service in Afghanistan, including 525.2 thousand people in the OKSV.

The losses of the 40th Army personnel were: killed and killed - 13,833 people, including 1,979 officers and generals, wounded - 49,985 people. During the fighting on the territory of Afghanistan, in addition, 572 military personnel of state security agencies, 28 employees of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as 190 military advisers, including 145 officers, were killed. Due to injuries, 172 officers stopped serving in the Armed Forces. 6,669 Afghans became disabled, including 1,479 people disabled in the first group.

For military and other merits, over 200 thousand people were awarded orders and medals, 86 were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 28 of them posthumously.

(Additional

Hi all! Today we will analyze the most difficult topic in the history of Russia. The war in Afghanistan is the final act of the Cold War, as well as the greatest test for the Soviet Union, which played a significant role in its collapse. In this article we will briefly analyze this event.

Origins

Causes of the war in Afghanistan 1979 - 1989 variety. But let's try to look at the main ones. After all, manuals and textbooks often immediately write about the coup in Kabul on April 27, 1978. And then follows a description of the war.

So that's what it really was. After World War II, revolutionary sentiments began to emerge among young people in Afghanistan. There were a lot of reasons: the country was practically feudal, power belonged to the tribal aristocracy. The country's industry was weak and did not satisfy its own needs for oil, kerosene, sugar and other necessary things. The authorities didn’t want to do anything.

Noor Muhammad Taraki

As a result, the youth movement Vish Zalmiyan ("Awakened Youth") arose, which then turned into the NDPA (National Democratic Party of Afghanistan). The PDPA was formed in 1965 and began to prepare coup d'etat. The party advocated democratic and socialist slogans. I think it’s clear why the USSR immediately relied on it. In 1966, the party split into Khalqists (“Khalq” is their newspaper) led by N.M. Taraki and Parchamists (“Parcha” is their publication) by B. Karmal. The Khalqists advocated more radical actions, the Parchamists were supporters of a soft and legal transition of power: its transfer from the aristocracy to the workers' party.

In addition to parties, by the beginning of the 70s, revolutionary sentiments also began to grow among the army. The army was separated from the aristocracy, recruited according to the tribal principle and consisted of ordinary Afghans. As a result, in July 1973, she overthrew the monarchy and the country became a republic.

It would seem that everything was fine, because both the Khalqists and the Parchamists were at one with the army. Now real progressive reforms will come to the country! On July 17, 1973, the new President Mohammed Daud read out an “Address to the People,” in which he outlined a number of fundamental progressive reforms. And if they could be implemented, then... But this could not be done. Because immediately after the revolution, a split arose again in the new political circles: M. Daud’s supporters (bourgeoisie, capitalists) wanted to direct the development of the country along the Western path, and the army along the non-capitalist - socialist path, following the example of the countries of the socialist camp.

As a result, from 1973 to 1978 nothing was done. In 1977, the Khalqists and Parchamists united because they realized the futility of their empty argument. On April 27, 1978, the army staged a second revolution and overthrew M. Daoud under the leadership of the PDPA. There was no one else to do this except the army; it was the main driving force in the country!

Hafizullah Amin

At first everything was great: the government headed by N.M. The Tarakis carried out land reform in the interests of the people, forgave all the debts of peasants to local feudal lords, and equalized women's rights with men.

But soon disagreements began again in the party. B. Karmal is already preparing a new coup, and Prime Minister H. Amin used monstrous means: massacres and conclusions ordinary people. So Amin fought against illiteracy of the population and solved other problems according to the principle: “No person, no problem!”

In October 1979, before L.I. Brezhnev, who met with Taraki a month ago, received the news of his death. The KGB reported that Amin had carried out a new coup d'etat in Afghanistan. The Soviet leadership decided to intervene in the internal political affairs of Afghanistan. This was, as we now know, a monstrously wrong decision.

The Soviet leadership did not take into account the specifics of the region: in fact, the PDPA did not have serious social support from the population: there was a deep gap between the party and the people. And after the revolution, trust in it fell even more due to the actions of Kh. Amin.

But in December 1979, the special forces of the KGB of the USSR carried out another coup. Kh. Amin was killed, and the country was formally headed by B. Karmal. However, the local population perceived the Soviet troops brought into the country as occupiers. In fact, a full-scale war has begun: the PDPA and the USSR against the opposition. The opposition was led by radical Islamists who carried out propaganda among the local population.

Events

The course of events of this war was as follows. In December 1979, a limited contingent of Soviet troops (OCSV) in the amount of 50,000 troops was introduced into Afghanistan. Soon it was brought to 100,000. All military operations can be divided into several stages.

First stage from December 25, 1979 to February 1980 - the USSR stationed the 40th Army in garrisons.
Second phase: March 1980 to 1985 - participation in the civil war in Afghanistan, active phase.
Third stage: from May 1985 to December 1986 - support of the Afghan armed forces in the fight against the opposition.
Fourth stage: from January 1987 to 1989 - the USSR participated in the reconciliation of the warring parties.

And you may ask, couldn’t we immediately move on to reconciliation? Of course it was possible. And Soviet citizens more than once asked themselves this question: why was the most modern Soviet army with the most modern weapons, which was able to defeat the million-strong Japanese Kwantung Army in two weeks of August 1945, unable to defeat the Afghan Mujahideen, even if they received help from the United States?

The point was that the Afghans were defending their country from occupation: that is exactly what the opposition convinced them to do. They defended their country, not the proletarian revolution. What kind of proletarian revolution could there be in a country where there are just over 116 thousand proletarians out of 16 million?!

The war became protracted, and the Soviet Union spent a fabulous amount of resources on it, which also made a significant contribution to the war.

Consequences

The results of the war in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 were dismal: the losses of the USSR amounted (according to official data) to 15,400 military personnel killed and more than 100 thousand wounded. Afghanistan, according to various estimates, lost from 1 to 2 million killed.

The withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country began on May 15, 1988 and continued until February 15, 1989. The situation of civil war in Afghanistan has not gone away, although it has become less tense. Until 1992, the Soviet Union, and then Russia, provided assistance to the government of this country with weapons, supplies, and oil.

Today Afghanistan is a rather exotic country, just like Russia.

Interesting facts about the Afghan war:

Soviet soldiers nicknamed the war in Afghanistan “The Sheep War” because the Mujahideen drove sheep into them to clear minefields.
Some experts also consider serious drug trafficking to the Soviet Union from Afghanistan to be one of the reasons for the war.
Throughout the war, 86 soldiers, including 11 posthumously, were awarded the Order of Hero of the Soviet Union. In total, 200 thousand people were awarded medals of various degrees, including 1,350 women.
A long time ago, on some livejournal blog, I read an article about a Soviet soldier, a young guy who alone stopped a convoy of Mujahideen and apparently destroyed it, too, alone. If anyone knows this story, write in the comments the name of the hero and a link to his story.

If you know more interesting facts about this war, write in the comments. When preparing the article, I used the book: N.I. Pikov. War in Afghanistan. M. - Voenizdat, 1991

The last ten years of the Soviet state were marked by the so-called Afghan War of 1979-1989.

