This report is the result of the work of BP's internal incident investigation team. The views expressed herein reflect those of the aforementioned team only and are in no way associated with other physical or legal entities. This report has been produced by the team exclusively for, and at the initiative of, BP in accordance with the terms of reference. Responsibility for the decision to make the results of this work public rests entirely with BP. The report was not prepared as a response to a third party during the investigation, inquiry or trial.

When preparing the report, the investigative team did not have the task of assessing the collected data according to the standards of legal or other norms, determining the degree of guilt of the participants in the incident, assessing their intentions, etc. Thus, it cannot be considered admissible to use the facts presented in a court or other proceeding.

The report presented is based on information available to the team during the investigation; the availability of additional data may have led to different conclusions and changed the team's final view and the conclusion presented in the report.

Received from time to time working group During the investigation, information turned out to be contradictory, inaccurate or unconfirmed. The inadmissibility of taking such data “on faith” is obvious, and when assessing such facts, the group sought to achieve maximum objectivity. However, it must be recognized that the adoption of different significance coefficients for some factors or different conclusions on certain information in other studies is possible.

During the course of the investigation, team members conducted various types of interviews, and this report is based on the team's understanding of the information provided during the interviews. There was no recording of any kind of interview (transcript, etc.); notes made during conversations by team members were not provided to the respondents for evaluation and approval. During each interview, at least two members of the investigative team were present at any time; When analyzing and subsequently using the data obtained during interviews, consistency or inconsistency with other sources was taken into account.

The report should be viewed in its entirety; individual passages can only be interpreted in the overall context of the report. Discussion or analysis based in any way on work performed by third parties on behalf of the investigative team, such as laboratory results or data prepared by authorized persons, is subject to the same evaluations and limitations as the team's own actions.

For a more visual presentation of information and scenarios for the development of events, graphic images were used; they may be structurally simplified, or may not correspond to real scale, since the main purpose of such graphics is to make it easier for the reader to perceive the topic in the context of a specific discussion.

Where appropriate, the report provides references to the sources or nature of the information on which the analysis was based or the conclusions drawn. Where such references made the material difficult to understand or were excessively repetitive, they were omitted.

On the evening of April 20, 2010, active integrity testing operations at the Macondo well resulted in an uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons onto Transocean's Deepwater Horizon drilling platform, causing subsequent fires and explosions on the latter. As a result of the incident, eleven people were killed and 17 were injured. The fire, fueled by hydrocarbon products from the well, lasted 36 hours until the platform sank. Hydrocarbons continued to leak from the reservoir through the well and blowout preventer (BOP) for 87 days, causing an oil spill of national significance.

BP Exploration & Production Inc. under leasing terms, it was the operator of sector 252 of the Mississippi Canyon, which includes the Macondo well. After the disaster, BP formed an investigation team whose tasks were: collecting facts relating to the man-made accident, analyzing available information to determine possible reasons incidents and develop recommendations to prevent similar incidents in the future.

The team created by BP began work immediately, immediately after the start of liquidation of the consequences of the accident. It operated independently of other internal response teams and external organizations. The ability to gather information was limited by natural factors such as a lack of physical evidence and limited access to potentially relevant witnesses. However, the investigative team had at its disposal some of the actual data on the condition of the platform in real time, documents covering various aspects of the design and construction of the Macondo well, answers to questions from its own interviews with witnesses and testimony given at public court hearings. In addition, the team used information freely distributed by other companies such as Transocean, Halliburton and Cameron to analyze and collate the facts. During the investigation, the group recruited more than 50 of its own and hired specialists in wide range areas: general safety, operations, subsea operations, deepwater drilling, well monitoring, cementing, dynamic well blowout modeling, blowout preventer systems and risk analysis.

This report provides an analysis of the events leading up to the accident, a description of eight key findings related to the causal chain of events, and recommendations for preventing similar disasters in the future. The investigation team worked separately from other companies involved in the investigation of the accident, and the conclusions and recommendations made did not undergo any coordination with third parties. In addition, other investigative activities are ongoing at the time of this report, such as the U.S. Coast Guard, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, and the President's National Commission. Although the publication of the results of the above studies will only improve the understanding of the causes of the disaster over time, the information contained in this report is sufficient to provide an understanding of the accident and the necessary measures to prevent similar incidents from occurring.