In the turbulent nineties, due to vigorous reforms and economic crises, information about the Afghan war was practically crowded out of the collective consciousness. However, in our time, after the colossal work of historians and researchers, after the removal of all ideological stereotypes, an impartial look at the history of those long-ago years has opened up.

Conditions for conflict

On the territory of our country, as well as on the territory of the entire post-Soviet space, the Afghan war can be associated with one ten-year period of time 1979-1989. This was a period when a limited contingent of Soviet troops was present on the territory of Afghanistan. In reality, it was just one of many moments in a long civil conflict.

The prerequisites for its emergence can be considered 1973, when the monarchy was overthrown in this mountainous country. After which power was seized by a short-lived regime headed by Muhammad Daoud. This regime lasted until the Saur revolution in 1978. Following her, power in the country passed to the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which announced the proclamation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

The organizational structure of the party and state resembled the Marxist one, which naturally brought it closer to the Soviet state. The revolutionaries gave preference to leftist ideology, and of course made it the main one throughout the Afghan state. Following the example of the Soviet Union, they began to build socialism.

Even so, even before 1978, the state already existed in an environment of continuous unrest. The presence of two revolutions and a civil war led to the elimination of stable socio-political life in the entire region.

The socialist-oriented government confronted a wide variety of forces, but radical Islamists played first fiddle. According to Islamists, members of the ruling elite are enemies not only of the entire multinational people of Afghanistan, but also of all Islam. Actually new political regime was in a position of declared holy war against the “infidels.”

In such conditions, special detachments of Mujahideen warriors were formed. It was these mujahideen that the soldiers of the Soviet army fought against, for whom the Soviet-Afghan War began after some time. In a nutshell, the success of the Mujahideen is explained by the fact that they skillfully carried out propaganda work throughout the country.

The task of the Islamist agitators was made easier by the fact that the vast majority of Afghans, approximately 90% of the country's population, were illiterate. On the territory of the country, immediately upon leaving large cities, a tribal system of relations with extreme patriarchy reigned.

Before the revolutionary government that had come to power had time to properly establish itself in the capital of the state, Kabul, an armed uprising, fueled by Islamist agitators, began in almost all provinces.

In such a sharply complicated situation, in March 1979, the Afghan government received its first appeal to the Soviet leadership with a request for military assistance. Subsequently, such appeals were repeated several times. There was nowhere else to look for support for the Marxists, who were surrounded by nationalists and Islamists.

For the first time, the problem of providing assistance to Kabul “comrades” was considered by the Soviet leadership in March 1979. At that time, General Secretary Brezhnev had to speak out and prohibit armed intervention. However, over time, the operational situation near the Soviet borders deteriorated more and more.

Little by little, the members of the Politburo and other senior government functionaries changed their point of view. In particular, there were statements from Defense Minister Ustinov that the unstable situation on the Soviet-Afghan border could prove dangerous for the Soviet state.

Thus, already in September 1979, regular upheavals occurred on the territory of Afghanistan. Now there has been a change of leadership in the local ruling party. As a result of this, the party and public administration ended up in the hands of Hafizullah Amin.

The KGB reported that the new leader had been recruited by CIA agents. The presence of these reports increasingly inclined the Kremlin to military intervention. At the same time, preparations began for the overthrow of the new regime.

The Soviet Union leaned towards a more loyal figure in the Afghan government - Barak Karmal. He was one of the members of the ruling party. Initially, he held important positions in the party leadership and was a member of the Revolutionary Council. When the party purges began, he was sent as ambassador to Czechoslovakia. He was later declared a traitor and conspirator. Karmal, who was then in exile, had to stay abroad. However, he managed to move to the territory of the Soviet Union and become the person who was elected by the Soviet leadership.

How the decision to send troops was made

In December 1979, it became abundantly clear that the Soviet Union might be drawn into its own Soviet-Afghan war. After short discussions and clarification of the last reservations in the documentation, the Kremlin approved a special operation to overthrow the Amin regime.

It is clear that at that moment it is unlikely that anyone in Moscow understood how long this military operation would last. However, even then, there were people who opposed the decision to send troops. These were the Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov and the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Kosygin. For the latter, this conviction became another and decisive pretext for an irrevocable severance of relations with General Secretary Brezhnev and his entourage.

They preferred to begin the final preparatory measures for the direct transfer of Soviet troops to the territory of Afghanistan over the next day, namely December 13. The Soviet special services attempted to organize an assassination attempt on the Afghan leader, but as it turned out, this had no effect on Hafizullah Amin. The success of the special operation was in jeopardy. Despite everything, preparatory activities to carry out the special operation continued.

How the palace of Hafizullah Amin was stormed

They decided to send in troops at the end of December, and this happened on the 25th. A couple of days later, while in the palace, the Afghan leader Amin felt ill and fainted. The same situation happened with some of his close associates. The reason for this was a general poisoning organized by Soviet agents who took over the residence as cooks. Not knowing the true causes of the illness and not trusting anyone, Amin turned to Soviet doctors. Arriving from the Soviet embassy in Kabul, they immediately began providing medical assistance, however, the president’s bodyguards became worried.

In the evening, at about seven o'clock, near the presidential palace, a car stalled near a Soviet sabotage group. However, it stalled in a good place. This happened near the communication well. This well was connected to the distribution center of all Kabul communications. The object was quickly mined, and after some time there was a deafening explosion that was heard even in Kabul. As a result of the sabotage, the capital was left without power supply.

This explosion was the signal for the beginning of the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989). Quickly assessing the situation, the commander of the special operation, Colonel Boyarintsev, gave the order to begin the assault on the presidential palace. When the Afghan leader was informed of an attack by unknown armed men, he ordered his associates to request help from the Soviet embassy.

From a formal point of view, both states remained on friendly terms. When Amin learned from the report that his palace was being stormed by Soviet special forces, he refused to believe it. There is no reliable information about the circumstances of Amin’s death. Many eyewitnesses later claimed that he could have lost his life by suicide. And even before the moment when Soviet special forces burst into his apartment.

Be that as it may, the special operation was carried out successfully. They captured not only the presidential residence, but the entire capital, and on the night of December 28, Karmal was brought to Kabul, who was declared president. On the Soviet side, as a result of the assault, 20 people (representatives of paratroopers and special forces), including the commander of the assault, Grigory Boyarintsev, were killed. In 1980, he was posthumously nominated for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Chronicle of the Afghan War

Based on the nature of combat operations and strategic objectives, the brief history of the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989) can be divided into four main periods.

The first period was the winter of 1979-1980. The beginning of the entry of Soviet troops into the country. Military personnel were sent to capture garrisons and important infrastructure facilities.

The second period (1980-1985) is the most active. The fighting spread throughout the country. They were of an offensive nature. The Mujahideen were being eliminated and the local army was being improved.

The third period (1985-1987) - military operations were carried out mainly by Soviet aviation and artillery. Ground forces were practically not involved.

The fourth period (1987-1989) is the last. The Soviet troops were preparing for their withdrawal. No one has ever stopped the civil war in the country. The Islamists were also unable to be defeated. The withdrawal of troops was planned due to the economic crisis in the USSR, as well as due to a change in political course.

The war continues

State leaders argued for the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan by the fact that they were only providing assistance to the friendly Afghan people, and at the request of their government. Following the introduction of Soviet troops into the DRA, the UN Security Council was quickly convened. An anti-Soviet resolution prepared by the United States was presented there. However, the resolution was not supported.

The American government, although not directly involved in the conflict, was actively financing the Mujahideen. The Islamists possessed weapons purchased from Western countries. As a result, the actual cold war between the two political systems acquired the opening of a new front, which turned out to be Afghan territory. The conduct of hostilities was at times covered by all the world media, which told the whole truth about the Afghan war.

American intelligence agencies, in particular the CIA, organized several training camps in neighboring Pakistan. They trained Afghan mujahideen, also called dushmans. Islamic fundamentalists, in addition to generous American financial flows, were supported by money from drug trafficking. Actually, in the 80s, Afghanistan led the world market for the production of opium and heroin. Often, Soviet soldiers of the Afghan War liquidated precisely such industries in their special operations.

As a result of the Soviet invasion (1979-1989), confrontation began among the majority of the country's population, which had never before held weapons in their hands. Recruitment into the Dushman detachments was carried out by a very wide network of agents spread throughout the country. The advantage of the Mujahideen was that they did not have any single center of resistance. Throughout the Soviet-Afghan War these were numerous heterogeneous groups. They were led by field commanders, but no “leaders” stood out among them.

Many raids did not produce the desired results due to the effective work of local propagandists with the local population. The Afghan majority (especially the provincial patriarchal one) did not accept the Soviet military personnel; they were ordinary occupiers for them.

"Politics of National Reconciliation"

Since 1987, they began to implement the so-called “policy of national reconciliation.” The ruling party decided to give up its monopoly on power. A law was passed allowing “oppositionists” to form their own parties. The country adopted a new Constitution and also elected a new president, Mohammed Najibullah. It was assumed that such events were supposed to end the confrontation through compromises.

Along with this, the Soviet leadership in the person of Mikhail Gorbachev set a course to reduce its weapons. These plans also included the withdrawal of troops from the neighboring state. The Soviet-Afghan war could not be waged in a situation when an economic crisis began in the USSR. Moreover, the Cold War was also coming to an end. The Soviet Union and the United States began negotiating and signing many documents related to disarmament and ending the Cold War.

The first time General Secretary Gorbachev announced the upcoming withdrawal of troops was in December 1987, when he officially visited the United States. Following this, the Soviet, American and Afghan delegations managed to sit down at the negotiating table on neutral territory in Switzerland. As a result, the corresponding documents were signed. Thus ended the story of another war. Based on the Geneva agreements, the Soviet leadership promised to withdraw its troops, and the American leadership promised to stop funding the Mujahideen.

Most of the limited Soviet military contingent has left the country since August 1988. Then they began to leave military garrisons from some cities and settlements. The last Soviet soldier to leave Afghanistan on February 15, 1989 was General Gromov. Footage of how Soviet soldiers of the Afghan War crossed the Friendship Bridge across the Amu Darya River flew all over the world.

Echoes of the Afghan War: losses

Many events of the Soviet era were assessed one-sidedly taking into account party ideology, the same applies to the Soviet-Afghan War. Sometimes dry reports appeared in the press, and heroes of the Afghan War were shown on central television. However, before Perestroika and glasnost, the Soviet leadership remained silent about the true scale of combat losses. While the soldiers of the Afghan war in zinc coffins returned home in semi-secrecy. Their funerals took place behind the scenes, and the monuments to the Afghan War were without mention of the places and causes of death.

Beginning in 1989, the newspaper Pravda published what it claimed was reliable data on losses of nearly 14,000 Soviet troops. By the end of the 20th century, this number reached 15,000, since the wounded Soviet soldier of the Afghan War was already dying at home due to injuries or illnesses. These were the true consequences of the Soviet-Afghan War.

Some references to combat losses from the Soviet leadership further reinforced conflict situations with the public. And at the end of the 80s, demands for the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan were almost the main slogan of that era. During the stagnant years, this was demanded by the dissident movement. In particular, academician Andrei Sakharov was exiled to Gorky for criticizing the “Afghan issue”.

Consequences of the Afghan War: results

What were the consequences of the Afghan conflict? The Soviet invasion extended the existence of the ruling party exactly as long as a limited contingent of troops remained in the country. With their withdrawal, the ruling regime came to an end. Numerous Mujahideen detachments quickly managed to regain control over the territory of all of Afghanistan. Some Islamist groups began to appear near the Soviet borders, and border guards were often under fire from them even after the end of hostilities.

Since April 1992, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan no longer existed; it was completely liquidated by Islamists. The country was in complete chaos. It was divided by numerous factions. The war against everyone there lasted until the invasion of NATO troops after the New York terrorist attacks in 2001. In the 90s, the Taliban movement emerged in the country, which managed to achieve a leading role in modern world terrorism.

In the minds of post-Soviet people, the Afghan war has become one of the symbols of the passing Soviet era. Songs, films, and books were dedicated to the theme of this war. Nowadays, in schools it is mentioned in history textbooks for high school students. It is assessed differently, although almost everyone in the USSR was against it. The echo of the Afghan war still haunts many of its participants.

Afghan War 1979-1989


	Afghanistan
	Overthrow of H. Amin, withdrawal of Soviet troops
Opponents
	Afghan Mujahideen
	Foreign Mujahideen
	Supported by:









Commanders
Yu. V. Tukharinov, B. I. Tkach, V. F. Ermakov, L. E. Generalov, I. N. Rodionov, V. P. Dubynin, V. I. Varennikov, B.V. Gromov, Yu. P. Maksimov, V. A. Matrosov Muhammad Rafi, B. Karmal, M. Najibullah, Abdul-Rashid Dostum	G. Hekmatyar, B. Rabbani, Ahmad Shah Masood, Ismail Khan, Yunus Khales, D. Haqqani, Said Mansur, Abdul Ali Mazari, M. Nabi, S. Mojaddedi, Abdul Haq, Amin Wardak, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Syed Gailani
Strengths of the parties
USSR: 80-104 thousand military personnel DRA: 50-130 thousand military personnel According to NVO, no more than 300 thousand.	From 25 thousand (1980) to more than 140 thousand (1988)
Military losses
USSR: 15,051 dead, 53,753 wounded, 417 missing DRA: losses unknown	Afghan Mujahideen: 56,000-90,000 (civilians from 600 thousand to 2 million people)

Afghan war 1979-1989 - a long-term political and armed confrontation between the parties: the ruling pro-Soviet regime of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) with the military support of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops in Afghanistan (OCSVA) - on the one hand, and the Mujahideen ("dushmans"), with a part of Afghan society sympathetic to them, with political and financial support foreign countries and a number of states of the Islamic world - on the other.