The disaster that occurred on April 20, 2010 was primarily due to the destruction of the integrity of the well with the subsequent loss of hydrostatic control. The subsequent failure of BOP equipment with the inability to control the flow of oil products from the well, in turn, led to the release of hydrocarbons and their subsequent ignition. Finally, the blowout preventer failed to perform its emergency function without sealing the well after the initial explosions.

During the investigation, the team used tree models to analyze possible causes of equipment failure, considering different scenarios and contributing factors to the disaster.

Ultimately, eight were identified key factors which together led to the accident. These findings are briefly described below. An overview of the team's analysis and conclusions is presented in Section 4. Section 5 provides details of the Deepwater Horizon accident. Figure 1 shows the detailed design of the Macondo well.

1. The annular cement barrier did not isolate hydrocarbons. The day before the accident, cement was pumped into the drill string body and into the annular barrier to prevent premature oil from entering the well from the reservoir being developed. Selected for the annular barrier located in close proximity to hydrocarbon-bearing formations, the cement turned out to be a light form of liquid foamy nitrified solution. Apparently physical characteristics of this material were mistakenly taken to be sufficient to provide the required strength. Due to the penetration of nitrogen into the structure, the latter could not withstand the pressure of hydrocarbons, which began to flow uncontrollably into the well. The investigation team found that errors were made in the calculations, design, testing of the ring barrier, quality control and risk assessment.
2. The settling tank barriers did not isolate the hydrocarbons. After the hydrocarbons entered the well through the annular barrier, they penetrated into the drill column body measuring 25.1 by 17.8 cm in cross section through the settling tank bodies installed below. It should be noted that the flow of oil products rushed into the well without damaging the annular body of the drill string itself, but passed inside it. This suggests that both barriers located in the sump did not cope with their task, failing to contain the penetration of hydrocarbons into the housing. The first barrier was also made of cement, while the second was a floating check valve - a special device on top of the sump, designed to prevent liquid from penetrating into the body. The investigation team determined that the most likely scenario was that hydrocarbons penetrated through the barriers in the settling tank, rather than damage to the drill string body, well walls, or the suspended sealing mechanism housing. The investigation team identified potential causes of failure of the above components to account for the subsequent penetration of hydrocarbons into the drill string body.

   

3. Despite negative pressure test results, no attention was paid to establishing the integrity of the well. Prior to temporarily abandoning the well, testing was conducted to verify the integrity of the existing mechanical barriers (sump tank, drill string housing, and overhang seal housing), which was negative. Among other things, the tests included replacing the heavy drilling fluid with lighter seawater to place the well into a controlled underbalance state. In retrospect, the pressure and volume readings obtained during the tests were an indication of the existence of a channel (flow) of communication with the reservoir, which, in turn, indicated that the integrity of the barriers was not ensured. This data was misinterpreted by the Transocean drilling crew and BP executives; an incorrect decision was made about the successful completion of the test and the integrity of the well with the existing mechanisms.
4. The leak was not detected until the last moment, when hydrocarbon products appeared directly on the surface. Since the negative pressure test results were taken as positive, operations with the well continued: it was transferred to an over-unbalanced state, in which further penetration of petroleum products from the reservoir was stopped. Later, while performing standard procedures to prepare for temporary well abandonment, the drilling fluid was again replaced with seawater, causing the well to become insufficiently unbalanced. Over time, this, coupled with the lack of integrity of the mechanical barriers, allowed hydrocarbon products to begin to penetrate the drill string without any reaction from the BOP equipment. This process was accompanied by an increase in pressure in the drill string and other noticeable factors, which can be monitored in real time. However, the crew took measures to restore control of the well only about 40 minutes after the leak began, when oil products were already reaching the surface at high speed. The drilling platform crew failed to promptly detect the leak and take necessary action before hydrocarbons rose up the drill string and overcame the blowout preventer.