The decision to send troops of the USSR Armed Forces to Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, in accordance with the secret resolution of the CPSU Central Committee No. 176/125 “Towards the situation in “A””, “in order to prevent aggression from outside and strengthen the southern borders friendly regime in Afghanistan." The decision was made by a narrow circle of members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee (Yu. V. Andropov, D. F. Ustinov, A. A. Gromyko and L. I. Brezhnev).

To achieve these goals, the USSR sent a group of troops into Afghanistan, and a detachment of special forces from the emerging special KGB unit “Vympel” killed the current President H. Amin and everyone who was with him in the palace. By Moscow's decision, the new leader of Afghanistan was a protege of the USSR, former Ambassador Extraordinary Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Afghanistan in Prague B. Karmal, whose regime received significant and diverse - military, financial and humanitarian - support from the Soviet Union.

Background

"Big game"

Afghanistan is located in the very center of Eurasia, which allows it to play an important role in relations between neighboring regions.

Since the beginning of the 19th century, a struggle for control over Afghanistan began between the Russian and British empires, called the “Great Game”. TheGreatGame).

Anglo-Afghan Wars

The British attempted to establish dominance over Afghanistan by force, sending troops from neighboring British India in January 1839. Thus began the first Anglo-Afghan war. Initially, the British were successful - they managed to overthrow the emir Dost Mohammed and put Shuja Khan on the throne. Shuja Khan's reign, however, did not last long and he was overthrown in 1842. Afghanistan concluded a peace treaty with Britain and retained its independence.

Meanwhile, Russian empire continued to actively move south. In the 1860-1880s, the annexation of Central Asia to Russia was basically completed.

The British, concerned about the rapid advance of Russian troops towards the borders of Afghanistan, began the Second Anglo-Afghan War in 1878. The stubborn struggle continued for two years and in 1880 the British were forced to leave the country, but at the same time leaving the loyal emir Abdur Rahman on the throne and thus maintaining control over the country.

In the 1880-1890s, the modern borders of Afghanistan were formed, determined by joint treaties between Russia and Britain.

Afghan independence

In 1919, Amanullah Khan declared Afghanistan's independence from Great Britain. The third Anglo-Afghan war began.

The first state to recognize independence was Soviet Russia, which provided Afghanistan with significant economic and military assistance.

At the beginning of the 20th century, Afghanistan was a backward agrarian country with a complete lack of industry, an extremely poor population, more than half of which were illiterate.

Republic of Daoud

In 1973, during the visit of the King of Afghanistan Zahir Shah to Italy, a coup d'état took place in the country. Power was seized by Zahir Shah's relative Mohammed Daoud, who proclaimed the first republic in Afghanistan.

Daoud established an authoritarian dictatorship and tried to carry out reforms, but most of them ended in failure. The first republican period in Afghanistan's history is characterized by strong political instability and rivalry between pro-communist and Islamist groups. Islamists launched several uprisings, but all of them were suppressed by government troops.

Daoud's reign ended with the Saur Revolution in April 1978, as well as the execution of the president and all members of his family.

Saur revolution

On April 27, 1978, the April (Saur) Revolution began in Afghanistan, as a result of which the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power, proclaiming the country the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).

Attempts by the country's leadership to carry out new reforms that would overcome Afghanistan's lagging behind have encountered resistance from the Islamic opposition. Since 1978, even before the introduction of Soviet troops, a civil war began in Afghanistan.

In March 1979, during the uprising in the city of Herat, the Afghan leadership made its first request for direct Soviet military intervention (there were about 20 such requests in total). But the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Afghanistan, created back in 1978, reported to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee about the obviousness negative consequences direct Soviet intervention, and the request was rejected.

However, the Herat rebellion forced the reinforcement of Soviet troops at the Soviet-Afghan border and, by order of Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov, preparations began for a possible landing of the 105th Guards Airborne Division into Afghanistan.

The further development of the situation in Afghanistan - armed uprisings of the Islamic opposition, mutinies in the army, internal party struggle and especially the events of September 1979, when the leader of the PDPA N. Taraki was arrested and then killed on the orders of H. Amin, who removed him from power - caused serious concern among the Soviet manuals. It warily followed Amin's activities at the head of Afghanistan, knowing his ambitions and cruelty in the struggle to achieve personal goals. Under H. Amin, terror unfolded in the country not only against Islamists, but also against members of the PDPA, who were supporters of Taraki. The repression also affected the army, the main support of the PDPA, which led to a drop in its already low morale and caused mass desertion and rebellion. The Soviet leadership was afraid that a further aggravation of the situation in Afghanistan would lead to the fall of the PDPA regime and the coming to power of forces hostile to the USSR. Moreover, the KGB received information about Amin’s connections with the CIA in the 1960s and about secret contacts of his emissaries with American officials after the assassination of Taraki.

As a result, it was decided to prepare for the overthrow of Amin and his replacement with a leader more loyal to the USSR. B. Karmal was considered as such, whose candidacy was supported by KGB Chairman Yu. V. Andropov.

When developing the operation to overthrow Amin, it was decided to use Amin’s own requests for Soviet military assistance. In total, from September to December 1979 there were 7 such appeals. At the beginning of December 1979, the so-called “Muslim battalion” was sent to Bagram - a GRU special forces detachment - specially formed in the summer of 1979 from Soviet military personnel of Central Asian origin to guard Taraki and perform special tasks in Afghanistan. In early December 1979, USSR Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov informed a narrow circle of officials from among the top military leadership that a decision would obviously be made in the near future on the use of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. From December 10, on the personal orders of D. F. Ustinov, the deployment and mobilization of units and formations of the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts was carried out. The Chief of the General Staff N. Ogarkov, however, was against the introduction of troops.

According to V.I. Varennikov, in 1979 the only member of the Politburo who did not support the decision to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan was A.N. Kosygin, and from that moment A.N. Kosygin had a complete break with Brezhnev and his entourage .

On December 13, 1979, the Operational Group of the Ministry of Defense for Afghanistan was formed, headed by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Army General S. F. Akhromeyev, which began work in the Turkestan Military District on December 14. On December 14, 1979, a battalion of the 345th Guards Separate Parachute Regiment was sent to Bagram to reinforce the battalion of the 111th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 105th Guards Airborne Division, which had been guarding Soviet troops in Bagram since July 7, 1979 -transport aircraft and helicopters.

At the same time, B. Karmal and several of his supporters were secretly brought to Afghanistan on December 14, 1979 and were in Bagram among Soviet military personnel. On December 16, 1979, an attempt was made to assassinate Amin, but he remained alive, and B. Karmal was urgently returned to the USSR. On December 20, 1979, a “Muslim battalion” was transferred from Bagram to Kabul, which became part of the security brigade of Amin’s palace, which significantly facilitated preparations for the planned assault on this palace. For this operation, 2 KGB special groups also arrived in Afghanistan in mid-December.