   

5. Response actions taken to regain control of the well were ineffective. The first actions taken after the leak was discovered were to close the BOP and redirect the rising fluid flows to the Deepwater Horizon mud degasser instead of diverting them overboard. If the liquid had been diverted overboard instead of using a separator, the crew would have had more time to respond and the consequences of the accident could have been reduced.
6. The redirection of hydrocarbons to the degasser ultimately resulted in gas entering the platform's ventilation system. After directing the flow of petroleum products to the separator, the platform was virtually ventilated using 30.5 cm of goose-neck pipes, quickly spreading flammable substances throughout the Deepwater Horizon along with other production lines. This allowed the gas to quickly reach ignition sources and significantly increased the risk of fire. The reason for this development is that, despite the purpose of the mud degasser system to pump gas into special tanks, the rate of hydrocarbon entry was too high, and the design load on the separator was greatly exceeded.
7. Gas detection and fire extinguishing systems did not prevent the hydrocarbons from igniting. From areas that were potentially well protected from ignition, hydrocarbons were carried throughout the Deepwater Horizon, into areas where ignition could easily occur. The heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems most likely contributed to the movement of the gas-saturated air mixture into the engine room, where at least one of the engines, in the current situation, went into abnormal operation and could serve as a source of ignition.
8. Working in mode emergency, the BOP equipment was unable to seal the well. There are three methods for operating a blowout preventer in an emergency, none of which worked.
   • It is very likely that the explosions and fire damaged the connection between the BOP and the platform control point, so the personnel were unable to manually activate the emergency mechanism for disconnecting the riser from the well and sealing the latter.
   • The unsatisfactory condition of critical components on the "yellow" and "blue" control panels of the PVP apparently prevented the automatic activation of the emergency self-steering mode. In it, the preventer had to independently, without manual commands given by a person, begin to seal the well in the event of loss of hydraulic pressure, power supply and remote communication with the drilling platform. A study of the control panels after the incident showed that the most important solenoid valve on the “yellow” panel had failed, and the charge of the battery located in the “blue” block was too low. It is very likely that these deficiencies existed at the time of the accident.
   • A remotely controlled forced intervention mechanism used to initiate shearing of the drill pipe is another device included in the BOP for emergency situations. Most likely, 33 hours after the first explosions, this component of the blowout preventer performed its function, but this was no longer enough to seal the well.

Through a review of maintenance records and a review of facts discovered during the platform assessment, the investigation team concluded that there were potential deficiencies in the testing and maintenance of the blowout preventer control systems.

The team did not identify any specific action or inaction that caused the accident. Rather, the culprit is a complex, interconnected series of events and facts, including both the presence of mechanical failures and unprofessional human decisions, incorrect approaches to engineering design, practical implementation and crew interaction. All this as a whole led first to the very possibility of an accident, and then to the rapid development of the disaster according to an extremely negative scenario. Over time, multiple companies, teams of workers, and circumstances became involved in the incident.

The investigation team developed a number of recommendations for each of the major issues identified, and these recommendations appear in this report (See Section 6, Investigation Team Recommendations). These recommendations are intended to prevent similar disasters from occurring in the future, and in some cases they extend beyond simple analysis reasons leading to the disaster.

Among other topics, these recommendations address contractor control and insurance issues, risk assessment, and well monitoring and tracking, integrity testing practices and Maintenance PVP systems.

By submitting the final version of this report, the investigation team considers the technical assignment for the investigation of the incident completed (See “Appendix A”).

Additional physical evidence may become available following further recovery of the subsea equipment. Ongoing activities, other ongoing investigations and court hearings may also further help to build a more complete picture of what happened. BP reserves the right to consider its position on particular evidence in the order in which it appears.

It can be recognized that it is necessary to evaluate this accident for BP in a potential systemic context, i.e. going beyond the immediate causes of the single disaster that occurred.

Finally, given the complex and interconnected nature of this incident, it may be appropriate for an industry-wide review of the consequences of the accident and its conclusions.

Oil is a liquid raw material, the products of which are widely used in the world as fuel, lubricants, oils, etc. It is quite difficult to overestimate the importance of “black gold”. Every day, millions of barrels of oil are sent from oil-producing countries to final consumers through pipelines, railcars and tankers. Unfortunately, this is accompanied by accidents that occur due to wear and tear of equipment, human error or a combination of unfavorable circumstances. . year - the largest disaster that caused significant damage to the ecology of the region.

Disaster in the Gulf of Mexico

April 22, 2010 is considered a black day for North American environmentalists. On this day, an oil platform crashed off the coast of the United States. The cause of the flooding was a gas explosion and subsequent fire. As a result of the accident, 24 went missing and has not been found to this day. 117 other employees were successfully evacuated, some of them with moderate injuries. Rescuers spent 36 hours trying to put out the fire, but all the measures had no effect. The platform was flooded.