Until December 25, 1979, the Turkestan Military District was preparing for entry into Afghanistan field management 40th combined arms army, 2 motorized rifle divisions, an army artillery brigade, an anti-aircraft missile brigade, an air assault brigade, combat and logistics support units, and in the Central Asian Military District - two motorized rifle regiments, a mixed air corps directorate, 2 fighter-bomber air regiments, 1 fighter regiment, 2 helicopter regiments, aviation technical and airfield support units. Three more divisions were mobilized as reserves in both districts. More than 50 thousand people from the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan were called up from the reserves to complete the units, and about 8 thousand cars and other equipment were transferred from the national economy. This was the largest mobilization deployment of the Soviet Army since 1945. In addition, the 103rd Guards Airborne Division from Belarus was also prepared for transfer to Afghanistan, which was already transferred to airfields in the Turkestan Military District on December 14.

By the evening of December 23, 1979, it was reported that troops were ready to enter Afghanistan. On December 24, D. F. Ustinov signed directive No. 312/12/001, which stated:

The directive did not provide for the participation of Soviet troops in hostilities on the territory of Afghanistan; the procedure for the use of weapons, even for the purposes of self-defense, was not determined. True, already on December 27, D. F. Ustinov’s order appeared to suppress the resistance of the rebels in cases of attack. It was assumed that Soviet troops would become garrisons and take protection of important industrial and other facilities, thereby freeing up parts of the Afghan army for active action against opposition forces, as well as against possible external interference. The border with Afghanistan was ordered to be crossed at 15:00 Moscow time (17:00 Kabul time) on December 27, 1979. But on the morning of December 25, the 4th battalion of the 56th Guards Air Assault Brigade crossed the pontoon bridge across the border river Amu Darya, which was tasked with capturing the high-mountainous Salang pass on the Termez-Kabul road to ensure the unhindered passage of Soviet troops.

In Kabul, units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division completed their landing by midday on December 27 and took control of the airport, blocking Afghan aviation and air defense batteries. Other units of this division concentrated in designated areas of Kabul, where they received tasks to blockade the main government institutions, Afghan military units and headquarters, and other important objects in the city and its environs. After a skirmish with Afghan soldiers, the 357th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 103rd Division and the 345th Guards Parachute Regiment established control over the Bagram airfield. They also provided security for B. Karmal, who was again taken to Afghanistan with a group of close supporters on December 23.

Storming of Amin's Palace

On the evening of December 27, Soviet special forces stormed Amin's palace, and Amin was killed during the assault. Government institutions in Kabul were captured by Soviet paratroopers.

On the night of December 27-28, B. Karmal arrived in Kabul from Bagram and Kabul radio broadcast an appeal from this new ruler to the Afghan people, in which the “second stage of the revolution” was proclaimed.

Main events

In July 1979, a battalion from the 111th Parachute Regiment (111 pdp) 105th Airborne Division (105 Airborne Division), the 103rd Airborne Division also arrived in Kabul, in fact, after regular reorganization in 1979 - a separate battalion 345 OPDP. These were the first military units and units of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan.

From December 9 to 12, the first “Muslim battalion” arrived in Afghanistan - 154 ooSpN 15obrSpN.

On December 25, the columns of the 40th Army (40 A) Turkestan Military District cross the Afghan border along a pontoon bridge over the Amu Darya River. H. Amin expressed gratitude to the Soviet leadership and gave orders to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the DRA to provide assistance to the incoming troops.

January 10-11 - an attempt at an anti-government mutiny by artillery regiments of the 20th Afghan division in Kabul. About 100 rebels were killed during the battle; Soviet troops lost two killed and two more were wounded. At the same time, a directive from the Minister of Defense D. Ustinov appeared on the planning and commencement of military operations - raids against rebel detachments in the northern regions of Afghanistan adjacent to the Soviet border, using an equally reinforced battalion and the use of firepower from the army, including the Air Force, to suppress resistance.

February 23 - tragedy in the tunnel at the Salang pass. When passing the tunnel by units 186 SME and 2 zrbr in the complete absence of the commandant's service, a traffic jam formed in the middle of the tunnel due to an accident. As a result, 16 Soviet servicemen suffocated 2 zrbr. There are no data on Afghans who suffocated.
February-March - the first major operation to suppress an armed rebellion in the mountain infantry regiment in Asmara, Kunar province of OKSV units against the Mujahideen - the Kunar offensive. On February 28-29, units of the 317th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division in the Asmara region entered into heavy bloody battles due to the blocking of the 3rd Parachute Battalion in the Asmara Gorge by dushmans. 33 people were killed, 40 people were injured, one soldier was missing.
April - The US Congress authorizes $15,000,000 in "direct and open assistance" to the Afghan opposition.

The first military operation in Panjshir.

May 11 - death of the 1st motorized rifle company of the 66th motorized rifle brigade (Jalalabad) near the village of Khara, Kunar province.
June 19 - decision of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on the withdrawal of some tank, missile and anti-aircraft missile units from Afghanistan.
August 3 - battle near the village of Shaest. In the Mashhad Gorge - the Kishim region near the city of Faizabad, the 783rd separate reconnaissance battalion of the 201st MSD was ambushed, 48 servicemen were killed, 49 were wounded. It was one of the bloodiest episodes in the history of the Afghan war.
August 12 - Special forces of the USSR KGB “Karpaty” arrive in the country.
September 23 - Lieutenant General Boris Tkach was appointed commander of the 40th Army.

September - fighting in the Lurkoh mountain range in Farah province; death of Major General Khakhalov.
October 29 - introduction of the second “Muslim battalion” (177 ooSpN) under the command of Major Kerimbaev (“Kara Major”).
December - defeat of the opposition base in the Darzab region (Jawzjan province).

April 5 - during military operation In western Afghanistan, Soviet troops mistakenly invaded Iran. Iranian military aircraft destroyed two Soviet helicopters.
In May-June, the fifth Panjshir operation was carried out, during which for the first time a mass landing of troops was carried out in Afghanistan: during the first three days alone, over 4,000 airborne personnel were landed. In total, about 12,000 military personnel of various military branches took part in this confrontation. The operation took place simultaneously throughout the entire 120 km depth of the gorge. As a result of this operation, Panjshir was captured.
November 3 - tragedy at the Salang pass. As a result of a traffic jam outside the tunnel, more than 176 people died in the tunnel.
November 15 - meeting between Yu. Andropov and Zia ul-Haq in Moscow. The Secretary General had a private conversation with the Pakistani President, during which he informed him about “ the new flexible policy of the Soviet side and understanding of the need to quickly resolve the crisis" The meeting also discussed the feasibility of the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the prospects for the participation of the Soviet Union in the war. In exchange for the withdrawal of troops, Pakistan was required to refuse assistance to the rebels.