The explosion also damaged the field pipeline that carried oil from the seabed to the platform. The damage caused the largest oil spill in US history. The oil leak was discovered only on April 24. From this moment on, British Petroleum, with the support federal services The United States began to carry out work to eliminate the spill of raw materials.

2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill

2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill

Due to the disaster, about 5 million barrels of oil entered the waters of the Gulf of Mexico. Every day, several tens of thousands of barrels of raw materials (equivalent to six million liters) entered the water. From the very first days after the leak was discovered, measures were taken to eliminate it. However, they were not successful. The work was carried out for 86 days, and only on June 3 a favorable result was achieved. Using special robotics capable of working at depth, it was possible to remove the drill pipe. At the same time, a special protective screen was placed in its place. The remaining oil flows were sent to specially designated tanks.

Despite this, a huge amount of oil has already managed to get into the waters. Due to the action of wind and currents, the oil slick expanded over a large area of ​​water. In early August, the leak was completely eliminated. The well was cemented. Additionally, a special relief well was created, which made it possible to reduce the fluid pressure. Both wells connected at a depth of five and a half kilometers.

Consequences

The accident caused enormous damage to the ecology of the region. More than two thousand kilometers of the North American coast were polluted with oil. Scientists noted the death of all invertebrate animals located within the radius of the leak. The mortality rate of dolphins and cetaceans has increased several times. At the same time, environmentalists say that the real figures are much worse than those given in official reports. Due to the accident, fishing was completely prohibited in the water area.

Controlled combustion technology was actively used to eliminate the oil spill. The coast and bottom were cleaned using mechanical cleaning methods. The unique nature of the region, the combination of microorganisms, relief and favorable sea currents played into the hands of the rescuers. Despite the fact that the water area was completely cleared only after a year and a half, the delayed Negative consequences disasters still manifest themselves to this day.

The oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico as a result of the Deepwater Horizon accident in 2010 is considered one of the largest man-made disasters, resulting in irreparable damage to the environment.

The Deepwater Horizon ultra-deep drilling platform was built by the shipbuilding company Hundai Industries ( South Korea) commissioned by R&B Falcon (Transocean Ltd.). This platform was launched in 2001, and some time later it was leased to the British oil and gas company British Petroleum (BP). The lease period was extended several times, most recently until the beginning of 2013.

In February 2010, BP began developing the Macondo field in the Gulf of Mexico. A well was drilled at a depth of 1500 meters.

Oil platform explosion

On April 20, 2010, 80 km off the coast of the US state of Louisiana, a fire and explosion occurred on the Deepwater Horizon oil platform. The fire lasted more than 35 hours; firefighting vessels that arrived at the scene of the accident tried unsuccessfully to extinguish it. On April 22, the platform sank in the waters of the Gulf of Mexico.

As a result of the accident, 11 people went missing; searches for them were carried out until April 24, 2010 and did not yield any results. 115 people were evacuated from the platform, including 17 injured. Subsequently, world news agencies reported that two more people died during the liquidation of the consequences of the accident.

Oil spill

From April 20 to September 19, liquidation of the consequences of the accident continued. Meanwhile, according to some experts, about 5,000 barrels of oil entered the water every day. According to other sources, up to 100,000 barrels per day entered the water, as stated by the US Secretary of the Interior in May 2010.

By the end of April, the oil slick reached the mouth of the Mississippi River, and in July 2010, oil was discovered on the beaches of the US state of Texas. In addition, the underwater oil plume stretched 35 km in length at a depth of more than 1,000 meters.

Over 152 days, about 5 million barrels of oil spilled into the waters of the Gulf of Mexico through damaged well pipes. The area of ​​the oil spill was 75 thousand km².

Elimination of consequences

After the Deepwater Horizon sank, efforts were made to seal the well, and later oil spill cleanup efforts began to combat the spread of the oil slick.

Almost immediately after the accident, specialists put plugs on the damaged pipe and began work on installing a steel dome, which was supposed to cover the damaged platform and prevent an oil spill. The first installation attempt was unsuccessful, and on May 13 it was decided to install a smaller dome. The complete oil leak was only discovered on August 4, due to the fact that drilling fluid and cement were pumped into the emergency well. To completely seal the well, two additional relief wells had to be drilled, into which cement was also pumped. Full sealing was announced on September 19, 2010.

To eliminate the consequences, tugs, barges, rescue boats, and BP submarines were raised. They were assisted by ships, aircraft and naval equipment from the US Navy and Air Force. More than 1,000 people took part in the liquidation of the consequences, and about 6,000 US National Guard troops were involved. To limit the area of ​​the oil slick, dispersants (active substances used to settle oil slicks) were sprayed. Booms were also installed to contain the spill area. Mechanical oil collection was used, both with the help of special vessels and manually by volunteers on the US coast. In addition, experts decided to resort to controlled burning of oil spills.

Incident investigation

According to an internal investigation conducted by BP safety officials, the accident was blamed on worker errors, technical faults and design flaws in the oil platform itself. The prepared report stated that rig personnel misinterpreted pressure measurements during a well leak test, causing a stream of hydrocarbons rising from the bottom of the well to fill the drilling platform through a vent. After the explosion, as a result of technical shortcomings of the platform, the anti-reset fuse did not work, which was supposed to automatically plug oil well.

In mid-September 2010, a report by the Bureau of Ocean Resources Management, Regulation and Conservation and the US Coast Guard was published. It contained 35 causes of the accident, with BP identified as the sole culprit in 21 of them. In particular, the main reason cited was the neglect of safety standards to reduce well development costs. In addition, the platform employees did not receive comprehensive information about the work at the well, and as a result, their ignorance was superimposed on other errors, which led to the well-known consequences. In addition, the reasons cited were poor well design that did not provide sufficient barriers to oil and gas, as well as insufficient cementing and changes made to the well development project at the very last moment.

Transocean Ltd, the owners of the oil platform, and Halliburton, which carried out the underwater cementing of the well, were named as partly to blame.

Trial and payment of compensation

The Mexican oil spill trial of the British company BP will begin on February 25, 2013 in New Orleans (USA). In addition to the claims from the federal authorities, the British company was brought claims from American states and municipalities. In accordance with US law, BP will have to pay a fine of 1.1 to 4.3 thousand dollars for each barrel of oil spilled as a result of the accident. In February 2013, it became known that the company managed to negotiate with the American authorities to reduce the amount of penalties by $3.4 billion. The reason for the change in the amount of compensation was the fact that 810 thousand barrels of oil were collected and did not end up in the environment. Thus, the maximum fine is $17.6 billion. The final amount of compensation will depend on the court ruling.

In addition, in the spring of 2012, an agreement was concluded with the plaintiffs’ committee on the amount of compensation: more than 100 thousand American entrepreneurs and individuals will receive more than $7.8 billion in compensation.

Also in November 2012, BP agreed with US authorities to pay fines amounting to $4.5 billion over five years.

Environmental implications

After the accident, one-third of the Gulf of Mexico was closed to fishing, and an almost complete fishing ban was introduced.

1,100 miles of state coastline from Florida to Louisiana were polluted, and dead marine life was constantly found on the shore. In particular, about 600 sea turtles, 100 dolphins, more than 6,000 birds and many other mammals were found dead. As a result of the oil spill, mortality among whales and dolphins increased in subsequent years. According to ecologists, the mortality rate of bottlenose dolphins has increased 50 times.

Tropical coral reefs located in the waters of the Gulf of Mexico also suffered enormous damage.

Oil has even seeped into the waters of coastal reserves and marshes, which play an important role in supporting wildlife and migratory birds.

According to recent studies, today the Gulf of Mexico has almost completely recovered from the damage it suffered. American oceanologists monitored the growth of reef-forming corals, which cannot live in polluted water, and found that the corals reproduce and grow in their usual rhythm. Biologists note a slight increase in average water temperature in the Gulf of Mexico.

Some researchers have expressed concerns about the impact of the oil accident on the climate-forming Gulf Stream. It was suggested that the current cooled by 10 degrees and began to break up into separate undercurrents. Indeed, some weather anomalies (such as severe winter frosts in Europe) have occurred since the oil spill occurred. However, scientists still do not agree on whether the disaster in the Gulf of Mexico is the primary cause of climate change and whether it affected the Gulf Stream.