January 2 - in Mazar-i-Sharif, the Mujahideen kidnapped a group of Soviet “civilian specialists” numbering 16 people.
February 2 - hostages abducted in Mazar-i-Sharif and kept in the village of Vakhshak in northern Afghanistan were released, but six of them died.
March 28 - meeting of the UN delegation led by Perez de Cuellar and D. Cordovez with Yu. Andropov. Andropov thanks the UN for “ understanding the problem" and assures the intermediaries that he is ready to undertake " certain steps”, but doubts that Pakistan and the United States will support the UN proposal regarding their non-intervention in the conflict.
April - operation to defeat opposition forces in the Nijrab gorge, Kapisa province. Soviet units lost 14 people killed and 63 wounded.
May 19 - Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan V. Smirnov officially confirmed the desire of the USSR and Afghanistan " set deadlines for the withdrawal of the contingent of Soviet troops».
July - Mujahideen attack on Khost. The attempt to blockade the city was unsuccessful.
August - the intense work of D. Cordovez's mission to prepare agreements for the peaceful settlement of the Afghan problem is almost completed: an 8-month program for the withdrawal of troops from the country was developed, but after Andropov's illness, the issue of the conflict was removed from the agenda of Politburo meetings. Now it was only about " dialogue with the UN».
Winter - fighting intensified in the Sarobi region and the Jalalabad Valley (Laghman province is most often mentioned in reports). For the first time, armed opposition units remain on the territory of Afghanistan for the entire winter period. The creation of fortified areas and resistance bases began directly in the country.

January 16 - Mujahideen shot down a Su-25 aircraft using Strela-2M MANPADS. This is the first case of successful use of MANPADS in Afghanistan.

April 30 - in the Khazar Gorge, during a large-scale military operation in the Panjshir Gorge, the 1st Battalion of the 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment was ambushed and suffered heavy losses.
October 27 - Mujahideen shoot down an Il-76 transport plane over Kabul using Strela MANPADS.

April 21 - Death of the Maravar company.
April 26 - uprising of Soviet and Afghan prisoners of war in Badaber prison, located in Pakistan.
May 25 - Kunar operation. Battle near the village of Konyak, Pechdara gorge, Kunar province, 4th company of the 149th Guards. Motorized rifle regiment. Finding themselves surrounded by Mujahideen and Pakistani mercenaries - the "Black Storks", the guardsmen of the 4th company and the forces of the 2nd battalion attached to it lost 23 dead and 28 wounded.
June - army operation in Panjshir.
Summer - a new course of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee towards a political solution to the “Afghan problem”.
October 16-17 - Shutul tragedy (20 dead, several dozen wounded)
The main task of the 40th Army is to cover the southern borders of the USSR, for which new motorized rifle units are brought in. The creation of stronghold fortified areas began in hard-to-reach areas of the country.
On November 22, 1985, while carrying out a mission, an outpost of the Motorized Maneuverable Group (MMG) of the Panfilov Border Detachment of the Eastern Border District of the KGB of the USSR was ambushed. In a battle near the village of Afrij in the Zardev Gorge of Badakhshan province, 19 border guards were killed. These were the largest losses of border guards in one battle in the Afghan War of 1979-1989.

February - at the XXVII Congress of the CPSU, M. Gorbachev makes a statement about the beginning of developing a plan for a phased withdrawal of troops.
April 4-20 - operation to destroy the Javara base: a major defeat for the Mujahideen. Unsuccessful attempts by Ismail Khan’s troops to break through the “security zone” around Herat.
May 4 - at the XVIII plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA, M. Najibullah, who previously headed the Afghan counterintelligence KHAD, was elected to the post of Secretary General instead of B. Karmal. The plenum proclaimed the intention to solve the problems of Afghanistan through political methods.
June 16 - Military operation "Maneuver" - Takhar province. A long battle on Mount Yafsaj of the 783rd ORB of the 201st MSD - Jarav Gorge, in which 18 scouts were killed and 22 were wounded. This was the second tragedy of the Kunduz Intelligence Battalion.
July 28 - M. Gorbachev publicly announced the imminent withdrawal of six regiments of the 40th Army (about 7,000 people) from Afghanistan. Later the withdrawal date will be postponed. There is debate in Moscow about whether to withdraw troops completely.
August - Massoud defeated a government military base in Farhar, Takhar Province.
August 18-26 - Military operation “Trap” under the command of Army General V.I. Varennikov. Assault on the Kokari-Sharshari fortified area in Herat province.
Autumn - Major Belov's reconnaissance group from 173 ooSpN 22obrSpN captures the first batch of three Stinger MANPADS in the Kandahar region.
October 15-31 - tank, motorized rifle, and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Shindand, motorized rifle and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Kunduz, and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Kabul.
November 13 - at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev noted: “ We have been fighting in Afghanistan for six years. If we don’t change our approaches, we will fight for another 20-30 years" Chief of the General Staff Marshal Akhromeyev stated: “ There is none military task, which would be posed, but not solved, but there is no result.<…>We control Kabul and provincial centers, but we cannot establish power in the occupied territory. We have lost the fight for the Afghan people" At the same meeting, the task was set to withdraw all troops from Afghanistan within two years.
December - an emergency plenum of the PDPA Central Committee proclaims a course towards a policy of national reconciliation and advocates an early end to the fratricidal war.

January 2 - an operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense headed by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Army General V.I. Varennikov, was sent to Kabul.
February - Operation Strike in Kunduz province.
February-March - Operation Flurry in Kandahar province.
March 8 - Mujahideen shelling of the city of Pyanj in the Tajik SSR.
March - Operation Thunderstorm in Ghazni province.
March 29, 1986 - during the fighting of the 15th brigade, when the Jalalabad battalion, with the support of the Asadabad battalion, defeated a large Mujahideen base in Karer.

Operation Circle in Kabul and Logar provinces.

April 9 - Mujahideen attack on a Soviet border post. When repelling the attack, 2 Soviet soldiers were killed and 20 Mujahideen were killed.
April 12 - the defeat of the Milov rebel base in Nangarhar province.
May - Operation Salvo in the provinces of Logar, Paktia, Kabul.

Operation "South-87" in Kandahar province.

Spring - Soviet troops begin to use the Barrier system to cover the eastern and southeastern sections of the state border.
November 23 - Operation Magistral begins to unblock the city of Khost.

January 7-8 - battle at height 3234.
April 14 - with the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation around the situation in the DRA. The USSR and the USA became guarantors of the agreements. The Soviet Union pledged to withdraw its contingent within a 9-month period, starting on May 15; The United States and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.
June 24 - Opposition troops captured the center of Wardak province - the city of Maidanshahr. In September 1988, Soviet troops near Maidanshahr carried out an operation to destroy the Khurkabul base area.
August 10 - Mujahideen took Kunduz

January 23-26 - Operation Typhoon, Kunduz province. The last military operation of the SA in Afghanistan.
February 4 - the last unit of the Soviet Army left Kabul.
February 15 - Soviet troops are completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the Limited Military Contingent, Lieutenant General B.V. Gromov, who, according to official version, was the last to cross the border river Amu Darya (the city of Termez). He stated: “There is not a single Soviet soldier left behind me.” This statement was not true, since both Soviet soldiers who were captured by the Mujahideen and border guard units who covered the withdrawal of troops and returned to USSR territory only in the afternoon of February 15 remained in Afghanistan. The border troops of the KGB of the USSR carried out tasks to protect the Soviet-Afghan border in separate units on the territory of Afghanistan until April 1989.

results

Colonel General Gromov, the last commander of the 40th Army (led the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan), in his book “Limited Contingent”, expressed the following opinion regarding the victory or defeat of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan:

I am deeply convinced that there is no basis for the assertion that the 40th Army was defeated, nor that we won a military victory in Afghanistan. At the end of 1979, Soviet troops entered the country unhindered, fulfilled their tasks - unlike the Americans in Vietnam - and returned home in an organized manner. If we consider the armed opposition units as the main opponent of the Limited Contingent, then the difference between us is that the 40th Army did what it considered necessary, and the dushmans did only what they could.