2010 was a year of major natural and man-made disasters that claimed many tens, hundreds and even thousands of lives. The first and most “bloody harvest” happened at the beginning of the year in an apparently prosperous island state:

Earthquake in Haiti

On January 12, several strong tremors destroyed the capital of Haiti, Port-au-Prince, almost to the ground. Due to the fact that the city was built without regard for the possibility of even weaker earthquakes, more than 200 thousand people died, more than 300 thousand were injured, and about 3 million Haitians were left homeless. But the humanitarian catastrophe did not end there: due to devastation and hunger, an epidemic began in the country. By the end of the year, more than 100 thousand people were infected with cholera, and the number of deaths as a result of the disease numbered many dozen.

Then the calendar brought in April a plane crash unheard of in the history of mankind, when the president and almost the entire military leadership of a fairly large European state found their death in one crashed plane.

Plane crash near Smolensk

On April 10, at 10.41 am Moscow time, the presidential Tu-154 of the Polish Air Force crashed while landing at the Smolensk-Severny airfield. 8 crew members and 88 passengers were killed, including Polish President Lech Kaczynski, his wife, almost the entire high command of the country, a number of famous politicians, religious and public figures. President Kaczynski and his entourage were flying to mourning events dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the execution of Polish officers in the Katyn Forest.

Less than a month passed, and again disaster struck on Russian territory - in the “coal capital” Western Siberia, in the city of Mezhdurechensk, Kemerovo region, an accident occurred in the best, exemplary mine since Soviet times.

Explosions at the Raspadskaya mine

On the night of May 8-9, two explosions occurred at the Raspadskaya mine in Kuzbass, the largest coal mine in Russia. Almost 100 people died - 76 victims were officially confirmed, and another 15 people who were considered missing were declared dead by the Mezhdurechensk court in early December. Rescue and search operations continued until the end of May. Until the end of the year, the investigation was unable to name the causes of the tragedy, but the miners accused the owners of the mine (40% of the shares of the coal company belong to Roman Abramovich’s Evraz Group) of trying to save on safety measures.

In the same April, a real environmental disaster occurred related to oil production in the shelf zone. This method of extracting underground hydrocarbons from under the seabed combines double risks, and therefore poses a double threat - not only for the miners, but also for all living things...

Oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico

On April 20, an explosion occurred on the DeepwaterHorizon drilling platform in the Gulf of Mexico, killing 11 people. And on April 22, the drilling rig, owned by British Petroleum, sank. Oil flowed from a well into the ocean. In the five months it took BP to finally plug the well, nearly 5 million barrels of oil spilled into the Gulf. This leak is recognized as the largest in US history; its negative impact on the ecology of the region will be felt for several decades.

The summer rampage of the fiery element on the territory of the European part of Russia can also be classified as a disaster. The cause of the suffering of tens of thousands of people in numerous disaster zones is said to be not only the apocalyptic heat, but also the actual unpreparedness of many regions for completely predictable weather anomalies.

Summer fires in Russia

Since the beginning of July, due to the unprecedented heat that has settled in the European part of Russia, peat bogs and forests have caught fire. The total area of ​​fires was 8 million hectares. About 150 settlements were completely or partially burned, not counting numerous holiday villages. More than 70 people died in the fire. The suffocating smog hung over Central Russia for more than two months; the death rate in Moscow alone doubled. Doctors say the terrible consequences of a hot and smoky summer will affect all children born in 2010.

Object: DeepWater Horizon oil platform, 80 km off the coast of Louisiana (USA), Gulf of Mexico.

An ultra-deepwater oil drilling platform has been leased by BP to develop the promising Macondo field. The length of the platform reached 112 m, width - 78 m, height - 97.4 m, it went 23 meters under water and had a mass of over 32 thousand tons.

Victims: 13 people, of which 11 died during the fire, another 2 died during the liquidation of the consequences. 17 people received injuries of varying severity.

Causes of the disaster

U major disasters there is no single reason, as confirmed by the explosion of the DeepWater Horizon oil platform. This accident was the result of a whole chain of violations and technical malfunctions. Experts say it was only a matter of time before a platform disaster occurred.

It is interesting that several parallel investigations into the causes of the disaster were carried out, which led to different conclusions. So in the report made by BP, only 6 main causes of the accident are indicated, and the main cause of the accident is named human factor. A more authoritative report made by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Resources Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) and the US Coast Guard already names 35 main reasons, and 21 of them are blamed entirely on BP.

So who is to blame for the DeepWater Horizon explosion and subsequent environmental disaster? The answer is simple - BP, which was chasing profit, and in this pursuit neglected basic safety rules and deep-sea drilling technologies. In particular, the well cementing technology was violated, and the specialists who arrived to analyze the cement were simply kicked out of the drilling site. Important control and safety systems were also disabled, so no one knew what was really going on beneath the ocean floor.

The result was an explosion and fire on the platform, a colossal oil spill and the title of one of the largest environmental disasters in the entire history of civilization.

Chronicle of events

Problems on the platform began almost from the first day of its installation, that is, from the beginning of February 2010. The well was drilled in a hurry, and the reason is simple and banal: the DeepWater Horizon platform was leased by BP, and every day it cost half a million (!) dollars!

However, the real problems began in the early morning of April 20, 2010. The well was drilled, a depth of just over 3,600 meters below the bottom was reached (the depth of the ocean in this place reaches one and a half kilometers), and it remained to complete the work of strengthening the well with cement in order to reliably “lock in” the oil and gas.

This process in a simplified form goes like this. Special cement is fed into the well through the casing, then drilling fluid, which, with its pressure, displaces the cement and forces it to rise up the well. The cement hardens quickly enough and creates a reliable “plug”. And then sea water is pumped into the well, which washes out the drilling fluid and any debris. A large protective device- a preventer, which in the event of an oil and gas leak simply blocks their access to the top.

Since the morning of April 20, cement has been pumped into the well, and by lunchtime the first tests to test the reliability of the cement “plug” have already been carried out. Two specialists flew to the platform to check the quality of cementing. This inspection was supposed to last about 12 hours, but the management, who could not wait any longer, decided to abandon the standard procedure, and at 14.30 the specialists with their equipment left the platform, and soon they began to pump drilling fluid into the well.

Suddenly, at 18.45, the pressure in the drill string increased sharply, reaching 100 atmospheres in a few minutes. This meant that gas was leaking from the well. However, at 19.55 water pumping began, which simply could not be done. In the next hour and a half, water was pumped with varying success, as sudden pressure surges forced work to be interrupted.

Finally, at 21.47 the well can’t hold up, gas rushes up the drill string, and at 21.49 there was a monstrous explosion. After 36 hours, the platform tilted heavily and sank safely to the bottom.

The oil slick has reached the coast of Louisiana. Source: Greenpeace

Consequences of the explosion

An accident on an oil platform has grown into an environmental disaster, the scale of which is simply amazing.

The main cause of environmental disaster is an oil spill. Oil from the damaged well (as well as accompanying gases) continuously flowed for 152 days (until September 19, 2010), and during this time the ocean waters received more than 5 million barrels of oil. This oil caused irreparable damage to the ocean and many coastal areas of the Gulf of Mexico.

In total, almost 1,800 kilometers of coastlines were polluted with oil, white sandy beaches turned into black oil fields, and an oil slick on the surface of the ocean was visible even from space. Oil has caused the death of tens of thousands of marine animals and birds.

The fight against the consequences of oil pollution was carried out by tens of thousands of people. “Black gold” was collected from the surface of the ocean by special vessels (skimmers), and the beaches were cleaned only by hand - modern science cannot offer mechanized means to solve this problem, it is so complex.

The main consequences of the oil spill were eliminated only by November 2011.

The accident had not only environmental, but also enormous (and most negative) economic consequences. Thus, the BP company lost about 22 billion dollars (this includes losses from the loss of a well, payments to victims, and costs to eliminate the consequences of the disaster). But the coastal areas of the Gulf of Mexico suffered even more significant losses. This is due to the collapse of the tourism sector (who will go on vacation to dirty oil beaches?), the ban on fishing and other activities, etc. As a result of the oil spill, tens of thousands of people who had nothing to do with this oil were left without work.

However, the disaster also had completely unexpected consequences. For example, while studying an oil spill, bacteria unknown to science were discovered that feed on oil products! It is now believed that these microorganisms significantly reduced the consequences of the disaster, as they absorbed huge amounts of methane and other gases. It is possible that using these bacteria, scientists will be able to create microorganisms that in the future will help deal with oil spills quickly and cheaply.

Workers clean up the consequences of an oil spill. Port Fourchon, Louisiana. Photo: Greenpeace

Current situation

Currently, no work is being carried out at the site where the DeepWater Horizon platform died. However, the Macondo field, which was developed by BP with the help of a platform, stores too much oil and gas (about 7 million tons), and therefore new platforms will definitely come here in the future. True, the same people will be drilling the bottom - BP employees.