The 40th Army faced several main tasks. First of all, we had to provide assistance to the Afghan government in resolving the internal political situation. Basically, this assistance consisted of fighting armed opposition groups. In addition, the presence of a significant military contingent in Afghanistan was supposed to prevent external aggression. These tasks were completed completely by the personnel of the 40th Army.

No one has ever set the task of winning a military victory in Afghanistan to the Limited Contingent. All the combat operations that the 40th Army had to conduct from 1980 until almost last days our stay in the country, were either proactive or reactive in nature. Together with government forces, we carried out military operations only to prevent attacks on our garrisons, airfields, automobile convoys and communications that were used to transport goods.

Indeed, before the start of the OKSVA withdrawal in May 1988, the Mujahideen had never managed to carry out a single major operation and failed to occupy a single one large city. At the same time, Gromov’s opinion that the 40th Army was not tasked with military victory does not agree with the assessments of some other authors. In particular, Major General Yevgeny Nikitenko, who was deputy chief of the operations department of the 40th Army headquarters in 1985-1987, believes that throughout the war the USSR pursued constant goals - suppressing the resistance of the armed opposition and strengthening the power of the Afghan government. Despite all efforts, the number of opposition forces only grew from year to year, and in 1986 (at the peak of the Soviet military presence) the Mujahideen controlled more than 70% of the territory of Afghanistan. According to Colonel General Viktor Merimsky, former deputy. Head of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense in Democratic Republic Afghanistan, the leadership of Afghanistan actually lost the fight against the rebels for its people, could not stabilize the situation in the country, although it had 300,000-strong military formations (army, police, state security).

After the outbreak of the Afghan war, several countries announced a boycott Olympic Games 1980, held in Moscow.

Humanitarian consequences

The result of hostilities from 1978 to 1992 was a flow of refugees to Iran and Pakistan, a large percentage of whom remain there to this day. Sharbat Gula's photograph, featured on the cover of National Geographic magazine in 1985 under the title "Afghan Girl", has become a symbol of the Afghan conflict and the refugee problem around the world.

The bitterness of the warring parties reached extreme limits. It is known that the Mujahideen subjected prisoners to torture, among which the “red tulip” is widely known. The weapon was used so widely that many of the villages were literally built from rockets left over from the departure of the Soviet army, residents used rockets to build houses, as ceilings, window and door beams, but statements by the US administration about the use of the 40th chemical weapons army, announced in March 1982, were never documented.

Losses of the parties

The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. The most common figure is 1 million dead; Available estimates range from 670 thousand civilians to 2 million in total. According to Harvard professor M. Kramer, an American researcher of the Afghan war: “During the nine years of war, more than 2.5 million Afghans (mostly civilians) were killed or maimed, and several million more became refugees, many of whom fled the country.” . There appears to be no precise division of victims into government soldiers, mujahideen and civilians.

USSR losses

Total - 13,833 people. These data first appeared in the Pravda newspaper in August 1989. Subsequently, the final figure increased slightly, presumably due to those who died from the consequences of injuries and illnesses after dismissal from armed forces. As of January 1, 1999, irretrievable losses in the Afghan war (killed, died from wounds, diseases and accidents, missing) were estimated as follows:

Soviet Army - 14,427
KGB - 576
Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28

Total - 15,031 people. Sanitary losses - almost 54 thousand wounded, shell-shocked, injured; 416 thousand sick.

According to the testimony of Vladimir Sidelnikov, a professor at the Military Medical Academy of St. Petersburg, the final figures do not take into account military personnel who died from wounds and illnesses in hospitals on the territory of the USSR.

In a study of the Afghan war conducted by officers of the General Staff under the leadership of prof. Valentin Runova, provides an estimate of 26,000 dead, including those killed in battle, those who died from wounds and illnesses, and those killed as a result of accidents. The breakdown by year is as follows:

Of the approximately 400 military personnel listed as missing in action during the war, a number of prisoners were taken by Western journalists to countries Western Europe and North America. According to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as of June 1989, about 30 people lived there; three people, after the statement by the USSR Prosecutor General that former prisoners would not be subject to criminal prosecution, returned to the Soviet Union. According to data from 02/15/2009 of the Committee on the Affairs of Internationalist Soldiers under the Council of Heads of Government of the Commonwealth (CIS) Member States, 270 people remained on the list of missing Soviet citizens in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989.

Number of dead Soviet generals according to press publications, it is usually four dead; sometimes the figure is 5 dead in Afghanistan.

	Title, position		Circumstances
Vadim Nikolaevich Khakhalov	Major General, Deputy Commander of the Air Force of the Turkestan Military District	Lurkokh gorge	Died in a helicopter shot down by the Mujahideen
Pyotr Ivanovich Shkidchenko	Lieutenant General, Head of the Combat Operations Control Group under the Minister of Defense of Afghanistan	Paktia Province	Died in a helicopter shot down by ground fire. Posthumously awarded the title of Hero Russian Federation (4.07.2000)
Anatoly Andreevich Dragun	Lieutenant General, Head of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces	DRA, Kabul?	Died suddenly during a deployment to Afghanistan
Nikolay Vasilievich Vlasov	Major General, Advisor to the Commander of the Afghan Air Force	DRA, Shindand Province	Shot down by a hit from a MANPADS while flying on a MiG-21
Leonid Kirillovich Tsukanov	Major General, Advisor to the Artillery Commander of the Afghan Armed Forces	DRA, Kabul	Died from illness

Losses in equipment, according to official data, amounted to 147 tanks, 1,314 armored vehicles (armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, BMD, BRDM), 510 engineering vehicles, 11,369 trucks and fuel tankers, 433 artillery systems, 118 aircraft, 333 helicopters. At the same time, these figures were not specified in any way - in particular, information was not published on the number of combat and non-combat aviation losses, on the losses of airplanes and helicopters by type, etc.

Some Soviet military personnel who fought in Afghanistan suffered from the so-called “Afghan syndrome” - post-traumatic stress disorder. Testing conducted in the early 1990s showed that at least 35-40% of participants in the war in Afghanistan were in dire need of help from professional psychologists.

Other losses

According to Pakistani authorities, in the first four months of 1987, more than 300 civilians were killed as a result of Afghan air raids on Pakistani territory.

Economic losses of the USSR

About 800 million US dollars were spent annually from the USSR budget to support the Kabul government.

In works of culture and art

Fiction

Andrey Dyshev. Reconnaissance. - M.: Eksmo, 2006. - ISBN 5-699-14711-X
Dyshev Sergey. Lost Platoon. - M.: Eksmo, 2006. - ISBN 5-699-15709-3
Mikhail Evstafiev. Two steps from paradise. - M.: Eksmo, 2006 - ISBN 5-699-18424-4
Nikolay Prokudin. Raid battalion. - M.: Eksmo, 2006 - ISBN 5-699-18904-1
Sergei Skripal, Gennady Rytchenko. Doomed contingent. - M.: Eksmo, 2006. - ISBN 5-699-16949-0
Gleb Bobrov. Soldier's saga. - M.: Eksmo, 2007 - ISBN 978-5-699-20879-1
Alexander Prokhanov. Tree in the center of Kabul. - M.: Soviet writer, 1982. - 240 p.
Svetlana Alexievich. Zinc boys. - M.: Time, 2007. - ISBN 978-5-9691-0189-3
Frolov I. A. Walks with the flight engineer. Helicopter pilot. - M.: EKSMO, 2007. - ISBN 978-5-699-21881-3
Victor Nikolaev. Alive in help. Notes from an "Afghan". - M.: Soft Publishing, 2006. - ISBN 5-93876-026-7
Pavel Andreev. Twelve stories. "Afghan War 1979-1989", 1998-2002.
Alexander Segen. Lost armored personnel carrier. - M.: Armada-Press, 2001, 224 p. - ISBN 5-309-00098-4
Oleg Ermakov. Afghan stories. Mark of the Beast.
Igor Moiseenko. Firing sector. - M.Eksmo, 2008

Memoirs

Gromov B.V."Limited contingent." M., Ed. group “Progress”, “Culture”, 1994. 352 p. The book by the last commander of the 40th Army contains many documents revealing the reasons for the deployment of troops and describes many events of the war.
Lyakhovsky A. A. Tragedy and valor of Afghanistan M., Iskona, 1995, 720 pp. ISBN 5-85844-047-9 Large fragments of the text coincide with the book by B.V. Gromov.
Mayorov A. M. The truth about the Afghan war Testimony of the chief military adviser. M., Human Rights, 1996, ISBN 5-7712-0032-8
Gordienko A. N. Wars of the second half of the 20th century. Minsk., 1999 ISBN 985-437-507-2 A large section of the book is devoted to the background and course of hostilities in Afghanistan
Ablazov V.I."Afghanistan. The Fourth War", Kyiv, 2002; “A cloudless sky over all of Afghanistan”, Kyiv, 2005; “The long way from Afghan captivity and obscurity”, Kyiv, 2005.
Bondarenko I. N.“How we built in Afghanistan”, Moscow, 2009
Podushkov D. L. Confession to yourself (about participation in hostilities in Afghanistan). - Vyshny Volochyok, 2002. - 48 s.
David S. Insbee. Afghanistan. Soviet victory // Flame of the Cold War: Victories that never happened. = Cold War Hot: Alternative Decisions of the Cold War / ed. Peter Tsouros, trans. Yu. Yablokova. - M.: AST, Lux, 2004. - P. 353-398. - 480 s. - (Great Controversies). - 5000 copies. - ISBN 5-17-024051 (alternate war history)
Kozhukhov, M. Yu. Alien stars above Kabul - M.: Olympus: Eksmo, 2010-352 pp., ISBN 978-5-699-39744-0

In cinema

“Hot Summer in Kabul” (1983) - film directed by Ali Khamraev
“Paid for Everything” (1988) - film directed by Alexey Saltykov
"Rambo 3" (1988, USA)
“Sergeant” (1988) - a film in the film anthology “The Bridge”, dir. Stanislav Gaiduk, production: Mosfilm, Belarusfilm
“Scorched by Kandahar” (1989, director: Yuri Sabitov) - a Soviet Afghan officer, decommissioned due to injury, enters the fight against the mafia and, in the end, exposes the criminals at the cost of his own life
“Cargo 300” (1989) - film from the Sverdlovsk film studio
“Two steps to silence” (1991) - film directed by Yuri Tupitsky
“Gorge of Spirits” (1991) - film directed by Sergei Nilov
“Afghan Break” (1991, USSR-Italy) - a film by Vladimir Bortko about the war in Afghanistan
“The Leg” (1991) - film directed by Nikita Tyagunov
“Afghan” (1991) - film directed by Vladimir Mazur. Contrabalt
“Afghan-2” (1994) - continuation of the film “Afghan”
“Peshawar Waltz” (1994) - a film by T. Bekmambetov and G. Kayumov, in the opinion of “Afghan” veterans, one of the most poignant and truthful films about that war, dedicated to the events in Badaber
“Muslim” (1995) - a film by Vladimir Khotinenko about a Soviet soldier who returned home after 7 years in captivity of the Mujahideen
“9th Company” (2005, Russia-Ukraine-Finland) - film by Fyodor Bondarchuk
“The Soldier’s Star” (2006, France) - a film by French journalist Christophe de Ponfilly about the story of a Soviet prisoner of war in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The prototype of the main character was one of the participants in the armed uprising in the Badaber camp
"Charlie Wilson's War" (2007, USA) - the film is based on real story about how, during the Afghan War, Texas Congressman Charles Wilson organized the financing of a covert CIA operation to supply weapons to the Afghan resistance forces (Operation Cyclone)
"The Kite Runner" (2007)
“Afghan War” 2009 - documentary-fiction series with elements of historical reconstruction
“Caravan Hunters” (2010) - a military drama based on the works of Alexander Prokhanov “Caravan Hunter” and “Muslim Wedding”.

In music

“Blue Berets”: Our Afghan, Afghan break, Silver plane, War is not a walk in the park, Borders
“Cascade”: Cuckoo, We leave at dawn, On the Bagram road, I will return, We are leaving, To the motorist warriors, Who needed this war?
"Contingent": Cuckoo, Prisoners, Two meters
“Echo of Afghanistan”: I was killed near Kandahar, Cigarette smoke
"Lube": For you
“Survival Instructions”: 1988 - Confrontation in Moscow - Afghan Syndrome
Igor Talkov: Ballad of an Afghan
Maxim Troshin: Afghanistan
Valery Leontyev. Afghan wind (I. Nikolaev - N. Zinoviev)
Alexander Rosenbaum. Monologue of the Black Tulip pilot, Caravan, In the Afghani mountains, Rain on the pass, We will return
Yuri Shevchuk. War is childish, don't shoot
Konstantin Kinchev. Tomorrow May Be Late (album “Nervous Night”, 1984)
Egor Letov. Afghan syndrome
N. Anisimov. The last monologue of the Mi-8, the song of the helicopter gunner
M. Bessonov. My heart aches until it hurts
I. Burlyaev. In memory of Afghan helicopter pilots
V. Verstakov. Allah Akbar
A. Doroshenko. Afghan
V. Gorsky. Afghan
S. Kuznetsov. An incident on the road
I. Morozov. Convoy Talukan-Faizabad, Midnight toast, Helicopter pilots
A. Smirnov. For KamAZ drivers
I. Baranov. An incident in battle, in the mountains near Peshawar
Sprint. Afghanistan
Nesmeyana.“A Fur Coat from Afghanistan”, “Bottle”, “Elevator of Love”
Collection of Afghan songs "Time has chosen us", 1988